

NAVY
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ADMIRAL TURNER'S SPEECH FILES

8-11 OCTOBER 1973

PACEM IN TERRIS III CONFERENCE; REMARKS
by STANSFIELD TURNER

8 - 11 OCTOBER 1973
WASHINGTON, D.C.

8 - 11 OCTOBER 1973

NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY

Sheraton-Park, Washington, D.C.

- Mr. Hutchins ltr with completed program A
- Mr. Hutchins ltr of 9 May A
- VADM TURNER's outgoing ltrs to Mr. Hutchins and
Sander Vanocur B

A



for the Study of Democratic Institutions / The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

July 23, 1973

Vice-Admiral Stansfield Turner
President
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Dear Admiral Turner:

I enclose a virtually completed program for the Center convocation on NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY to be held at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., October 8-11, 1973. We regard the remarkable response from so many very busy people as heartening evidence of the timeliness and importance of this undertaking.

As you will recall from my original letter, we set a deadline of September 1 for advance texts of major addresses. We will distribute appropriate texts to panelists as soon as they are available. Each panelist is asked to prepare a three to five minute opening response, and if possible, we would like to have these in writing by October 1. This will help insure the widest possible dissemination through the print and broadcast media. Provision will be made to accommodate ad libbed remarks in published material, and our \$500 fee covers these rights.

Your appearance is scheduled for the session on THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY POWER and DETERRENCE BY MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION beginning at 8 p.m. on Tuesday evening, October 9.

The convocation opens with a reception and buffet at the Sheraton-Park on Monday evening, October 8, at 6:30 p.m. You are, of course, invited, and I hope you will be able to attend other sessions of the convocation. The enclosed form will enable us to make the necessary arrangements.

I know you will make a significant contribution to our effort to open up a constructive national dialogue on foreign policy, and I am looking forward to greeting you in Washington.

Sincerely yours,

Robert M. Hutchins
Chairman

Program participants for the convocation on New Opportunities for United States Foreign Policy are requested to fill out appropriate sections of this form and return it to the Center in the enclosed envelope.

ALL SESSIONS WILL BE AT THE SHERATON-PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C., OCTOBER 8-11.

For All Program Participants:

- I (~~will~~) (will not) attend the reception and buffet, 6:30 p.m., Monday, October 8, 1973.
- My spouse (will) (will not) accompany me. I expect to bring () guests.

Please reserve tickets for attendance at the following regular sessions of the convocation. If more than one, indicate number desired.

Monday, October 8

Opening session, 8 p.m. ()

Tuesday, October 9

Morning, 9:30 a.m. () Luncheon, 1 p.m. ()
Afternoon, 2 p.m. () Evening, 8 p.m. ()

Wednesday, October 10

Morning, 9:30 a.m. () Luncheon, 1 p.m. ()
Afternoon, 2 p.m. () Evening, 8 p.m. ()

Thursday, October 11

Morning, 9:30 a.m. () Luncheon, 1 p.m. ()
Afternoon, 2 p.m. ()

For Out-of-Town Program Participants:

- [] Please make hotel reservations (single) (double) at the Sheraton-Park Hotel for arrival on _____ and departure on _____
- [] I will make my own housing arrangements and can be reached at (hotel) _____ or (phone number) _____

NOTE: Arrangements will be made for those staying at the Sheraton-Park to sign hotel bills upon departure. Travel and other expenses may be submitted for reimbursement at the Convocation office at the Sheraton-Park, or submitted later by mail to the Center in Santa Barbara. Details on arrangements may be obtained in Washington from Mrs. Sharon Arnan, Center, 12th Floor, 1156 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. Telephone: (202) 833-1932



for the Study of Democratic Institutions/The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

Pacem in Terris III.

NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

A convocation to be held by the

Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions

October 8-11, 1973

Washington, D.C.

Notes:

1. Those listed on the attached outline have accepted invitations to participate unless marked by (*), which indicates formal acceptance has not been received.
2. These sessions are timed on the assumption that formal speeches ordinarily will not exceed forty minutes. Panel members will be expected to make three to five minute opening responses in rotation, with the remainder of the time available for free exchange. Principal speakers and session chairmen are expected to participate in the panel discussions.
3. All sessions will be open to the press, and extensive television coverage is being arranged.

2. These sessions are timed on the assumption that formal speeches ordinarily will not exceed forty minutes. Panel members will be expected to make three to five minute opening responses in rotation, with the remainder of the time available for free exchange. Principal speakers and session chairmen are expected to participate in the panel discussions.

3. All sessions will be open to the press, and extensive television coverage is being arranged.

MONDAY EVENING, October 8
8:00 to 11:00

PRESIDING: Robert M. Hutchins

I. THE NEW GLOBAL SETTING

(Opening session to be announced)

II. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

A. The view of the Administration

Henry A. Kissinger

B. A Congressional View

J. William Fulbright

(The opening addresses are intended to set forth the current range of agreement and disagreement among those officially charged with responsibility for creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy.)

TUESDAY MORNING, October 9
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: Fred Warner Neal ✓

III. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES (cont'd)

A. An Independent View

1. Stanley Hoffmann ✓
2. Robert Tucker*
3. Richard Barnet ✓

(These addresses are intended to be representative of more detached views among the experts who operate in the academic/intellectual community. The central questions are: How are the national interests of the U.S. currently defined in terms of its international relations? How are they threatened? How can they be defended and advanced?)

*Invitation under consideration

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Frances FitzGerald,
Leslie Gelb, Stanley Karnow*, Hans
Morgenthau, Harvey Wheeler, George F.
Will ✓

TUESDAY AFTERNOON, October 9
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING: Norton Ginsburg ✓

IV. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (cont'd)

A. Relations with Allies

Paul Warnke

B. Relations with Adversaries

Marshall Shulman ✓

C. Relations with Less Developed
Countries

Theodore M. Hesburgh

D. The Special Case of Japan

Edwin O. Reischauer*

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Herschelle Challenor, ✓
Jerome Cohen, John Paton Davies,
Morton Halperin, David Horowitz, ✓
Ronald Steel ✓

*Invitation under consideration

TUESDAY EVENING, October 9, 1973
8:00 to 10:00

PRESIDING: Stanley R. Resor*

V. THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY
POWER

Clark Clifford

(What kind of military establishment is
required to maintain national security
in the new global setting?)

VI. DETERRENCE BY MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Herbert York

(Possible new developments in armaments,
the limitations of arms control, and the
possibilities of disarmament.)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Gloria Emerson, William
Foster, Admiral Gene La Rocque, Jeremy
Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner,
Albert Wohlstetter

WEDNESDAY MORNING, October 10
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: W. Michael Blumenthal* ✓

VII: TRADE AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION

Peter G. Petersen

(The possible replacement of security
by economics as the primary factor in
international relations; credits and
currency; the multinational corporation.)

*Invitation under consideration

VIII: DEVELOPMENT

Kenneth Thompson ✓

(Can we transfer resources and technology from developed to developing countries on terms acceptable to both?)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Frank Church, Richard N. Cooper, Neil Jacoby, Abraham Ribicoff, Walter Surrey, Paul Sweezy ✓

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, October 10
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING: Lord Ritchie-Calder ✓

IX. THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

- A. The Scientific/Technological Challenge to Traditional Concepts of Sovereignty

Alexander King

- B. The Necessity of Common or Shared Resources, including Science and Technology

Gerard Piel

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: George Brown, Jr., Harrison Brown*, Seyon Brown*, Jonas Salk, Louis Sohn, John Wilkinson ✓

*Invitation under consideration

WEDNESDAY EVENING, October 10
8:00 to 11:00

PRESIDING: Bradford Morse✓

X. THE IMPERATIVES OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING
Philip Jessup✓

(The basic questions of sovereignty, nationalism, interdependence, and the role of law.)

XI. THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS

Richard Gardner✓

(Charter revision and/or the creation of new regional or interest groupings to deal with peace-keeping, and the increasing demands upon the specialized agencies.)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Elisabeth Mann Borgese✓
George Bush, Richard Falk✓, Pauline
Frederick✓, Sol Linowitz, Charles Yost✓

THURSDAY MORNING, October 11
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: Rexford G. Tugwell

XII. INTERNAL CHECKS AND BALANCES:
EXECUTIVE vs. CONGRESS

Sam J. Ervin, Jr.

(Divided powers as stultification of policy-making vs. lack of accountability as a force toward authoritarianism.)

PRESIDING: Harry S. Ashmore

XIII. THE ROLE OF THE PARTISAN OPPOSITION

Hubert Humphrey
Eugene McCarthy
George McGovern
Edmund S. Muskie
George Wallace

(Political parties as the focus of interest-centered and ideological pressures on the allocation of priorities. Can politics stop at the water's edge? If possible, is bi-partisan foreign policy desirable? What are the proper limits to the adversary process in a political campaign?)

THURSDAY AFTERNOON, October 11
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING: John Cogley

XIV. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC
FOREIGN POLICY

A. The Establishment and Foreign
Policy

J. Kenneth Galbraith

(Can a self governing people tolerate the concentrated power, self-interest and social pretense inherent in a closed elitist foreign policy process?)

B. The Relationship of Government and
Media

James C. Thomson

(Secrecy, deception, and manipulation of public opinion. The First Amendment issue.)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Alfred Balk, Tom Cronin,
David Halberstam, Richard Holbrooke,
Peter Lisagor, George Reedy

CONCLUSION: Robert M. Hutchins

The
Center



for the Study of Democratic Institutions / The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

May 9, 1973

Vice-Admiral Stansfield Turner
President
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Dear Admiral Turner:

In the belief that we have come to a critical turning point in American foreign policy, the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions is arranging a national convocation to consider the new imperatives that have brought about a fundamental change in the Cold War strategy that determined the state of the world for the last quarter of this century.

I hope you will be willing to take part in Pacem in Terris III: New Opportunities for United States Foreign Policy, to convene in Washington on October 8-11. As in previous convocations under this title in New York and Geneva, we shall consider ideas presented by leading foreign policy experts and practitioners. The Convocation proceeds on the assumption that there is general agreement that the end of the bi-polar power balance that dominated the post-World War II era is in sight. It should not explore old divisions and controversies, but take a prospective look at the new and profoundly different world that has emerged while the great powers were occupied with the aftermath of World War II.

A general outline of the Convocation is attached. We shall present a series of major statements by persons whose experience entitles them to speak with authority on crucial areas of agreement and disagreement about foreign policy. Each of these presentations will be followed by a critique panel of specially qualified experts.

We hope you will consent to serve on the panel addressed to "The National Interest and Military Power" and "Deterrence by Means of Mass Destruction" at the evening session on Tuesday, October 9. Texts of major addresses will be circulated in advance, and each panelist will be expected to respond with a three to five minute initial statement. We would appreciate having these in writing by October 1 so that they may be made available to the other participants.

We can offer an honorarium of \$500, plus expenses, to include publication rights.

Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600160001-9

Sincerely yours,



for the Study of Democratic Institutions / The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

Copy to [unclear] + [unclear] c/ 7/9

Pacem in Terris III

NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

A convocation to be held by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, October 8-11, 1973, Washington, D. C.

WORKING DRAFT, May 9, 1973

Notes:

1. Those listed on the attached outline have been invited to participate. Those who have accepted are designated by asterisks.
2. These sessions are timed on the assumption that formal speeches will not exceed forty minutes. Panel members will be expected to make five minute opening responses in rotation, with the remainder of the time available for free exchange. Wherever practicable principal speakers will be expected to participate in the panel discussions.
3. The ballroom will be set up with tables at all sessions for the convenience of those making notes and to insure a tolerable density of about 1,000 in the invited audience.
4. Lunch will be available in the ballroom for each of the three days for those who buy tickets in advance.
5. No dinner is presently scheduled.
6. All sessions will be open to the press, and extensive television coverage is being arranged.

MONDAY EVENING, October 8
8:00 to 11:00

PRESIDING: Robert M. Hutchins

I. THE NEW GLOBAL SETTING

(Opening session to be announced)

II. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

A. The view of the Administration.

Henry M. Kissinger

B. A Congressional View

*J. William Fulbright

TUESDAY MORNING, October 9
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: *Norton Ginsburg

III. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES (cont'd)

A. An independent view.

1. *Stanley Hoffman
2. *Zbigniew Brzezinski
3. *Richard Barnet

(The opening addresses are intended to set forth the current range of agreement and disagreement among those officially charged with responsibility for creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy. These addresses are intended to be representative of more detached views among the experts who operate in the academic/intellectual community. The central questions are: How are the national interests of the U.S. currently defined in terms of its international relations? How are they threatened? How can they be defended and advanced?)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: *Harvey Wheeler, George F. Will, *Frances Fitzgerald, *Hans Morgenthau, Leslie Gelb

TUESDAY AFTERNOON, October 9
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING: *Fred Warner Neal

IV. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES (cont'd)

A. Relations with *Allies -

*Paul Warnke

B. Relations with Adversaries -

*Marshall Shulman

C. Relations with Less Developed Countries -

Theodore M. Hesburgh

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Herschelle Challenor,
*John Paton Davies, *Ronald Steel,
*David Horowitz, *Morton Halperin, *Jerome
Cohen

TUESDAY EVENING, October 9, 1973
8:00 to 10:00

PRESIDING: Gen. M. B. Ridgway (USA, Ret.)

V. THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY POWER

Clark Clifford

(What kind of military establishment
is required to maintain national
security in the new global setting?)

VI. DETERRENCE BY MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

*Herbert York

(The limitations of arms control, the
possibilities of disarmament, and,
prospectively, possible new develop-
ments in armament.)

*Acceptances

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Albert Wohlstetter,
*Admiral Gene La Rocque, *Jeremy Stone,
Admiral Stansfield Turner, Gloria
Emerson, William Foster

WEDNESDAY MORNING, October 10
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: *Lord Ritchie-Calder

VII. THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

A. The Scientific/Technological
Challenge to Traditional
Concepts of Sovereignty -

*Alexander King

B. The Necessity of Common or Shared
Resources, including Science and
Technology -

*Gerard Piel

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: *Jonas Salk, *John
Wilkinson, *George Brown, Harrison
Brown, Louis Sohn, James Akins

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, October 10
2.00 to 5:00

PRESIDING: William M. Roth

VIII: TRADE AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION

Peter G. Petersen

(The possible replacement of questions
of security by economics as the
primary factor in international
relations; credits and currency;
the multinational corporation.)

*Acceptances

IX. DEVELOPMENT

Kenneth Thompson

(Can we transfer resources and technology from developed to developing countries on terms acceptable to both?)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: *Neil Jacoby, *Richard N. Cooper, *Frank Church, *Abe Ribicoff, Walter Surrey

WEDNESDAY EVENING, October 10
8:00 to 11:00

PRESIDING: *Bradford Morse

X. THE IMPERATIVES OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING

*Philip Jessup

(The basic questions of sovereignty, nationalism, interdependence, and the role of law raised by sovereign nations.)

XI. THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS

*Richard Gardner

(Charter revision and/or the creation of new regional or interest groupings to deal with peace-keeping, and the increasing demands upon the specialized agencies.)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: *Elisabeth Mann Borgese, *Richard Falk, *Pauline Frederick, *Charles Yost, *Sol Linowitz, *George Bush

*Acceptances

THURSDAY MORNING, October 11
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: Earl Warren

XII. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN
POLICY

A. Checks and Balances: Executive
vs. Congress

*Sam Ervin

(Divided powers as stultification of
policy-making vs. lack of account-
ability as a force toward authoritar-
ianism.)

B. Checks and Balances: The Partisan
Role

Barry Goldwater
*Hubert Humphrey
*George McGovern
George Wallace
Nelson Rockefeller
*Eugene McCarthy

(Political parties as the focus of
interest-centered and ideological
pressures on the allocation of
priorities. Can politics stop at
the water's edge? If possible, is
bi-partisan foreign policy desirable?
Are there proper limits to the adversa
process in a political campaign?)

* Acceptances

PRESIDING: *Harry S. Ashmore

XII. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC
FOREIGN POLICY (cont'd)

C. Power, Self-Interest and
Social Pretense - The
Establishment and Foreign
Policy.

*J. Kenneth Galbraith

D. The Relationship of Government and
Media.

*James C. Thomson

(Secrecy, deception, and manipulation
of public opinion. The First Amend-
ment issue.)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: *John Cogley, *David
Halberstam, *George Reedy, *Alfred
Balk, *Peter Lisagor, *Richard Holbrooke

CONCLUSION: *Robert M. Hutchins

(Can a self governing people tolerate
a close elitist foreign policy process?
Can international relations be based on
open covenants, openly arrived at? Is
there a practical balance?)

Proposed PIT III Budget

I. Participants Expenditures			
A. Honoraria and publication rights	\$ 51,000.		
B. Travel	13,350.		
C. Accomodations and Maintenance	<u>12,000.</u>		
	76,350	\$ 76,350.	
II. Arrangements			
A. Meeting facilities	2,000.		
B. Office Exp. and rent	3,750.		
C. Staff	7,000.		
D. Travel	<u>3,500.</u>		
	\$ 16,250.	16,250.	
III.			
A. Consultants and planning meetings	34,500.		
B. Public relations and information	<u>5,400.</u>		
	\$ 39,900.	39,900.	
IV. Supporting Services			
A. Transcription	1,000.		
B. Secretarial (special)	650.		
C. Duplication	<u>1,000.</u>		
sub total	\$ 2,650.	2,650.	
		\$135,150.	
Indirect Expenditures 15% (overhead)	20,272.	<u>20,272.</u>	
Total		\$155,422.	
V. Publication and Distribution			
Audiotape editing and production	24,000.		
	<u>3,000.</u>		
	\$ 27,000.	27,000.	
Grand Total		\$182,422.	

T B

Rev. 1/10/68

Dear Dr. Hutchins,

My thanks for your letter of May 9th and the invitation to serve as a panelist in "Pacem in Terris III: New Opportunities for United States Foreign Policy." I would appreciate the opportunity to join the panel on the evening of October 9th, but with one caveat. As a uniformed military officer, I would prefer not to be the only "establishment" member of the panel. With a fairly balanced group, the discussions should be tremendously stimulating and challenging.

On a new subject, I would like to invite you to come to the Naval War College on November 15-16 to serve as Rapporteur for our annual military-media conference. More than 60 national and regional media representatives are being invited to attend this year's conference to meet and talk candidly with the officers in the student body.

The title for the conference is, "The Military and the Media: Mutual Responsibilities." A general outline of the two-day program, an information brochure on the College and a copy of last year's program are enclosed for your review. We hope the interchange between the media on the one hand, and our students and faculty on the other, will promote an understanding of, and a respect for, the missions and practices of both professions. Past experience indicates a free and candid flow of ideas is possible in our academic environment.

Because of the existing military-media malevolence, we want to make our students (many of whom will be future leaders of the armed forces) aware of the nature of the present relationship and to do what we can to improve that relationship. I think our conference can provide a proper platform for the military and the media to put aside their visceral reactions and engage in approductive and intelligent discussion of their respective professions.

The conference will convene Thursday afternoon at 2 p.m. with opening statements by media representatives on issues involved in the military-media relationship. The dialogue produced by the speeches will then be discussed in a panel

discussion made up of other media guests and will include free interchange with the audience. Following the opening plenary session we will breakup into seminar groups each of about 10-12 students with two media representatives serving as moderators to continue the discussions in greater depth. The format will be duplicated in morning and afternoon segments on Friday concluding with your wrap-up speech and my final comments.

I am aware of your keen interest in the freedom of the press and of the immense importance you place on information flowing creditably and freely to the American public. I have read of your efforts in this regard dating back to 1947 when you headed a Commission on the Freedom of the Press. Your wide professional knowledge of and personal involvement in the general area of press freedom would certainly serve as the appropriate anchor to put our conference in perspective.

We can offer an honorarium of \$500, plus expenses.

I'm sure you will agree that good relations between the military and the media are vital to our country. Our conference aims at eroding the misunderstanding that exists between the two professions and at reestablishing a firm footing characterized by mutual respect. We would be deeply honored if you could arrange to be with us in November and help us work toward that important goal.

With very best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Dr. Robert M. Hutchins
Chairman, The Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions/
The Fund for the Republic, Inc.
P.O. Box 4068
Santa Barbara, California 93102

Enclosures

Written by: CDR White, PAO (003:eh) 1 June 73
bcc: 01, 02, 022, RADM Thompson, Profs. Delaney, Bunting, 003A

SER 1 547

19 JUN 1973

Dear Sandy,

It was a pleasant surprise to meet you in the airport last week. I'm thrilled you plan to be with us for another military-media conference. Although we're still in the early planning stage, it looks like we'll have a bigger and better turnout than last year.

I'm also looking forward to participating in Pacem in Terris III in New York this fall. Thanks for placing my name in the hat. I thought you might like to see my reply to Dr. Hutchins' letter of invitation. As a participant in our first media conference, perhaps you could give it a boost with Dr. Hutchins. We'd very much like to have him as the rapporteur.

In answer to your question about other military officers who you might like to invite to the October conference, I would suggest Brigadier General Bob Gard whose address is: Brigadier General Robert G. Gard, U.S. Army, Director, Human Resources Development, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D.C. 20310

A candidate from the Air Force who I would endorse equally would be: Major General Leslie W. Bray, Jr., U.S. Air Force, Director of Doctrine, Concepts and Objectives, DCS/P&O 4D1083, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301.

A really thought provoking Naval officer who just retired a few months ago who would add a great deal is: Vice Admiral John M. Lee, USN (Ret.), Apt. 704, Bldg. 2, Pt. Brittany, 5108 Brittany Drive South, St. Petersburg, Florida 33715.

Again, I look forward to seeing you in October and November. With very best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Mr. Sander Vanocur
The Center for the Study
of Democratic Institutions
12th Floor
1155 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

Enclosure

Written by: CDR White (003:eh)
19 June 73 bcc: 01, 02, 022, Profs.
Delaney, Bunting, 003A

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

02840

6/14/73

MEMORANDUM FOR 003

While walking down the corridors of National Airport on Wednesday I saw Sandy Vanocur. I hailed him down. He asked me if I had received an invitation to Robert Hutchins's conference next October. I said I had and had accepted. I asked if he had prompted the invitation, and he said he had. I thanked him. He asked if there were other military people whom I thought would do well at that conference, I suggested BGEN Bob Gard.

I then mentioned that I had just written him a letter inviting him to our second Military-Media Conference. When I told him the date he said that he would accept.

Let's drop him a note and tell him that I am delighted that he can come, enclose a copy of the letter to Hutchins and gently urge him to encourage Hutchins to accept.


for STANSFIELD TURNER



for the Study of Democratic Institutions / The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

Memorandum

To: Participants in Pacem in Terris III
From: Harry S. Ashmore
Subject: Publication of Proceedings

Date: January 18, 1974

Mary Harvey

Fred Warner Neal has completed editing of the Pacem in Terris III proceedings and we are preparing for publication. The attached tables of content will indicate the scope and arrangement of the four volumes. A limited edition in hard-back will be published for use by libraries, and paperback editions will be offered for general distribution.

We are not submitting for clearance prepared texts used in whole or extensively excerpted. The attached excerpts are transcribed from the audiotape record or are excerpted out of their original context. Would you please check your own statement and let us know by return mail if you desire changes in the published version?

If the transcript is satisfactory there is no need to reply. If we have no response by February 1, 1974 we will assume approval.

Sander Vanocur has completed editing of five one-hour television programs taken from the 27-hour videotape record of the convocation, and we are now negotiating for showing of these programs on the Public Broadcasting System network and elsewhere. We will let you know when these are definitely scheduled.

Edited audiotape cassette transcription of the program is being completed by Bernard Norris and will be available as a part of the Center's regular audiotape distribution. If you would like to have a set of these for your own use, please let me know.

THE MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Edited by Fred Warner Neal

Volume II of four volumes edited from the proceedings of Pacem in Terris III, a National Convocation to Consider New Opportunities for United States Foreign Policy, convened in Washington, D.C., October 8-11, 1973, by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions

PACEM IN TERRIS III: Volume II

The Military Dimensions of Foreign Policy

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The Special Case of Japan

--Edwin O. Reischauer p.

PART IV A Spectrum of Views on Military Alliances

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Herschelle Challenor, Paul C. Warnke

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mk14

PART II

The Debate on Military Policy:
How Much is Enough? How Mad is MAD?

In the sharp discussion that followed the addresses by Messrs. Clifford and Dr. York, it is significant that no member of the panel opposed reduction in the size of our armaments, although Vice Admiral Turner, President of the Naval War College, insisted it should be mutual, contending that détente depends on a general balance between American and Soviet forces. Mr. Clifford came back with arguments for unilateral restraint, within limits. He was supported by Rear Admiral La Roque, recently retired from active duty, and now heading an independent Institute of defense analysis, who maintains our present balancing policies "serve to escalate and continue the arms race."

Albert Wohlstetter, the University of Chicago disarmament expert, opened the debate with a critique of Dr. York's position on "mutually assured deterrence," which he feels is needlessly dangerous, both militarily and politically, even if the number of nuclear weapons is reduced. Jeremy Stone, expanding Mr. Clifford's attack on the present defense budget, strongly supported the opposing view.

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W. H. H. H.

*former Director of
U.S. Arms Control
& Disarmament
Agency*

(partial nuclear)

~~Ambassador Foster~~, who negotiated the atmospheric test
ban treaty, suggested that the way to cut down on nuclear
weapons is through an agreement limiting missile testing and
prohibiting underground nuclear testing altogether. *Glavin*
Emerson, the panel's pessimist, expressed doubt that the
American people will ever insist on reducing *the U.S.* nuclear stock-
pile.

PART II

Albert Wohlstetter: On the important subject of deterrence^{ce}
the two main speakers agree on relying on assured nuclear
destruction of civilians. I feel called upon to introduce on
~~this particular subject~~ a note of discord and ^{To ask some} questioning.⁵
My questions center mainly on ^{Herbert} ~~Professor~~ York's praiseworthy
effort to make a little saner what he himself has called an
essentially mad strategic doctrine, deterrence by threatening
the mass destruction of a civilian population. However, in
considering whether alternative forms of deterrence entail
a strategic arms spiral, I shall question the received notions
reflected by Mr. Clifford, as well as by ^{Mr.} Professor York as to
the nature and actual history of strategic arms competition.

^{OK with transcript} The received strategic doctrine in the foreign policy
establishments today calls not only for keeping civilians
defenseless on both sides, but for deliberately aiming whatever
strategic forces are available exclusively to kill the
adversary's civilian population. This doctrine of "mutual
assured destruction," ~~which Donald Brannan~~ identified by its
acronym "MAD," has never been officially acknowledged as
policy by either the Soviet or the American governments. Nor
do the forces of either side conform to such a policy. The

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Soviet Union, for example, continues to spend roughly as much on defense of its civilian population as the United States spends on strategic offense and defense. Official statements on both sides insist that, whatever the capabilities for reciprocal mass civilian destruction, in the event of a nuclear war the governments would use their forces against a variety of military targets.

As ^{Mr.} ~~Professor~~ York has pointed out, the increase in accuracy of these weapons, and therefore the ability to reduce unintended destruction, has improved dramatically, and is likely to continue improving on both sides. Systems analysts gave currency to the ghastly and most unassuring phrase, "mutual assured destruction." They stress, however, that this is an accounting device, measuring only how the forces could be used, rather than a reflection of the policy for their actual use in the event of war. The relevance and meaning of such macabre accounting are dubious, and cast doubts on both the doctrines and the forces of the superpowers.

A responsible nuclear policy would move away from, rather than toward the targeting of civilians. The diverse critics of ~~mutual assured destruction~~ ^{MAD} range from the respected Princeton theologian and student of the ethics of war, Paul Ramsey, to the current director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ~~Dr.~~ ^{Dr.} Fred Ikle to ~~Dr.~~ ^{Dr.} Michael May, who, like ~~Professor~~ ^{Herbert} York, accepts one of their most powerful objections,

namely that even if MAD were a persuasive deterrent to a thoroughly rational decision-maker, such rationality is hardly universal. Even if no one "deliberately takes the responsibility for the appalling destruction and sorrow that war would bring in its train," as the Pacem in Terris Encyclical defined it, the conflagration may be set off by some uncontrollable and unexpected chance. In that event, to execute the doctrine would mean an unprecedented mass slaughter of unoffending civilians.

~~Professor~~ ^{jm} York therefore proposed to limit the damage that would be done in such a case by altering not the aiming points but the size of the force aimed, leaving essentially intact the MIRV^{ed} (to use the jargon) missile force, Poseidon and Minute Man III. To these remaining missiles he would limit the yield of each warhead, if I understand him, to twelve-and-a-half kilotons. I presume he would welcome, if not insist, on cutting the Soviet force to the same total of small warheads.

Now I want to stress that I am completely sympathetic with attempts to modify so harsh a doctrine, though I never supported it in the first place. I favor reducing the weight of the explosives that can be launched by strategic forces. I would like to see each side with the same total, and that total much lower than the present U.S. capacity.

However, one must question ~~Professor~~ ^{jm} York's reduced force on these grounds: First, if it is still deliberately

aimed at killing civilians, will the reduction in fact significantly limit the slaughter? Second, would the alternative of aiming such a reduced force at military targets provide a useful deterrent and yet destroy fewer bystanders? As for the first question, even if the 12 and a half kiloton limit were monitorable, and the successful launching of three-quarters of Minute Man III missiles, and less than half the Poseidon capacity, when aimed solely to kill Russian civilians, would promptly destroy nearly 100 million. The delayed effects from fallout would be small only in comparison with this enormous immediate slaughter. In short, simply reducing the force as he proposes, would not accomplish ^{Mr.} Professor York's goal. Even more drastic cuts in the strategic force to a size that still remains reasonably secure against attack in the face of uncertainties or unmonitorable increases, will not make it small enough to keep the slaughter less than catastrophic, so long as the force is aimed exclusively at defenseless population centers.

confirm with York's & Tyke

A nuclear war will in any case be terrible, but if deterrence fails, the alternative to aiming at civilians is to aim at military targets, to limit these targets in number, to choose them in part precisely for their geographical separation from civilian population centers so as to keep the destruction of civilians as low as one can; to select weapons and yields and accuracy with that purpose in mind; and, specifically, to reduce fallout by using weapons with low fusion fractions and

by avoiding surface bursts. Further, the aim^s should be to maintain command and control of nuclear weapons throughout the conflict, to avoid destroying adversary command centers, and to try to bring the war to an end as rapidly as one can, with as much as possible left intact of civil^{ian} society.

This suggests an answer to the second question raised by ~~Professor~~ York's proposal. There are tens of thousands of possible military targets, just as there are at least equal numbers of villages and farms containing civilians ^{which} ~~that~~ could be attacked. But there is no legitimate military need to attack every single military target, not to say every civilian target. The force that ~~Dr.~~ York proposes, given the accuracies that he himself has predicted, could destroy any of several selected military systems, either long-range or general purpose forces and their means of support. This would be felt as an enormous disaster by ^(a given) ~~the~~ political-military leadership, leaving it and the nation naked to its enemies. Why wouldn't the prospect of such a loss be an excellent deterrent? Must we aim to kill noncombatants?

~~Professor~~ ^{Wohlstetter} York is concerned that if we aim at anything other than population centers this would mean more and larger weapons, and so more unintended damage to civilians than would be done deliberately by use of a smaller force. On the face of it, given the concentration of populations and their vulnerability to even a few weapons, this seems implausible. With the

accuracy ~~Professor~~ York and others expect, fewer and smaller weapons than those deployed in the present forces -- which may be agreed to under SALT II -- would do very well for attacking military targets. For one thing, SALT I already limits numbers, and SALT II can add further limits.

The hypothetical "spiral" models, popular in the academy, seem to me quite remote from the realities. For years claims have been repeated, without supporting evidence, that there has been a spiral increase in strategic budgets, in megatonnage, or in the area that could be destroyed by strategic weapons. And it has been argued that this spiral would continue its upward turn unless civilians become the exclusive targets. These claims are simply inconsistent with actual developments.

The United States has always aimed its nuclear arsenal at military targets, and this has not meant an exponential increase in destructive power in the past. In constant dollars, strategic budgets in the mid-1950's were two and a half times what they are now. Strategic defense vehicles, which current arms race theory supposes to be particularly destabilizing, peaked at ^{seven} 7 times what they are now. Offensive vehicles, as ~~Messers~~ Clifford and ~~Professor~~ York observe, have been roughly constant.

Not only has strategic megatonnage climbed drastically, but the geographical area that could be destroyed by the many smaller warheads has been declining for many years, and in 1972

was the same as in 1956. We may reach agreements, and I hope we do, on still lower strategic budgets. But can we justify ^{aiming} our nuclear weapons at civilians simply because they're easy to reach and cheap to kill? Because, so to speak, these non-combatant populations are available in the large, economy size? We should question not only the familiar arguments about budget instabilities occasioned by the arms race, but also the argument that strategic forces aimed exclusively at civilians can provide a stable deterrent, while a force aimed at military targets cannot.

To deter, one needs to possess not only a capability to destroy something that's important to an adversary, but also an ability to convince him that the capability would actually be used in response to the action one wants to deter. One of the many problems with ^(MAD) ~~mutual assured destruction~~, when used as a threat, is that the destruction it promises would, in fact, be mutual and therefore is quite obviously unassured. On the other hand, a policy of attacking military targets that minimizes unintended civilian fatalities would offer incentives for an adversary to reciprocate under similar restraints by attacking military targets, therefore obviating both mass homicide and mass suicide.

In any case, military attacks, even with the proposed reduced force, could scarcely remove the possibility of the urban destruction to which proponents of ^{MAD} ~~mutual assured destruction~~ claim. A responsible deterrent calls for a less reckless, less homicidal and less suicidal response.

One final point concerns detente. The process of constructing common interests and warranted mutual trust among sovereign nations with a long history of divergence is likely to be lengthy and painful. The Pacem in Terris Encyclical had something to say about the disabilities of threats and fears as a way of moving men toward common goals. In the long run, mutual threats to kill innocent populations seem an especially poor way of building a community of interests between the Soviet Union and the United States.

all A from P. 1

William Foster: *Hertford* Dr. York made two important main points. First, deterrence through the threat of mutually assured destruction is a terrible and uncivilized strategy, *that* And high priority must be given to developing something better. It is unworthy of civilized mankind to have to deal in terms of annihilation. The plain fact is that no President of the United States and no leader of the USSR could bring himself to launch such an attack. ~~As quoted by Dr. York, McGeorge Bundy strongly supported that view.~~ Aside from the immediate consequences to the nuclear adversaries, they would have to recognize that *in* these actions would produce millions of casualties outside their own territories. There is no way to contain the inhumane consequences of a nuclear exchange.

all P. 11
 William Foster *was* former Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and former Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Mr. York's second point emphasizes the insane potential magnitude of overkill in ^{the} our nuclear weapons, ^{of both superpowers} ~~and in those of~~ ~~the Soviet Union.~~ Certainly, most experts in nuclear science agree that these excesses exist. ~~Dr.~~ York also provides background on how and why we arrived at where we are, in strategic weapons, and states sound reasons why, with the passage of time, with the changes that have taken place in the global political situation, we should begin to reduce our nuclear inventories and the ⁱⁿ threat, ~~they encompass~~.

There ought to be less burdensome and wiser ways to achieve and maintain stability. It is true that for some time now the MAD concept -- an appropriate acronym -- has led at least to temporary balance among the great powers. However, the only ultimate answer is to alter our defensive attitudes and recognize the crucial fact that we dwell on one spacecraft, and that damage to the craft would be a universal calamity.

Mr. York introduces a suggestion for reducing the over-large inventories of nuclear weapons so as to make possible an eventual elimination of dependence on the ^{MAD} strategy, ~~of~~ ~~Mutual Assured Destruction.~~ Even with his recommended reduction, both sides would still have the capability of threatening destruction at a lower level. But at least the threat might be confined to the cities of the two adversaries, eliminating much of the generalized threat to the rest of mankind, ^{if} the great powers mutually ~~destroyed~~ or removed some of the older,

very powerful, but less efficient devices. ^MDr. York is hopeful that effective containment of the nuclear threat might follow, and be certified.

However, United States attempts back in 1964 to do something of this sort by matching destruction of U.S. B-47s and Soviet TU-16s ran into stubborn resistance. There seems to be a universal tendency to hang onto weapons that may have outlived their initial broad usefulness. We all remember the horse cavalry and how long it survived the advent of the internal combustion engine. In view of that/^{history}I venture another suggestion which might either supplant or supplement Dr. York's idea and, over time, might have a major effect. It is obvious that for a military establishment to be certain its inventory of weapons is ready and effective, it must maintain continuous proof-testing. The testing of nuclear missile delivery vehicles is done in the atmosphere and is readily detectable by the other side. Also, the development of new devices depends on a multitude of tests. My suggestion is that we negotiate a mutual agreement limiting all tests of missiles to a modest number. This would have two effects. First, gradually, weapons and inventory would become less dependable, and second, the ability to deploy new devices would be restricted. I would strengthen the restrictive effect of these aerial proof tests by a comprehensive ~~test~~ ^{underground} ban on nuclear ~~explosions underground~~ ^{Testing}. Our capability to detect such tests from a distance and to distinguish them from earthquakes has, by the

massive expenditure of funds and scientific effort, gradually improved over the years so that the risk of an adversary making tests of significant value without detection is minimal.

Mr. York says that after 30 years not one single nuclear weapon has been destroyed as a result of an agreement to do so. That could lead, he states, to a feeling of utter hopelessness, or to renewed determination to accomplish something at long last. Certainly, the time is ripe for the latter. SALT, if vigorously pressed by our leaders, can make progress in this direction. Our new Secretary of State has, in the past, been deeply engaged in negotiations in the nuclear field, including SALT. With his new formal authority he can, by vigorous participation, give new momentum to United States efforts on that front.

Mr. York's formula, and my own, plus SALT, are all we can perhaps realistically expect in the way of arms control for the time being. Obviously this falls far short of a final answer. That answer, as everyone knows, is to focus the great technology and resources of the world on undertakings that are beneficial to the march of man rather than those that contemplate his destruction.

After many years of grappling with the problem and countless hours in negotiations and in preparation for negotiations, it seems clear that the answer is not in the hands of men but in their hearts. Given what we are given, Mr. York is right. Let us do what we can.

W B from P. 8

Jeremy Stone: What Mr. Clifford's excellent paper says is that whether the strategic planning of the country was done by civilians, or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or by Joseph Alsop, the history of the last 25 years suggest^s that the planning, and the reasoning behind it, ought to be taken with a very large grain of SALT. (That's one bad joke made at the expense of the experts.) I would like to offer one other. It concerns a man at a dinner party who turned to the woman next to him and said, "Mrs. Post?" She replied, "Yes." "Mrs. Emily Post?" Again she said "Yes." He said, "well, you're eating my salad." Now, I put it to you, our problem begins with the fact that the Defense Department is eating our salad, and has been doing so for the last 25 years, and has gotten into the habit. Our job now is to avoid making the same mistakes that we made in the last quarter^{of a} century.

Our chance to avoid these mistakes is much improved by the current economic crisis. Twenty years ago one eminent critic of defense spending, President Eisenhower, was already claiming that the Pentagon's budget would bankrupt America, but he was widely advised to study Keynes. Today the dollar is badly devalued, and there are fears expressed about the over-~~hand~~^{hang} of dollars around the world. Sometimes we even refuse payment for those dollars when we only have enough soybeans for ourselves.

Jeremy Stone is director, the Federation of American Scientists

It is clear that President Eisenhower threw away an argument which looks a lot better now than it did then. Ten years ago, defenders of defense spending changed this subject to emphasize domestic security, but even those who took them seriously were entitled to ask whether there wasn't a difference in emphasis, and in cost, between Chicago insurrection^s and nuclear war. Today, even the Arms^{el} Services Committee wonders whether manpower and rising weapons costs have priced the military out of the market.

Our country is now in the budgetary position other countries have been in for most of thier existence. We have to realistically consider civilian^(vs.) military priorities. As long as the economic spiral was assumed to be permanently upward, objections on the basis of cost could be dismissed as slogan opposition to the military. Now, those who oppose such expenditures command the country's attention.

What is still missing is^{is} analysis of the calculus of priorities of[^] exactly what it meant over the last two decades when we depleted the civilian sector and withdrew from the civilian economy resources that might have increased productivity. Some facts are self-evident. The United States is now last in the rate of growth of industrial productivity among all the OECD countries ~~that is, in effect, throughout~~ the industrialized world. Even Great Britain, the founder of the industrial revolution, and the first inheritor of its tribulations, has a higher rate of growth of industrial productivity

the U.S.
 than ~~we~~ do. The inflationary effect of protracted deficits occasioned by the Vietnam war -- or at least by the political decision to disguise its costs -- are now translated into the costs of failing to heal social ills.

Mr.
~~Secretary~~ Clifford's observation that the military establishment hasn't changed its mind, even though the situation *has* changed, is a warning not to take geopolitical and military planning too seriously. We've seen two wars mishandled. Alleged "missile gaps," have revealed our compulsive response to politically-motivated misinformation. In our political system, with all of its benefits, the two-party system polarizes and exacerbates this debate. And except for this Administration, which called into question its own strategic efforts, every other Administration throughout the Cold War was attacked by the "outs" for being too soft and was forced to defend the adequacy of its strategic stance. Our system reduces the concern over our national security to the question of whether we are spending enough.

It's
 Even the Defense Department can fall into this trap now that ~~Defense~~ Budget is not going to go up in constant dollars. No administration can be expected to be more favorable to defense spending than the current incumbents. So if the current administration is having trouble finding the money for a B-1 bomber, and for all the rest of those Pentagon priority items, it seems to me that the Defense Department is going to have to recognize that, although they can put on a big scare campaign

to ramrod these systems through Congress, they can't, in the long-run, pay for them without a squeeze that will push out of the budget all kinds of things which, in retrospect, they'll find they really preferred.

This year the Pentagon came on with a hard-hitting, and, I would say, a very unscrupulous public relations campaign. The spokesmen sounded as though the Russians were marching on Capitol Hill, and surprisingly enough, this still works. Even though the White House is snuggled down with the Kremlin. It reminds me of that cartoon in which two crows are looking down at a scarecrow in a cornfield and one says to the other, "I know it's a scarecrow, but it still scares the hell out of me!"

I think we may have seen everything now; ad hoc explanations for strategic systems, weapons systems in search of missions, scare stories timed to the spring appropriations season, and finally, the Pentagon switched ⁱⁿ from a two-and-a-half war strategy to a one-and-a-half war strategy without any significant change in the infrastructure required to keep the war machine going.

As for Herbert York's paper, I'm very sympathetic with his proposal for throwing away the large strategic weapons on each side. ^{their removal} ~~They're the ones which~~, as he pointed out, would ^{eliminate} ~~remove~~ much of the threat of fallout on each side, and on the bystanding civilians. These large land-based missiles are also the most provocative, ^{the} and most destabilizing, and the most vulnerable ⁱⁿ in terms of the international standoff -- which is another

good reason for throwing them away. Unfortunately, the case isn't good enough to persuade either government without saying something more. Because, as Herbert York advanced the case, it is based on humanitarian considerations ~~reducing overkill~~ ^{considerations} and these things are not going to motivate governments which have already persuaded themselves to spend money to improve the prospects of overkill.

I would like to try one additional argument: It isn't very expensive to maintain ~~a~~ nuclear weapons system^s, so we can't argue we would save a lot of money by throwing them away. But it is very expensive to modernize such systems and to keep improving them. We have abundant evidence in our own country, and in the Soviet Union, that neither superpower can resist the impulse to keep modernizing what it has. I suggest that the best argument for containing, and ultimately eliminating these systems, and for reducing the size of our strategic force, is that you can't modernize what you don't have.

I think it's very important to recognize that even if you threw away those weapons, as both ^{Mr.} ~~Dr.~~ Wohlstetter and ^{Mr.} ~~Dr.~~ York agreed in principle should be done, you don't do more than reduce overkill. The weapons are still there in large enough numbers to kill almost everyone who might be killed with them. We have to ask ourselves whether or not we've given enough attention to preventing the use of those weapons. There are still things to be done in that area.

Of the five nuclear powers, only one -- the People's Republic of China -- has formally declared that it would never be the first to use the doomsday weapons. The United States has never said ~~we~~ ^{it} would not be the first to use nuclear weapons; in fact, our stated policy is quite the opposite. We've openly threatened to use them first if necessary.)

(It seems to me we should move away from this policy as rapidly as possible. ~~As~~ ^{As} a first step I suggest the following:

(In the Congress there is a widely-supported movement to place restrictions on the President's war powers, proper restrictions in my view, which would require him to consult with Congress before exercising his authority as commander-in-chief. Surely such limitations begin with the authority to use the nuclear-striking capacity, for this is to turn conventional warfare into an entirely different thing. It is like starting a new war. No president would have to be in a hurry in responding with nuclear weapons to a conventional attack. If it is to continue to be our policy to deter our presumed adversaries with our capacity to launch ^a nuclear holocaust, whether as a second or first strike, it is fair to ask whether we have ever had a president, not excluding George Washington, ^{to whom} we would entrust ~~with~~ such responsibility. No one man should have the right and authority to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Perhaps it is necessary to give the president the right to retaliate against a nuclear attack with nuclear weapons. I think so.

But is it necessary to give him the right to use nuclear weapons first? I think not.

We are the greatest power in the world, and nuclear weapons are the great equalizer. It seems to me our security would be badly undermined if the idea got around that nuclear weapons were usable. We have a (25)-year precedent against the use of these nuclear weapons, and I think we should cherish it. We should seek to persuade people that nuclear weapons are in a category like biological weapons, something that should not be used first by anyone, something it would be criminal to use. I think by adopting this policy we could at least persuade our military forces to plan on the assumption -- which they do not now, I think, accept -- that they will not be permitted to use these nuclear weapons except as a very, very last resort.

Dr. Wohlstetter discusses a very important and very current problem, but it is one we can think about too much and reach conclusions which, in my opinion, offend common sense. At the present time we have a very large number of nuclear weapons. There will soon be *ten* thousand warheads. There are only 50 large cities in the Soviet Union. We obviously have more than enough weapons for aiming at all their cities. So we could aim the rest at some of their military targets. We don't put too much emphasis on this because we couldn't destroy all of their military targets anyway since now they have *nuclear* ballistic missile-firing submarines *be* underneath the oceans. These can't be targeted; *and* they can't be hit. How much effort,

under these circumstances, should be spent in trying to maintain the capability to attack their military targets? I say not much. Some say, well, it's another option to use instead of attacking their cities. But we have this option now. If you'd like to fire a few missiles off at some of their dams or some of their military targets, you can do that now. What's really under discussion is whether we should take these ten thousand warheads which are now being planned and ^{give them} ~~put high~~ accuracy on them, sufficiently high accuracy so they could threaten to destroy at once at least everything we could see, even if not the submarines that we can't see.

While this won't improve our strategic situation one iota, since Moscow maintains the ability to destroy us with submarines, it will be sufficient to unnerve and offend the Russians and persuade them to build further land-based missiles. We can know this for a fact from introspection because in the last strategic debate, where it was argued that we needed the ABM to protect our land-based missiles, ^{former defense} ~~Secretary~~ ^{Milburn} Laird said, "Yes, they're trying to get a first strike against us because they're trying to get the ability to destroy our land-based missiles. ^{"When asked"} ~~We said~~ what kind of a first strike is this, since they can't hit our submarines. Laird said, "Look, it is only a first strike." So what is being talked about ~~enclosed~~ as if it were a humanitarian doctrine of avoiding attacking their cities and preserving another option is nothing of the kind. No one is proposing in any way shape or form that we should put aside

or downgrade or in any way remove the ability we have to destroy Soviet cities. It is simply a new form of argument for something which Secretary MacNamara a decade ago said was impossible and not worth pursuing. A counterforce strategy of being able to attack everything you can see in your sights, that is, all the Soviet land-based missiles. So I think it's something that should be roundly opposed and not in any way misunderstood ~~with those humanitarian instincts, we should have about attacks on cities.~~ The solution to attacks on cities is not to fire the weapons and, in the long run, to get rid of them.

add C from P. 12

Gloria Emerson: We have no national memory, We forget everything. We do not remember Hiroshima, and evidently we cannot even remember the murderous bombing of North Vietnam last December and the unimaginable destruction of Cambodia. I say this because here ~~at this convocation~~ most of the audience rose to applaud Henry Kissinger, the man who symbolizes to me the murder of Indochina and our criminal tendencies when we wish to punish other countries for not obeying us. It was a sickening moment for me, and it reminded me of the great and terrible moral disgrace I felt being an American during two years in Vietnam.

We are a curious people, we are a movie audience. Let us be wiser about ourselves and who we are and what we are willing

is a at the
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to do and what we want. There is no possibility at all of reducing the nuclear weapons we already possess. It would be quite hopeless to say that this will happen. If we do not see our limits now, we never will. I suspect most Americans want us to have a huge stockpile, for they see these weapons, if they think about them at all, as being against other people, to be used against other people who do not conform with what we wish them to be.

Regarding Vietnam, they used to say, win the war or get out. Winning, of course, meant destroying Vietnam.)

It is my impression that nuclear weapons are not a major deterrent. It is also my impression that had we used nuclear weapons against North Vietnam the five surviving people would have formed a squad and continued the war. As a nation we cannot imagine any country doing to us what we did for so long to the Indochinese. Since we permitted this to be done, do we really have the optimism here to talk about diminishing our stockpile of nuclear weapons? That is an optimism so insane I can barely stand to think about it. We will never become sufficiently disturbed and persistent enough to see our nuclear weapons diminished because we do not really want to expend the effort. We will neither struggle nor sacrifice nor devote 10, 20, 30 years to something. We will just go on talking to each other in our pleasant, wellbred little voices, no scenes, please, no shouting, good manners above all.

A nation which makes Henry Kissinger its superstar is not a nation able to appraise itself, let alone effect the very huge and radical changes which are needed in our society. Vietnam ~~is~~ ^{was} not an isolated catastrophe. It was not a series of well-meaning mistakes. It was the natural result of the shortcomings of our society and the arrogance on which we have nourished ourselves for a very long time. Mr. Clifford's address saddened me. At one time I considered him an heroic figure and was indeed grateful to him for his policy on the Vietnam war. He feels the war is over. He says we are no longer involved in the Indochina war. How is it possible anyone in this room could believe this? We have pulled out American troops because their presence there was an embarrassment to the Administration, not for humanitarian reasons. We have stopped bombing because we had to, but we continue to make the war possible in Vietnam. We choose to forget this. We provide assistance and money to what is a ruthless police state. We give two and a half billion dollars for the fiscal year of '74. There are five thousand Americans in Vietnam, and they are not there for their health. There are 100,000 political prisoners in their jails, and many of them probably were put in jail because of the Phoenix program which the Central Intelligence Agency thought up in 1968. The war is not over. There is still blood on our hands.

add D from P. 20

Gene R. La Roque: As a military man I find I am not as militant nor as bright and clever or as dedicated as Gloria Emerson, whom I sincerely support, ~~however~~. I also support strongly the statements made by ~~Mr.~~ ^{pers.} Clifford and ~~Dr.~~ ^{U.S.S.R.} York, as well as the explanation by my good friend Jeremy Stone. Anyone who for the past 20 years has had any knowledge of U.S. and ~~Soviet Union~~ military affairs knows ~~damn~~ ^{full} well that we've been way out ahead of the Soviets in the development of every major weapons systems. You name it. The atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, the nuclear-powered submarines, the ~~sea-based~~ ^{submarine} missiles, the ICBMs, ~~the~~ ^{ant} MIRVs ~~which~~ the Soviets are just getting. We've been way out ahead. The trend and our position, as far as the Soviets are concerned, in conventional forces is the same thing. We've been years ahead of them. The Warsaw Pact, let's not forget, was formed five years after we formed NATO and ~~after we~~ had ringed the Soviet Union with missiles and other weapons. Only now, after 30 years ~~of~~ ^{of} dominance on the sea, are the Soviets building two tiny little aircraft carriers.

We've been overwhelmingly dominant in military power, and it has been quite natural for the Soviets to try to catch up. If I were a ~~military~~ ^{Soviet} planner and I saw what the United States was developing, I would be pushing my bosses, year in and year out, to make some movement to increase ~~our~~ ^{my} forces. The thrust of what I'm saying here tonight is this: We have some influence

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on our government, very little on the Soviet government, and we ought to look at the facts as they are and see what we've done and where we are vis-a-vis the Russians. If we're going to make any change, people like those at the Pacem in Terris III Convocation are the people who can do it, with our own government.

Let me just give you some more figures. Everybody here has talked about nuclear weapons. Let me give you some comparisons, comparisons that Senator Symington dragged out of the Pentagon. Just two years ago, the Soviets had 2300 nuclear weapons to shoot at us; we had 4700 to shoot at them. Today the Soviets have 2300, they have increased by 200. Today we have 7100 to shoot at them. These are Pentagon figures.

If we go ahead with the Triton submarine ^{dent} and the B-1 bomber in the early ^{eighties} ~~80s~~ we're going to have ~~18 thousand~~ ^{15,000} nuclear weapons to shoot at the Soviet Union, which is just totally insane. Somehow, we, the strongest nation in the world, have been made fearful of nations which do not deserve this fear. We've been ~~sort of~~ chasing our own shadow in the arms race. Just one more weapon, one more force, and we'll be secure. ~~But~~ I think right now the time has come to tell it like it is.

Every admiral, every general knows that in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union there is no defense. There is no system, no amount of money, which can defend the United States against

a missile attack. The American government, the Soviet government, the American military and the Soviet military, all recognize that, and they have, as a matter of fact, made it the primary statement and position of their governments. In the SALT talks, which took place in Moscow in May of 1972, both ^{Salt} of us agreed to be vulnerable to each other's missile attacks. The President didn't like to sign that agreement, but he admitted that there was no way to defend the United States against a missile attack. You would have thought that having agreed that we're not even going to try to defend the United States against a missile attack, and that the Soviets are not going to try to defend themselves, that there would be some sort of arbitrary limitation on our offensive weapons. But that's not the case. We continue to build more and more.

The important thing is to recognize that we ought to stay within the limits of an adequate military defense of the United States. As Senator Symington and Congressman ^{Aspen} have so eloquently said, so many times, we need to stop this extravagant spending for military forces we do not need and which only serve to accelerate and continue the arms race.

all E from P 23

Stansfield Turner: From the Convocation audience and its responses, I have received the message that you would like to see a smaller ~~United States~~ military establishment. This message

of The U.S. Navy
The
Stansfield Turner ^{is} Vice-Admiral ^{USN} and President ^{of} Naval War College.

is, of course, not new to us in uniform, but it is one which we must take seriously and studiously. Another message or signal, which does not come through as clearly to me, however, is just what purposes you would want your military establishment to be capable of serving. Defining what the military should not do or what weapons they should not have really does not provide adequate guidance to carry out your mandates.

There seemed^s to me to be unresolved issues here as to the criteria that we should establish for selecting military forces, and as to the degree of burden which carrying those forces imposes on our economy. For instance, ^MMr. York has made a very constructive suggestion for reducing nuclear weapons, based on the criteria of minimizing collateral damage to innocent bystanders if nuclear war should occur. I support that suggestion. However, I would suggest that our primary objective, above all others, is to prevent nuclear war from ever occurring. I would welcome a discussion as to what effect ^MMr. York's proposed reduction of nuclear forces might have on that primary objective. There is more to this than the issue of the numbers of missiles or the numbers of warheads. The problem is compounded first by technical issues of warhead yields, of accuracy, of throw weight and of survivability. But, even more important, it is also compounded by the perceptions which are feared by ourselves, our allies, the uncommitted nations, and our potential antagonists. And I have heard very little here about the impact of perceptions of military power.

In my view, a key factor in the present détente policy is a perceived balance of strategic nuclear power between ourselves and the Soviet Union. If either of us today felt vulnerable to the other, détente would simply be out of the question. So the test to me of any steps to reduce strategic nuclear forces should be whether it promotes equilibrium and mutual confidence. For this reason, although I support the intent of Mr. York's proposal, I feel that the practical method is ^{to} proceed step by step, in a series of negotiations to limit strategic nuclear weapons on both sides.

We need equilibrium or balance also in the area of conventional forces if détente is to remain a reality. Therefore, I believe that the central criteria for shaping and sizing our non-nuclear forces must be the resultant state of balance with those forces of the Soviet Union. Mr. Clifford does not appear to agree with this, but I raise this cardinal issue in the hope of providing our dialogue a focal point of logic. I am concerned with our strength relative to the Soviets' because I find few instances in history when a major nation which possessed a marked military advantage over another one voluntarily forsook that advantage. This applies, I would suggest, even to the nation I consider the most magnanimous in the history of the world, a nation that, when it possessed a monopoly of nuclear weapons, pressed a policy of containment, not détente. Hence, I cannot accept Mr. Clifford's plea for

further force reductions on our part based solely on considerations on our side of the equation.

Now, don't misinterpret me. Acknowledging the importance of considering military balance does not necessarily lead to larger U.S. military forces. The Soviets may be very foolish in what they are doing with their military buildup. The Soviets may be benign. They may just be waiting for a signal from us to do the same. Or ^{perhaps} ~~maybe~~ it is not improvident for us to allow an imbalance of some sort. I personally do not subscribe to these views. But I do suggest that it is not meaningful for us to talk about a ^{\$}69 billion ~~dollar~~ defense budget without being explicit as to the impact that that would have on the military balance. If it would appear that ^{it} ~~that~~ would result in a balance markedly unfavorable to us, it could well lead the Soviets away from detente. Advocates of detente, then, should be those who are most anxious to consider this point.

Finally, and again for the purpose of focusing our dialogue, I would like to set a few basic facts straight. No matter how you manipulate the statistics, there is no way that you can prove that our defense budget is increasing in purchasing power, or that it is distorting the economy of the United States. It is unfair and inaccurate to cite military spending as the ^{primary} cause of inflation or a shortage of funds for other purposes. The facts are that defense expenditures have increased only ^{\$1} ~~one~~ billion ~~dollars~~ in current dollars since 1968, while total federal budget expenditures have increased

~~A~~ 90 billion ~~dollars~~. ~~Defense does not share the burden of~~
 inflation. Mr. Clifford states that the purchasing power of
 this year's non-Vietnam budget is higher than last year's.
 And he pointed out that this comparison was based on an assump-
 tion that the Congress will pass the full request asked for by
 the President this year, which of course it almost never does.
 But even beyond that questionable assumption, there are two
^{Other Things} ~~new charges~~ that we must levy against ^{the military} ~~our~~ budget and which
 produce no defense power. The first is a promissory note in
 the form of military retirement benefits which is coming due.
 This is ^a ~~the~~ cost of past wars. It takes about ^{\$4} ~~four~~ billion
~~dollars~~ of today's defense budget. The second is that an
 artificial subsidy to the defense budget, or a free good, in
 the form of the draft has been removed. This has added about
~~\$~~ 3 billion ~~dollars~~, to ^{the} ~~our~~ budget.

With this budget situation, the hard facts are that
 our ^{force} ~~fore~~structure is going down. You simply cannot obscure a
 drop from pre-Vietnam levels of 47% of the Navy's ships and ^{SP-1}
20% of its aircraft, or 20% of the Army divisions or 17% of the
 manpower of all of the services, ^{for instance} ~~just for instance~~. I'm not
 arguing for the moment that our forces should necessarily be
 larger. But ^{am} ~~I'm~~ simply pointing out that there has been a
 very real decline in our military force levels over the past
 five to eight years. And, in contrast, the Brookings Institu-
 tion states that Soviet expenditures on defense in real

purchasing power have increased at the rate of at least 5% a year for the last 14 years. *Spec 1 on 11*

All this is not to say that force reductions are not possible, either on our side, or on the Soviets', or by mutual action. I am only concerned that, if military balance has been one factor opening the door to detente, we may want to proceed cautiously before upsetting that balance. We do not want to engage ~~in the American tradition of overreaction, to a~~ war. *2*

We all want to place more emphasis on improving our environment, raising our standards of living, preventing crime in the streets, and generally enhancing the quality of American life. But we would be ill-advised to delude ourselves into hoping that a slice of the defense budget can solve all of these problems of a ^{\$}1.3 trillion dollar economy. Nor, in conclusion, do we want to judge our military strength on whether or not we believe we are wise enough to employ it properly. We are a rational people with all the capability that we need to shape our destiny through positive choices, not negative ones. This Convocation of private citizens is evidence of that, and it should help us to make the difficult choices which lie ahead in a positive manner.

Add F from P. 25

Clark Clifford: The statements of members of the panel are very valuable. They have enlightened the program, and have

brought home illustrations that I think you will remember.)

I value Miss Emerson's ~~commendation with~~ reference to our joint efforts on Vietnam. I am sorry she finds some sense of disappointment in my position this evening. I think it is explainable because I was not asked to speak on Vietnam, although I would certainly have been prepared to. I was asked to speak on the Defense Budget. And therefore, in commenting upon one reason why we should cut our expenses, one reason was ^{that} we had actually withdrawn American troops from South Vietnam. I did not suggest that we had concluded our activities in Indochina. The fact is, ^{as I said} ~~one statement I made~~ in my prepared address, ² was that, as our tragic intervention in Indochina draws too slowly to a halt, we still have 50, ^{two} thousand troops in Thailand and are still sending arms and funds to South Vietnam. I would like to withdraw our troops from South Vietnam, whatever capacity they are in. I would like to get our troops out of Southeast Asia. I think we've learned a lesson, and we do not need to keep any troops there at all.

I think that Admiral Turner stated his position admirably well. I'm only grateful that Admiral Turner chose the Navy instead of being a competitor at the bar. But when ^{he} talks about our relative strength compared to that of the Soviet Union, I find ^{it} ~~this~~ a salacious comparison. If the Russians choose to have a standing army of four or five million men, it

is suggested in some quarters that we should have an army of four or five million men. I think that is an erroneous concept. I get back to the statement that what we must do is protect the United States. ~~That's~~ ^{That's} our first obligation. And, second, we must be prepared to help defend those nations whose survival and security are a question of importance to the United States. We are doing that.

We have erred in the past. We erred when we went into Vietnam because we thought that the result of the war in Vietnam ~~had~~ ^{would have} an impact either upon our national security or upon our national welfare. That was a tragic and lamentable error on our part. I think we've learned from it. I do not believe that we should be prepared militarily to go into every area of the world where there is trouble. At one stage, I think, we felt we should do that. I've ~~changed~~ ^{changed} certainly my notions in that regard, and I hope that persons in high places today have changed in that regard also.

We ~~hear a lot of times~~ ^{frequently} about having bargaining chips when we sit down with the Soviets. I have grave difficulty with that concept. When we say to the Russians, we are now going to build the Trident submarine, ~~and they cost a billion three apiece, and~~ ^{that, each vessel of which} ~~we're going to build the B-1 bomber, and we are going to build the F-14 Navy carrier-based plane,~~ ^{\$1.3 billion} those are supposed to be bargaining chips. They are supposed to persuade the Soviet Union that they should make some agreement with us. What I

think ^{this} ~~that~~ does is to lead the Soviet Union to build bigger submarines and bigger bombers and bigger ~~Navy~~ fighters. I believe we would do well to say to the Soviets, ~~now, here is something we're going to do.~~ "We are not going to build ~~a~~ new, ~~longer-range~~ ^{big} submarines. You know, We've never tried that, and it would be interesting to see the result. It's entirely possible that if we said, "Mr. ~~Kosygin~~ ^{Brezhnev}, we're not going to build ~~a~~ new sub-~~marine~~ ^{weapons}, his face might light up, and he might put out his hand and say, "if you don't, then we won't." And I think it's worth a try.

~~I shall not respond at length about the relationship between defense expenditures and inflation.~~ Regarding the relationship between inflation and defense expenditures, I would only point out that we spent ~~a hundred and thirty billion dollars~~ ^{\$130} on the war in Vietnam, and I suggest to you that we should not have spent any part of that. Now, even though the war is over, even though we have detente with China, even though we have a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union, our expenditures, ^{\$3.5} according to the Navy and the defense figures, are ~~three and a half~~ ^{3.5} billion over last year. They go up another ~~four~~ ⁴ billion next year. I think that every saving that we can make in defense expenditures will reduce the deficit that we have, and by reducing the deficit we will become economically sound again. If we could ^{U.S.} one year balance the ^{U.S.} budget ~~in the United States~~ I believe the international attitude toward our dollar would change overnight.

With regard to Professor Wohlstetter's comments, it sounds good to say we will aim exclusively at military targets, but I believe it generally does result in more weapons and therefore more deaths, more potential deaths. The only way to reduce the danger to us is to reduce the number of weapons the Russians possess and vice versa. I don't think that administrative arrangements about targeting will produce the desired result.

Also, my suggested reduction was not meant to be to a level which we would then permanently maintain. It was meant to be a substantial step for once in the right direction. The long-range goal, as I said, remains to get rid of the deterrence doctrine and also the nuclear weapons that back it up, and not just to change or to claim to change their targets. I take seriously the various statements of Presidents and party chairmen and kings about the nuclear disarmament. I'm sure that those men were always sincere when they made them, but I think we should use their statements and hold their feet to the fire all the same.

Admiral Turner has said that one should consider what would be the effect of something, such as my suggestion on the probability of nuclear war. I agree that's a good question; it's not something that I'm prepared to answer right now. But I would only repeat what I just said, that it is meant to be a step towards a situation in which there aren't any nuclear weapons, and under those circumstances there can't be any

nuclear war, no matter what other kinds of mistakes people may make.

One last comment: Gloria Emerson is probably right ~~at~~ least the odds are on her side ~~when~~ ^{either side} she said it was probably hopeless to get ~~us~~ ^{nuclear} to reduce the number of weapons ~~we have, and~~ ~~them also.~~ But I think that even with the odds being on her side, we simply have to keep trying, especially ~~we~~ ^{those of us} who were so involved in getting us in this situation in the first place. She may be right, but I'm going to keep trying to get the number down.

Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 8 Oct 1973

Dr. York and Mr. Clifford have clearly identified the fact that the usefulness of military forces and the situations in which they are appropriate are quite different today than a decade ago. There are many complex reasons for this. Some reasons such as the achievement of nuclear balance by the Soviets, are almost certainly permanent. Others such as the current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic and economic purposes may change tomorrow.

The essential ingredient of today's detente is the military balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or conquest. The primary role of our military forces today is to preserve that strategic balance so that detente can flourish. This balance is a dynamic matter. This means that we must continuously adapt the size and shape of our military forces and how we employ them to meet the demands of balance.

In doing this we must first achieve equilibrium of strategic nuclear forces. SALT I was an attempt to dampen strategic arms competition, but I do not believe we and the Soviets have yet reached a state of sufficient trust and confidence necessary to achieve an assuring balance. Dr. York may be correct then. Today there is already substantial overkill capacity on both sides. Yet, what he calls overkill or

overinsurance may be the only practical substitute for mutual trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers on the triggers of nuclear holocaust it may not be all bad. The primary virtue in reducing overkill, Dr. York contends, is in reducing the effects on innocent bystanders if a nuclear exchange should occur. It seems to me, though, that our primary concern should be to ensure that no such exchange ever occurs.

We must search for a new strategy for world security which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war. For instance, perhaps deliberate efforts to translate some of our investment in nuclear weapons into joint economic adventures within each other's territory could eventually put self interest above fear as the stabilizing factor in super power relations.

In the interim, our approach to strategic nuclear balance should be a positive one of searching for steps that will promote equilibrium and confidence. The result, hopefully will be a smaller and less costly force, but its composition may be somewhat different from what we have today and additional investment expenditure may be required to attain it. In short much as we may wish to adopt a force-cutting strategy it may be incompatible with the requirements to achieve and sustain a nuclear equilibrium in a dynamic multi-polar world.

Just as balance is necessary in nuclear weaponry, so it is in (what we label as) general purpose forces. As enunciated in the Nixon Doctrine, we must rely on our principal allies for assistance in maintaining enough warfighting capability to deter aggression. It is, however, the U.S. military contribution to this common objective which provides the essential linkage to our nuclear power. Without that, our allies would be subject to nuclear blackmail. This does not mean that we must maintain a capability for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining defense budget simply does not permit us to do that in any event. The defense budget of \$79 billion in outlays being considered by the Congress today is well below pre-Vietnam figures in purchasing power. In fact President Nixon's FY 1974 National Defense Budget is the lowest in real terms since FY 1951. There are three fundamental factors which push the size of the defense budget upward in terms of current dollars, but which have no effect on the actual defense we are purchasing. These are:

- First, a promisory note in the form of military retirement benefits is coming due. This is a cost of past wars. It makes today's budget of \$5 billion higher than that of a decade ago.

- Second, an artificial subsidy to the defense budget in the form of the draft has been removed. This has added several billions to the defense budget in FY 1974.
- Third, the Defense Department suffers from the same general inflation which affects us all. This has been over 64 percent since 1964. This amounts to \$33 billion in FY 1974, when compared with FY 1964.

We also have an obligation to provide military balance in relations with the Third World. Hopefully this will induce abstention of the major powers and discourage adventurism on the part of those nations themselves, either of which could be dangerously escalatory. Clearly the Soviets are increasing their military activities in the Third World, by adventurous positioning of air and air defense forces, and by the increasing display of their growing naval forces. We need not try to match meter by meter. But without a reasonable countervailing capability on our part, we can expect these Third World nations to succumb to military pressures. For example one might reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their "advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediterranean Sea. To express a personal opinion, even though the U.S. is not an ally of Egypt our visible military force on the scene might well have been the latent potential support which permitted him to take the action he did.

In summary, our military force structure and employment practices must change under these new circumstances, as Mr. Clifford mentioned. The motivating pressure to achieve this must not be an obsession simply to cut forces and defense dollars. Such an approach could upset the delicate balance of force which we have sought and which has made the current steps toward detente feasible. Rather, our purpose should be to examine continuously what minimum size and shape military force will best preserve that balance. We have a responsibility here not only to ourselves, but to all those others who aspire to freedom and human dignity. While we clearly must acknowledge the limits on our power and on the scope of our national interests, the people of this country, I am confident, are not willing to turn their backs on the contribution that our example and support can give to those struggling for what we have been given as our heritage.

Remarks Delivered by VADM Stansfield Turner
at Pacem in Terris III Conference, 9 October 1973

At least one or two of you want a lesser military establishment in this country. That is not a new message to those of us in uniform, but it is one we should be careful to understand. At the same time, I receive less than a clear signal as to exactly what purposes many of you wish our military forces to serve. Defining what the military should not do or weapons it should not have, does not provide adequate guidance to carry out mandates. There seem to be unresolved issues both as to the criteria for determining military forces and as to the burden which such forces impose on the resources of the nation.

For instance Dr. York has made a constructive suggestion for reducing nuclear weapons based on the criteria of minimizing collateral damage to innocent bystanders if nuclear war should occur. I support this objective. However, our primary objective above all others, it seems to me, is to prevent nuclear war from ever occurring. I would welcome a discussion as to what effect Dr. York's proposed force reductions would have on this primary objective. There is more to this issue than mere numbers of missiles. The problem is compounded first by technical questions of warhead yield, accuracy, throw weight, and survivability. But even more important it is also compounded by the perceptions shared by us and our allies as well as those of any potential antagonist.

For instance, one key reason that we are easing into detente today is that there is a perceived balance of strategic weapons between us and the Soviets. If either of us felt vulnerable to the other, detente would be out of the question. The test of any step to reduce strategic nuclear forces should be whether it promotes equilibrium and confidence. For this reason I support the intent of Dr. York's proposals, but feel that the practical method of approach is to proceed step by step in a series of negotiations to limit strategic weapons.

We need equilibrium or balance in the field of conventional weapons as well, if detente is to remain a reality. Therefore, I believe that the central criteria for shaping our non-nuclear forces must be the resultant state of balance with those of the Soviet Union. Mr Clifford does not appear to agree with this, but I raise this cardinal issue in the hope of providing our

dialogue a focal point of logic. I am concerned with our strength relative to the Soviets because I find few instances in history when a major nation voluntarily forsook a marked military advantage over a rival. This even applies to what I consider the most magnanimous nation in history, a nation which, when it possessed a monopoly in nuclear weapons, pressed for a policy of containments, not detente. Hence, I can not accept Mr. Clifford's plea for further reductions on our part based solely on considerations of our side of the equation.

Now acknowledging the value of considering military balance need not lead automatically to larger U.S. forces. The Soviets may be foolish in building up their forces; the Soviets may indeed be benign, the Soviets may in fact just be waiting to follow our example or it may not be inexpedient for us to be out of balance somewhat. I doubt these possibilities, but I do suggest that it is not meaningful to talk about a \$69 billion defense budget without being explicit about the impact it would have on military balance. If it appears that it would result in a balance markedly unfavorable to us, it could well lead the Soviets away from a policy of detente to one of isolating the United States. Advocates of detente should be those most anxious to consider this point. Finally, and again for the purpose of focusing the dialogue, I would like to set some basic facts straight.

No matter how you manipulate the statistics, there is no way that you can prove that our Defense budget is increasing in purchasing power or that it is distorting the economy of the United States. It is unfair and inaccurate to cite the military budget as the cause of inflation or of shortages of funds for other purposes. The facts are that defense expenditures have increases only 1 billion in current \$ since 1968 while total federal budget expenditures have increased by \$90 billion. So defense is not the primary cause of inflation.

Mr. Clifford states that the purchasing power of this year's non-Vietnam defense budget is higher than last year's. He pointed out that this comparison was based on the assumption that the Congress would give the President all he requested for Defense. This is highly unlikely.

Even disregarding this unlikely assumption, there is no trend of real increase because we have two new bills to pay:

- First, a promissory note in the form of military retirement benefits is coming due. This is a cost of past wars. It takes about \$4 billion more of today's budget than that of that a decade ago.
- Second, an artificial subsidy to the defense budget, or a free good in the form of the draft has been removed. This has added about \$3 billion to the defense budget.

The hard facts are that our force structure is going down. You simply can not obscure a drop from pre-Vietnam levels of 47% of the Navy's ships, or of 20% of the Army's divisions, or of 17% of the manpower of all of the services, for instance. I am not arguing for the moment that our forces should necessarily be larger, but simply pointing out that there has been a very real decline in military force levels over the past 5 to 8 years. In contrast, the Brookings Institution states that Soviet expenditures on defense in real purchasing power have been increasing at a rate of at least 5 percent a year for the past 14 years.

All this is not to say that force reductions are not possible on our side, on the Soviet side or by mutual actions. I am concerned, though, that if military balance has been one factor in opening the door to detente, we may want to proceed cautiously in upsetting that balance. We do not want to engage in the American tradition of over-reaction to a war. We all want to place more emphasis on standards of living, on the prevention of crime, on improving the atmosphere and on the general quality of American life. We do not want, however, to delude ourselves into hoping that a slice off the defense budget can solve all the problems that beset a \$1.3 billion economy. Nor do we want to judge how much military strength we need on whether we believe that we are wise enough to utilize it sagely. We are a rational people with all the capability that we need to shape our destiny through positive choices not negative ones. This convocation is evidence of that and should help us to make the difficult choices which lie ahead in positive manner.

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Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 9 Oct 1973

The essential ingredient of today's moves toward detente is the military balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or conquest. The primary role of our military forces today is to preserve that strategic balance so that detente can flourish. Balance is a dynamic matter. This means that we must continuously adapt the size and shape of our military forces and how we employ them to meet the demands of balance.

In doing this we must first achieve equilibrium of strategic nuclear forces. SALT I was an attempt to dampen strategic arms competition, but we and the Soviets have not yet reached a state of sufficient trust and confidence necessary to achieve an assuring balance. Today there may already be substantial overkill capacity on both sides, as Dr. York contends.

Overkill or overinsurance may be the only practical substitute for mutual trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers on the triggers of nuclear holocaust, it may not be all bad. The primary virtue in reducing overkill, Dr. York points out, is in reducing the effects on innocent bystanders if a nuclear exchange should occur. I submit, though, that the proper measure for sizing nuclear arsenals is the resultant probability that no nuclear exchange ever occurs.

We must search for a new strategy for world security which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war. For instance, perhaps deliberate efforts to translate some of our investment in nuclear weapons into joint economic adventures within each other's territory could eventually put self interest above fear as the stabilizing factor in super power relations.

Our approach to strategic nuclear balance should be a positive one of searching for steps that will promote equilibrium and confidence to reduce force levels and not just a search for ways. In short, much as we may wish to adopt a force-cutting strategy it may be incompatible with the requirements to achieve and sustain a nuclear equilibrium in a dynamic multi-polar world.

To me, this means that we should consider the size and scope of Soviet military power as the central criteria for shaping U.S. forces. This is a fundamental proposition with which, I suspect, Mr. Clifford and others of you here would not agree. I believe it not because I suspect the Soviets of less than honorable intentions when they speak softly of detente while they simultaneously increase the size of their big stick. I believe it for two reasons, First, I do not want to put our security and the freedoms that we defend at the sufferance of the good will and unilateral restraint of any other nations, especially any that place a markedly different

value on the individual and his rights. Secondly, I believe that history shows that if one nation holds a clear advantage over another, it is not likely to forsake that advantage in favor of detente. We certainly did not during our nuclear monopoly. We can use detente to encourage mutual force reductions. But any unilateral impulse to military imbalance will surely kill detente.

Whether you can agree with this or not, I think that we should get some basic facts straight. Budget numbers can be manipulated in many fashions. There is no way, however, that numberology can prove that our military force posture is improving relative to the Soviets. According to estimates of the Brookings Institution, real Soviet defense expenditures have been increasing at the rate of over 7% a year since 1960. IN the past 5 years, the military force structure of the United States has been cut by 30%. Now military men like their forces, as Mr. Clifford well knows. They do not cut like this if they are receiving more each year than the last. The Brookings statistics clearly show that in terms of constant dollars this year's defense budget is as low as any since 1964. This does not even consider two quite new charges that must be paid from that budget:

- First, a promisory note in the form of military retirement benefits is coming due. This is a cost of past wars. It makes today's budget about \$4 billion higher than that of a decade ago.
- Second, an artificial subsidy to the defense budget in the form of the draft has been removed. This has added about \$3 billion to the defense budget in FY 1974.

Thus in comparable purchasing power today's budget is about \$7 billion below that of a decade ago before we even talk of inflation.

In the past five years defense spending has dropped from 40% to 20% of the federal budget, and to the lowest percentage of GNP in 2 decades. Thus, the defense budget can not be a principal cause of inflation. If you want to slash at Defense, do so in recognition that either you are following a tradition of American over reaction following a war, or that with Soviet forces going up and U.S. forces coming sharply down, you are willing to base national security more on the intent of the Soviets than on the capability of the United States.

Remarks Delivered by VADM Stansfield Turner
at Pacem in Terris III Conference, 9 October 1973

At least one or two of you want a lesser military establishment in this country. That is not a new message to those of us in uniform, but it is one we should be careful to understand. At the same time, I receive less than a clear signal as to exactly what purposes many of you wish our military forces to serve. Defining what the military should not do or weapons it should not have, does not provide adequate guidance to carry out mandates. There seem to be unresolved issues both as to the criteria for determining military forces and as to the burden which such forces impose on the resources of the nation.

For instance Dr. York has made a constructive suggestion for reducing nuclear weapons based on the criteria of minimizing collateral damage to innocent bystanders if nuclear war should occur. I support this objective. However, our primary objective above all others, it seems to me, is to prevent nuclear war from ever occurring. I would welcome a discussion as to what effect Dr. York's proposed force reductions would have on this primary objective. There is more to this issue than mere numbers of missiles. The problem is compounded first by technical questions of warhead yield, accuracy, throw weight, and survivability. But even more important it is also compounded by the perceptions shared by us and our allies as well as those of any potential antagonist.

For instance, one key reason that we are easing into detente today is that there is a perceived balance of strategic weapons between us and the Soviets. If either of us felt vulnerable to the other, detente would be out of the question. The test of any step to reduce strategic nuclear forces should be whether it promotes equilibrium and confidence. For this reason I support the intent of Dr. York's proposals, but feel that the practical method of approach is to proceed step by step in a series of negotiations to limit strategic weapons.

We need equilibrium or balance in the field of conventional weapons as well, if detente is to remain a reality. Therefore, I believe that the central criteria for shaping our non-nuclear forces must be the resultant state of balance with those of the Soviet Union. Mr Clifford does not appear to agree with this, but I raise this cardinal issue in the hope of providing our

dialogue a focal point of logic. I am concerned with our strength relative to the Soviets because I find few instances in history when a major nation voluntarily forsook a marked military advantage over a rival. This even applies to what I consider the most magnanimous nation in history, a nation which, when it possessed a monopoly in nuclear weapons, pressed for a policy of containments, not detente. Hence, I can not accept Mr. Clifford's plea for further reductions on our part based solely on considerations of our side of the equation.

Now acknowledging the value of considering military balance need not lead automatically to larger U.S. forces. The Soviets may be foolish in building up their forces; the Soviets may indeed be benign, the Soviets may in fact just be waiting to follow our example or it may not be inexpedient for us to be out of balance somewhat. I doubt these possibilities, but I do suggest that it is not meaningful to talk about a \$69 billion defense budget without being explicit about the impact it would have on military balance. If it appears that it would result in a balance markedly unfavorable to us, it could well lead the Soviets away from a policy of detente to one of isolating the United States. Advocates of detente should be those most anxious to consider this point. Finally, and again for the purpose of focusing the dialogue, I would like to set some basic facts straight.

No matter how you manipulate the statistics, there is no way that you can prove that our Defense budget is increasing in purchasing power or that it is distorting the economy of the United States. It is unfair and inaccurate to cite the military budget as the cause of inflation or of shortages of funds for other purposes. The facts are that defense expenditures have increases only 1 billion in current \$ since 1968 while total federal budget expenditures have increased by \$90 billion. So defense is not the primary cause of inflation.

Mr. Clifford states that the purchasing power of this year's non-Vietnam defense budget is higher than last year's. He pointed out that this comparison was based on the assumption that the Congress would give the President all he requested for Defense. This is highly unlikely.

Even disregarding this unlikely assumption, there is no trend of real increase because we have two new bills to pay:

- First, a promissory note in the form of military retirement benefits is coming due. This is a cost of past wars. It takes about \$4 billion more of today's budget than that of that a decade ago.
- Second, an artificial subsidy to the defense budget, or a free good in the form of the draft has been removed. This has added about \$3 billion to the defense budget.

The hard facts are that our force structure is going down. You simply can not obscure a drop from pre-Vietnam levels of 47% of the Navy's ships, or of 20% of the Army's divisions, or of 17% of the manpower of all of the services, for instance. I am not arguing for the moment that our forces should necessarily be larger, but simply pointing out that there has been a very real decline in military force levels over the past 5 to 8 years. In contrast, the Brookings Institution states that Soviet expenditures on defense in real purchasing power have been increasing at a rate of at least 5 percent a year for the past 14 years.

All this is not to say that force reductions are not possible on our side, on the Soviet side or by mutual actions. I am concerned, though, that if military balance has been one factor in opening the door to detente, we may want to proceed cautiously in upsetting that balance. We do not want to engage in the American tradition of over-reaction to a war. We all want to place more emphasis on standards of living, on the prevention of crime, on improving the atmosphere and on the general quality of American life. We do not want, however, to delude ourselves into hoping that a slice off the defense budget can solve all the problems that beset a \$1.3 billion economy. Nor do we want to judge how much military strength we need on whether we believe that we are wise enough to utilize it sagely. We are a rational people with all the capability that we need to shape our destiny through positive choices not negative ones. This convocation is evidence of that and should help us to make the difficult choices which lie ahead in positive manner.

Delivered
Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 9 October 1973

10/15/73

In the last 24 hours I have gained the impression that
a military man's opinion might not be automatically accepted
as valid by this audience. When I came up on the platform
this evening and looked down into this group here assembled
I was instantly reminded of how Daniel must have felt just
before he entered the lions' den. Then I realized what just
retribution this might be. For the past year at the Naval War
College I have recruited many non-military speakers and
subjected them to the test of appearing before several hundred
officers of the uniformed services and defending their views.
So far my experiences at this convocation have reaffirmed a
message that we in uniform receive from the academic-intellectual
community at least one or two of you want a lesser military
establishment in this country. *At the same time I*
However I also continue to receive
less than a clear signal as to exactly what purposes many of you
wish our military forces to serve. Defining what the military
should do does not provide adequate guidance for spending the
austere budgets which Mr. Clifford proposes. There seem to be
unresolved issues both as to the criteria one should adopt in
structuring military forces and as to the burdens which such
forces impose on the resources of the nation.

For instance Dr. York has made a constructive suggestion
for reducing nuclear weapons based on the criteria of reducing

the probability of collateral damage to innocent bystanders if nuclear war should occur. I support the objective of reducing collateral damage, however, our ^{primary} interest above all others, it seems to me, is to prevent nuclear war from ever occurring at all. I would welcome a discussion as to what effect ^{Dr. York's} proposed force reductions would have on this primary objective. There is more to this issue than mere numbers of missiles. The problem is compounded by technical questions of warhead yield, accuracy, throw weight, and survivability to be sure. But even more important ^{it is also emphasized by} than these quantitative issues, however, are the perceptions shared by us and our allies as well as those of any potential antagonist.

For instance, one key reason that we are easing into detente today is that there is a perceived balance of strategic weapons between us and the Soviets. If either of us felt vulnerable to the other, detente would be out of the question. The test of any step to reduce strategic nuclear forces should be whether it promotes equilibrium and confidence, and ~~thereby reduces the possibility of war by miscalculation.~~ For this reason I support the intent of Dr. York's proposals, but feel that the practical method of approach is to proceed step by step in a series of negotiations with the Soviets, and indeed all nuclear powers, to gradually limit strategic weapons.

We need equilibrium or balance in the field of conventional weapons as well, if detente is to remain a reality. ~~Both we and the Soviets have learned that a capability for massive retaliation does not automatically make us feel safe from superior~~

10/9/73
Version II

~~conventional forces.~~ Therefore, I believe that the central criteria for shaping our non-nuclear forces must be the resultant state of balance with those of the Soviet Union. Mr. Clifford ~~appears to base his force level requirements on an~~ *not appear to agree with this* *Levit* impression of Soviet intent rather than the realities of ~~growing Soviet strength.~~

I raise this cardinal issue in the hope of providing our dialogue a focal point of logic. I am concerned with our strength relative to the Soviets because I find few instances in history where a major nation voluntarily forsook a marked military advantage over a rival. This even applies to what I consider the most magnanimous nation in history, a nation which, when it possessed a monopoly in nuclear weapons, pressed for a policy of containment, not detente. Hence, I can not accept Mr. Clifford's plea for further reductions on our part based *solely on* ~~on unilateral considerations alone~~ *from side of the equation*. If we acknowledge the value of considering military balance *W* this need not lead automatically to larger U.S. forces. The Soviets may be foolish in building up their forces; the Soviets may indeed be benign; the Soviets may in fact just be waiting to follow our example. *It* It may not be inexpedient for us to be out of balance somewhat. I doubt these possibilities, but I do suggest that it is not meaningful to talk about a \$69 billion defense budget without being explicit about the impact it would have on military balance. If it appears ~~certain~~ that it would result in a balance markedly unfavorable to us, it could well lead the

Soviets away from a policy of detente to one of isolating the United States. Advocates of detente should be those most anxious to consider this point. Finally, and again for the purpose of focusing the dialogue I would like to set some basic facts straight.

10/9/73
Version I

No matter how you manipulate the statistics, there is no way that you can prove that our Defense budget is increasing in purchasing power or that it is distorting the economy of the United States. It is unfair and inaccurate to cite the military budget as the cause of inflation or shortages of funds for other purposes. The facts are that defense expenditures in ~~current~~ ^{man dollars} ~~dollars~~ have increased \$1 billion since 1968 while total federal budget expenditures have increased by \$90 billion. ^{SDP is not the only cause of inflation}

^{non-Viet Nam} Mr. Clifford states that the purchasing power of this year's defense budget is higher than last year's. He did this by ~~comparing that which the President requested this year with what Congress appropriated last year and last year Congress lopped \$5 billion off the President's request.~~ ^{Printed out and not based on the assumption that the comparison would give the picture of a drop in the budget}

Even disregarding ^{this unlikely assumption} the fallacy of this apples and oranges approach, ~~the budget does not show any trend of increase because we have two new bills to pay:~~ ^{There is no}

- First, a promissory note in the form of military retirement benefits is coming due. This is a cost of past wars. It requires about \$4 billion more of today's budget than of that a decade ago.
- Second, an artificial subsidy to the defense budget, or a free good in the form of the draft has been removed. This has added about \$3 billion to the defense budget in the past five years.

The hard facts are that our force structure is going down. You simply can not obscure a drop from pre-Vietnam levels of 47%

10/9/73

Version II

of the Navy's ships, or of 20% of the Army's divisions, or of 17% of the manpower of all of the services, for instance. I am not arguing for the moment that our forces should necessarily be larger, but simply pointing out that there has been a very real decline in military force levels over the past 5 to 8 years. In contrast, the Brookings Institution states that Soviet expenditures on defense in real purchasing power have been increasing at a rate of at least 5 percent a year for the past 14 years.

All this is not to say that force reductions are not possible on our side, on the Soviet side or by mutual actions. I am concerned, though, that if military balance has been one factor in opening the door to detente, we may want to proceed cautiously in upsetting that balance. We do not want to engage in the American tradition of over-reaction to a war. We all want to place more emphasis on standards of living, on the prevention of crime, on improving the atmosphere and on the general quality of American life. We do not want, however, to delude ourselves into hoping that a slice off of the defense budget can solve all ~~these~~ problems that beset a \$1.3 billion economy. Nor do we want to judge how much military strength we need on whether we believe that we ~~will~~ ^{are enabled to} utilize it ~~readily~~. We are a rational people with all the capability that we need to shape our destiny through positive choices not negative ones.

*Brookings
table all
with Clifford
Bunker
off conference
Society*

I should like to see the evidence that is difficult which is ahead

in positive manner

5

PROPOSED AD LIB COMMENT

What do our national interests require that we be able to accomplish with military power? I believe that there are 3 things:

The first is to deter strategic nuclear warfare. There is, of course, room for considerable debate on what kind and size of forces are required for deterrence. Dr. York, however, has led our debate away from this issue by working from a simplistic assumption that fewer forces are better.

The second objective in having military forces today is to deter Soviet military adventures in Western Europe and to reassure our European allies that they need not accede to the threats and brandishments of Soviet military and political power. Again there is room for debate on how much and what kind of force this requires. Mr. Clifford has led us away from this basic issue by arguing over whether this year's force structure is larger or smaller than last.

Thirdly, we need military force today to preserve a military balance in the so-called Third World. How other than with the Sixth Fleet would we this very evening be able to show U.S. determination that the present hostilities in the Mid East not be allowed to expand and to engulf us. Our national interests in obtaining raw materials from the Third World, including oil, and exporting to pay for these imports are greater today than ever. Admiral La Rocque in his written diatribes continually attempts to steer us away from this issue. He downgrades aircraft carriers because they are not needed, in his view, to defend our

continental shores. . He ignores the fact that our national interests have, do, and for the indefinite future, will, extend well past that continental shore line.

10/6/73

Version III

Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 9 OCT 1973

The subject of this portion of our conference is "National Interests and Military Forces." Our task is to define our national interests, and then determine what military forces are desirable to support those interests. The approach offered by both Mr. Clifford and Dr. York is that they simply would reduce the size of our military forces. This "out of context" approach to defining military force levels is quite unconvincing.

Dr. York comes closest to a constructive statement of national interests when he states that we should reduce the probability of collateral damage to innocent bystander nations if nuclear war should ensue. I suggest that this is not of primary national interest. Our interest above all others, it seems to me, is to prevent nuclear war from occurring at all. Surely Dr. York owes us an explanation of the impact his proposed reductions in strategic nuclear forces would have on this primary objective. If a redundancy or overkill does exist, is it not likely that this reduces the urgency of response in a crisis? Overkill or overinsurance may be our only practical substitute for mutual trust and confidence. Additionally, one key reason we are easing into detente today is that a near balance of strategic weaponry exists between us and the Soviets. If either of us felt vulnerable to the other, detente would be out of the question.

We must at least weigh whether Dr. York's humanitarian impulses toward those innocent bystanders in the event of a holocaust, might, then, impair detente and increase the likelihood of the kind of war we must avoid at all costs.

I would suggest a more positive approach to this problem of nuclear weapons. We must search for a new strategy for world security which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war. For instance, perhaps deliberate efforts to translate some of our investment in nuclear weapons into joint economic adventures within each other's territory could eventually put self interest above fear as the stabilizing factor in super power relations. In the interim, our approach to strategic nuclear balance should be a positive one of searching for steps that will promote equilibrium and confidence.

We need equilibrium or balance in the field of conventional weapons as well, if detente is to remain a reality. Surely both we and the Soviets have learned that we cannot feel safe from superior conventional forces simply because either could retaliate massively. In short, I believe that we must consider the size and scope of Soviet military forces as the central criteria for shaping our own. It is curious that Mr. Clifford makes no mention of either the Soviet positions or actions. Surely he has reasons for not being concerned whether comparative trends in conventional military forces will give us an advantage, or the Soviets, or neither.

While I doubt that I can persuade Mr. Clifford on this point. I will state my reasons for not ignoring this cardinal issue so that our debate can have a focal point in logic. I am not concerned with our strength relative to the Soviets simply because Mr. Brezhnev states as he did publicly on 19 September; "It stands to reason that the class war in the international arena - the opposition of socialism and capitalism - will continue. As before, the social structure of states belonging to different social systems with different reigning ideologies remains diametrically opposed." After all, the nuances of public rhetoric are subject to misinterpretation, especially between different cultures and ideologies. I do not even base my position on the views of a man like Professor Sakharov who shares Brezhnev's culture and ideology. Rather, I prefer to survey the record of history. I find no instance where a major nation voluntarily forsook a marked military advantage over a rival. This even applies to what I consider the most magnanimous nation in history, which when possessing a monopoly in nuclear weapons pressed for containment, not detente. Hence, I can not accept Mr. Clifford's willingness to consider further force reductions on our side based on unilateral actions alone.

At least we must ask what the Soviet response might be. We do not have to impute malevolence to them to understand that they are not likely to follow suit. With a Chinese threat

to the east any Soviet leader would be cautious in reducing force levels. With restive satellites to the west, he would think twice before reducing force levels. With a long tradition of using force to ensure domestic security and order, any Soviet leader would go slowly in lowering military readiness. A Soviet force level compatible with these requirements is very likely to be seen by us and others as a threat. It will certainly express political leverage. Whether we care about this or not, we should not talk of \$69 B defense budgets without an awareness that a balance unfavorable to us would inevitably result; and this in itself would likely force the Soviets away from a policy of detente to one of isolating the United States.

Finally, before we debate whether the Soviet's comparative military position should be taken into account, we must set some basic facts straight.

No matter how you manipulate statistics, there is no way you can prove that our Defense Department is getting wealthy, healthy or more powerful at present budget levels. Mr. Clifford has, of course, shown that this year's budget is higher than last by comparing what the President requested this year with what Congress appropriated last year, after lopping \$51B off the request.

Even disregarding this fallacy, there is no way the purchasing power of this year's budget can show any trend of increase over the past. Over and above inflation, we have two new bills to be paid:

- First, a promisory note in the form of military retirement benefits is coming due. This is a cost of past wars. It requires about \$4 billion more of today's budget than of that a decade ago.
- Second, an artificial subsidy to the defense budget in the form of the draft has been removed. This has added about \$3 billion to the defense budget in FY 1974.

The point is, our force structure is going down - you just can not obscure a drop from 976 to 527 ships, in the Navy, or of 410,000 men in all Services. Leaving aside for the moment the issue of whether we want or need to increase or even maintain our force capability; there is no way hard statistics can obscure our precipitate decline in military capabilities over the past 5 - 8 years. statistic that Soviet expenditures on defense in real purchasing power have been increasing 7% yearly for 14 years. If it was an approximate military balance that opened the door to detente - the present trends will kill it. If you want to slash at Defense, do so in recognition that either you are following a tradition of American over-reaction following a war or that with Soviet forces going up and U.S. forces coming sharply down, you are willing to base national security more on the intent of the Soviets than the capability of the United States.

ADMIRAL LA ROCQUE

Admiral La Rocque would be more helpful if he would give us some idea what he is for. Nowhere in his writings is there any expression of what he wants the U.S. military establishment to accomplish. If he would tell us that, we could offer professional judgment on what it would require.

Without any idea of what Admiral LaRocque wants the Navy to accomplish, it is senseless to argue over 12 carriers or 11 or 20.

TRIDENT SUB STRETCH-OUT PROS & CONS

1. Trident has been attacked regularly tonight.
2. I note that no one says that he wants to dispense with it - just delay it. I hope that is what they intend.
3. If so let us look at the benefits & liabilities. The benefit is deferring an immediate expenditure of money for a year or two, perhaps 800 million \$. We all like to defer expenses because of the cost of money. Against the two year's of interest charge on this \$800 m we must balance the risk that we will need Trident sooner than 1980. I assume that everyone wants to proceed with Trident because sea based deterrent forces are recognized as the most survivable element of our deterrent. Now no one can say with certainty that 1978 will be the critical year, or 1979 or 1980, but, so much rests upon maintaining our second strike deterrent, that I suggest that prudence may be on the side of caution of paying the small expense of being ready sooner rather than too late.

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Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 8 Oct 1973

Dr. York and Mr. Clifford have clearly identified the fact that the usefulness of military forces and the situations in which they are appropriate are quite different today than a decade ago. There are many complex reasons for this. Some reasons such as the achievement of nuclear balance by the Soviets, are almost certainly permanent. Others such as the current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic and economic purposes may change tomorrow.

The essential ingredient of today's detente is the military balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or conquest. The primary role of our military forces today is to preserve that strategic balance so that detente can flourish. This balance is a dynamic matter. This means that we must continuously adapt the size and shape of our military forces and how we employ them to meet the demands of balance.

In doing this we must first achieve equilibrium of strategic nuclear forces. SALT I was an attempt to dampen strategic arms competition, but I do not believe we and the Soviets have yet reached a state of sufficient trust and confidence necessary to achieve an assuring balance. Dr. York may be correct then. Today there is already substantial overkill capacity on both sides. Yet, what he calls overkill or

overinsurance may be the only practical substitute for mutual trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers on the triggers of nuclear holocaust it may not be all bad. The primary virtue in reducing overkill, Dr. York contends, is in reducing the effects on innocent bystanders if a nuclear exchange should occur. It seems to me, though, that our primary concern should be to ensure that no such exchange ever occurs.

We must search for a new strategy for world security which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war. For instance, perhaps deliberate efforts to translate some of our investment in nuclear weapons into joint economic adventures within each other's territory could eventually put self interest above fear as the stabilizing factor in super power relations.

In the interim, our approach to strategic nuclear balance should be a positive one of searching for steps that will promote equilibrium and confidence. The result, hopefully will be a smaller and less costly force, but its composition may be somewhat different from what we have today and additional investment expenditure may be required to attain it. In short much as we may wish to adopt a force-cutting strategy it may be incompatible with the requirements to achieve and sustain a nuclear equilibrium in a dynamic multi-polar world.

Just as balance is necessary in nuclear weaponry, so it is in (what we label as) general purpose forces. As enunciated in the Nixon Doctrine, we must rely on our principal allies for assistance in maintaining enough warfighting capability to deter aggression. It is, however, the U.S. military contribution to this common objective which provides the essential linkage to our nuclear power. Without that, our allies would be subject to nuclear blackmail. This does not mean that we must maintain a capability for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining defense budget simply does not permit us to do that in any event. The defense budget of \$79 billion in outlays being considered by the Congress today is well below pre-Vietnam figures in purchasing power. In fact President Nixon's FY 1974 National Defense Budget is the lowest in real terms since FY 1951. There are three fundamental factors which push the size of the defense budget upward in terms of current dollars, but which have no effect on the actual defense we are purchasing. These are:

- First, a promisory note in the form of military retirement benefits is coming due. This is a cost of past wars. It makes today's budget of \$5 billion higher than that of a decade ago.

- Second, an artificial subsidy to the defense budget in the form of the draft has been removed. This has added several billions to the defense budget in FY 1974.
- Third, the Defense Department suffers from the same general inflation which affects us all. This has been over 64*percent since 1964. This amounts to \$33 billion in FY 1974, when compared with FY 1964.

We also have an obligation to provide military balance in relations with the Third World. Hopefully this will induce abstention of the major powers and discourage adventurism on the part of those nations themselves, either of which could be dangerously escalatory. Clearly the Soviets are increasing their military activities in the Third World, by adventurous positioning of air and air defense forces, and by the increasing display of their growing naval forces. We need not try to match meter by meter. But without a reasonable countervailing capability on our part, we can expect these Third World nations to succumb to military pressures. For example one might reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their "advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediterranean Sea. To express a personal opinion, even though the U.S. is not an ally of Egypt our visible military force on the scene might well have been the latent potential support which permitted him to take the action he did.

In summary, our military force structure and employment practices must change under these new circumstances, as Mr. Clifford mentioned. The motivating pressure to achieve this must not be an obsession simply to cut forces and defense dollars. Such an approach could upset the delicate balance of force which we have sought and which has made the current steps toward detente feasible. Rather, our purpose should be to examine continuously what minimum size and shape military force will best preserve that balance. We have a responsibility here not only to ourselves, but to all those others who aspire to freedom and human dignity. While we clearly must acknowledge the limits on our power and on the scope of our national interests, the people of this country, I am confident, are not willing to turn their backs on the contribution that our example and support can give to those struggling for what we have been given as our heritage.

Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 9 Oct 1973

Dr. York and Mr. Clifford have clearly identified the fact that the usefulness of military forces and the situations in which overt force may be an appropriate instrument of foreign policy are quite different today than a decade ago. There are many complex reasons for this. Some factors are almost certainly permanent, such as the achievement of nuclear balance by the Soviets. Others may change tomorrow, such as the current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic and economic purposes.

The essential ingredient of today's detente is the military balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or conquest. The primary role of our military forces today is to maintain a strategic balance so that detente can flourish. This means that we must continuously adapt the size and shape of our military forces and how we employ them to meet the demands of a changing world order.

We must first achieve equilibrium of strategic nuclear forces. SALT I was a successful attempt to dampen strategic arms competition, but we and the Soviets have not yet reached a state of sufficient trust and confidence to achieve a static balance. Today there may well be substantial excess nuclear weapons capacity on both sides, as Dr. York points out. Overinsurance may be the only practical substitute, however, for mutual trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers,

on the triggers of nuclear holocaust it may not be all bad. The virtue in reducing overkill, Dr. York points out, is in reducing the effects on innocent bystanders if a nuclear exchange should occur. This is desirable, but it is even more important that we ensure that no such exchange ever occurs. This means searching imaginatively for a new strategy for world security - for a strategy which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war. Perhaps deliberate efforts to translate some of our investment in nuclear weapons into joint economic adventures within each other's territory could eventually put self interest above mutual fear as the stabilizing factor in super power relations.

In the interim, our approach to strategic nuclear balance must be a positive one of searching for steps that will promote equilibrium and confidence, not just a search for ways to reduce force levels or minimize damage if we fail. In short, much as we may wish to adopt a force-cutting strategy, it may not be the safest way to the essential of nuclear equilibrium in a dynamic multi-polar world.

Just as balance is necessary in nuclear weaponry, so it is in the conventional forces that we label as General Purpose Forces. We must rely on our principal allies, Western Europe and Japan for more assistance in maintaining enough conventional warfighting capability to deter aggression in their areas. It is, however, the US military contribution to this common objective which provides the essential linkage between our nuclear power and the threat of either conventional or nuclear assault under which these nations live. Without that assurance, our allies would be subject to military blackmail. This does not mean that we must maintain

a capability for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining defense budget simply does not permit us to do that in any event. The defense budget of \$85 billion being considered by the Congress today is well below pre-Vietnam figures in purchasing power. In fact it is the lowest defense budget in real terms since FY 1951. Looking back to the last pre-Vietnam defense budget in FY 64, it would take \$87 billion in today's currency to match it; or \$2 billion more than currently requested. In addition, there are two entirely new charges which eat into the defense budget today:

- First, a promissory note in the form of military retirement benefits is coming due. This cost of past wars artificially makes today's defense budget about \$5 billion higher than that of a decade ago, without adding a single rifleman to our current defenses.
- Second, a 33 year subsidy to the defense budget in the form of the draft has been removed. This has made it necessary to increase military pay over and above inflationary rises and has added at least \$8 billion to the defense budget.

Thus in comparable current real purchasing power today's budget is about \$15 billion or 17 percent below pre-Vietnam levels. In contrast, The Brookings Institution estimates that the Soviet defense budget is up over 52% from 1964 levels in real purchasing power.

Despite these reduced funds the U.S. still has an interest in providing military balance in relations with the Third World as well as in Europe and Japan. Hopefully this will induce abstension by the major powers and discourage adventurism on the part of those nations themselves, either of which could be dangerously destabilizing. Clearly the Soviets are increasing their military activities in the Third World, by adventurous positioning of air and air defense forces, and by the increasing display of their growing naval forces. We need not try to match them meter by meter. But without a reasonable countervailing capability on our part, we can expect these Third World nations to succumb to military pressures. For example one might reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their "advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediterranean Sea. Even though the U.S. is not a formal ally of Egypt our visible military force on the scene might well have been the latent potential support which permitted him to take the action he did.

In summary, our military force structure and employment practices must change to match ever changing circumstances. Pressure for change must be more than simply an obsession to cut forces and defense dollars. Our discussions here need to be on a positive note. First we must ask what we want to be capable of achieving through the maintenance of military forces. Next we must ask what is the minimum size force to achieve this. Adopting the negative approach of what we can do without could unwittingly upset the delicate balance of force which we have sought and which has made the current steps toward detente feasible. While we clearly must acknowledge the limits on our power and the scope of our national interests. We have a responsibility not only to ourselves, but to others who aspire to freedom and human dignity to maintain a viable spectrum of military capability with which to defend our vital interests.

Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 9 Oct 1973

Dr. York and Mr. Clifford have clearly identified the fact that the usefulness of military forces and the situations in which overt force may be an appropriate instrument of foreign policy are quite different today than a decade ago. There are many complex reasons for this. Some factors are almost certainly permanent, such as the achievement of nuclear balance by the Soviets. Others may change tomorrow, such as the current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic and economic purposes.

The essential ingredient of today's detente is the military balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or conquest. The primary role of our military forces today is to maintain a strategic balance so that detente can flourish. This means that we must continuously adapt the size and shape of our military forces and how we employ them to meet the demands of a changing world order.

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Harry S. Ashmore

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Admiral Stansfield Turner:

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York/Clifford clearly identified fact that the usefulness of military force and the situations in which it is appropriate today are quite different than a decade ago. The reasons for this are several and complex. Some of them, such as the achievement of nuclear balance by the Soviets, are almost certainly permanent. Others such as the mutuality of interest in detente for domestic purposes may change tomorrow.

The key ingredient of today's detente, though, is the strategic military balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or conquest. The primary role of our military forces today is to preserve that strategic balance so that detente can flourish. That does not mean preserving the precise size and shape of today's forces. It means something quite different - the adaptation of our force structure and its employment to meet the changing demands of that balance.

First and foremost we need balance in the strategic nuclear area. Balance is a dynamic matter in this area because the Soviets still have momentum from their climb toward equality. Where equilibrium will be established remains to be seen. Surely there is already substantial overkill capacity on both sides, as Dr. York points out. It may be that overkill or over-insurance against nuclear checkmate or technological breakthroughs is an essential ingredient of the feeling of

mutual assurance that currently stabilizes this awesome field of military might. It would be nice to reduce this overkill to protect the lives of innocent bystanders to a nuclear exchange. It is far more important to take every step to ensure that no exchange ever occurs.

Dr. York's specific proposals might lull us into falsely believing that they had moved us in this direction, whereas they are not intended to do so and quite likely would have the reverse effect of lessening our sense of security. In short, we should approach this problem from the positive side of what do we need for balance; not the negative one of Dr. York's what can we dispense with. The result hopefully will be a smaller and less costly deterrent force, but the composition might be quite different.

Much the same applies to second area of military balance, that surrounding the position of our principal allies, Western Europe and Japan. We are not maintaining the capability for sustained warfare in Europe which Mr. Clifford would have us forsake. Our declining budget simply does not permit such extravagance. The current Defense Budget being considered by the Congress is well below pre-Vietnam figures in constant dollars. On top of that the country has elected to dispense with the draft. This has forced considerably increased incentives to personnel, which come from this already reduced budget. Unless we are magicians, Mr. Clifford's preferred

\$69B is not far from reality today.

Our third military function is to provide a balance in relations with the Third World that will induce abstention of the major powers and discourage adventurism in those nations themselves. Clearly the Soviets are increasing their military activities in the Third World, by adventurous positioning of forces, deployments first in Egypt and now in Syria, and by the increasing display of their growing naval forces. We need not match meter by meter. Without a reasonable countervailing capability on our part, we can expect these Third World nations to succumb to military pressures alone; for far from sensing an mutality of military force today, countries such as Israel, India, Indonesia and North Vietnam all find it very meaningful and useful.

people
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Cold
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no

There are, of course, those myopics who see no U.S. interests in the Third World. They ignore our growing dependence on imported raw materials and our necessity to export more to balance our outflow. More importantly, such shallow critics overlook the basic soundness of the American public's approach to our nation's responsibilities. Who else can supply the inspiration that gives many others around the world hope for tomorrow? Our resources are stretched too thin to continue to carry this burden alone, but we still are the only source of leadership and direction. After all, the world is not five sided any more than it is bi-polar today. It is

triangular in military matters with the Soviet Union, China and ourselves. It is also triangular in economic affairs with Western Europe, Japan and ourselves. We are the common element.

The military element of these responsibilities has clearly changed from the defensive preparedness for combat of Cold War days, to the deterrence function of these days of strategic balance and its accompanying detente. Our military force structure and employment practices must change under these new circumstances. The motivating pressure to achieve this must not be an obsession to cut because less for is bound to be better suited to this new purpose. This will only stimulate artificial and unwanted resistances. Our pressure should be to reexamine in a positive way what forces best ensure deterrence, and let the size and shape shake out as they may.

Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 8 Oct 1973

Dr. York and Mr. Clifford have clearly identified the fact that the usefulness of military forces and the situations in which they are appropriate are quite different today than a decade ago. There are many complex reasons for this. Some reasons such as the achievement of nuclear balance by the Soviets, are almost certainly permanent. Others such as the current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic and economic purposes may change tomorrow.

The essential ingredient of today's detente is the military balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or conquest. The primary role of our military forces today is to preserve that strategic balance so that detente can flourish. This balance is a dynamic matter. This means that we must continuously adapt the size and shape of our military forces and how we employ them to meet the demands of balance.

In doing this we must first achieve equilibrium of strategic nuclear forces. SALT I was an attempt to dampen strategic arms competition, but I do not believe we and the Soviets have yet reached a state of sufficient trust and confidence necessary to achieve an assuring balance. Dr. York may be correct then. Today there is already substantial overkill capacity on both sides. Yet, what he calls overkill or

overinsurance may be the only practical substitute for mutual trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers on the triggers of nuclear holocaust it may not be all bad. The primary virtue in reducing overkill, Dr. York contends, is in reducing the effects on innocent bystanders if a nuclear exchange should occur. It seems to me, though, that our primary concern should be to ensure that no such exchange ever occurs.

We must search for a new strategy for world security which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war. For instance, perhaps deliberate efforts to translate some of our investment in nuclear weapons into joint economic adventures within each other's territory could eventually put self interest above fear as the stabilizing factor in super power relations.

In the interim, our approach to strategic nuclear balance should be a positive one of searching for steps that will promote equilibrium and confidence. The result, hopefully will be a smaller and less costly force, but its composition may be somewhat different from what we have today and additional investment expenditure may be required to attain it. In short much as we may wish to adopt a force-cutting strategy it may be incompatible with the requirements to achieve and sustain a nuclear equilibrium in a dynamic multi-polar world.

Just as balance is necessary in nuclear weaponry, so it is in (what we label as) general purpose forces. As enunciated in the Nixon Doctrine, we must rely on our principal allies for assistance in maintaining enough warfighting capability to deter aggression. It is, however, the U.S. military contribution to this common objective which provides the essential linkage to our nuclear power. Without that, our allies would be subject to nuclear blackmail. This does not mean that we must maintain a capability for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining defense budget simply does not permit us to do that in any event. The defense budget of \$79 billion in outlays being considered by the Congress today is well below pre-Vietnam figures in purchasing power. In fact President Nixon's FY 1974 National Defense Budget is the lowest in real terms since FY 1951. There are three fundamental factors which push the size of the defense budget upward in terms of current dollars, but which have no effect on the actual defense we are purchasing. These are:

- First, a promisory note in the form of military retirement benefits is coming due. This is a cost of past wars. It makes today's budget of \$5 billion higher than that of a decade ago.

- Second, an artificial subsidy to the defense budget in the form of the draft has been removed. This has added several billions to the defense budget in FY 1974.
- Third, the Defense Department suffers from the same general inflation which affects us all. This has been over 64 percent since 1964. This amounts to \$33 billion in FY 1974, when compared with FY 1964.

We also have an obligation to provide military balance in relations with the Third World. Hopefully this will induce abstention of the major powers and discourage adventurism on the part of those nations themselves, either of which could be dangerously escalatory. Clearly the Soviets are increasing their military activities in the Third World, by adventurous positioning of air and air defense forces, and by the increasing display of their growing naval forces. We need not try to match meter by meter. But without a reasonable countervailing capability on our part, we can expect these Third World nations to succumb to military pressures. For example one might reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their "advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediterranean Sea. To express a personal opinion, even though the U.S. is not an ally of Egypt our visible military force on the scene might well have been the latent potential support which permitted him to take the action he did.

In summary, our military force structure and employment practices must change under these new circumstances, as Mr. Clifford mentioned. The motivating pressure to achieve this must not be an obsession simply to cut forces and defense dollars. Such an approach could upset the delicate balance of force which we have sought and which has made the current steps toward detente feasible. Rather, our purpose should be to examine continuously what minimum size and shape military force will best preserve that balance. We have a responsibility here not only to ourselves, but to all those others who aspire to freedom and human dignity. While we clearly must acknowledge the limits on our power and on the scope of our national interests, the people of this country, I am confident, are not willing to turn their backs on the contribution that our example and support can give to those struggling for what we have been given as our heritage.

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The essential ingredient of today's detente is the military balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or conquest. The primary role of our military forces today is to maintain a strategic balance so that detente can flourish. This means that we must continuously adapt the size and shape of our military forces and how we employ them to meet the demands of a changing world order.

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Thus in comparable current real purchasing power, today's budget is about \$15 billion or 17 percent below pre-Vietnam levels. *In contrast,* ~~(In terms of)~~ *The* Brookings Institute estimates that the Soviet defense budget is up over 52% from 1964 levels. *in*

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Despite these reduced funds the U.S. still has an interest in providing military balance in relations with the Third World as well as in Europe and Japan. Hopefully this will induce abstention by the major powers and discourage adventurism on the part of those nations themselves, either of which could be dangerously destabilizing. Clearly the Soviets are increasing their military activities in the Third World, by adventurous positioning of air and air defense forces, and by the increasing display of their growing naval forces. We need not try to match them meter by meter. But without a reasonable countervailing capability on our part, we can expect these Third World nations to succumb to military pressures. For example one might reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their "advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediterranean Sea. Even though the U.S. is not a formal ally of Egypt our visible military force on the scene might well have been the latent potential support which permitted him to take the action he did.

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DRAFT REMARKS FOR PACEM IN TERRIS III

The key thrust of this Convocation is how to obtain enduring peace - peace founded on rationale choice not on delicate balances of terror. As Robert Hutchins said at Pacem in Terris II, peace through the medium of war is too dangerous a game to play in today's world, and peace through common fear is not much better.

Unfortunately war and fear have dominated relations between nation states for longer than we care to recall. The issue before us in this era is whether there are adequate forces abroad to encourage mankind to shake the old habit. As Pope John pointed out, we can recognize that everyone inside the world enclosure is potentially vulnerable to miscalculation in the war and fear equation; it is not just the lives of the warriors, the kings or even the combatant nations that are at stake. Will these factors allow rationality to rise above habit?

Perhaps a good analogy is that of an individual attempting to drop the hard drug habit. How does he bring rationality to the fore? Not by sudden and total disavowal of his tools of hallucination. Rather by the physical process of attenuation of the drug habit. Equally important, there must be a mental process of awakening to the dangers of continuing on this course of appreciation of the sweetness of another course.

So, too, it seems to me, must be our process of weaning from the war - fear habit in the relations of nation - states. A drug addict who instantly forsakes his habit, is subject to delirium tremens (?). He is neither physically or mentally prepared. So, too, a major nation that moved too precipately toward disarming could today induce international vibrations of the most alarming nature. The necessary concomitant physical steps, it seems to me, are the mutual agreements between nations to deemphasize armaments in their relations. The concomitant mental transformation must come from savouring the benefits of rational cooperation.

I recognize that this argument or analogy could be interpreted as an attempt at excusing a go slow policy with respect to lessening our reliance on armaments as an operating force among nations. It need not be that if properly and conscientiously construed. That conscientiousness in finding the right attenuation of war machinery in an attempt at international decompression, must come from both sides - that is from those inclined to be cautious in not withdrawing too fast, and from those whose idealism and aspirations are perhaps running faster than the physical and mental readiness of the world community. I submit that with respect to the size and shape of the war machine of the United States, this means accenting a positive approach to what kind of military

we need and how we are to employ it. We have, in the emotional wake of Viet Nam, ample rehetoric (?) about what elements of our military forces we do not want. I have, for instance, read all of the published position papers of my former compatriot Gene La Roque's Center for Defense Information. I am distressed to find that while I know many things that he does not want our military to possess, I can not identify the shape of the military power which he would endorse our possessing. If our disucussions on the military power of the United States are going to be constructive and toward our goal of safe withdrawal from reliance on the war - fear syndrome, it is high time that we began talking of the positive role that we want our military forces to play in this process. Advocating simply less force is an irresponsible and negative approach to a world - sized problem that requires all of our positive contributions.

I believe that there are three very useful contributions which United States military forces can make to the furthering of the peace habit. One is clearly the deterrence of strategic nuclear warfare. We simply cannot by lack of military preparedness or by lack of national resolve, tempt some other nuclear power to seek advantage by use of those weapons. In many ways we will be well advised to err on the cautious side here of too much rather than too little. The consequences of too little are too high. The consequences of too much are twofold. One is possible

impairment of international attitudes of cooperation. Unnecessary expense, that need not be a serious problem unless it is allowed to impact on our other forces to the point where they are incapable of performing their contribution to movement towards peace.

The primary mission of what are termed general purpose forces is also deterrence or perhaps better termed dissuasion. This is primarily a matter of dissuading others from starting armed conflicts, be they against us or others. It is also a question of dissuading others from establishing destabilizing dominance in areas of the world. These functions of deterrence or dissuasion are, of course, the classic resort to at least fear of war against which Robert Hutchins has inveighed. It is a necessary part of winding down to peace by rationality, but the critical point is that we recognize that this is our purpose and employ our military forces deliberately for it. This is different than holding the military in the wings until diplomacy fails or considering combat employment of military force an extension of diplomacy by other means. The employment of military forces in peacetime must have a clear political purpose. What we buy as well as how we employ will be affected by this purpose. To be persuasive or dissuasive, our military forces must be credible to the nation to be dissuaded. For a sophisticated opponent this means matching him in

quality and quantity. For an inferior opponent, it means having forces that appear to be relevant to his situation. These requirements are quite different and need to be recognized separately. They must also be employed in a menacing manner only deliberately in orchestration with other forms of pressure or suasion. In short, the careful political control of the deterrent use of military force is the essential distinction between the dangers of common fear and the benefits of common respect. Those who in effect advocate military castration because of the dangers of misapplication of military power, clearly distrust our political processes and would risk the vibrations of preemptory withdrawal from the world power structure and it actually exists. How much and how long military forces will be needed for disuasion will be a function of how rapidly the nations of the world progress toward cooperation for peace. A third use of our military forces should be to promote such cooperation. As antithetical as this may sound, the opportunities for exploring cooperation through military organizations is multiplying today. Take a few examples:• How are we ever to control aircraft hijackings? The cooperative efforts of Air Forces could possibly be brought to bear. Or even military punitive ventures reminiscent of our handling of the Barbary pirates, but today as multi-national undertakings.

o All the world is concerned with our hazarding the ecology. Much of this is multi-national in import; pollution of the oceans and from it coastlines; atmospheric pollution that crosses national boundaries with impunity. Detection and monitoring systems for these types of things are natural extnsions of military systems, and so, too, might be the policing function.

o Protection and resuce of life at sea and in the air is another area where military systems have potential for cooperative action.

o Meteorology, oceanology, and oceanography are areas where the exchange of data could benefit mankind, and all are related to military missions .

The opportunities for using military organizations and systems to promote understanding of the benefits of multi-national coordinated actions are presently barely being tapped.

Withdrawal from our entrenched habits of war and fear as primary constraining elements in the relations between nations has breat opportunity for success in today's environment. It will gake very practical physical and mental steps to bring it about. Lofty idealism and metaphysical appeals are not likely to suffice. We must tread a fine line with respect to the role of military forces in the process we all hope to bring about. That line is between obdurate persistence in old habits of employing military pressures and rushing

madily into new habits that will be more upsetting than beneficial. The military portion of this equation can only be properly written if we all together approach it from an affirmative point of view, seeking postive ways to tap a potential, not negative means of avoidind risks or evading the difficult issues of force size, shape, employment and control. It was a Roman who siad "If you want peace, be prepared for war" (check quote) The theme of this Convocation understandly questions that dictrum. Two thousand years of adherence to it, however, can not be swept away over night, but clearly the time is opportune to start a withdrawal.



for the Study of Democratic Institutions / The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

Agto [unclear] ✓ c/ 7/9

Pacem in Terris III

NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

A convocation to be held by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, October 8-11, 1973, Washington, D. C.

WORKING DRAFT, May 9, 1973

Notes:

1. Those listed on the attached outline have been invited to participate. Those who have accepted are designated by asterisks.
2. These sessions are timed on the assumption that formal speeches will not exceed forty minutes. Panel members will be expected to make five minute opening responses in rotation, with the remainder of the time available for free exchange. Wherever practicable principal speakers will be expected to participate in the panel discussions.
3. The ballroom will be set up with tables at all sessions for the convenience of those making notes and to insure a tolerable density of about 1,000 in the invited audience.
4. Lunch will be available in the ballroom for each of the three days for those who buy tickets in advance.
5. No dinner is presently scheduled.
6. All sessions will be open to the press, and extensive television coverage is being arranged.

MONDAY EVENING, October 8
8:00 to 11:00

PRESIDING: Robert M. Hutchins

I. THE NEW GLOBAL SETTING

(Opening session to be announced)

II. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

A. The view of the Administration.

Henry M. Kissinger

B. A Congressional View

*J. William Fulbright

TUESDAY MORNING, October 9
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: *Norton Ginsburg

III. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES (cont'd)

A. An independent view.

1. *Stanley Hoffman
2. *Zbigniew Brzezinski
3. *Richard Barnet

(The opening addresses are intended to set forth the current range of agreement and disagreement among those officially charged with responsibility for creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy. These addresses are intended to be representative of more detached views among the experts who operate in the academic/intellectual community. The central questions are: How are the national interests of the U.S. currently defined in terms of its international relations? How are they threatened? How can they be defended and advanced?)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: *Harvey Wheeler, George F. Will, *Frances Fitzgerald, *Hans Morgenthau, Leslie Gelb

*Acceptances

TUESDAY AFTERNOON, October 9
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING: *Fred Warner Neal

IV. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES (cont'd)

A. Relations with Allies -

*Paul Warnke

B. Relations with Adversaries -

*Marshall Shulman

C. Relations with Less Developed Countries -

Theodore M. Hesburgh

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Herschelle Challenor,
*John Paton Davies, *Ronald Steel,
*David Horowitz, *Morton Halperin, *Jerome Cohen

TUESDAY EVENING, October 9, 1973
8:00 to 10:00

PRESIDING: Gen. M. B. Ridgway (USA, Ret.)

V. THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY POWER

Clark Clifford

(What kind of military establishment
is required to maintain national
security in the new global setting?)

VI. DETERRENCE BY MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

*Herbert York

(The limitations of arms control, the
possibilities of disarmament, and,
prospectively, possible new develop-
ments in armament.)

*Acceptances

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Albert Wohlstetter,
~~*Admiral Gene La Rocque~~, *Jeremy Stone,
Admiral Stansfield Turner, Gloria
Emerson, William Foster

WEDNESDAY MORNING, October 10
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: *Lord Ritchie-Calder

VII. THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

- A. The Scientific/Technological
Challenge to Traditional
Concepts of Sovereignty -

*Alexander King

- B. The Necessity of Common or Shared
Resources, including Science and
Technology -

*Gerard Piel

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: *Jonas Salk, *John
Wilkinson, *George Brown, Harrison
Brown, Louis Sohn, James Akins

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, October 10
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING: William M. Roth

VIII: TRADE AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION

Peter G. Petersen

(The possible replacement of questions
of security by economics as the
primary factor in international
relations; credits and currency;
the multinational corporation.)

*Acceptances

IX. DEVELOPMENT

Kenneth Thompson

(Can we transfer resources and technology from developed to developing countries on terms acceptable to both?)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: *Neil Jacoby, *Richard N. Cooper, *Frank Church, *Abe Ribicoff, Walter Surrey

WEDNESDAY EVENING, October 10
8:00 to 11:00

PRESIDING: *Bradford Morse

X. THE IMPERATIVES OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING

*Philip Jessup

(The basic questions of sovereignty, nationalism, interdependence, and the role of law raised by sovereign nations.)

XI. THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS

*Richard Gardner

(Charter revision and/or the creation of new regional or interest groupings to deal with peace-keeping, and the increasing demands upon the specialized agencies.)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: *Elisabeth Mann Borgese, *Richard Falk, *Pauline Frederick, *Charles Yost, *Sol Linowitz, *George Bush

*Acceptances

THURSDAY MORNING, October 11
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: Earl Warren

XII. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN
POLICY

A. Checks and Balances: Executive
vs. Congress

*Sam Ervin

(Divided powers as stultification of
policy-making vs. lack of account-
ability as a force toward authoritar-
ianism.)

B. Checks and Balances: The Partisan
Role

Barry Goldwater
*Hubert Humphrey
*George McGovern
George Wallace
Nelson Rockefeller
*Eugene McCarthy

(Political parties as the focus of
interest-centered and ideological
pressures on the allocation of
priorities. Can politics stop at
the water's edge? If possible, is
bi-partisan foreign policy desirable?
Are there proper limits to the adversary
process in a political campaign?)

* Acceptances

THURSDAY AFTERNOON, October 11
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING: *Harry S. Ashmore

XII. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC
FOREIGN POLICY (cont'd)

C. Power, Self-Interest and
Social Pretense - The
Establishment and Foreign
Policy.

*J. Kenneth Galbraith

D. The Relationship of Government and
Media.

*James C. Thomson ✓

(Secrecy, deception, and manipulation
of public opinion. The First Amend-
ment issue.)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: *John Cogley, *David
Halberstam, *George Reedy, *Alfred
Balk, *Peter Lisagor, *Richard Holbrooke

CONCLUSION: *Robert M. Hutchins

(Can a self governing people tolerate
a close elitist foreign policy process?
Can international relations be based on
open covenants, openly arrived at? Is
there a practical balance?)

*Acceptances

Proposed PIT III Budget

I. Participants Expenditures

A. Honoraria and publication rights	\$ 51,000.	
B. Travel	13,350.	
C. Accomodations and Maintenance	<u>12,000.</u>	
	76,350	\$ 76,350.

II. Arrangements

A. Meeting facilities	2,000.	
B. Office Exp. and rent	3,750.	
C. Staff	7,000.	
D. Travel	<u>3,500.</u>	
	\$ 16,250.	16,250.

III.

A. Consultants and planning meetings	34,500.	
B. Public relations and information	<u>5,400.</u>	
	\$ 39,900.	39,900.

IV. Supporting Services

A. Transcription	1,000.	
B. Secretarial (special)	650.	
C. Duplication	<u>1,000.</u>	
	\$ 2,650.	2,650.
sub total		\$135,150.

Indirect Expenditures 15% (overhead)	20,272.	<u>20,272.</u>
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Total		\$155,422.
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V. Publication and Distribution	24,000.	
Audiotape editing and production	<u>3,000.</u>	
	\$ 27,000.	27,000.
Grand Total		\$182,422.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

02840

31 JUL 1973

MEMO TO RUSTY WILLIAMS
CHARLIE PEASE
BING WEST

Will appreciate your help in preparing for the Convocation Pacem in Terris III next October 8-11. It seems to me I need help in four areas:

Bibliographic data on the participants whom I do not know. On the enclosed copy of the program, I have put a check mark by those people. Would Charlie please pick this up and see what we can find. Don't make an extensive effort, but "Who's Who." Jim King, and others may help.

Preparation of a three- to five-minute set of remarks that I am required to deliver and to submit in writing by 1 October. My initial reaction is to build on the material from the London Economist's "Foreign Report" which I recently sent to Admiral Zumwalt with a copy to you; the theme being that the Soviets are going for detente now but with an intent to outbuild us militarily and technically so that they can gain the upper hand in perhaps a decade. We must be cautious that we not let this happen. At the same time, we must acknowledge that it is difficult to get off an ascending spiral with each of us suspicious of the other's military buildup. On balance, we must move cautiously because the long-term implications are so serious, but must be flexible. At the same time, we must take into account the perceptions others have of our relative military strength. Would Rusty take charge of this and Charlie and Bing help.

I will also need some preparation for the panel discussion. This, I believe, could be largely knowing something of the positions the other panel members are

likely to take. Would Charlie do some research on the writings, etc. of the other panelists, except Albert Wohlstetter whom I know. Most specifically, I would like to have a good summary of the Gene La Rocque materials. What nonsense is he peddling and what are the principle flaws in his arguments. I would like to furnish this to Albert Wohlstetter in advance also. Captain Swede Hansen in CHINFO promised me a summary of the La Rocque positions and the counterarguments. I have not received it. Would you phone him please.

Finally, any particular views or material for the other panel discussions that might help me in either commenting from the floor, if allowed, or in discussions.

When you have a chance to read the outline for the Convocation, please come in and let's talk about it.

I think I will have to leave after the Wednesday evening session to attend another meeting in Chicago.



STANSFIELD TURNER

Copy to:
003
001

The
Center



for the Study of Democratic Institutions / The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

July 23, 1973

Vice-Admiral Stansfield Turner
President
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Dear Admiral Turner:

I enclose a virtually completed program for the Center convocation on NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY to be held at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., October 8-11, 1973. We regard the remarkable response from so many very busy people as heartening evidence of the timeliness and importance of this undertaking.

As you will recall from my original letter, we set a deadline of September 1 for advance texts of major addresses. We will distribute appropriate texts to panelists as soon as they are available. Each panelist is asked to prepare a three to five minute opening response, and if possible, we would like to have these in writing by October 1. This will help insure the widest possible dissemination through the print and broadcast media. Provision will be made to accommodate ad libbed remarks in published material, and our \$500 fee covers these rights.

Your appearance is scheduled for the session on THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY POWER and DETERRENCE BY MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION beginning at 8 p.m. on Tuesday evening, October 9.

The convocation opens with a reception and buffet at the Sheraton-Park on Monday evening, October 8, at 6:30 p.m. You are, of course, invited, and I hope you will be able to attend other sessions of the convocation. The enclosed form will enable us to make the necessary arrangements.

I know you will make a significant contribution to our effort to open up a constructive national dialogue on foreign policy, and I am looking forward to greeting you in Washington.

Sincerely yours,

Robert M. Hutchins
Chairman



for the Study of Democratic Institutions / The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

Pacem in Terris III.

NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

A convocation to be held by the

Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions

October 8-11, 1973

Washington, D.C.

Notes:

1. Those listed on the attached outline have accepted invitations to participate unless marked by (*), which indicates formal acceptance has not been received.
2. These sessions are timed on the assumption that formal speeches ordinarily will not exceed forty minutes. Panel members will be expected to make three to five minute opening responses in rotation, with the remainder of the time available for free exchange. Principal speakers and session chairmen are expected to participate in the panel discussions.
3. All sessions will be open to the press, and extensive television coverage is being arranged.

MONDAY EVENING, October 8
8:00 to 11:00

PRESIDING: Robert M. Hutchins

I. THE NEW GLOBAL SETTING

(Opening session to be announced)

II. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

A. The view of the Administration

Henry A. Kissinger

B. A Congressional View

J. William Fulbright

(The opening addresses are intended to set forth the current range of agreement and disagreement among those officially charged with responsibility for creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy.)

TUESDAY MORNING, October 9
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: Fred Warner Neal ✓

III. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES (cont'd)

A. An Independent View

1. Stanley Hoffmann ✓
2. Robert Tucker*
3. Richard Barnet ✓

(These addresses are intended to be representative of more detached views among the experts who operate in the academic/intellectual community. The central questions are: How are the national interests of the U.S. currently defined in terms of its international relations? How are they threatened? How can they be defended and advanced?)

*Invitation under consideration

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Frances FitzGerald,
Leslie Gelb, Stanley Karnow*, Hans
Morgenthau, Harvey Wheeler, George F.
Will ✓

TUESDAY AFTERNOON, October 9
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING: Norton Ginsburg ✓

IV. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (cont'd)

A. Relations with Allies

Paul Warnke

B. Relations with Adversaries

Marshall Shulman ✓

C. Relations with Less Developed
Countries

Theodore M. Hesburgh

D. The Special Case of Japan

Edwin O. Reischauer*

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Herschelle Challenor, ✓
Jerome Cohen, ✓ John Paton Davies,
Morton Halperin, David Horowitz, ✓
Ronald Steel ✓

*Invitation under consideration

TUESDAY EVENING, October 9, 1973
8:00 to 10:00

PRESIDING: Stanley R. Resor*

V. THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY
POWER

Clark Clifford

(What kind of military establishment is
required to maintain national security
in the new global setting?)

VI. DETERRENCE BY MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Herbert York

(Possible new developments in armaments,
the limitations of arms control, and the
possibilities of disarmament.)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Gloria Emerson, William
Foster, Admiral Gene La Rocque, Jeremy
Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner,
Albert Wohlstetter

WEDNESDAY MORNING, October 10
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: W. Michael Blumenthal* ✓

VII: TRADE AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION

Peter G. Petersen

(The possible replacement of security
by economics as the primary factor in
international relations; credits and
currency; the multinational corporation.)

*Invitation under consideration

VIII: DEVELOPMENT

Kenneth Thompson ✓

(Can we transfer resources and technology from developed to developing countries on terms acceptable to both?)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Frank Church, Richard N. Cooper, Neil Jacoby, Abraham Ribicoff, Walter Surrey, Paul Sweezy ✓

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, October 10
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING: Lord Ritchie-Calder ✓

IX. THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

A. The Scientific/Technological
Challenge to Traditional
Concepts of Sovereignty

Alexander King

B. The Necessity of Common or Shared
Resources, including Science and
Technology

Gerard Piel

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: George Brown, Jr.,
Harrison Brown*, Seyon Brown*, Jonas
Salk, Louis Sohn, John Wilkinson ✓

*Invitation under consideration

WEDNESDAY EVENING, October 10
8:00 to 11:00

PRESIDING: Bradford Morse✓

X. THE IMPERATIVES OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING

Philip Jessup✓

(The basic questions of sovereignty, nationalism, interdependence, and the role of law.)

XI. THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS

Richard Gardner✓

(Charter revision and/or the creation of new regional or interest groupings to deal with peace-keeping, and the increasing demands upon the specialized agencies.)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Elisabeth Mann Borgese, George Bush, Richard Falk, Pauline Frederick, Sol Linowitz, Charles Yost✓

THURSDAY MORNING, October 11
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: Rexford G. Tugwell

XII. INTERNAL CHECKS AND BALANCES:
EXECUTIVE vs. CONGRESS

Sam J. Ervin, Jr.

(Divided powers as stultification of policy-making vs. lack of accountability as a force toward authoritarianism.)

PRESIDING: Harry S. Ashmore

XIII. THE ROLE OF THE PARTISAN OPPOSITION

Hubert Humphrey
Eugene McCarthy
George McGovern
Edmund S. Muskie
George Wallace

(Political parties as the focus of interest-centered and ideological pressures on the allocation of priorities. Can politics stop at the water's edge? If possible, is bi-partisan foreign policy desirable? What are the proper limits to the adversary process in a political campaign?)

THURSDAY AFTERNOON, October 11
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING: John Cogley

XIV. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC
FOREIGN POLICY

A. The Establishment and Foreign
Policy

J. Kenneth Galbraith

(Can a self governing people tolerate the concentrated power, self-interest and social pretense inherent in a closed elitist foreign policy process?)

B. The Relationship of Government and
Media

James C. Thomson

(Secrecy, deception, and manipulation of public opinion. The First Amendment issue.)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Alfred Balk, Tom Cronin,
David Halberstam, Richard Holbrooke,
Peter Lisagor, George Reedy

CONCLUSION: Robert M. Hutchins

PACEM (VERSION #1)

1. York/Clifford - identified fact

utility military force evolving.

2. Each approach problem of restructuring the size and employment of military forces by assuming major reductions possible. Appealing:

- Saves \$
- Appears to harmonize with detente.
- Appeals idea existence of force is cause of tension

3. York have us unilaterally or voluntarily give up much of our overkill. It is certainly appealing, especially to by-standers - humanitarians.

4. Wouldn't it be more humanitarian worry about all mankind - concentrate on preventing release of weapons rather mitigating effect.

York's proposal might do opposite.

1. Might give impression we had attacked root causes rather than side effects.
2. Overkill represents insurance against technological or tactical surprise - makes a superpower less trigger happy - may be small expense.
5. Not to say can not reduce costs deterrence - must take more positive approach, especially than seeking a substitute for mutual assured destruction.

6. Similarly with non-strategic forces. Will an arbitrary cut to \$69B move us in right direction? That, in real purchasing power term, would be about ____% of our pre-Vietnam Defense budgets, and when add in cost going from conscription to AVF, even less.

7. Important question: how reshape our military forces to preserve that strategic balance which makes detente possible? If either we or Soviets felt militarily exposed, detente evaporates overnight.

8. Again not mean can not make changes. Balance is dynamic - must constantly adapt.

1. Danger war in Europe decreased - function of our forces is to deny Soviets potential for coercing or persuading those living under shadow increasing Soviet military might from undue readiness to accept adverse economic or political terms in order to placate the Soviets.

2. In Third World function preserve a perceived balance of capability such that growing dependence imports raw materials and exports to pay for them not jeopardized.

Arbitrary cuts in force capability not necessarily solution.

Especially not from a base already shrunken from that which achieved the balance that generated detente.

A Navy, for instance, that is ____% as large in ships today as in ____; in fact smaller than any time since 193__.

9. Simply cannot be cavalier about this by not recognizing what has and is happening to our military posture.

Mr. Clifford knows we no longer have a capability for sustained war in Europe or for global intervention.

10. Question is what minimum size and what shape of force will preserve the balance on which not only we, but entire free world depends?

There are forces for detente on us and on the Soviets and Chinese -

They are different. Clearly Soviet sociological would not abandon strong military capability for domestic purposes; or Soviet concepts of sphere of influence forsake power to hold satellites in line and China in check.

Soviet thinking on Third World relations is increasingly willing to bring military force to bear as in Egypt and

Syria and in the expanding operations of
an expanding Fleet.

If our old mission was to be prepared to fight if necessary -
and our new mission is to carry out deterrence as is surely necessary
no guarantee that just arbitrarily reducing the force posture
that was prepared to fight will serendipitiously turn out to
tailor our forces for deterrence.

We can not just stand pat, either. We must look positively
at the mechanisms of conventional as well as strategic deterrence
and develop a new posture because of what it can do for us,
not what it can not do.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

02840

31 JUL 1973

MEMO TO 001

Check and see whether I can stay for the Thursday morning session or not, and if so change it.

STANSFIELD TURNER

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
02840

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

31 JUL 1973

MEMO TO RUSTY WILLIAMS
CHARLIE PEASE
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STANSFIELD TURNER

Copy to:
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001

PACEM (Version #3)

9/19

Dr. York and Mr. Clifford have clearly identified the fact that the usefulness of military force and the situations in which they are appropriate are quite different today than a decade ago. There are many complex reasons for this trend. Some factors such as the achievement of nuclear balance by the Soviets, are almost certainly permanent. Others such as the Current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic purposes may change tomorrow.

The key ingredient of today's detente, though, is the military balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or conquest. The primary role of our military forces today is to preserve that strategic balance so that detente can flourish. That does not necessarily mean preserving the precise size and shape of today's forces. Rather, it requires continuous adaptation of our force structure and its employment to meet the changing demands of that balance.

Our principal purpose must be to achieve equilibrium of strategic nuclear forces. SALT II had a dampening effect on the strategic arms competition. However the Soviets and the United States have not yet reached the state of trust and confidence necessary to achieve a final balance. Where and when equilibrium will be achieved is uncertain. Surely there is already substantial overkill capacity on

both sides, as Dr. York points out. Overkill or over-insurance may be necessary until such time as mutual trust is established by all parties concerned with nuclear arms. While I share Dr. York's concern over the effects of collateral damage and fallout it seems to me that our primary concern should be to ensure that no exchange ever occurs. If overkill contributes to mutual security as perceived by both sides, it is a risk we must live with at least for the immediate future, much as we may deplore the necessity of doing so.

The ultimate answer must be a new strategy for world security which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war. Those incentives must be strong enough to convince all parties to abandon nuclear weapons. Perhaps deliberate efforts to translate investment in nuclear weapons into joint economic adventures within each other's territory could eventually put self interest above fear as the stabilizing factor in super power relations. This is a long term phenomenon which must await a passing of the surge in nationalism which has characterized the past World War II era.

In the interim until the millennium is realized the predominant criterion for reshaping our military forces must be the necessity for preserving the strategic balance (both real and perceived) which makes detente possible. Our

approach to the problem should be a positive one with equilibrium the goal. The result, hopefully will be a smaller and less costly force, but its composition may be somewhat different from what we have today. It may require additional investment expenditure to attain. In short much as we may wish to adopt a force cutting strategy it may be incompatible with the requirements to achieve and sustain a nuclear equilibrium in a dynamic multi-polar world. If either the U.S. or the Soviets felt militarily exposed detente would evaporate overnight.

Just as balance is necessary in nuclear weaponry so it is in general purpose forces. We may rely on our allies, Western Europe and Japan, for assistance in maintaining an actual warfighting capability. It is however the U.S. contribution which provides the cement to our alliance system. Until such time as new security arrangements are made, our contribution must remain credible. The fact is that we are not maintaining the capability for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining budget does not permit us that luxury. The current Defense budget being considered by the Congress is well below pre-Vietnam figures in constant dollars. In dollars of constant (FY 1973) buying power, National Defense outlays are below what they were in FY 1964. In fact President Nixon's FY 1973 National Defense Budget is the lowest in real terms since FY 1951. We must realize that there are three fundamental factors which tend to inflate the defense budget in terms of current budget

expenditures, but which have no effect on the actual defense we are purchasing. These are:

- A promisory note in the form of retirement benefits is coming due which is a cost of past wars to the tune of over \$5 B in FY 1974.
- An artificial subsidy to the defense budget in the form of the draft has been

removed which will cost the Defense budget
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600160001-9
\$, B in FY 1974.

Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600160001-9
We also have an obligation to provide a balance in

relations with the Third World that will induce abstension of major powers and discourage adventurism on the part of those nations themselves. Clearly the Soviets are increasing their military activities in the Third World, by adventurous positioning of forces, and by the increasing display of their growing naval forces. We need not match meter by meter. But without a reasonable countervailing capability on our part, we can expect these Third World nations to succumb to military pressures... For example one might reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their

"advisors" from Egyptian territory if the United States 6th Fleet were not present in the Mediterranean Sea. Even though the U.S. is not a staunch ally of Egypt our diplomatic declarations of interest in the independence of Third World nations, coupled with our visible military force on the scene might well have been the latent potential support which permitted him to take the action he did.

In summary, our military force structure and employment practices must change under these new circumstances as previously mentioned by Mr. Clifford. The motivating pressure to achieve this must not be an obsession to simply cut forces and defense dollars for this will only upset the delicate balance of force which we have long sought to achieve. Rather, our prime purpose should be to examine continuously what minimum size and shape military force will best preserve that balance on which not only we but the entire free world depends.



Study of Democratic Institutions / The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

Program participants for the convocation on New Opportunities for United States Foreign Policy are requested to fill out appropriate sections of this form and return it to the Center in the enclosed envelope.

ALL SESSIONS WILL BE AT THE SHERATON-PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C., OCTOBER 8-11.

For All Program Participants:

- I (~~will~~) (will not) attend the reception and buffet, 6:30 p.m., Monday, October 8, 1973.
- My spouse (~~will~~) (will not) accompany me. I expect to bring () guests.

Please reserve tickets for attendance at the following regular sessions of the convocation. If more than one, indicate number desired.

Monday, October 8

Opening session, 8 p.m. (2)

Tuesday, October 9

Morning, 9:30 a.m. (2) Luncheon, 1 p.m. (2)
Afternoon, 2 p.m. (2) Evening, 8 p.m. (2)

Wednesday, October 10

Morning, 9:30 a.m. (2) Luncheon, 1 p.m. (2)
Afternoon, 2 p.m. (2) Evening, 8 p.m. (2)

Thursday, October 11

Morning, 9:30 a.m. (2) Luncheon, 1 p.m. (2)
Afternoon, 2 p.m. (2)

For Out-of-Town Program Participants:

- ☐ Please make hotel reservations (single) (~~double~~) at the Sheraton-Park Hotel for arrival on 8 OCT and departure on Thurs 11 OCT
- ☐ I will make my own housing arrangements and can be reached at (hotel) _____ or (phone number) _____

NOTE: Arrangements will be made for those staying at the Sheraton-Park to sign hotel bills upon departure. Travel and other expenses may be submitted for reimbursement at the Convocation office at the Sheraton-Park, or submitted later by mail to the Center in Santa Barbara. Details on arrangements may be obtained in Washington from Mrs. Sharon Arnan, Center, 12th Floor, 1156 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.



for the Study of Democratic Institutions / The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

July 23, 1973

Vice-Admiral Stansfield Turner
President
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Dear Admiral Turner:

I enclose a virtually completed program for the Center convocation on NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY to be held at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., October 8-11, 1973. We regard the remarkable response from so many very busy people as heartening evidence of the timeliness and importance of this undertaking.

As you will recall from my original letter, we set a deadline of September 1 for advance texts of major addresses. We will distribute appropriate texts to panelists as soon as they are available. Each panelist is asked to prepare a three to five minute opening response, and if possible, we would like to have these in writing by October 1. This will help insure the widest possible dissemination through the print and broadcast media. Provision will be made to accommodate ad libbed remarks in published material, and our \$500 fee covers these rights.

Your appearance is scheduled for the session on THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY POWER and DETERRENCE BY MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION beginning at 8 p.m. on Tuesday evening, October 9.

The convocation opens with a reception and buffet at the Sheraton-Park on Monday evening, October 8, at 6:30 p.m. You are, of course, invited, and I hope you will be able to attend other sessions of the convocation. The enclosed form will enable us to make the necessary arrangements.

I know you will make a significant contribution to our effort to open up a constructive national dialogue on foreign policy, and I am looking forward to greeting you in Washington.

Sincerely yours,

Robert M. Hutchins
Chairman

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION
TO CONSIDER
NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
OCTOBER 8-11, 1973
WASHINGTON, D.C.

September 7, 1973

Vice-Admiral Stansfield Turner
President
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Convocation Committee:
HAROLD WILLENS, *Chairman;*
Center Director;
Chairman,
Businessmen's Educational Fund

Dear Admiral Turner:

According to our records, we have not yet received information concerning your arrival and departure times for the Pacem in Terris III convocation at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D. C., October 8 through 11.

(Committee in formation)

Perhaps your form arrived but could not be identified as being yours. In any event, could I ask you to fill out and return the enclosed as soon as possible, so that arrangements can be made for your hotel requirements? (If this request does not reach you before October 1, please send your reply to me c/o The Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D. C. 20005.)

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

Peter Tagger


Peter Tagger
Executive Director
Convocation Committee

PT:db

encls.

Mail the form
mailed 8/11/73
copy to
Pacem III
file

Center for the Study
of Democratic Institutions,
Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Ca. 93103
Telephone [805] 969-3281



Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions / The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

For Out-of-Town Program Participants:

☒ Please make hotel reservations (single) (~~double~~) at the Sheraton-Park Hotel for 3 nights, arriving on 8 Oct and departing on 11 Oct

☐ I will make my own housing arrangements and can be reached at (hotel) _____ or (phone number) _____

For All Program Participants:

Please reserve tickets for attendance at the following sessions of the convocation. If more than one, indicate number desired.

Monday evening, October 8, 1973

0 Buffet reception: _____ tickets
Plenary session: _____ tickets

Tuesday, October 9, 1973

Morning session: 2 tickets
Luncheon: 2 tickets
Afternoon session 2 tickets
Evening session 2 tickets

Wednesday, October 10, 1973

Morning session: 2 tickets
Luncheon: 2 tickets
Afternoon session 2 tickets
Evening session 2 tickets

Thursday, October 11, 1973

Morning session: 2 tickets
Luncheon: 2 tickets
Afternoon session 2 tickets

Vice-Admiral Stansfield Turner

Stansfield Turner
SER 1547

19 JUN 1973

003

Dear Sandy,

It was a pleasant surprise to meet you in the airport last week. I'm thrilled you plan to be with us for another military-media conference. Although we're still in the early planning stage, it looks like we'll have a bigger and better turnout than last year.

I'm also looking forward to participating in Pacem in Terris III in New York this fall. Thanks for placing my name in the hat. I thought you might like to see my reply to Dr. Hutchins' letter of invitation. As a participant in our first media conference, perhaps you could give it a boost with Dr. Hutchins. We'd very much like to have him as the rapporteur.

In answer to your question about other military officers who you might like to invite to the October conference, I would suggest Brigadier General Bob Gard whose address is: Brigadier General Robert G. Gard, U.S. Army, Director, Human Resources Development, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D.C. 20310

A candidate from the Air Force who I would endorse equally would be: Major General Leslie W. Bray, Jr., U.S. Air Force, Director of Doctrine, Concepts and Objectives, DCS/P&O 4D1083, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301.

A really thought provoking Naval officer who just retired a few months ago who would add a great deal is: Vice Admiral John M. Lee, USN (Ret.), Apt. 704, Bldg. 2, Pt. Brittany, 3108 Brittany Drive South, St. Petersburg, Florida 33715.

Again, I look forward to seeing you in October and November. With very best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Mr. Sander Vanocur
The Center for the Study
of Democratic Institutions
12th Floor
1156 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

Enclosure

*Written by: CDR White (003:eh)
19 June 73 bcc: 01, 02, 022, Profs.
Delaney, Bunting, 003A

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

02840

6/14/73

MEMORANDUM FOR 003

While walking down the corridors of National Airport on Wednesday I saw Sandy Vanocur. I hailed him down. He asked me if I had received an invitation to Robert Hutchins' conference next October. I said I had and had accepted. I asked if he had prompted the invitation, and he said he had. I thanked him. He asked if there were other military people whom I thought would do well at that conference, I suggested BGEN Bob Gard.

I then mentioned that I had just written him a letter inviting him to our second Military-Media Conference. When I told him the date he said that he would accept.

Let's drop him a note and tell him that I am delighted that he can come, enclose a copy of the letter to Hutchins and gently urge him to encourage Hutchins to accept.



for STANSFIELD TURNER

Rev. letter 12/5/71

Dear Dr. Hutchins,

My thanks for your letter of May 9th and the invitation to serve as a panelist in "Pacem in Terris III: New Opportunities for United States Foreign Policy." I would appreciate the opportunity to join the panel on the evening of October 9th, but with one caveat. As a uniformed military officer, I would prefer not to be the only "establishment" member of the panel. With a fairly balanced group, the discussions should be tremendously stimulating and challenging.

On a new subject, I would like to invite you to come to the Naval War College on November 15-16 to serve as Rapporteur for our annual military-media conference. More than 60 national and regional media representatives are being invited to attend this year's conference to meet and talk candidly with the officers in the student body.

The title for the conference is, "The Military and the Media: Mutual Responsibilities." A general outline of the two-day program, an information brochure on the College and a copy of last year's program are enclosed for your review. We hope the interchange between the media on the one hand, and our students and faculty on the other, will promote an understanding of, and a respect for, one missions and practices of both professions. Past experience indicates a free and candid flow of ideas is possible in our academic environment.

Because of the existing military-media malevolence, we want to make our students (many of whom will be future leaders of the armed forces) aware of the nature of the present relationship and to do what we can to improve that relationship. I think our conference can provide a proper platform for the military and the media to put aside their visceral reactions and engage in approdutive and intelligent discussion of their respective professions.

The conference will convene Thursday afternoon at 2 p.m. with opening statements by media representatives on issues involved in the military-media relationship. The dialogue produced by the speeches will then be discussed in a panel

discussion made up of other media guests and will include free interchange with the audience. Following the opening plenary session we will breakup into seminar groups each of about 10-12 students with two media representatives serving as moderators to continue the discussions in greater depth. The format will be duplicated in morning and afternoon segments on Friday concluding with your wrap-up speech and my final comments.

I am aware of your keen interest in the freedom of the press and of the immense importance you place on information flowing creditably and freely to the American public. I have read of your efforts in this regard dating back to 1947 when you headed a Commission on the Freedom of the Press. Your wide professional knowledge of and personal involvement in the general area of press freedom would certainly serve as the appropriate anchor to put our conference in perspective.

We can offer an honorarium of \$500, plus expenses.

I'm sure you will agree that good relations between the military and the media are vital to our country. Our conference aims at eroding the misunderstanding that exists between the two professions and at reestablishing a firm footing characterized by mutual respect. We would be deeply honored if you could arrange to be with us in November and help us work toward that important goal.

With very best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Dr. Robert M. Hutchins
Chairman, The Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions/
The Fund for the Republic, Inc.
P.O. Box 4068
Santa Barbara, California 93102

Enclosures

Written by: CDR White, PAO (003:eh) 1 June 73
bcc: 01, 02, 022, RADM Thompson, Profs. Delaney, Bunting, 003A

81 JUL 1973

MEMO TO 003

Attached is some material on a meeting I am going to attend in Washington in October. Note first that it is going to be both published and televised. Note secondly that one of the last speakers (p.m. of October 11) is James C. Thomson. We have invited him and the Nieman Fellows, which he administers at Harvard, to attend our media conference. Jim came down and spoke to us on Asia last spring at the War College. You might keep him in mind if we need somebody as a panelist or speaker in the area that he's talking about in Washington, "The Relationship of Government and Media." Obviously, he could give practically the same speech.



STANSFIELD TURNER

SCHEDULE: WASHINGTON (8-11 OCT)

Monday, 8 OCT

1003 - Dep Prov, Al 774
1159 - Arr DC

1330 - Dep D.C. Pied 934
1407 - Arr Charlottesville
1630 - Dep Charl Pied 935
1707 - Arr D.C. Met by CNO Driver
1800 - 2000 Reception (P in T III)
2000-2300 I Opening Session
Session II The National Interests of the U.S.
Presiding: Robert M. Hutchins

Tuesday, 9 OCT

0930 - 1230 - Session III
The National Interests of the U.S.
Presiding: Morris L. Levinson

1300 - 1400 - Luncheon

1400 - 1700 - Session IV
The National Interests of the U.S.

*2000 - 2230 - Session V The National Interest and Military Power
Session VI Deterrence through the Threat of
Mutual Assured Destruction
Presiding: James H. Douglas

* Member of Critiquing panel

Wednesday, 10 OCT

0930 - 1230 - Session VII: Trade & Economic Competition
Session VIII: Development
Presiding: Charles H. Dyson

1300 - 1400 - Luncheon

1345 - The Special Case of Japan
Presiding: Seniel Ostrow

1415 - 1700 - Session IX: The Emergence of Transnational Issues
Presiding: Edward Lamb

Wednesday, 10 OCT

2000 - 223- - Session X: The Imperatives of Institution-
Building
Session XI: The U.N. and Alternative Formulations
Presiding: Frances McAllister

Thursday, 11 OCT

0930 - 1230 - Session XII: The Requirements of Democratic
Foreign Policy
Presiding: J.R. Parten

1130 - Pick up by CNO driver

1230 - Lunch with Under Secretary Middendorf

1400 - To Airport by CNO driver

1430 - Dep DC Amer 481

PACEM (Version #3)

9/19

Dr. York and Mr. Clifford have clearly identified the fact that the usefulness of military force and the situations in which they appropriate are quite different today than a decade ago. There are many complex reasons for this trend. Some factors such as the achievement of nuclear balance by the Soviets, are almost certainly permanent. Others such as the "Current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic purposes may change tomorrow.

The key ingredient of today's detente, though, is the military balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or conquest. The primary role of our military forces today is to preserve that strategic balance so that detente can flourish. That does not necessarily mean preserving the precise size and shape of today's forces. Rather, it requires continuous adaptation of our force structure and its employment to meet the changing demands of that balance.

Our principal purpose must be to achieve equilibrium of strategic nuclear forces. SALT II had a dampening effect on the strategic arms competition. However the Soviets and the United States have not yet reached the state of trust and confidence necessary to achieve a final balance. Where and when equilibrium will be achieved is uncertain. Surely there is already substantial overkill capacity on

both sides, as Dr. York points out. Overkill or over-insurance may be necessary until such time as mutual trust is established by all parties concerned with nuclear arms. While I share Dr. York's concern over the effects of collateral damage and fallout it seems to me that our primary concern should be to ensure that no exchange ever occurs. If overkill contributes to mutual security as perceived by both sides, it is a risk we must live with at least for the immediate future, much as we may deplore the necessity of doing so.

The ultimate answer must be a new strategy for world security which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war. Those incentives must be strong enough to convince all parties to abandon nuclear weapons. Perhaps deliberate efforts to translate investment in nuclear weapons into joint economic adventures within each other's territory could eventually put self interest above fear as the stabilizing factor in super power relations. This is a long term phenomena which must await a passing of the surge in nationalism which has characterized the past World War II era.

In the interim until the millennium is realized the predominant criteria for reshaping our military forces must be the necessity for preserving the strategic balance (both real and perceived) which makes detente possible. Our

approach to the problem should be a positive one with equilibrium the goal. The result, hopefully will be a smaller and less costly force, but its composition may be somewhat different from what we have today. It may require additional investment expenditure to attain. In short much as we may wish to adopt a force cutting strategy it may be incompatible with the requirements to achieve and sustain a nuclear equilibrium in a dynamic multi-polar world. If either the U.S. or the Soviets felt militarily exposed detente would evaporate overnight.

Just as balance is necessary in nuclear weaponry so it is in general purpose forces. We may rely on our allies, Western Europe and Japan, for assistance in maintaining an actual warfighting capability. It is however the U.S. contribution which provides the cement to our alliance system. Until such time as new security arrangements are made, our contribution must remain credible. The fact is that we are not maintaining the capability for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining budget does not permit us that luxury. The current Defense budget being considered by the Congress is well below pre-Vietnam figures in constant dollars. In dollars of constant (FY 1973) buying power, National Defense outlays are below what they were in FY 1964. In fact President Nixon's FY 1973 National Defense Budget is the lowest in real terms since FY 1951. We must realize that there are three fundamental factors which tend to inflate the defense budget in terms of current budget

expenditures, but which have no effect on the actual defense we are purchasing. These are:

- A promisory note in the form of retirement benefits is conning due which is a cost of past wars to the tun of over \$5 B in FY. 1974.
- An artificial subsidy to the defense budget in the form of the draft has been removed which will cost the Defense budget \$ B in FY 1974.
- The Defense Department suffers from the same general inflation which affects us all. This has been over 34 percent since 1964. This amounts to \$ B in FY 1974.

We also have an obligation to provide a balance in relations with the Third World that will induce abstension of major powers and discourage adventurism on the part of those nations themselves. Clearly the Soviets are increasing their military activities in the Third World, by adventurous positioning of forces, and by the increasing display of their growing naval forces. We need not match meter by meter. But without a reasonable countervailing capability on our part, we can expect these Third World nations to succumb to military pressures.. For example one might reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their

"advisors" from Egyptian territory if the United States 6th Fleet were not present in the Mediterranean Sea. Even though the U.S. is not a staunch ally of Egypt our diplomatic declarations of interest in the independence of Third World nations, coupled with our visible military force on the scene might well have been the latent potential support which permitted him to take the action he did.

In summary, our military force structure and employment practices must change under these new circumstances as previously mentioned by Mr. Clifford. The motivating pressure to achieve this must not be an obsession to simply cut forces and defense dollars for this will only upset the delicate balance of force which we have long sought to achieve. Rather, our prime purpose should be to continuously examine what minimum size and shape military force will best preserve that balance on which not only we but the entire free world depends.

Dear Star -

Attached is a copy of
Albert's comments for the Oct. 9
panel of Pacem in Terris III.

Respectfully,

J. White

Oct 5, 1973

Pin
File

Albert Wohlstetter
10/3/73

ALTERNATIVES TO MASS DESTRUCTION AS DETERRENT -- COMMENTS ON THE ADDRESSES
OF PROF. YORK & MR. CLIFFORD

My comments focus mainly on Prof. York's praiseworthy effort to make somewhat more sane what he himself has characterized as an essentially mad strategic doctrine: deterring attack by threatening the mass destruction of civilian population. However, in considering whether alternative forms of deterrence imply a strategic arms spiral, I shall question the received notions --- reflected by Mr. Clifford as well as Prof. York --- as to the nature and actual history of strategic arms interactions.

1. The received strategic doctrine in the foreign policy establishment today calls not only for keeping civilians defenseless on both sides, but for deliberately aiming whatever strategic forces are available exclusively to kill adversary civilians; for avoiding military targets; and for shunning as much as possible any development of discriminateness, of an ability to destroy military targets without destroying civilians in mass.

2. Despite ambiguities, this doctrine of "Mutual Assured Destruction" (for which Donald Brennan proposed the acronym "MAD") has never been officially accepted by either the Soviet or the American government as the policy for actually using their strategic forces. Nor do the forces of either side conform to such a policy. The Soviet Union, for example, continues to spend roughly as much on defense of their civilians as the United States spends in total on strategic offense and defense. And official statements on both sides have made clear that --- whatever the capabilities for reciprocal mass

Albert Wohlstetter
10/3/73

destruction --- in the event of a nuclear war, the governments would use their forces against a variety of military targets. Moreover, as Prof. York has himself pointed out, accuracies (and, therefore, the ability to reduce unintended destruction) have improved dramatically and are likely to continue improving on both sides.

3. Systems analysts gave currency to the ghastly --- and most un-assuring --- phrase "mutual assured destruction". They stressed that it was an accounting device measuring how the forces could be used rather than a policy for their actual use in the event of war. The relevance and meaning of such a macabre accounting device are then dubious. And indeed there is plenty wrong with both the doctrines and the forces of the present super-powers. However, in my view, a responsible policy would move further away from rather than towards the targeting of civilians.

4. The diverse critics of Mutual Assured Destruction range from the respected Princeton theologian and long-term student of ethics and war, Paul Ramsey, to the current director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Fred Iklé, and to Dr. Michael May, who, like Prof. York, formerly directed the Lawrence Livermore Radiation Laboratory. Prof. York accepts one of their most powerful objections: namely --- even if MAD were a persuasive deterrent to a thoroughly rational decision maker, such rationality is hardly universal. Even if no one "deliberately takes the responsibility for the appalling destruction and sorrow that war would bring in its train," as the Encyclical Pacem in Terris said, "the conflagration may be set off by some uncontrollable and unexpected chance". In that event, to execute the doctrine would mean an unprecedented mass slaughter of unoffending civilians. Prof.

York therefore proposes to limit the damage that would be done in such a case, by altering not the aiming points but the size of the force aimed, and leaving essentially the "MIRVed" missile force: Poseidon and Minute Man III. For these remaining missiles, he would limit the yield of each warhead, if I understand him, to $12\frac{1}{2}$ kilotons. I presume he would welcome, if not insist on, cutting the Soviet force to the same total of small warheads.

I want to stress my complete sympathy with any attempts to modify so harsh a doctrine, though I do not hold this doctrine and never have. In any case, I favor reducing the weight of explosives that can be launched by strategic forces. I would like to see each side with the same total, and that much lower than the present U.S. total.

However, one must ask of Prof. York's reduced force first--- if it is deliberately aimed at killing civilians --- will the reduction in fact significantly limit the slaughter? And second, would aiming such a reduced force at military targets provide a useful deterrent and yet destroy fewer bystanders?

As for the first question, even if the $12\frac{1}{2}$ KT limit were monitorable, the successful launching of $3/4$ of Minute Man III and less than half the Poseidon---when aimed solely to kill Russian civilians--- would promptly destroy nearly 100 million. The delayed effects from fallout would be small only in comparison with this enormous prompt slaughter. In short, simply reducing the force will not accomplish Prof. York's goal. Even more drastic cuts in the strategic force to a size that still remains reasonably secure against attack in

-4-

Albert Wohlstetter
10/3/73

the face of uncertainties or unmonitorable increases will not make it small enough to keep slaughter less than catastrophic --- so long as the force is aimed exclusively at defenseless population centers.

A war will in any case be terrible. But if deterrence fails, the alternative to aiming at civilians is to aim at military targets, to limit these targets in number, to choose them in part for their geographical separation from civilian population centers so as to keep the destruction of civilians as low as one can, to select weapons and yields and accuracies with that purpose in mind, and specifically to reduce fallout by using weapons with lower fission fractions, to avoid surface bursts;* and, (as Jeremy Stone's comment reminds us) to maintain command and control of nuclear weapons throughout the conflict, to avoid destroying adversary command centers and to try to bring the war to an end as rapidly as one can with as much as possible left intact of civil society.

This suggests an answer to the second question raised by Prof. York's proposal. There are tens of thousands of possible military targets just as there are at least equal numbers of villages and farms containing civilians that could be attacked. But there is no legitimate military need to attack every single military target, (not to say every civilian target). The force that Dr. York proposes, given the accuracies that he himself has predicted,

*In fact, surface bursts in such military attacks are a doubly bad idea: they not only increase the unintended harm done by fallout; they also reduce the intended harm to military structures, both hard and soft, from blast over-pressure, (the most predictable weapons effect, and therefore the one most likely to be counted on by a conservative military planner).

10/3/73

could destroy any of several selected military systems --- either long range or "general purpose" forces and their means of support. The loss of any of several such massive and costly systems --- for example, along tensely disputed borders --- would be felt as an enormous disaster by the political-military leaders, leaving them and the nation "naked to enemies". Why wouldn't the prospect of such a loss be an excellent deterrent? Must we aim to kill non-combatants? I have said that I favor cutting the force to an agreed lower total, though I might specify the cuts differently from Prof. York. For reducing mass destruction of civilians, however, the force cut is not the essential; it is how the force would be aimed and used.

Prof. York fears that if we aim at anything other than population centers, this would mean more and larger weapons and so more unintended damage to civilians, ^{than} could be done deliberately by his smaller force. On the face of it, given the concentration of populations and their vulnerability to even a few weapons, this seems implausible. With the accuracies Prof. York and others expect, fewer and smaller weapons than in the present forces (which may be agreed to under SALT II) would do very well for attacking military targets. Moreover, we should think most soberly about using a hypothetical increase in weapons to justify so cruel a targetting policy. For one thing, numbers are limited by agreement. Further, claims have been repeated for years, without evidence, that there has been a spiralling increase in strategic budgets, in megatonnage, or in the area that could be destroyed by strategic weapons, and that this spiral would be worsened unless civilians became the exclusive targets. These claims are simply

-6-

Albert Wohlstetter
10/3/73

inconsistent with the actual U.S. history. The United States has always aimed at military targets and this has not meant an exponential increase in destructive power in the past, nor need it in the future.

In constant dollars, strategic budgets in the mid-1950s were $2\frac{1}{2}$ times what they are now. Strategic defense vehicles, (which current arms race theory supposes to be particularly destabilising) peaked at 7 times what they are now. Offense vehicles have been roughly constant, (as Mr. Clifford and Prof. York observe). Moreover, contrary to stereotype, not only has strategic megatonnage declined drastically, but the area that could be destroyed by the many smaller warheads has been declining for many years and in 1972 was the same as in 1956.*

We may reach agreements on still lower strategic budgets, but can we justify aiming at civilians simply because they are easy and cheap to kill, because, so to speak, non-combatant populations come in the large economy size?

7. We should question not only the familiar arguments about budget instabilities, but also the argument that strategic forces aimed exclusively at civilians can provide a stable deterrent ("even one bomb on one city" etc.), while a force aimed at military targets cannot. To deter one needs to possess not only a capability to destroy something important to an adversary, but also an ability to convince him that the capability would actually be used in response to the action one wants to deter. However, if the action to be deterred left our own civil society essentially intact --- as it would most

*What is in the jargon called "equivalent megatons" --- a measure in between (and somewhat less crude than) counting warheads of disparate size and counting megatons.

Albert Wohlstetter
10/3/73

obviously if an adversary made a nuclear attack on an ally in Europe or on Japan --- would our promise to respond be convincing if the response would destroy not only his civilians but also our own? One of the many problems with Mutual Assured Destruction when used as a threat is that the destruction would be mutual and therefore quite unassured.

On the other hand, a policy of attacking military targets that minimizes unintended civilian fatalities would offer incentives for an adversary to reciprocate by attacking military targets and therefore would be neither mass homicide nor suicide. In any case military attacks even with the proposed reduced force could scarcely remove the possibility of the urban destruction, to which proponents of Mutual Assured Destruction cling. With Prof. York's force of Minute Man III and Poseidon (assuming 10 reentry vehicles per Poseidon, rather than 14), there would be 6200 RVs on each side. No one could dream of destroying 6199; for whatever that is worth, the possibility of one bomb on one city would always remain. But a responsible deterrent calls for a less reckless and less suicidal response.

One final point concerns détente. The process of constructing common interests and warranted mutual trust among sovereign nations with a long history of divergence is likely to be long and painful. The Pacem in Terris Encyclical had something to say about the disabilities of threats and fear as a way of moving men towards common goals. In the long run, mutual threats to kill innocent populations seem a poor way of building a community of interest between the Soviet Union and the United States.

PACEM IN TERRIS

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

III

Circulated: October 4, 1973

Critique:

by Rear Admiral Gene La Rocque, USN (ret.)

Director, Center for Defense Information, Rear Admiral (Ret.),
United States Navy

FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY

Scheduled:

Session V-VI, beginning at 8 p.m., Tuesday, October 9, 1973

Also Scheduled:

Addresses by Clark Clifford and Herbert York

Critique: Albert Wohlstetter (Chairman); Gloria Emerson,
William Foster, Admiral Gene R. La Rocque,
Jeremy Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner



A Paper prepared for delivery at a national convocation sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, to convene at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, Oct. 8-11, 1973. Press inquiries should be directed to Frank K. Kelly, The Center, PO Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103. Telephone: Area Code 805 969-3281.

Center For Defense Information

PACEM IN TERRIS III

STATEMENT

OF

REAR ADMIRAL GENE LA ROCQUE, USN (RET.)

BECAUSE I FIND MYSELF SO STRONGLY IN AGREEMENT WITH THE ANALYSIS OF BOTH SECRETARY CLIFFORD AND DR. YORK, I WOULD LIKE TO CONFINE MYSELF TO ADDING TO THEIR CASE.

ANYONE PRIVY TO THE DATA ON THE SOVIET MILITARY OVER THE PAST TWENTY YEARS CAN SEE CERTAIN TRENDS.

FIRST, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN AHEAD IN EVERY MAJOR OFFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEM SINCE WORLD WAR II. CONSISTENTLY, IN MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS THE ATOMIC BOMB, THE HYDROGEN BOMB, ICBM'S, THE MISSILE SUBMARINE, THE NUCLEAR SUBMARINE, AND THE MULTI-WEAPON MIRV CAPABILITY, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN YEARS AHEAD OF THE SOVIETS.

THIS TREND IS NO LESS TRUE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES THAN STRATEGIC. THE WARSAW PACT WAS CREATED AFTER WE SET UP NATO. AFTER WE HAD RINGED THE SOVIET UNION WITH LAND-BASED MISSILES IN EUROPE. THE SOVIETS ARE ONLY NOW, AFTER THIRTY YEARS OF AMERICAN DOMINANCE OF THE SEAS, BUILDING TWO SMALL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.

Page 2

FOR THIRTY YEARS THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN THE OVERWHELMINGLY DOMINANT MILITARY FORCE IN THE WORLD. OUR STRENGTH SO FAR OUTRAN THE SOVIET CAPABILITY THAT THEY WERE FORCED TO TRY AND CATCH UP. FOR EXAMPLE, IN 1971 THE U. S. HAD 4,700 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ATTACK RUSSIA, AND THE SOVIETS HAD 2,100. TODAY WE HAVE 7,100 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE SOVIETS ONLY 2,300.

OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS AMERICANS HAVE HEARD WARNINGS OF MISSILE GAPS, BOMBER GAPS, SOVIET DIVISIONS IN EUROPE AND OTHERS. THESE STATEMENTS WERE LARGELY DESIGNED TO CREATE A SENSE OF FEAR IN THE U. S. THE STRONGEST NATION IN THE WORLD--STRONGER THAN ALL THE REST OF THE WORLD TOGETHER--HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO FEAR ADVERSARIES WHICH MERIT LITTLE FEAR.

THE SIMPLE FACT IS WE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN CHASING OUR OWN TAIL IN THE ARMS RACE DURING THE LAST THIRTY YEARS. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD OVER AND OVER THAT BUYING ONE MORE WEAPON, OR BACKING ONE MORE FORCE WOULD MAKE US SECURE.

BUT, NOW THE TIME HAS COME TO TELL IT LIKE IT IS. THE TRUTH AS ANY GENERAL OR ANY ADMIRAL IN THE PENTAGON KNOWS,

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IN A NUCLEAR WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION THERE IS NO DEFENSE. THERE IS NO SYSTEM FOR ANY AMOUNT OF MONEY WHICH WILL DEFEND THE UNITED STATES AGAINST MISSILE ATTACK. THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, THE AMERICAN MILITARY, THE SOVIET MILITARY ALL RECOGNIZE THIS FACT. THEY HAVE, AS A MATTER OF FACT, MADE THIS MUTUAL WEAKNESS THE DECLARED NATIONAL POLICY OF BOTH NATIONS AT THE SALT TALKS.

IN MOSCOW BOTH SIDES IN THE COLD WAR ACCEPTED THEIR MUTUAL MILITARY VULNERABILITY. THEY SIGNED AWAY THE DEFENSE OF THEIR PEOPLE WITH A STRICT LIMITATION ON ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES IN A PERMANENT TREATY. AND THEY DID THIS OUT OF RECOGNITION OF THE HARD MILITARY FACTS OF LIFE--NOT THE GOODNESS OF THEIR HEARTS. NO DOUBT PRESIDENT NIXON SPOKE FOR PREMIER BREZHNEV, AND ALL THE ASSEMBLED MILITARY FROM BOTH SIDES, WHEN HE SAID HE WISHED MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE THAT HE COULD PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE U. S. AGAINST STRATEGIC MISSILES. BUT HE CANDIDLY ADMITTED HE COULD NOT. THAT HE SIGNED, THAT THEY ALL SIGNED, WAS A RARE TRIUMPH OF REASON OVER WISHFUL THINKING AND WASTEFUL SPENDING.

THE SOVIETS HAVEN'T CAUGHT UP WITH THE UNITED STATES. THEY DON'T HAVE TO. THERE ARE NO WINNERS IN NUCLEAR WAR.

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THEY HAVE AN INFERIOR FORCE, MUCH LESS EXPENSIVE. BUT THEY HAVE ENOUGH. SO DOES FRANCE. SO DOES ENGLAND. SOON CHINA WILL HAVE ENOUGH. PERPHAPS JAPAN THEN, AND LATER GERMANY....

YET, AMERICANS GO ON SEEKING STRATEGIC SECURITY. WISHFULLY, HOPEFULLY, WE BUY POSEIDON, TRIDENT, THE B-1, SAM-D AND THE REST...STOCKPILING \$50 BILLION IN WHAT WE HAVE COME TO CALL BARGAINING CHIPS. AGAINST WHOM?

THE SOVIETS HAVE NOTHING LIKE TRIDENT, THEIR BOMBERS ARE TWENTY YEARS OLD AND FOURFOLD FEWER THAN OURS.

IS IT WORTH OUR DEVELOPING A \$13 BILLION TRIDENT NUCLEAR SUBMARINE AS A BARGAINING CHIP?

IS IT WORTH OUR BUILDING AN \$11 BILLION B-1 BOMBER WHEN THE SOVIETS COME TO THE BARGAINING TABLE WITH 140 OLD BOMBERS?

IS IT WORTH WRECKING OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS TO SPEND \$17 BILLION FOR KEEPING FORCES IN EUROPE ON THE CHANCE THAT THEY MIGHT FIGHT A COVENTIONAL WAR AGAINST THE SOVIETS? IS A CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE WITH THE SOVIET UNION EVEN A REMOTE POSSIBILITY? MUCH LESS A \$17 BILLION ANNUAL PROBABILITY?

ONE FINAL CAUTION...BEWARE OF ARMS CONTROL. BEWARE OF THOSE WHO SAY WE SHOULD NEGOTIATE ON EVERY MILITARY ISSUE AND EVERY MILITARY FORCE. WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO IN STABILIZING

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OUR OWN FORCES, BEFORE THE SOVIETS ARE EVEN IN THE SAME BALL GAME. IN THESE AREAS OF OVERWHELMING AMERICAN DOMINANCE WE CAN TAKE THE INITIATIVE UNILATERALLY WITH NO RISK TO OURSELVES. IF WE HAD ONLY ONE-HALF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS WE HAVE TODAY, WE WOULD HAVE FAR MORE THAN NEEDED TO DETER AN ATTACK AND RETALIATE IF NECESSARY.

INSTEAD OF CHASING OURSELVES ROUND AND ROUND IN THE ARMS RACE WHY DON'T WE PLAY THE WAITING GAME OURSELVES. SLOWDOWN, HANGBACK, AND SEE WHAT THE SOVIETS DO. THEY HAVE SAVED A LOT OF MONEY BY LETTING US DO THE LEADING FOR THIRTY YEARS.

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PACEM IN TERRIS

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

III

Circulated: October 4, 1973

Critique:

by William C. Foster

former Director, United States Arms Control & Disarmament Agency;
former Deputy Secretary of Defense

FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY

Scheduled:

Session V-VI, beginning at 8 p.m., Tuesday, October 9, 1973

Also Scheduled:

Addresses by Clark Clifford and Herbert York

Critique: Albert Wohlstetter (Chairman); Gloria Emerson,
William Foster, Admiral Gene R. La Rocque, Jeremy Stone
Admiral Stansfield Turner



A Paper prepared for delivery at a national convocation sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, to convene at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, Oct. 8-11, 1973. Press inquiries should be directed to Frank K. Kelly, The Center, PO Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103. Telephone: Area Code 805 969-3281.

Pacem in Terris III

Comments by William C. Foster

In view of the time limitation, I will confine my comments to Dr. Herbert York's statement.

Dr. York has made two important main points: First, deterrence through the threat of mutually assured destruction is a terrible and uncivilized strategy, and high priority must be given to developing something better. It is unworthy of civilized mankind to have to deal in such threats of massive destruction.

The plain fact is that no President of the United States and no leader of the U.S.S.R. could bring himself to launch such an attack. As quoted by Dr. York, McGeorge Bundy strongly supported that view. This view ignored the additional fact that in the event of an actual nuclear exchange there would be millions of casualties outside of the countries of the two main adversaries, making the possible nuclear exchange even more inhumane.

Dr. York's second point sets forth the insane potential magnitude of "overkill" in our nuclear weapons, and also in those of the Soviet Union. Certainly most experts agree that these excesses exist.

Dr. York also outlines the background of how and why we arrived at where we are in strategic weapons and states sound reasons why, with the passage of time and with the changes that

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have taken place in the political situation, we should now begin to reduce both inventories and the threat. There are less burdensome and wiser ways to maintain stability. It is true that for sometime now the M.A.D. concept (appropriate acronym) has led to at least temporary stability. However, the only answer in the end is to alter attitudes and realize the crucial fact that we dwell on one space craft not two; that damage to the craft would be universal, not only a national calamity.

Dr. York later introduces a suggestion for reducing these over-large inventories of nuclear weapons so as to make possible an eventual elimination of dependence on the strategy of mutual assured destruction. It is true, that even with his recommended reduction, both sides would still have the capability of reacting to any world strife by the threat of destruction at a lower level, but at least it might be confined to the cities of the two adversaries, eliminating much of the threat to the rest of mankind.

In other words, start by mutually destroying or removing some of the older, powerful, but less efficient devices. He is hopeful that this might work, but United States' attempts back in 1964 to do something of this sort by matching destruction of U.S. B-47's and Soviet TU-16's, ran into stubborn resistance. There seems to be a universal tendency to hang on to weapons that may have outlived broad usefulness.

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In view of that, I venture another suggestion which might either supplant or supplement Dr. York's idea and over time could have a major effect. It is obvious that to be certain that weapons in inventory are ready and effective, there must be continuous proof testing. This testing of delivery vehicles is done in the atmosphere and is readily detectable by national means on the other side.

Also, the development of new devices depends on a multitude of tests. My suggestion is that we negotiate a mutual agreement limiting all atmospheric tests to a modest number. This would have two effects. First, gradually, weapons in inventory would become less dependable; and, second, the ability to deploy new devices would be restricted. I would strengthen the restrictive effect of these proof tests by a comprehensive test ban on nuclear explosions underground. Our capability to detect such tests from a distance and to distinguish them from earthquakes has, by the massive expenditure of funds and scientific effort, gradually improved over the years so that the risk of an adversary making tests of significant value without detection is minimal.

Dr. York says that after thirty years not one single nuclear weapon has been destroyed or even moved as a result of an agreement to do so. That could lead, he states, to a feeling of utter

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hopelessness or to a renewed determination to accomplish something at long last. Certainly the time is ripe for the latter. SALT, if vigorously pressed by our leaders, can make progress in this direction.

Our new Secretary of State has in the past been deeply engaged in the nuclear field, including SALT. With continued interest and new authority, he can by vigorous participation give new momentum to United States' efforts.

Dr. York's method and my own, plus SALT, are all we can perhaps attempt for the time being, and would be something but not the final answer. That answer, as everyone knows, is to focus the great technology and resources of the world on undertakings that are vastly more beneficial to the march of man than preparing for his destruction.

After many years of grappling with the problem, of countless hours in negotiations, and in preparation for negotiations, it seems clear that the answer is not in the hands of men, but in their hearts. But given what we are given, Dr. York is right; let us do what we can.

Nixon Foreign Policy Called Full of Contradictions

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Nixon administration was charged by a cross-section of intellectual critics yesterday with pursuing a foreign policy that is studded with contradictions.

Improved U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China were widely praised in the second day of a national seminar, "Pacem in Terris," sponsored by The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. But the administration was overwhelmingly criticized in the forum for lack of a coherent strategy to match its "declaratory policy," as former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford described it.

While there have been "profound changes in the international setting," Clifford said last night, "if we turn from declaratory policy to the hard facts of [defense] budgets and forces, we find incredibly little change."

"We are being asked to spend more, not less" on "overblown military forces and hardware" unnecessary for national security at a time of acute challenge to the credibility of the government and the national economy, Clifford said.

This only illustrates, said Richard Barnet, co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies, "that national security is a sufficiently slippery concept" in the hands of policy makers to be manipulated at will.

"Most of the changes in U.S.-Soviet relations," said Barnet, "took place in Wash-

ington, not Moscow." He said, "The 'mellowing process' which was supposed to be the result of surrounding the mightiest land masses in the world with nuclear rockets has, much like 'peace with honor' in Vietnam, been simply stipulated."

Threats Redefined

In fact, said Barnet, "The military might of the Soviet Union has never been greater. What has happened is that the foreign military threats have been redefined to a manageable level."

The conference, attended yesterday by about 1,500 persons, is looked on by its hopeful sponsors as the opening of a national dialogue to stimulate a new consensus on foreign policy in the aftermath of the divisive Indochina war. But even that premise was challenged by some participants on grounds that U.S. money continues American involvement in that war.

With its own society and moral standards in disarray, said Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau of the City University of New York, "Today America offers the world not something to emulate, but to avoid."

American policy "is riddled with internal tensions and contradictions," said Prof. Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University.

"The great art of the administration" under the Nixon Doctrine, he said, "has been in making many believe that we had transformed, or were transforming, the 'U.S. world system' into a pluralistic, mul-

tilateral, 'stable structure of peace.' In reality, we have only changed the method of operation and control of that system" through "a policy of indirect primacy."

For real transformation of U.S. policy from a pattern of over-commitment abroad, said Hoffmann, "we will have to see ourselves again as one player among many, rather than as a specially anointed missionary or teacher."

In a forum on national defense policy last night, Herbert York, former science adviser to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy and Defense Department director of research and engineering, said the nation's highest priority should be to "get rid of" the nuclear strategy of mutual assured destruction as soon as possible.

"Terrible Strategy"

"It is a terrible strategy," said York, because: "If for any political or psychological or technical reason - deterrence should fail, the physical, biological and social consequences [of nuclear war] would be completely out of line with any reasonable view of the national objectives of the U.S.A. or the Soviet Union."

Besides killing most of the urban population of both nations and "well over one-half of the town and country populations," said York, a full nuclear exchange could result in perhaps "10 million casualties from cancer and leukemia in countries situated well away

from the two main protagonists."

York said this is because the weapons we rely on for deterrence are "from 10 to 100 times as murderous and destructive" as they need be to satisfy that purpose.

In negotiations with the Soviet Union, said York, the United States should start by eliminating nuclear weapons that deliver the most megatons of destruction. He proposed that the United States eliminate its long-range bombers and its 54 Titan missiles, and the Soviet Union eliminate its "300 very large SS-9 missiles plus a relatively small intercontinental bomber force," with replacements barred.

In addition, York said that the United States should eliminate one-half of its Minuteman missiles that are not being converted into Minuteman III weapons, and also eliminate the 10 of its 412 Polaris submarines not scheduled to be converted to carry Poseidon missiles, in exchange for matching Soviet offsets.

Even cutting this much "overkill capacity," said York, would little reduce the nuclear war threat to urban populations; but would considerably decrease casualties in rural areas and small towns.

In an argument familiar to nuclear specialists, Prof. Albert Wohlstetter of the University of Chicago, a consultant to government agencies, countered that the essential factor in reducing mass destruction of civilians is not the size of the force cut, but "how

the force would be aimed and used."

"The United States has always aimed at military targets," said Wohlstetter, and a policy of "attacking military targets that minimizes unintended civilian casualties would offer incentives for an adversary to reciprocate," limiting civilian casualties.

York and other critics contend there is no way to assure that an adversary will follow such a pattern of targeting. "New Strategy"

Vice Adm. Stansfield Turner, president of the Naval War College and former director of the Navy's Systems Analysis Division, agreed that "we must search for a new strategy for world security

which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war."

But today, Turner said, what is called "overkill or overinsurance may be the only practical substitute for mutual trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers on the triggers of nuclear holocaust, it may not be all bad."

Paul Warnke, former assistant secretary of defense, said earlier that "perhaps the talent most needed in foreign policy for the decade ahead will be that of making friends out of former enemies without losing those present allies whose continued friendship is of key importance to our national interests." This, he said,

has been the Nixon administration's greatest failing.

Debate continued in the conference yesterday on whether to demand better treatment of dissidents and potential emigrants in the Soviet Union as a condition for trade with the United States.

Prof. Marshall Shulman of Columbia University agreed with the Nixon administration that first priority in official U.S. policy should be placed on "reducing the danger of nuclear war" and that "public and frontal demands upon the Soviet Union in regard to domestic affairs" should be avoided.

Individuals and groups protesting "the repugnant aspects of the Soviet system," includ-

ing "the barbaric throttling of the creative life of its intellectuals and artists," he said, should apply such protests "even-handedly" to all nations. "Otherwise," said Shulman, "the motivation for these protests is suspect, and our moral commitment is clouded."

Panelist John Paton Davies, former U.S. diplomat, however, expressed the more popular view in the conference. He said, "We have, in effect, made a deal with the Kremlin" by which it profits from detente, and it is "little to ask that it should 'stop affronting the civilized world with savage abuse of its most worthy subjects.'"

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P.T

Dr. York has presented a most interesting argument in his paper. Briefly summarized it says: (1) Deterrence by mutual destruction is bad and we should search for ways and means of getting out of it, but (despite 25 years of search), (2) we have not found anything better, so let us accept it for the short run, however (3) let us reduce the number of weapons we maintain toward this purpose. We will not reduce deterrence but will reduce the overkill--and presumably the kill of innocent bystanders in other countries. I shall review and comment on each of these three points and make some suggestions of my own as to the future.

Dr. York makes the case that strategic deterrence is bad. He admits that there has been no invasion of Western Europe, but also points out that this does not prove that nuclear deterrence has worked. Of course, Dr. York's argument is correct. However, one should not disregard the fact that this argument applies to any form of deterrence--we never know when deterrence works. We only know when it fails. The only thing that can be said with certainty is that there has been no war in Europe since 1945, that is about 28 years. From 1870 to 1914 there was a period of 44 years and from 1918 to 1939 a period of 21 years where war was absent from the European scene. These are meager data on which to base a serious discussion of the effectiveness of nuclear weapons for deterrence.

A question, however, is worth asking: Did we see signs of the forthcoming events between 1870 and 1914, between 1918 and 1938? And do we see any signs of such events now? It is also interesting to speculate for a second and to ask what would have been the course of history if there had not been an agreement outlawing poisoned gas? Could it be that World War II would have been deterred? It is difficult on this basis to decide whether the strategy of nuclear deterrence has been or is an undesirable one.

Dr. York's opposition to strategic deterrence would seem to stem more from the magnitude of the consequences of failure--and the fact that third parties may be penalized without actual involvement, than from any particularly abhorrent aspect of deterrence itself. That is Dr. York seems to accept the need for some means of achieving what strategic deterrence seeks to achieve. He, however, appears to accept as a fact that nuclear deterrence is the only form of deterrence available today. I am not convinced that this is absolutely true. We have agreed not to maintain other forms of deterrence such as chemical and biological warfare options, very large, and obviously expensive, general purpose forces and probably, other less realistic forms of deterrence. Should one re-examine these forms and compare them to nuclear deterrence? I do not believe that we should periodically reexamine our premises and our assumptions.

As a result of this acceptance, Dr. York states, "We must find some better form of international relationship than the current dependency of a strategy of mutual assured destruction." ~~and~~, ~~Barring anything radically different to propose in lieu of the strategy of mutual assured destruction, he suggests that by getting progressively rid of obsolete weapons, either by mutual agreement or by unilateral act, overkill, and the fallout danger to third parties could be reduced and a general sense of the situation will have improved.~~

Even the most ardent opponent of disarmament would have to agree with the risks inherent in nuclear weapons, with their potential to wreak disasters of immense magnitude and with the great value to humanity of reducing this risk to a tolerable level. Hence, the question is not really whether reducing armaments, while maintaining deterrence, is the way to achieve the purpose. Indeed the question is whether such an approach is not worse than no reduction in the numbers of weapons. ~~It can be argued indeed that such steps as proposed by Dr. York act as safety valves in the pressure for searching for better alternatives to strategic deterrence; if his proposal was acted upon we could find ourselves lulled into a false sense of security and locked in the resulting structure of strategic force with little incentive to pursue changes. This from the point of view of the value of reduction.~~ ~~One can however also~~ ask what are the risks involved in unilateral disarmament from a political point of view. Here again the arguments can vary; but our allies may view such moves as an acceptance on our part of Soviet Superiority in numbers. And while the military effect of such disparity in numbers may be negligible, a point not fully agreed upon if the reduction were to eliminate one of our three strategic deterrence branches, the political ~~one~~, may be disastrous. Again, another view can be suggested, whereas we would reap huge propaganda value and put the Soviet Union under pressure to follow suit. This could well be so, but our past achievements on the propaganda front have been meager.

Where does this leave us? It is clearly not enough to propose or reject proposals for limited disarmament as conducive or dangerous to further final disarmament. One must take a longer point of view and examine whether, and under what condition, a nonnuclear world stability could be achieved, which would be acceptable to all concerned, reliable, and which would therefore be the basis for building trusting relationships between opposing political systems.

Asking the question in these terms may appear tantamount to saying that this is an impossibility. And the reason for this appearance is that we tend to think of a solution in terms of conventional terms. Yet, we are faced with a most unconventional problem and we must try to think out unconventional solutions. The origin of the problem in broadbrush can be viewed as our fear

that the Soviet Union--or China--would enter into a massive--or stepwise continuous attack against territories of economic, political and military interest to us and that they would do this until such time when they feel they have weakened us enough to overtake us, directly or indirectly. The Communist fears are probably not much different. Nuclear weapons have given us a real, albeit dangerous, sense of security against these perceived threats. With the immensity of the retribution that the attacked nation could give to the attacking one, the price is just too high. The answer then must lie into a new perception of what is a deterrent.

To arrive at the elimination of nuclear weapons as deterrents, one must find a replacement for their deterrence value and give the countries involved the time to shift their perception of deterrence. In particular one can try to introduce the notion that losses exist, which do not imply a nation's vanishing from the earth's surface, which nonetheless would be considered intolerable and would be valid deterrents. And since military might, when deprived of its nuclear weapons back-up does not seem alone to be a workable approach, other avenues for this new form of deterrence must be explored.

We would like to suggest, as an example, that the creation of large joint economic ventures which would be destroyed if the partners would cease to cooperate would provide such a deterrent. The size of these ventures would be such that their loss could disrupt a country's economy to such a degree that this would become in itself an unacceptable risk.

Where would the funds for such a venture come from? To this question Dr. York's proposal provides an immediate answer. By establishing a joint plan to reduce a certain fraction of nuclear weapons systems every year and to invest the savings resulting from this move into joint ventures one could have huge amounts available. One can envision a plan for reduction and eventual eliminations of strategic weapons over a period of say twenty to twenty-five years which would be revised every two years and ammended to remain responsive to world conditions.

For those who fear the effect of such an ultimate disarmament one could suggest that some of these funds be used to help maintain modern and well equipped general purpose forces. One should include in the plan provision for creation of economic ventures common to both the NATO and WARSAW pact nations. Such ventures could lead to some form of United States of Europe.

*Recent intelligence reports of Secretary Brekznev's speech to the Communist Leaders tend to support this view, with the USSR using detente, instead of force to achieve its purpose.

The kind of joint ventures which can be undertaken has to be defined carefully. Large trade agreements, such as the Administration has been pushing for, are a step in the right direction but are only a beginning. Attempts such as those described here must follow, because it is important for all of us to realize that real removal of the nuclear threat will not occur until we have been able to replace the deterrence based on the fear of destruction by the deterrence based on some other fear, may be that of widespread unrest that governmental powers may be unable to bring under control.




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THE SOVIET NAVAL THREAT: REALITY AND ILLUSION

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has told Congress that "a major shift in the naval balance between the United States and the Soviet Union" is taking place.

"Unless we accelerate the modernization of our fleet," he told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 15, 1972, "the Soviets will increasingly challenge our control of the seas in those maritime regions essential to the success of our forward defense strategy, as well as in ocean areas closer to our shores."

On the basis of these arguments, the Defense Department has asked Congress for \$9.7 billion in new Navy procurement funds for fiscal 1973, about \$1 billion more than in 1972, which was in turn about \$1 billion more than in 1971. These funds are part of a Navy "modernization" program: 42 major combat ships and 21 submarines now under construction or authorized by Congress and more than 60 major surface ships and a new fleet of ballistic missile submarines contemplated (see tables 4 and 5).

The Center for Defense Information has made its own study of the naval balance and has reached the following conclusions:

- The balance is heavily in favor of the United States.
- The Soviet Union is doing little which would significantly change the balance in the next few years.
- There is little evidence to support the request for a large increase in money for ships designed to project US power overseas and to greatly expand US strategic weapons capability.

A Look at the Balance

Defense Department testimony to Congress on the Soviet naval threat stresses such trends as an increase in the number of Soviet major combat surface ships in the last five years (from 185 to 215, including two new helicopter carriers, seven new missile cruisers, 18 new missile destroyers and 36 new escorts). It stresses Russia's numerical advantage in submarines (about 343 Soviet to 138 US), new Soviet anti-ship missiles, and increases in Soviet naval operations in the world's oceans.

But these presentations fail to give a fair picture of the relative strengths of these two navies. The diagrams and data on the following pages give a fair picture. They show that:

1. The Soviet Union has no nuclear-powered combat surface ships and is not projected to be building any. The United States has four and is building seven more.

2. The United States has 14 attack aircraft carriers which carry from 40 to 90 jet aircraft each, used for striking land or sea targets. Two nuclear carriers are under construction. The Soviet Union has no attack carriers and no sea-based fixed-wing aircraft. The Defense Department has asked for funds in 1973 to start building the power plant for a fourth nuclear attack carrier. It also has asked for funds to design a new fleet of at least eight smaller follow-on carriers to be called Sea Control Ships.

3. The United States has two anti-submarine carriers which carry helicopters and fixed-wing anti-submarine aircraft. The Soviets have two anti-submarine carriers which are actually cruisers with large helicopter landing decks. One 35,000-ton ship is under construction in the Soviet Union which may be a carrier or some other type of ship.

4. The United States has seven "assault" helicopter carriers designed to move marines ashore. Five more, twice the size of the existing ones, are under construction. The Soviet Union has no comparable ships.

5. The United States has nine cruisers. The Soviets have 25. But four of the Soviet cruisers are pre-World War Two and are probably being retired. Ten of the Soviet cruisers are smaller than many US destroyers. The US Navy wants to build two 2200-ton prototypes of what would eventually be a cruiser-size hovercraft called a "surface effects ship."

6. Soviet missile-firing destroyers are fewer and smaller than their US counterparts. Congress has already authorized 30 new destroyers (DD963 Spruance Class), which are larger than any destroyers of the Soviet Union. The US Navy is asking for funds for 50 new "patrol frigates" which will be larger than most Soviet destroyers. By the late 1970s all US destroyers and patrol frigates are to be equipped with the new Harpoon surface-to-surface missile.

7. The present US fleet of 41 strategic ballistic missile submarines has 2800 separately targetable warheads. Russia's ballistic missile submarines have about 500 warheads (see Table 1). Also, a greater percentage of the US ballistic missile submarines are on station at a given time than is the case with the Soviet submarines. By 1976, the

Continued on Page 2

* To put in context with overall US strategic capability, Secretary Laird gave these comparative figures for nuclear weapons for mid 1972:

	US	USSR
Total offensive strategic warheads	5700	2500
Warheads on ICBMs	1000	1000
Warheads on SLBMs	1000	1000
Warheads on SSBNs	1000	1000
Warheads on other systems	2700	500

MEGATONS

Senate agrees to consider Air Guard merger with Air Reserve

By ALBERT SEHLSTEDT, JR.
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — The Senate adopted a proposal yesterday to study the feasibility of merging the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve.

This politically sensitive plan was proposed Saturday by Senator Barry M. Goldwater (R., Ariz.) and accepted yesterday by the Senate as an amendment to the \$20.4 billion military procurement bill.

The Air Force Reserve is an adjunct of the Air Force and operates under the aegis of the Defense Department while the guard is a state-oriented military organization largely responsible to each governor.

A similar plan to merge the Army Reserve and the ground units of the National Guard in 1964 was vigorously opposed, and eventually turned down by Congress.

Senator Goldwater, whose proposed study would be car-

ried out by the Defense Department, conceded Saturday that he was dealing with a "very emotional subject" and predicted that each senator would be besieged to "stop Goldwater and his crazy idea."

Current requests

The senator has been a member of both the guard and the reserve and is now a retired major general in the reserve.

His idea for the study was prompted, at least in part, by questioners around the country who wanted to know why it was necessary to have two such separate flying units in the defense establishment, Mr. Goldwater indicated.

Congress has been asked to approve a budget of \$767 million for the Air National Guard in the current fiscal year. That authorization also would include a personnel level of 92,291 men and women and 1,533 aircraft.

The requested budget for the Air Force Reserve is \$406 million with a personnel level of 49,773 and 408 aircraft.

The Goldwater proposal was approved by two key senators, Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), the majority leader, and John C. Stennis (D., Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Senator Stennis did modify the amendment, with the approval of the Senate, to include in the study a consideration of the modernization needs of the guard and reserve, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of merging the guard into the reserve and the reserve into the guard.

The study would be conducted by the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Stennis told his colleagues yesterday that the present secretary, James R. Schlesinger, was "interested in this matter" and had said he would "give the whole question

urgent consideration."

The Goldwater amendment, as modified by Senator Stennis, was approved on a voice vote without a roll call.

In other action yesterday, the Senate accepted an amendment to the procurement bill from Senator George S. McGovern (D., S.D.), who wanted the Pentagon to give affected communities advance notice of base closings.

The amendment, accepted on a voice vote, too, would require six months notice through the Defense Department's Office of Economic Adjustment when any firm decision had been made at the Pentagon to close a base or substantially cut back on its operations.

Further, the amendment calls for an expansion of the Office of Economic Adjustment and obligates that office to consult with local leaders about the base closings.

Debate on the military procurement bill resumes today and will occupy much of the Senate's time for the rest of the week.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS - 24 SEPTEMBER 1973 P-19 (25)

RICHARD WILSON

Schlesinger Lays It on the Line

One after another, presidents and secretaries of Defense succeed each other in the White House and the Pentagon and they all come to the same conclusion. From time to time the military confrontation with the Soviet Union varies in intensity but it remains as a real and incontrovertible fact of life.

Now and again a secretary of defense is able to articulate the problem with clarity. That is the case today and makes Defense Secretary James Schlesinger worth listening to.

He is more like some of the earlier intellectualizing secretaries of Defense, James Forrestal and Robert Lovett, and less the human computer like Robert McNamara. Certainly he has no quick read-out on weapons systems except that they ought to be simpler.

Schlesinger gets back to simple common sense answers on the basic questions which are

anew today in the post-Vietnam climate of no more wars. What is the threat? Why do we need troops in Europe? Aren't we coming to terms with the Communists? Aren't we spending way too much on defense?

"We ought to have a conventional capability in Europe so that the President is not driven to immediate use of nuclear weapons," he says. Anyway, the Europeans are now supplying 70-75 percent of the ready forces of NATO, including sea and air.

OK, why not just Europeanize the NATO defense as we Vietnamized South Vietnam's defense?

The difference, according to Schlesinger, is that in Europe there is not a single power facing another power of somewhere near equal strength. In Europe there is a conglomeration of relatively small, weak states facing a super power. They require a backbone supplied by the United States.

without it they may collapse from Communist pressure.

Consequently, safety depends on a maintenance of military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and that is why American troops ought to stay in Europe to provide the backbone.

Well, isn't the threat being exaggerated? Don't the Russians really have to have peace because they can't solve their internal problems without it?

Even so, as Schlesinger sees it, detente has not affected Soviet Union behavior at all. Soviet leaders see no conflict between peaceful coexistence and the improvement of their military forces. They are doing so at a progressive rate of 3 percent each year. They have a mailed fist. It now is encased in a velvet glove. That really doesn't make the fist any softer.

It is just a lot of bunk, Schlesinger continues, that defense is draining off resources and that the country is being warned.

improve the human lot. Since 1969, measured in constant dollars, there has been a shrinkage in defense of better than a third, while non-defense has gone up \$70 billion. Defense is now down to 23 percent of the federal budget from 30 and 40 percent in the 1950s and 1960s.

This goes on and on to Schlesinger's final conclusion that phony and foggy claims are being made about a defense budget which may not be enough. To maintain the force level of 1969 would require an outlay of \$40 billion more.

Schlesinger is different as secretary of Defense because he is pulling no punches. He is not romancing Congress, like Melvin Laird, or trying to outwit it like Robert McNamara, but is laying it on the line that the Russians are going ahead toward military superiority without any apologies and this country needs to be warned.

Kissinger invites U.N. members to join big powers in detente

By JAMES S. KEAT
Sun Staff Correspondent

New York—Henry A. Kissinger, the new Secretary of State, invited the United Nations yesterday to join the big powers in forging a permanent peace from the evolving detente among the world's leaders.

Making his first public speech as the chief United States diplomat in name as well as fact, Dr. Kissinger sought to conciliate most of the nation's critics in the international organization.

Couched almost entirely in general statements of principle, Dr. Kissinger's 26-minute formal address to the U.N. General Assembly contained a few hints of future administration tactics but little about specific policies.

He made only passing reference to the Middle East, expected to be the object of his next major diplomatic offensive. He reiterated the long-standing U.S. policy to "assist in the search for just solutions" in the Mideast, while adding that "we cannot substitute for the efforts of those most directly involved" in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

In a last-minute change in his prepared address, Dr. Kissinger said the U.S. would "urge" the adversaries to make "practical progress." His text used the word "encourage" instead of the stronger verb he voiced.

The nuance is slightly closer to the position the Arabs would like the United States to assume, bringing pressure on Israel to negotiate on terms they could accept. Israel has said it would negotiate, but only without preconditions like an advance pledge to withdraw from all the territory it captured in the 1967 war.

Dr. Kissinger also proposed that a world food conference be convened next year under the U.N. to "harness the efforts of all nations" to alleviate diminishing reserves needed to protect against regional famines.

International agriculturalists have been discussing means of combating the growing shortage of essential grains, and Dr. Kissinger was suggesting a speedup in those efforts.

He signalled a slight but perhaps important shift in the U.S. position on U.N. peace-keeping efforts by declaring "the time has come to agree

on a peace-keeping guidelines . . . The United States is prepared to consider how the Security Council can play a more central role.

This represents movement away from the past U.S. insistence that the U.N. secretary general be authorized to direct peace-keeping missions, such as those which operated in the Middle East and in the Congo, under a general directive of the Security Council.

The Soviet Union long has insisted that the Security Council, where the five permanent members have a veto, maintain close control over peace-keeping missions. Some Western nations recently have adopted this position and the administration appears to be moving toward them.

After the speech, Dr. Kissinger launched the most important part of his three day mission here, conferring with the foreign ministers attending the 28th session of the General Assembly.

He met Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the British foreign secretary and Masayoshi Ohira, Japanese foreign minister, and was host at the secretary's annual dinner for Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister, at his Waldorf-Astoria suite.

President Nixon's projected visit to Western Europe, planned as the capstone of the administration's "Year of Europe," was inconclusively discussed with Sir Alec and Mr. Ohira, U.S. officials said.

Because the planned declaration of principles binding the U.S., Western Europe and Japan in a modified political alliance, is still far from worked out, Dr. Kissinger will discuss it further in the next month or so in visits he will make to Britain and Japan, the officials said.

Although no decision is said to have been made, knowledgeable officials doubt now that Mr. Nixon will visit Europe before next year.

The visit to Japan this year is still possible.

The secretary's 2½-hour dinner with Mr. Gromyko covered a wide range of well known issues affecting the two countries, U.S. officials said. They included a brief discussion of the Middle East, the conferences on European security and mutual troop reductions in Europe, trade concessions with the Soviet Union, immigration

sion of Soviet dissidents. U.S. officials had little in the way

of specific information about the substance of these talks.

Speaking to an unusually crowded General Assembly hall with U.N. employees packed on the sidelines, Dr. Kissinger spoke at length about the philosophy of building a world permanently at peace.

He assured the smaller nations, which make up the vast and restive majority of the world body, that the U.S. has "no desire for domination."

Speaking as much to U.S. allies in Western Europe nervous over behind-the-scenes deals with the Soviet Union, Dr. Kissinger declared: "We have not been asked to participate in a condominium: We would reject such an appeal if it were made."

Asserting that there is "no alternative" to "perpetual peace" by choice or necessity, Dr. Kissinger said: "The United States has made its choice. My country seeks true peace, not simply an armistice. We strive for a world in which the rule of law governs and fundamental human rights are the birthright of all.

"Beyond the bilateral diplomacy, the pragmatic agreements and dramatic steps of recent years, we envisage a comprehensive, institutionalized peace encompassing all nations great and small—a peace which this organization is uniquely situated to foster and to anchor in the hearts of men."

Dr. Kissinger reiterated in muted form some of the criticisms he has made in the past of the international organization. While it has made some "substantial achievements," he said, it has also "poured forth . . . rhetoric."

Some delegates, while pleased at Dr. Kissinger's expressions of hope in the U.N., were disappointed in the lack of specific political statements in his speech. One ambassador of a nonaligned nation commented, "He rightly criticized us for rhetoric, but then he indulged in it himself."

Dr. Kissinger conceived his speech as a broad statement of principles, rather than a substantial discussion of specific issues. In that approach, however, he skirted close to the bland generalizations of his predecessors, few of whom as a body that could cope with serious political problems.

WASHINGTON POST

25 SEP 1973 P-4

Congress

Senate

Meets at 9 a.m.

COMMITTEES:

Commerce—9:30 a.m. Open: Nomination of George Hearn to be a federal maritime commissioner, 510 Dirksen Office Bldg.
Commerce Subcommittee on Surface Transportation—2 p.m. open: S. 2267, removal of certain restrictions on trans. of dry bulk commodities; Robert Blinder, asst. Sec'y. of Trans.; Floyd Blaskie, Amer. Commercial Barge Line, 5110 DOB.
Finance Subcommittee on Financial Markets—10 a.m. open: Institutional investor in the stock market, Edward Malone, General Motors; Quentin Ford, Bankers Trust; James Lane, Chase Manhattan Bank, 2228 DOB.

Foreign Relations—10 a.m. open: Ambassador and AID nominations, 4221 DOB.
Interior Subcommittee on Minerals, Metals and Fuels—10 a.m. open: S. 378, providing for a Bureau of Mines research center at Blacksburg, Va. Sen. Byrd, Rep. Wampler, Dr. T. Marshall Hahn, pres. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 3110 DOB.

Labor and Public Welfare Subcommittee on Children and Youth—10 a.m. open: Influence of govt. policies on families with children, Dr. Margaret Mead, Dr. Uriel Bronfenbrenner of Cornell U., and others, 4232 DOB.

Select Comtee. on Presidential Campaign Activities—10 a.m. open: Watergate, E. Howard Hunt, 318 Russell Office Bldg.

Joint Comtee. on Atomic Energy—10 a.m. & 2 p.m. open: Nuclear Reactor Safety, Dixy Lee Ray and William Anders, AEC and others, 5407 Cap.

Joint Economic Subcommittee on Consumer Economics—10 a.m. open: Food and other consumer price increases, Gary Seavers, Council of Economic Advisers, 1202 DOB.

Conferees—2:30 p.m. closed: S. 1081, rights of way across federal lands, EF-100 Cap.

Conferees—2:30 p.m. closed: S. 426, testing of potentially harmful or polluting chemical substances before manufacture, S. 126 Cap.

Minority Policy—12:30 p.m. Closed: Luncheon meeting, S207 Cap.

Appropriations Subcommittee—2:30 p.m. Closed: Mark up Labor-HEW, 5128 Cap.

House

Meets at noon on a continuing resolution.

Committees:

Agriculture—10 a.m. Open: Forests Subcommittee, HJ Res. 729-Forest Serv. employee reduction, Dept. & pub. wit. 1301 Longworth Office Bldg.
Appropriations—10 a.m. Closed: Defense Subcommittee, Navy Dept. wit. H-140 Cap.

Armed Services—10 a.m. Open: Subcommittee No. 4, HR8593-aviation crew incentive pay, dept. witnesses, 2118 Rayburn Office Bldg.

Education and Labor—9 a.m. Open: Cont. HR2-Welfare & pension plans disclosure act, & HR69-ESEA, 2175 ROB.

Foreign Affairs—10 a.m. Closed: Inter-Amer. Affairs subcommittee, Developments in Chile, Asst. Sec. of State Jack Kubisch, 2200 ROB.

Government Operations—9:30 a.m. Open: Resolution to auth. the chmn. to issue subpoenas for comte investigations, 2154 ROB.

Government Operations—9:30 a.m. Open: Special studies subcommittee, Animal transport, dept. pub. wit. 2247 ROB.

Interior—9:45 a.m. Open: Environ. & mining subcommittee, Mark up surface mining legis. 2253 ROB.

Interior—9:45 a.m. Open: Territorial & Insular Affairs subcommittee, HR6775-place certain lands under auth. of U.S. trust territories, Mc. V.I. Gov. Evans, dept. & pub. wit. 1324 LOB.

Commerce—10 a.m. Open: pub. health & environ. subcommittee, Mark up HR7274-public health act, 2322 ROB.

Commerce—10 a.m. Closed: transport & aeronautics subcommittee, Mark up HR9142-northeast railroad asst. 2123 ROB.

Commerce—10 a.m. Open: Commerce & finance subcommittee, Mark up HR5529-motor vehicle & school bus safety, 2218 ROB.

Judiciary—10:30 a.m. Open: Pending legis. 2141 ROB.

Judiciary—3 p.m. Open: Criminal justice subcommittee, Mark up rules of evidence legis. H-122 Cap.

Merchant Marine & Fisheries—10 a.m. Open: Fish & wildlife subcommittee, Tule Elk Natl. Wildlife Refuge, Pub. wit. 1334 LOB.

Rules—10:30 a.m. Open: HR1008-Big Cypress natl. preserve, Fla. H-313 Cap.

Science & Astronautics—10:30 a.m. Open: Energy subcommittee, energy & environ. funds, MC, asst. commerce secy. Dr. Ancker-Johnson, 2318 ROB.

Small Business—9:30 a.m. Open: Small bus. problems subcommittee, Grain marketing, pub. wit. 2359 ROB.

Veterans Affairs—10 a.m. Open: Edu. & training subcommittee, report of edu. testing serv., Princeton Univ., VA wit. 334 Cannon Office Bldg.

Ways & Means—9 a.m. Closed: Mark up HR6767-Trade reform act, Comtee

REALITY Continued from Page 1

number of separately targetable US submarine-launched warheads will increase to almost 7000. This figure does not reflect the proposed new ULMS ballistic missile submarine system which will be the subject of a subsequent edition of *The Defense Monitor*.

8. The Soviets have a fleet of 68 submarines armed with anti-shiping "cruise" missiles. The United States decided in the 1950s not to develop a capability in this area and abandoned its Regulus missile program. Recently, the Pentagon decided to go ahead with development of a new cruise missile for a new attack submarine.

9. The US has more than twice the number of nuclear-powered attack submarines as the Soviet Union. The Russians have 190 diesel attack submarines as compared to 41 for the US, but these are being phased out of both navies. The total number of Soviet attack submarines has decreased from 430 in 1960 to 283 in 1972, and Admiral Moorer states that he expects this number will continue to decline as newer submarines are introduced at a slower rate than older units are withdrawn. The US is building a new class of nuclear attack submarines (SSN-688 Los Angeles Class).

Construction

Admiral Moorer told Congress: "The rate of modernization in the Soviet surface fleet is expected to accelerate during the next few years."

The Russians are building mainly light cruisers and destroyers. These include Kresta II cruisers, and Krivak and Kashin destroyers. Recently these have been built at a rate of about one per year in each class. Defense Department reports have suggested another "possible" cruiser construction program and a "possible" carrier.

But in view of the US construction program already in progress, Soviet "acceleration" would have to be enormous to make a significant difference in the overall balance.

Regional Balances

When talking about a shifting balance, Defense Department witnesses limit themselves to comparing the US and Soviet navies. Yet, many NATO allies have modern effective navies that must be taken into account. When NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are compared the balance clearly favors NATO (see Table 2).

The balance is even more striking when naval forces in the Mediterranean, for example, are examined alone (see Table 3). (Not shown in the table are the more than 50

small patrol boats armed with anti-ship missiles which the Soviet Union has given many of her allies in the area. These boats normally operate relatively near shore.)

Other Factors

The map on page seven shows that Soviet fleets suffer geographic and climatic handicaps—limitations not faced by the US Navy. Some fleets are partially iced-in during winter. Others can be bottled up in home waters because of narrow passages through which they must travel. These "choke points" also facilitate NATO's monitoring of Soviet fleet movements.

In discussing the US-USSR naval balance, Defense Department witnesses neglect to consider the US Coast Guard—a force which possesses over 50 ocean-going cutters of naval destroyer size, armed with guns and anti-submarine weapons.

USSR SUB QUALITY ↑
Conclusions

The overall naval balance favors the United States. The Soviet Union is not likely to change this status in the near future.

The naval "balance" argument does not, therefore, justify, by itself, the kind of naval buildup which the Defense Department has under way now or plans in the future. However, Defense Department testimony makes clear that the Navy has other purposes in mind. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, told Congress that the Navy's four "capabilities" are:

- "Assured second strike"
(This refers to the Polaris-Poseidon fleet retaliating with strategic missiles after a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States.)
- "Control of sealines and areas"
- "Projection of power ashore"
- "Overseas presence"

The first "capability" is defensive. In view of the overwhelming second strike capability which the US possesses, the new ULMS program is not needed at this time. The American public deserves a much clearer definition of the other Navy "capabilities". What kind and degree of "control of the seas" has the US decided to pursue? Under what conditions and in what areas of the world will it "project power ashore"? What portion of the present Navy and what portion of the "modernization" program is designed for overseas presence? These are questions which must be publicly asked and answered before additional programs are approved by Congress.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

"Every addition to defense expenditure does not automatically increase military security. Because security is based upon moral and economic, as well as purely military strength, a point can be reached at which additional funds for arms, far from bolstering security, weaken it."

President Eisenhower

Balance is already
in favor of USSR
according to Table Six

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

CDI NEGLECTS ISSUE OF
QUALITY, AGE AND TRENDS IN
SOVIET PROGRAMS

TABLE ONE

CURRENT BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE COMPARISON

Type	Number of Submarines	Missile Type	Missile Range	Number of Launchers per Submarine	Total Number of Launchers	Number of Independent Warheads per Submarine	Total Number of Warheads
US ¹ Poseidon	12	Poseidon	2500 nm	16	192	192	2304
Polaris	21	A-3	2500 nm	16	336	16	336
Polaris	8	A-2	1500 nm	16	128	16	128
Totals	41				656		2768
USSR ² Yankee	26	SS-N-6 (Sawfly)	1300 nm	16	416	16	416
Hotel II	9	SS-N-5 (Serb)	850 nm	3	27	3	27
Golf II	25	SS-N-5 (Serb)	650 nm	3	75	3	75
Totals	60				518		518

¹ Figures as of June 1972² Figures as of February 1972

MEGATONS

X

4X

TABLE TWO

MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANT COMPARISON

(Figures as of February 1972)

NATO													WARSAW PACT							
Totals	United States	United Kingdom	France	Canada	Denmark	Netherlands	Italy	Norway	Portugal	Greece	Turkey	West Germany	Totals	USSR	Bulgaria	Czechoslovakia	East Germany	Hungary	Poland	Rumania
Attack and ASW Carriers	20	16	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Helicopter Carriers	12	7	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cruisers	16	9	3	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	25	25	0	0	0	0	0	0
Destroyers and Escorts	460	214	76	48	20	2	18	24	5	11	12	10	206	195	2	4	3	0	2	0
Submarines	259	138	34	20	4	6	5	10	15	4	2	10	350	343	2	0	0	0	5	0
Totals	767	384	118	74	24	8	25	34	20	15	14	20	583	565	4	4	3	0	7	0

TABLE THREE

MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANTS IN MEDITERRANEAN AREA

NATO AND US ALLIES						WARSAW PACT AND USSR ALLIES					
Totals	NATO ¹	Spain ²	Israel	Morocco		Totals	W.P. (USSR)	Egypt	Yugo-slavia ²	Al-bania ²	Others ³
Attack and ASW Carriers	5	4	1	0	0	0-0	0-0	0	0	0	0
Helicopter Carriers	3	3	0	0	0	0-1	0-1	0	0	0	0
Cruisers	3	2	1	0	0	2-4	2-4	0	0	0	0
Destroyers and Escorts	106	86	17	2	1	14-17	5-8	7	2	0	0
Attack Submarines	47	41	3	3	0	27-32	7-12	12	5	3	0
Totals	164	136	22	5	1	43-54	14-25	19	7	3	0

¹ NATO includes US 6th Fleet; United Kingdom forces normally in the area; one half of the French navy; and the naval forces of Italy, Greece, and Turkey.² One half of the Spanish navy.¹ USSR totals are normal and highest observed.² Yugoslavia and Albania are included though the political situation with the USSR may be strained at the moment.³ Others include Syria, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Lebanon.

TABLE FOUR

SUMMARY OF MAJOR US COMBATANT SHIPS
AUTHORIZED OR PRESENTLY UNDER CONSTRUCTION

- 2—Nuclear Attack Carriers
- 5—Large Amphibious Helicopter Assault Carriers
- 5—Large Nuclear Guided Missile Destroyer Leaders
- 16—Large All-Purpose Destroyers (DD963 Spruance Class)
- 14—Large Escorts (DE1052 Knox Class)
- 12—Large Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSN688 Los Angeles Class)
- 9—Medium Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSN637 Sturgeon Class)

NOTHING
ABOUT
SOVIET
BUILDING PROGRAM

TABLE FIVE

SUMMARY OF MAJOR US COMBATANT SHIPS
FISCAL YEAR 1973 REQUESTED

- \$299 million for long lead items for one additional nuclear attack carrier (CVN-70). (Eventual total program will cost an estimated \$951 million.)
- \$10 million for contract design for a "first buy" of eight new follow-on carriers called Sea Control Ships (SCS). (Eventual total program will cost an estimated \$1 billion.)
- \$50 million for two 2200-ton prototypes of a new major surface combatant called Surface Effect Ship (SES), which will be a large hovercraft. (Eventual total program cost is not available.)
- \$945 million for advanced development of a new strategic-missile nuclear submarine called Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS). (Eventual total program will cost an estimated \$11.2 billion as "presently constituted.")
- \$612 million for procurement of seven additional all-purpose destroyers of the DD963 Spruance Class. (Eventual total program will cost an estimated \$2.7 billion.)
- \$192 million for the lead ship of a new fifty ship class called Patrol Frigate (PF). (Eventual total program cost is estimated at \$2.4 billion.)
- \$1.05 billion for procurement of six additional nuclear attack submarines of the SSN688 Los Angeles Class. (Eventual total program will cost an estimated \$6.8 billion.)

(All total program cost estimates are based on Department of Defense figures.)

TABLE SIX

US AND USSR MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANTS
(Figures as of February 1972)

	US	USSR
SURFACE		
Aircraft Carriers	16	0
Helicopter Carriers	7	2
Cruisers (with missiles)	3	11
Cruisers (without missiles)	1	14
Destroyers and Escorts (with missiles)	65	40
Destroyers and Escorts (without missiles)	149	155
SURFACE TOTALS	246	222
SUBMARINES		
Nuclear Submarines (with ballistic missiles)	41	35 (est.)
Diesel Submarines (with ballistic missiles)	0	25
Nuclear Attack Submarines (with cruise missiles)	0	40 (est.)
Diesel Attack Submarines (with cruise missiles)	0	28
Nuclear Attack Submarines (without missiles)	56	25
Diesel Attack Submarines (without missiles)	41	190
SUBMARINE TOTAL	138	343
MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANT TOTALS	384	565

This is a balance heavily in favor of U.S.

TABLE SEVEN

US AND USSR MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANTS

(Figures as of February 1972)

US					USSR				
No. of Ships	Class or Type	Tonnage	Status	Operational Dates	No. of Ships	Class or Type	Tonnage	Status	Operational Dates
NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS					NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS				
1	Enterprise	75,000	Active	1961	None				
2	Nimitz	81,000	Under construction	1974-6					
1	Nimitz	81,000	Requested FY1973						
			\$299 million for long lead items (Est. total cost—\$951 million)						
CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS					CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS				
4	Kitty Hawk	60,100	Active	1961-8	None				
4	Forrestal	59,650	Active	1955-9					
3	Midway	51,000	Active	1945-7					
2	Hancock	32,800	Active	1944-50					
2	Essex	32,800	Active	1943-5					
8	Sea Control Ship	17,000 (est.)	Requested FY1973	late 1970s					
			\$10 million for contract design (Est. total cost—\$1 billion)						
HELICOPTER CARRIERS					HELICOPTER CARRIERS				
7	Iwo Jima	17,000	Active	1961-70	2	Moskva	15,000	Active	1967-8
5	Amphibious Assault Ship	35,000 (est.)	Under construction	1973-6	1	(Possible carrier or merchant ship)	35,000 (est.)	Under construction	late 1970s
NUCLEAR CRUISERS					NUCLEAR CRUISERS				
1	Long Beach	14,200	Active	1961	None				
CONVENTIONAL CRUISERS					CONVENTIONAL CRUISERS				
1	Salem	17,000	Active	1949	10	Sverdlov	15,450	Active	1951-60
3	Albany	13,700	Active	1945-6	1	Dzerzhinski	15,450	Active	1962
4	Cleveland	10,670	Active	1944-5	2	Chapaev	11,500	"Probably" being deactivated (old)	1948-50 ²
7	Surface Effect Ship (Hovercraft)	10,000 (est.)	Requested FY1973	late 1970s	1	Missile Cruiser	9,000 (est.)	Under construction	late 1970s
			\$50 million for two 2200 ton prototypes (Est. total cost—not available)		2	Kirov	8,500	"Probably" being deactivated (old)	1938-44
NUCLEAR DESTROYERS					NUCLEAR DESTROYERS				
5	California	9,000 (est.)	Under construction	1972-5	(The following Soviet cruisers are smaller in size than US destroyers.)				
1	Truxton	8,200	Active	1967	2	Kresta II	6,000	Active	1968-?
1	Bainbridge	7,600	Active	1962	4	Kresta I	5,140	Active	1967-8
CONVENTIONAL DESTROYERS AND ESCORTS					4	Kynda	4,800	Active	1962-5
63	Missile Destroyers	3,370	Active	1953-67	None				
30	Sorance	6,000 (est.)	Under construction	late 1970s	CONVENTIONAL DESTROYERS AND ESCORTS				
50	Patrol Frigate	3,400 (est.)	Requested FY1973	late 1970s	40	Missile Destroyers	2,850	Active	1954-?
			\$192 million for lead ship				5,200		
46	Knox	3,011	Active	1971-2	(The USSR has about 155 additional older non-missile destroyers and escorts. Some are being converted to missile ships.)				
			(14 still under construction)		NUCLEAR SUBMARINES WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES				
(The US has about 115 additional older destroyers and escorts.)					NUCLEAR SUBMARINES WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES				
NUCLEAR SUBMARINES WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES					35	Yankee	7,300	Active	1969-?
41	Polaris/Poseidon	5,900	Active	1959-67		Hotel II	3,700	Active	1961-?
7	ULMS	16,000 (est.)	Requested FY1973	late 1970s	DIESEL SUBMARINES WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES				
			\$945 million for advanced development (Est. total cost—\$11.2 billion)		25	Golf II	2,300	Active	1950-65
DIESEL SUBMARINES WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES					NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES				
None					40	Echo I+II	5,000	Active	1961-8
NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES						Charlie	4,000	Active	1969-?
None					DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES				
(The US decided not to pursue this weapon system in the late 1950s, but a cruise missile weapon system is presently under development.)					28	Juliett	2,200	Active	1962-7
DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES						Whiskey	1,200	Active	1950-7
None					NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES				
NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES					25	Victor	3,600	Active	1969-?
55	Sturgeon and others	2,317	Active	1954-?		November	3,500	Active	1959-65
12	5,000 (est.)	3,860	(Nine more under construction)		DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES				
	Los Angeles		Under construction (Six more requested in FY1973 budget)	1967-?	190	Fox Trot and others	650-2,000	Active (Most being deactivated)	1950-67
DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES					(Question marks denote continuing construction.)				
41	Guppy and others	1,350-2,145	Active (But being deactivated)	1943-59	1 Cruiser forward with large ASW helicopter deck aft				

(All total program cost estimates are based on Department of Defense figures.)

The surface-to-surface missile (Harpoon) will be put on these units and almost all other destroyers by the late 1970s. These units are shown because of this fact and their large size.

2 Construction began in 1938

In addition to the over all numerical superiority of the US major naval combatant force and its preponderance of strength in ballistic missile capability, the US Navy also enjoys fewer climatic and geographic limitations in its normal fleet operations. The Soviet North and Pacific Fleets are restricted by severe winter weather. The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets can easily be blocked if necessary to prevent them from exiting their home waters into international seas. Also, due to geographic factors, it is easier for NATO to keep the Soviet fleets under surveillance than it is for the Soviets to maintain continuous surveillance of NATO naval operations.


But Soviet do maintain continuous surveillance

TABLE EIGHT

US AND USSR FLEET OPERATIONAL COMPARISONS

US				USSR			
Normal Operations	Estimated No. of Major Units	Major Facilities	Climatic or Geographic Limitations	Normal Operations	Estimated No. of Major Units	Major Facilities	Climatic or Geographic Limitations
FIRST FLEET: Extensive training operations in eastern Pacific year-round.	125	San Diego, Long Beach, San Francisco	None	BLACK SEA FLEET: Normal in-area training operations in Black Sea year-round. Extensive deployments to Mediterranean Sea. Infrequent operations in Atlantic or Caribbean Sea.	123	Batumi, Sevastopol, Novorossiisk (USSR)	Narrow exit via Turkish Straits
SEVENTH FLEET: Extensive training operations in Western Pacific year-round. Frequent operations in Sea of Japan and South China Sea. War operations in Gulf of Tonkin and Philippines Sea. Infrequent operations in Indian Ocean. Patrols US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.	61	Pearl Harbor, Guam, Midway, Japan, Philippines, Formosa, Vietnam	None	MEDITERRANEAN FLEET: Normal operations in Eastern and Central Mediterranean Sea. Extensive time spent at anchorages or in ports. Submarines deploy from North or Baltic Fleets. Most surface combatants deploy from Black Sea Fleet.	21	Egypt	Narrow entrance via Strait of Gibraltar and Turkish Straits
SECOND FLEET: Extensive training operations in western Atlantic, Norwegian and North Seas, and in the Caribbean Sea year-round. Annual operations around South America. Deploys to Mediterranean Sea and to the Indian Ocean.	179	Norfolk, Newport, Charleston, Mayport, Key West, New London, Spain, Scotland, Iceland, Cuba, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Azores	None	BALTIC FLEET: Normal in-area training operations in Baltic Sea year-round. Out-of-area operations in North Sea. Infrequent operations in the North Atlantic or Caribbean Sea.	74	Riga, Kaliningrad (USSR)	Partial winter freeze in both ports/Narrow exit via The Sound
SIXTH FLEET: Extensive training operations throughout the Mediterranean Sea year-round. Quarterly deployment of 2-3 destroyers into the Black Sea.	231	Ports in Italy, Greece, France, Spain, Turkey, Malta	Narrow exit via Strait of Gibraltar	NORTH FLEET: Normal in-area training operations in White and Barents Seas during summer months. Out-of-area exercises in Norwegian Sea. Infrequent operations in North Atlantic and Caribbean Sea.	197	Kola, Murmansk, Severodvinsk (USSR)	Partial winter freeze in all ports
MIDDLE-EAST FORCE: Normal training operations in Persian Gulf.	2	Bahrain, Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean)	Narrow exit from Persian Gulf via Strait of Hormuz	PACIFIC FLEET: Normal in-area training operations in Seas of Japan and Okhotsk. Infrequent out-of-area operations in North and Central Pacific during summer months only. Deployments to the Indian Ocean.	161	Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Petropavlovsk (USSR)	Partial winter freeze in all ports/Narrow exits via Kuril Islands and Korea and Tsugaru Straits
Includes two attack carriers and amphibious landing ships with embarked Marine Battalion Landing Team.				INDIAN OCEAN DETACHMENT: Extensive time spent at anchor in the Socatra Island area, or in Seychelles and Maldiva Islands. Minor training operations in Arabian Sea.	5	None. Use friendly ports for support	Narrow entrance via Strait of Malacca/Long distance from Pacific and North Fleets
				GUINEA PATROL: Off west coast of Africa.	3	None. Use Conakry, Guinea for support	None

USSR FLEET OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS



THE CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION

The enormous size and complexity of the military effort in this country has outrun the institutions established for citizen understanding and control of public policy. An informed public opinion on national defense and foreign commitments is lacking in our society.

For these reasons the Center for Defense Information has been established. The Fund for Peace has encouraged and made possible the initiation of this Center. Further funding will be provided by private foundations and interested individuals. The Center will be under absolutely no financial or other obligation to any government, military, industrial or individual special interest.

The Center will concentrate exclusively on analyzing and circulating public information on matters of national defense and overseas commitments, as well as scrutinizing our national defense program on a day-to-day basis. Its appraisals will challenge existing assumptions about national defense and provide the basis for rational alternative

policies and budgets, to be measured against those of the Department of Defense.

The Center will disseminate its research and information to the broadest public possible through position papers; a journal, *The Defense Monitor*, of which this is the first edition; and material designed for the news and other media. In addition, the Center will respond to requests for information on defense matters. Future editions of *The Defense Monitor* will include analysis of the defense budget, ULMS (Underwater Long-range Missile System), the B-1 Bomber, technological superiority, the proposed attack carrier, US forces overseas and military commitments to foreign nations, as well as other topics of vital national and military concern.

The Center and its rapidly developing inventory of information will be a reliable and non-partisan resource for all individuals and groups insisting upon a military that will genuinely defend and strengthen American society, not weaken it by overcommitments and waste of resources.



Rear Admiral Gene R. La Rocque retired from the United States Navy on April 1st 1972 to become Director of the Center for Defense Information.

He commanded destroyers in the Pacific in World War Two and holds the Bronze Star and Navy Commendation Medal. He commanded a fast carrier task group with the Sixth Fleet, a division of destroyers, a cruise and Cruiser Destroyer Flotilla. He served on the staff of the Naval War College, and more recently, in the Strategic Plans Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral La Rocque recently received the Legion of Merit and left his position as Director of the Inter-American Defense College to direct the Center for Defense Information.

THE STAFF

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When quoting any material from *The Defense Monitor*, please give credit to the Center for Defense Information.

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Alexandria, Virginia 22312

July 27, 1973

The Honorable Jonathan B. Bingham
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Bingham:

Your letter of July 24 stating that "Mr. Norman Polmar... offered no data comparable to the tables (presented by Rear Admiral La Rocque)" struck me as being inaccurate and misleading.

As you will recall, (1) I asked if I could use slides to present information to the group and was told "no," that I would only be expected to speak informally for about 15 minutes, and (2) after Rear Admiral La Rocque's presentation of his "quantitative" material, at your invitation, I spoke for more than 30 minutes providing corrections to his data.

I am enclosing a copy of the working papers that I distributed at the session which you sponsored. These contain quantitative and qualitative data.

Please note that these working papers address trends. Simple numerical comparisons, such as Rear Admiral La Rocque presented at the session, are too often misleading, especially when taken out of context.

In addition, Rear Admiral La Rocque presented partial, inaccurate, and extraneous material that supported his recommendations that all naval programs were of questionable, if any, value. Attached are corrections and additions to his qualitative data that represent broader and more-balanced perspective.

Obviously, more significant than simple numbers in today's complex military environment are trends and force missions. The trends with respect to the Soviet Navy are most interesting: Today the Red Navy has reached some degree of equality or surpassed the US Navy in several areas. This, sir, is fact. (Please see the final chart in my working paper packet.)

July 27, 1973

Page 2

If we simply look at numbers how, for example, could we have won World War II? When one looks at the comparison of Allied and German submarines in the Atlantic, the Germans had several times more submarines, but were defeated at sea in the various Battles of the Atlantic because all allied ASW forces (air, surface, and submarine) were the comparative counterpart of the German U-boats.

Also, age of ships is most important. The capability of sustained readiness as well as certain combat capabilities decline with age. If new ship programs are (in large part) for replacing existing ships, then we must look at ships that will not be available (e.g., 25 years and older) when new-program ships are completed.

Accordingly, I submit that simplistic comparisons such as those offered by Rear Admiral La Rocque are meaningless and too often misleading. We cannot afford such an approach to the vital subjects of national defense and national expenditures.

I would be most pleased to discuss this matter further with you and your colleagues at your convenience. Indeed, I would be pleased to have the opportunity to present a brief slide talk on Soviet naval/maritime activities to graphically show some of the rather dramatic developments in this field.

Very respectfully,



Norman Polmar
United States Editor
JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS

NP:bw

Distribution

Attendees at meeting on July 18, 1973

Representative Les Aspin
Representative Pierre du Pont
Representative Elwood Hillis
Representative Marjorie Holt
Representative Edward Koch
Representative Robert Leggett
Representative William Lehman
Representative Robert McClory
Representative George O'Brien
Representative Robert Price
Representative Patricia Schroeder
Representative Henry Smith
Representative Floyd Spence
Representative Fortney Stark

SCHEDULE: WASHINGTON (8-11 OCT)

Monday, 8 OCT

1003 - Dep Prov, AI 774
1159 - Arr DC

1330 - Dep D.C. Pied 934
1407 - Arr Charlottesville
1630 - Dep Charl Pied 935
1707 - Arr D.C. Met by CNO Driver
1800 - 2000 Reception (P in T III)
2000-2300 I Opening Session
Session II The National Interests of the U.S.
Presiding: Robert M. Hutchins

Tuesday, 9 OCT

0930 - 1230 - Session III
The National Interests of the U.S.
Presiding: Morris L. Levinson

1300 - 1400 - Luncheon

1400 - 1700 - Session IV
The National Interests of the U.S.

(middle of available after 1600)
1930 - SANDER VANOCUR - PATOMAC ROOM @ SHERATON PARK
*2000 - 2230 - Session V The National Interest and Military Power
Session VI Deterrence through the Threat of
Mutual Assured Destruction
Presiding: James H. Douglas

* Member of Critiquing panel

Wednesday, 10 OCT

0930 - 1230 - Session VII: Trade & Economic Competition
Session VIII: Development
Presiding: Charles H. Dyson

1300 - 1400 - Luncheon

1345 - The Special Case of Japan
Presiding: Seniel Ostrow

1415 - 1700 - Session IX: The Emergence of Transnational Issues
Presiding: Edward Lamb

Wednesday, 10 OCT

2000 - 2230 - Session X: The Imperatives of Institution-
Building
Session XI: The U.N. and Alternative Formulations
Presiding: Frances McAllister

Thursday, 11 OCT

0930 - 1230 - Session XII: The Requirements of Democratic
Foreign Policy
Presiding: J.R. Parten

1130 - Pick up by CNO driver

1230 - Lunch ~~with Under Secretary Middendorf~~ *Open*

1400 - To Airport by CNO driver

1430 - Dep DC Amer 481 *for Chicago*

A

B

Don Brennan

Clark Clifford

Incompetent in detail
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No esp for activity
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even if every not -

✓ No arg that if so foolish
we need not be -
Argn cld be made -
but not considered

✓ Need expose 4 contingent
thru 4-5 years off

Never asked - considered for position

p12 not in a no 1st use posture
eg NATO policy on use
nucs

warning -

WWI - no

plus thought short war

p15

short war

WWI

Esp if not going to use nucs

PACEM IN TERRIS

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

III

Circulated: September 14, 1973

Address

THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY POWER

by Clark Clifford

Former Secretary of Defense; Special Counsel to
President Truman

FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY

Scheduled:

Session V-VI, beginning at 8 p.m., Tuesday, October 9, 1973

Also Scheduled:

Address by Herbert York

Critique: Albert Wohlstetter (Chairman); Gloria Emerson,
William Foster, Admiral Gene La Rocque,
Jeremy Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner



A Paper prepared for delivery at a national convocation sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, to convene at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, Oct. 8-11, 1973. Press inquiries should be directed to Frank K. Kelly, The Center, PO Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103. Telephone: Area Code 805 969-3281.

Speech of Clark M. Clifford
Pacem in Terris III
October 9, 1973

THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY POWER

Out of the welter of conflicting views regarding the world today, there is one development upon which we can all agree. That is the profound and far reaching manner in which our world has changed these last few years.

The major thrust of my remarks on this occasion is that,

(A) The world has changed; and (B) The United States defense establishment and the defense budget have not. I cannot state the problem more simply.

My hope is that I may offer thoughts tonight that will lead to a better understanding of the defense policy that our country needs in today's world.

There exists a gap -- an undeniable gap -- between a foreign policy that purports to deal with a world of detente, and a defense policy that is mired in the backward looking attitudes of the Cold War.

Like many of you here, and in a sense like the military establishment which we are examining tonight, I am a product of the Cold War. I was with President Truman from 1945 to 1950 and I recall with vividness and pride those dramatic days. But the military forces devised to meet the problems that existed then still exist today. They are enormous, unwieldy, terribly expensive and unnecessary.

Times change, and the challenge of our era is whether we can change with them.

As our tragic intervention in Indo-China draws too slowly to a halt, we look at the world around us and we see a near total transformation. Contrast the world as it appeared immediately after the second World War, and for much of the period up until the middle 1960's, to the world as it appears now. In this contrast we will find the guides for reshaping our defense policies and budgets.

During that earlier era, the Soviet Union seemed intent on threatening the United States, if not directly, then through pressure on other nations whose survival and independence were, and to a great degree remain, vital to our interests. We had no alternative but the firmest common resistance.

For all but the last few years of that period, there appeared to be allied to the strength of the Soviet Union the massive population and immense potential of China.

In that era, the Soviets and their Chinese associates seemed resolved to make the political situation and the economic development of every nation in the world, no matter how small or how obscure, a testing ground for the confrontation of the most ultimate issues of how society and life were to be organized. We responded in kind.

Faced with that situation -- an aggressive USSR, Soviet-Chinese solidarity, and a communist effort to be involved in every significant conflict over the future of any nation -- those responsible for our nation's policies, including the state of our military forces, felt that the United States had to plan its military forces with the real expectation that they might, at any

moment, be called upon to resist militarily, and directly, large-scale aggression in Asia or Europe, and perhaps in both simultaneously.

On the nuclear side, as our atomic monopoly evaporated, the need for constantly increasing stock of even more sophisticated nuclear weapons seemed to grow greater, not less. The first priority was to build a deterrent, proof against the most effective conceivable surprise Soviet attack. The result was the construction of a strategic deterrent force composed of three basic elements -- land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, and bombers -- each independently capable of surviving an all-out Soviet attack with sufficient strength for a retaliation that would destroy the Soviet Union as an organized society. In addition, in an effort to extend our nuclear strength to protect our allies, we deployed literally thousands of nuclear weapons throughout the world. These weapons were supposed to compensate for inadequacies in ours and our allies' non-nuclear forces.

This image of the world on which our military forces were premised is scarcely recognizable from the perspective of late 1973.

First, while the profound differences between the social and political systems of the United States and the Soviet Union remain, and while there persist genuine areas of serious international conflict between the U.S. and the USSR, the relationship of the two superpowers simply can no longer be described as one of general and unrelenting confrontation. The past two years have seen two United States-Soviet summits marked by effusive cordiality, by the conclusion of the strategic arms limitation agreement which, whatever

its limitations, marks an acceptance by both sides that there is no real defense against nuclear war except mutual vulnerability, and by intense discussion of immensely expanded economic links between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nor, of course, is this phenomenon of detente with the USSR only a bilateral one. The Ostpolitik has brought with it, if not permanent settlement of the conflicts which divide Europe, at least a renunciation of the use of force. The European security conference and the negotiations on force reductions in Europe are signs of a change in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the nations of Western Europe and may portend more basic settlements in the long run. Such a sign of change and an end to confrontation is the very rapidly expanding Soviet trade with Western Europe and Japan.

Even more dramatic is the change in the relationship between the United States and China. Rigid antagonism on each side has given way to a reopening of communication based on a cautious but, in all probability, irreversible recognition that there are simply not that many profound conflicts between the vital interests of the United States and those of China. As we come to take a more realistic view of China, and, perhaps, also a less omnipotent view of ourselves, we find less and less to fear from that immense nation, faced as it is with profound challenges in its own internal development.

At the same time, relations between China and the USSR have so deteriorated as to make the phrase "Sino-Soviet Bloc" but a memory.

And, of course, in planning defense policy, there is the fact that we are involved no longer in the war in Indo-China.

Finally, in a world in which economic issues on the international scene are growing in relative importance, we must recognize that the United States has lost its economic domination of the international scene, even while retaining its vast military strength.

*So here
not to
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From these profound changes in the international setting, one would expect profound changes in American military policy and military forces. For it is, of course, to serve our international policy that we create military forces, however often it may seem that the relationship is reversed.

To be sure, there has been a certain amount of verbal change in our declaratory policy. But if we turn from declaratory policy to the hard facts of budgets and forces, we find incredibly little change. Measured by its own sound maxim -- watch what we do, not what we say -- the present Administration's defense policies seem all but oblivious to the great changes taking place in the world around us.

Despite these changes and the much-advertised winding down of American involvement in Viet Nam, we are being asked to spend more, not less, on military force. The Department of Defense budget requested by the President for Fiscal 1974 -- that is the year we are now in -- is \$4.1 billion more than we spent in 1973 and that expenditure was, in turn, \$3.2 billion more than in 1972. Even taking price changes fully into account, spending on non-Viet Nam military forces will increase by \$3.4 billion from 1973 through 1974, if the Administration's proposals are approved by Congress.

*not
true in
real #*

This is in sharp contrast to past post-war budgets. Following the second World War, by the year 1947, the defense budget was less than 10 per cent of its wartime high. After Korea, defense spending fell in two years to just 45 percent of its Korean peak in 1952. In the present post-Viet Nam case, there were, to be sure, small reductions from the years of very high levels of combat activity in Viet Nam. But the basic pattern, fixed early in the process of reducing direct combat expenses in Viet Nam, has been to maintain real defense spending at a relatively constant level. - Even during VN - it was "late" the war ✓ figures

Even this "level budget" policy cannot long continue, unless we change the policies on force size, manpower, and procurement which underlie the present budget. The current budget includes plans to buy weapons and maintain forces whose increase in costs in the rest of this decade can be fairly readily measured.

The estimates of the cost of staying on our present course are staggering. The 1974 budget projects a further \$4.6 billion increase in the national defense budget for next year. = 5% or inflation

The Brookings Institution in its analysis of the 1974 budget offers a longer-term projection. It estimates that maintaining current defense policies will require that we increase the defense budget from the \$85 billion requested for Fiscal 1974 to almost \$100 billion in Fiscal 1980. And that is without making any allowance for increases in price, which, according to the same analysis, would mean the \$100 billion mark would be passed in 1977 and we would have a \$114 billion budget in 1980.

Thus, we face a paradox of an increasing budget for military

purposes in a world in which all the political signs point to contingencies calling for U. S. military action being less rather than more. This paradox cannot be explained by any restructuring in our forces to meet the new situation. Instead, the \$85 billion request of the Administration is to support forces of essentially the same size and type as (though in most cases far more powerful than) those maintained by the United States in the early to middle 1960's, when political conditions were radically different.

? which signs

To be specific:

--Our strategic forces in 1974 will be essentially identical in numbers of vehicles to those of 1964, except for the retirement of some older bombers and the completion of some missiles and submarines under construction in 1964. The effective striking power of those forces has, of course, been multiplied several times in the interim by the introduction of multiple warheads.

--Our tactical air forces have remained at only slightly below the 1964 levels, with 2,800 aircraft in all services as against 3,000 in that year. But simply counting aircraft or squadrons ignores the fact that the improvements in the new aircraft which have come into service in the interval have greatly increased the capability of the force as a whole.

--Our naval forces continue to be centered around aircraft carriers. Again, although there is a reduction from the 15 attack carriers maintained in 1964 to 13 now, the newer units are more capable than those they replaced. The number of ships in the fleet is substantially reduced, but the force as a whole is much newer and more capable. ? for what.

--Similarly, with ground forces, there has been but a modest

reduction from the 1964 figure of 19 1/3 divisions to the present 16 divisions with a considerable build-up of firepower and mobility.

Moreover, the missions assigned these forces are essentially the same as those assigned to forces in 1964. The Air Force is designed to conduct deep interdiction of enemy supply routes as part of a prolonged war in Europe or on the Asian continent. The Navy is planned on the assumption it must be ready to fight a sustained antisubmarine effort in the North Atlantic and, with its carrier aircraft, to provide interdiction, air superiority, and ground support for sustained combat ashore. The Army and Marines are to be prepared to sustain a long war in Europe, and, to judge from their deployment and numbers, also to be prepared to fight directly on the Asian continent.

Is it not clear that today we simply do not need all the military forces which we now maintain? As I have suggested, we are maintaining in 1973, in the face of substantially reduced international tensions and substantially consolidated U. S. international objectives, practically as large a force as we did in 1964 when the global confrontation seemed to be much sharper and America's goals much more ambitious. It should be noted that 1964, the last pre-Viet Nam year, marked a post-Korea high.

What kind of forces would the Administration be asking the American people and the economy to support if international relations had remained essentially the same? And what would we be told we required if relations with China and the Soviet Union had worsened? - *What if relations with China and the Soviet Union had worsened?*

It must be recognized that, to a degree, our forces and our defense

policies are functions of tradition and bureaucratic pressures as well as products of analysis of our interests and the forces we need to protect them. To the degree that this is true, it makes it all the clearer that something is gravely wrong.

For, if we consider our international policy and not bureaucratic politics, our present situation is truly inexplicable.

Why, in the changed world situation which President Nixon has called an era of negotiation, do we still need -- and why should the American people be asked to support -- the military establishment which was created for an era of confrontation?

After Viet Nam, do we really want the military forces we now maintain to fight a land war in Asia?

With the profound changes in relationships between the two parts of Europe, do we really need an Army, Navy and Air Force structured around a mission of sustaining a long conventional land war in Europe? Incidentally, this question is made all the more pointed by the fact that neither the Soviets nor their allies, nor our own NATO allies, appear to believe sufficiently in the likelihood of such a contingency to design their forces for it. All other forces in Europe appear quite clearly to expect a short, intense conflict, if there is one.

Why, given our recognition of the inadvisability of military intervention in marginal conflicts, do we need a military force with the capability of intervening on a massive scale anywhere in the world with carrier air, land-based tactical air, and ground troops?

We need a fundamental re-examination of our defense policies and

the missions for our forces.

There are, of course, substantial savings that can be made simply from greater efficiencies, especially in the use of manpower, in curtailing our military establishment's propensity for overly complex multi-purpose weapons systems, and in avoiding procurement of strategic nuclear weapons which actually diminish our security by decreasing mutual stability. However, to bring our defense budgets into line with our foreign policies and our national interests, we cannot avoid a fundamental re-examination of the missions of our military forces.

What military missions make sense in this decade of the twentieth century?

--First, of course, the defense of the United States itself. Indeed, it is a striking measure of how large our defense establishment has become to consider what would be necessary if this were the only mission we now assigned our military forces -- as, of course, it was for all but about the last 30 years of our nation's history. Adequate for that mission would be an invulnerable nuclear deterrent and minimum conventional forces, all of which would cost perhaps one-third of our current defense budget.

--However, we must recognize that, while there have been important changes in the world, there are still many elements of tension and potential conflicts between the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China on the one hand and, on the other, nations whose independence is a direct and vital national interest of the United States. For this reason, we do indeed need the

✓
military forces necessary to support international commitments jointly agreed
upon by the Congress and the President as genuinely serving our vital
interests.

In strategic forces, we need a secure and stable nuclear deterrent,
that is, a force such that any potential attacker would recognize that enough
U. S. forces would survive and be used after an all-out surprise attack utterly
to destroy the society of the attacker.

In planning a new national defense policy that takes account of our
national interests as they now exist, we must also recognize that there are
limits to what we can afford to spend on defense even in this rich, though
currently troubled, economy. A dramatic example of how heavy a burden our
people have had to bear for arms is the following. In the last ten years,
individual income taxes on all Americans have totaled \$790 billion. During
that same ten years, spending on defense has totaled \$760 billion. That is,
virtually the entire revenue of the individual income tax has been devoted to
defense spending. As we continue a chronic inflation at home, and as inter-
national confidence in the American economy declines, these economic factors
assume increased relevance.

Particularly in these days when "national security" is being used
to justify things far worse than inflated defense budgets, we must give new
thought to what real national security means.

Finally, it seems to me appropriate to establish certain negative
goals as well as affirmative ones, that is, to say what we do not need our
military forces to be able to do. We do not need to exceed our potential

Which?
 ✓ opponents in every possible category merely to avoid the supposed stigma of not being "number one" in everything. We do not need the capability for general intervention everywhere in the world. We do not need to buy forces necessary only for contingencies which are not only remote -- such as the so-called war at sea or a long conventional war in Europe -- but which would never occur without advance warning, far in advance, by a radical change in the political setting.

✓ With respect to strategic forces as well, negative goals may be as important as affirmative missions. We need, as the President has said, sufficiency; we need not be concerned about disparities in crude force levels or destructive power which in Churchill's haunting phrase would only "make the rubble bounce." We must not construct systems which, sometimes in the name of accumulating "bargaining chips," make negotiations on arms control more difficult by creating powerful vested constituencies for the preservation of weapons. Also, we must recognize that for all their terrible destructiveness, the political and military use of nuclear weapons is quite limited, namely, the deterrence of their use by others.

The recent Pentagon announcement that the Soviets have now tested MIRVs, the Multiple Independently-targettable Reentry Vehicle, does not change the basic facts of the nuclear stalemate. The only surprise about the Soviet development is that it has taken so long in coming. When I was in the Pentagon, five years ago, it was anticipated that the Soviets would develop, within a couple of years, the capacity to deploy on its missiles multiple

warheads that were capable of being aimed separately at different targets. We had, at that time, already tested MIRVs of our own, and we have now deployed them on hundreds of our land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

We continue to retain a large lead in numbers of warheads. But the Soviet Union has the capability today of destroying our society, without its new MIRVs, even if the United States were to attempt a first strike. No matter how many or how large the missiles that the Soviet Union might equip with multiple warheads, we would still have the ability to retaliate and destroy Soviet society even after an all-out attack.

Accordingly, all that the Soviet MIRV development should mean is that both sides should pursue as a matter of priority the efforts at SALT II to place effective controls on further accumulation of unnecessary, immensely expensive and desperately dangerous nuclear weapons.

These principles, presenting the reasons for our military forces, demonstrate vividly that substantial cuts can be made in the defense budget and in the forces it sustains. Such changes will make our military posture reflect the changes in the world and the changes in our national policies. The changes will leave us with a military force fully adequate for our own defense and for carrying out commitments to our allies, but they will permit us to do so at a cost that our economy and our health, as a society, can far better sustain.

I believe it is a mistake to plan our military expenditures for one year only, on a year to year basis. An area of expense that constitutes over

fifty per cent of our total budget deserves better planning than that.

If the Administration's requests for new weapons and for its building and manpower programs were to be granted, it is estimated that the defense budget would continue to increase yearly, to a figure of over \$100 billion. I consider this an outrageous burden for our country to carry. Instead of defense expenditures going up each year, they should be coming down.

I do not favor a large cut in one year in the defense budget. I believe it would be better to make smaller reductions but to continue such cuts over a period of years. This plan would have less impact on our domestic economy, upon employment in defense industries and upon the attitude of other countries.

I would like to cut the defense budget in Fiscal 1974 from the proposed figure of \$85 billion to \$81 billion. Next year, I would favor a further cut to \$77 billion. Then, in the following year, Fiscal 1976, cut to \$73 billion. From then on, starting with Fiscal 1977, I would stabilize the budget at \$69 billion.

This approach would contrast with budgets which could otherwise be expected, under present policies, to be \$85 billion for 1974, and to reach more than \$93 billion for 1978.

In this period of time, therefore, under the plan I recommend, we would, in round numbers, go from a current budget of \$85 billion to \$70 billion a year in 1978, instead of going from \$85 billion to \$95 billion in the same period. Thus, the total savings over the five fiscal years would be an impressive figure

of \$80 billion. The saving thus effected is computed in current dollars. If one anticipates continuing inflation, the saving would be substantially greater.

There is not sufficient time on an occasion such as this to present in detail each specific cut which I believe ought to be made to accomplish this objective. There has been developed in recent years a number of extremely well-informed critiques of the official proposals, with comprehensive suggestions for bringing specific items in our military forces in line with current realities and policies. However, it is appropriate to indicate some general areas in which changes should be made.

The substantial ground and air forces earmarked for operations in Asia can be greatly cut back or eliminated, since we clearly do not need or want, as a nation, to pursue political policies which would make it necessary to use military force in that way. As a first step, the U. S. division still in Korea should be withdrawn and demobilized.

We should start bringing troops back from Europe now. We can do this without destroying the NATO alliance and, indeed, without compromising the principle, which I fully support, that the highest priority for our conventional forces is the contribution they make to presenting a credible conventional defense in Europe. Indeed, by abandoning the "long war" premise, and configuring our NATO force recognizing that in the unlikely event of a conventional war in Europe, it will be a short one, we could actually have a stronger NATO conventional capability at lower costs and troop levels.

Making the changes to bring our NATO force up to date will not,

as is so often claimed, foredoom the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe which are now beginning. Those talks are certain to be long and not unlikely to be ultimately unproductive. Therefore, we must not delay the steps we need to take in our own national interests to preserve "bargaining chips" for them. But, I believe, carefully planned U. S. withdrawals and restructuring of our NATO forces could actually increase the favorable prospects for those negotiations. International arms control negotiations are not fully understood by drawing analogies to poker tables. In fact, unilateral signs of restraint, far from vitiating the prospects of negotiated restraint on the other side may, by indicating seriousness of purpose, actually make the agreements easier to reach.

What? Similarly, we must not be deluded, in the cause of gathering "bargaining chips" for further rounds of the SALT talks, into buying strategic weapons we do not need and which could actually jeopardize our security by contributing to nuclear instability. If such programs are truly "throw-aways" for bargaining purposes, the Soviet negotiators can be expected to understand that. If, as it seems more likely, they have powerful bureaucratic backers, taking the first step now is likely simply to create a constituency for insisting that the right to build these systems be protected in any future negotiation.

Many of our current weapons programs not only are inordinately complex and expensive, but they represent little, if any, real advance over existing systems which will be adequate for years to come.

I am by no means calling for across-the-board cuts in every

too slow
lighter
category of our military program. Precisely because I believe that forces in being should be sharply cut, I urge the importance of keeping up an active and imaginative research and development program to provide us with the technological base we would need for adjustment to future changes in the international situation. Similarly, if we adopt a military policy which takes better account of the international political situation and which accepts the fact that we cannot afford to hedge heavily against all possible contingencies, it becomes all the more important to have an efficient -- and honest -- intelligence-gathering system.

In any discussion of American defense policy for the future, it is impossible to ignore problems of more efficient use of manpower. Manpower has been a steadily increasing element in the defense budget. Some 58 percent of the defense dollar now goes for pay and allowances for military personnel.

Consider the following facts: There are more three and four star generals today than at the end of World War II, when the military establishment was four times as large; twenty-five years ago, the Army had seven recruits for each sergeant, today there are more sergeants than recruits; twenty-five years ago, more than half of our officers were below the grade of captain, today two-thirds of our officers are captains or higher. With a total defense establishment of 315,000 men less than in 1948, we now have 26,000 more captains, 21,000 more majors, 15,000 more lieutenant colonels, and 4,000 more colonels.

The most fundamental decision on military manpower made in recent years has been the adoption of the all-volunteer force concept. That some

alternative to the inequities and irrationalities of the old draft was needed, few would dispute.

But that the volunteer army is an equitable or a workable solution seems equally doubtful. It is proving extremely expensive, not merely in pay but in accumulated pension obligations for the future. Further, as enlistments fall short of goals in both numbers and quality, one may fairly ask whether a volunteer system is likely to produce the large number of technically talented personnel needed in the increasingly technological military establishment.

Finally, the volunteer army concept rests upon negation of a principle which I believe remains valid even under today's changed conditions -- that a free society can properly call on its citizens to perform military service and to have military training. Indeed, an all-volunteer army appears to be a way of institutionalizing the worst feature of the old military draft, that is, concentrating military service and its burdens and risks among citizens with lower incomes.

As we adjust our defense policy to new conditions, I believe we must start now to explore what we will put in the place of the volunteer army system if, as I believe, that system proves itself to be unworkable and unacceptable. In that consideration, the concept of universal national service whereby all young men and women would give a year of service to their country, either in the military or in assigned civilian jobs in the areas of their background and competence, ought, I believe, to receive the highest attention.

In sum, I believe that the changed world calls for a changed defense policy and a changed defense budget. Of course, it will always be said that the uncertainties of any change are so great that only the most trivial adjustments can safely be made. But with the profound changes on the international scene, if we cannot begin now to reduce our defense budget, rather than continuing to increase it, when will we ever be able to do so? Will we have to wait until we really reach a \$100 billion defense budget, and even higher, before we take a serious look at where we are and where we are going?

It is argued in many circles that the defense budget must be cut in order to free funds for domestic programs. I would not cast the argument in those terms. For the reasons I have stated, I believe the defense budget should be cut to bring our military policy in line with our foreign policy and international reality. I do not necessarily propose that the funds thus saved would automatically be expended in other parts of the federal budget. Indeed, I suggest that a high national priority now is to get our own house in order financially. This requires, given the heavy inflationary pressures in this country, putting a stop to the budget deficits to which defense spending makes so large a contribution. In the years since 1969, the total United States deficit has been \$74 billion. Is it any wonder that with these deficits, combined with a serious inflation, there has been a decline in international confidence in the dollar and in the American economy in general? Unnecessary, profligate defense spending and maintenance of unnecessary overseas military establishments has contributed importantly to this loss of confidence in America's financial

integrity, both directly and through its contributions to the unacceptable budget deficits of recent years.

Our true national security resides in something more than overblown military forces and hardware. It rests, more basically, on the ability of our society to maintain a sound, productive and growing economy. Today we are deeply troubled by a damaging and unabated inflation, a deterioration in our balance of trade and our balance of payments which, in turn, lead to an increasing lack of confidence in the dollar.

We have the undoubted power to destroy all the countries of the world. But our present inability to control our own economic destiny threatens to deprive us of any genuine influence in world affairs. If we allow this to occur, we will indeed have become, in President Nixon's imagery, a "pitiful, stumbling giant."

In sum, for a defense posture for an era of negotiation, not confrontation, I offer a different concept of the policies and missions our military forces are to perform. The premises on which these proposals are based would maintain fully adequate forces to defend our country and to carry out our basic international commitments.

A study of the rise and fall of great nations discloses that their decline was not due to a reduction in their military strength, but to a loss of confidence of their own people in their government and in their economy. Our most important problems today are internal ones.

We must place the issue of defense policy in its proper perspective,

and let us get on with the task of developing once again that moral fibre and economic strength and opportunity that made the United States the hope of the world.

PACEM IN TERRIS

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

III

Circulated: September 25, 1973

Critique:

by Dr. Jeremy Stone

Director, Federation of American Scientists; former
Consultant, RAND Corporation

FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY

Scheduled:

Session V-VI, beginning at 8 p.m., Tuesday, October 9, 1973

Also Scheduled:

Addresses by Clark Clifford and Herbert York

Critique: Albert Wohlstetter (Chairman); Gloria Emerson,
William Foster, Admiral Gene La Rocque, Jeremy
Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner



A Paper prepared for delivery at a national convocation sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, to convene at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, Oct. 8-11, 1973. Press inquiries should be directed to Frank K. Kelly, The Center, PO Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103. Telephone: Area Code 805 969-3281.

Panel Response of Jeremy J. Stone
Pacem in Terris III
October 9, 1973 8-10 P.M.

RE: THE PAPER BY CLARK CLIFFORD

Secretary Clifford's paper notes that the world has changed. These changes have finally validated arguments long used by critics of defense spending.

Twenty years ago one of these critics, President Eisenhower, was already complaining that defense costs would "bankrupt" America; he was widely advised to study Keynes. But today the dollar is badly devalued, and fears are still expressed about the "overhang" of dollars extant around the world -- dollars for which we sometimes even have to refuse payment; for example, when we have only enough soybeans for ourselves.

Ten years ago, seizing upon domestic disorder, other critics of defense spending argued that "security" ought to be interpreted to include "domestic security"; were we not running greater risks of losing Chicago through insurrection than through nuclear war? But today it is not necessary to expand the notion of security to complain about the defense budget. Even the Armed Services Committee wonders whether manpower, and rising weapons costs, have priced the military out of the market.

America is now in a position in which most world countries have been for most of their existence -- one in which we must consider seriously civilian-military priorities. Heretofore, these were often only a slogan -- a slogan of opposition to military expenditure.

In the words of Madison Avenue, those who voiced the criticism have got "attention". The time has come to deliver the message. Now we need much more serious analyses of the costs to Americans of slighting

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non-military expenditures in favor of military ones. The depletion of the civilian sector, the withdrawal from the civilian economy of resources that might have increased productivity, the inflationary effect of running constant deficits because of a swollen defense budget, and the costs to society of failing to heal social ills. In this age, American scholars must become adept at the calculus of priorities.

Secretary Clifford's second observation that the defense establishment has not changed despite world changes should be a final warning to all who take geopolitical and military planning too seriously. The record of strategic plans of the Cold War is not a happy one. Both the Korean and the Vietnamese wars were mishandled. Between wars, bomber gaps, missile gaps, anti-missile gaps, and big-missile gaps revealed our compulsive response to strategically motivated misinformation. Wisdom was found in such gems as "more bang for the buck". Thousands of nuclear weapons were placed in Europe with no visible doctrine for their use. In strategic weapons, a tradition was developed of cost overruns, waste, and overbuilding in numbers. Ad hoc explanations for strategic decisions; weapons systems in search of missions; and scare stories timed to the spring became perennial phenomena. Finally, to top it off, we switched from a 2-1/2 war strategic requirement to a 1-1/2 war strategic requirement and nothing much happened to our force structure.

Whether the strategic planning is done by civilians, the Joint Chiefs, or Joseph Alsop, the history of the last 25 years suggests that their plans and reasoning ought to be taken with a very large grain of salt. Our job, in the next 25 years, is to avoid making again the same mistakes.

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RE: The paper by Herbert York

The paper by Herbert F. York, "Nuclear Deterrence and the Forces Needed for It", observes that superpower strategic forces are much larger than necessary and could be greatly reduced without affecting the strategy of mutual deterrence. It concludes that our "highest priority short-term objective" should be to do just that.

It is true that enormous reductions of strategic forces could be achieved without affecting the capability of the United States and the Soviet Union to destroy high percentages of the population of the other side. But, if so, do these reductions make enough difference to deserve the highest priority, albeit in the short run?

Could it not be argued as follows, from the same datum: If disarmament is irrelevant to the vast majority of the lives that would be destroyed with nuclear weapons, then perhaps the highest immediate priority should be placed on making sure that nuclear weapons are not used. This includes such ideas as:

discouraging the initial use of nuclear weapons: by requiring that no one man (even the President) can make the decision; by shaping the options provided in military planning; by controlling the authority of nuclear commanders, especially at sea; by encouraging public attitudes to consider the use of nuclear weapons a criminal act; by shaping the reciprocal expectations of leaders in favor of non-use rather than use of nuclear weapons through public statements, quiet discussions, and so on.

discouraging the escalation to nuclear war of any isolated use of nuclear weapons: by indoctrination of battlefield commanders; locks and physical restraints on unauthorized use, methods of high-level explanatory communication (hot lines), and so on.

encouraging methods for terminating nuclear war if it occurs: by avoiding doctrines that encourage spasm war, embodying recognition of the fruitlessness of trying to disarm the other side in the plans and expectations of the highest military leadership; avoidance of attacks upon command centers rather than emphasizing such attack; preparing to maintain command and control of nuclear weapons throughout any war whatsoever.

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If, for example, planning in Europe in one or both camps is for prompt and easy escalation to nuclear weapons; if the sudden outbreak of violence will not realistically permit other possibilities, then what is needed is a world-wide campaign against these plans and attitudes and against nuclear weapons themselves, rather than a campaign only to reduce their numbers. Would we, for example, prefer to have: (a) 50% of the nuclear weapons destroyed (and national planning as it is), or (b) everyone thinking that the first use of nuclear weapons anywhere was a criminal act comparable to the use of biological warfare (and national planning based on that latter assumption). Neither of these outcomes provides perfect protection but there is a lot to be said for the second. It may, of course, be harder to achieve -- I'm not sure. But, in any case, it strikes me as irresponsible to continue to ignore the dynamics of nuclear war in conferences of this kind. The world in general, and Europe in particular, is a nuclear tinderbox which disarmament is not going to cure.

Of course, nuclear reductions, if explained properly, can play an important role in discouraging the use of nuclear weapons. How can these reductions best be motivated? Dr. York has argued persuasively for destroying the largest nuclear weapons on the grounds that they create that much more collateral damage through fallout. Happily for his excellent proposal, these same large nuclear weapons are probably also to be found among the most vulnerable, destabilizing and/or provocative nuclear weapons. Thus, the argument for his conclusion is greatly strengthened.

However, I would argue that, in general, the most persuasive argument for reductions may lie elsewhere -- in the realm of economics.

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While it is not, by great power standards, overwhelmingly expensive to maintain a large strategic force, it is extremely expensive to keep modernizing such a force. And neither great power seems to be able to resist the impulse to modernize all that it has built -- no matter how much it says about part of the force being "backup", "secondary", "insurance only" or whatever. Thus the slogan, "One does not modernize what one does not have" might be of more significance to political leaders than the fallout produced by the weapons they have already paid for and built.

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PACEM IN TERRIS

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

III

Part 3
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Circulated: September 6, 1973

Address

DETERRENCE BY MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

by Herbert York

Professor of Physics, University of California at San Diego;
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former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE FORCES NEEDED FOR IT

by Herbert F. York

In this paper I shall try to make two main points and one specific proposal based on them.

The first point is that, while Deterrence through the Threat of Mutual Assured Destruction may be the best strategy available to us at the present time, we should not delude ourselves into believing that it is a good strategy. It is a terrible strategy, and our highest-priority, long-run objective should be to get rid of it altogether.

The second point is that, even if we accept the strategy of deterrence as the best currently available to us, the stockpile of weapons we now rely on to produce it is from ten to one hundred times as murderous and destructive as it needs to be to satisfy that purpose. Therefore, our highest-priority objective for the immediate future should be to reduce greatly the current level of "overkill" even while we still maintain the strategy of deterrence.

The specific proposal describes a way to make a very large reduction in overkill without requiring or producing any change in the strategy of nuclear deterrence.

Basically, a strategy of nuclear deterrence is one in which we seek to prevent certain political or military actions by others by threatening to use our nuclear weapons rather than by actually using them. Maintaining such a strategy, therefore,

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is more a matter of political psychology than of nuclear technology. Someone will be deterred if he believes that the nuclear punishment he will receive will be more severe than the achievement of some particular objective merits. Thus, the actual physical properties of the weapons only enter the deterrence equation insofar as the physical properties affect the beliefs of the various parties. However, if and when deterrence fails, the matter changes radically. Then it is no longer what people believe about the weapons that counts, but the real physical facts about their properties.

Twenty years ago, the general strategy of nuclear deterrence was particularized in John Foster Dulles' doctrine of Massive Retaliation. The Korean War was fresh in peoples' minds, and those who advocated massive retaliation were in effect saying, "The next time we are seriously challenged, we will not allow the enemy to choose the place and style of warfare most favorable to him." Instead, they said, "If there is another attack anywhere on one of our allies, we will immediately retaliate with a massive nuclear strike on the real source of the new aggression." At that time, the idea was to deter conventional war anywhere in the world, but especially in Europe, through the threat of massive nuclear retaliation. The United States was able to make such a threat because we had an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons. We had, perhaps, a few hundred atomic bombs, each somewhat bigger than the one that had killed about 100,000 people in Hiroshima eight years earlier. We also had many long-range aircraft and we had many air bases from which even short-range aircraft could reach the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviets had only just begun to accumulate atomic bombs, their aircraft were less capable, and they had no air bases close to our heartland. The situation was so unsymmetrical that it made perfectly good sense from our point of view to deter conventional attack by a threat of massive retaliation.

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Since then, the situation has changed radically. In the meantime, the hydrogen bomb has been perfected, resulting in a thousandfold increase in the power of individual weapons. Now nuclear bombs number in the tens of thousands rather than in the hundreds, intercontinental bombers and rockets have replaced short-range aircraft, and forward bases are no longer essential. Most important, there are now two nuclear superpowers possessing these extreme capabilities, and there are three other nuclear powers each of which has a nuclear capability that is small compared to what the superpowers have today, but enormous compared to that which the USA had when it first put forth its policy of massive retaliation. In recognition of the fact that for some time now there has been a rough balance of terror between the two superpowers, we now speak of deterrence as being based on the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction. Under such circumstances, one set of strategic nuclear forces does little more than deter a direct attack by another. To be sure, there are those who would like to believe these terribly murderous and destructive forces achieve other, broader objectives, but it is doubtful that they any longer do so. The best that is usually claimed for nuclear deterrence is that it "works," and that it is stable. The first of these claims is speculative -- and in any event, unprovable. The fact that there has been no invasion of Western Europe is consistent with the notion that the threat of massive retaliation "worked," but does not prove that it did. Similarly, the fact that there has been no strategic nuclear bombardment by anybody since 1945 is also consistent with the idea that nuclear deterrence works, but again it simply is not possible to prove there is any causal connection.

Along with most others, I believe the current nuclear balance has been stable for some time, and that the SALT I agreements go a long way toward assuring that it will remain

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stable for the foreseeable future. Moreover, I believe the present balance is stable in two different ways. First, it possesses what is called "crisis stability." That is, in a military crisis, one side cannot add much to its chances of survival by striking first, and so there is no strong inducement to do so. The current nuclear balance is also reasonably stable in the "arms race" sense. That is, there does not appear to be any way for one side to achieve an overwhelming advantage over the other side by quickly acquiring any reasonable quantity of some new weapon, and so again there exists no really strong inducement to do so.

So much for what might be called "the good side" of deterrence; what is wrong with it? Simply this: If for any political or psychological or technical reason deterrence should fail, the physical, biological and social consequences would be completely out of line with any reasonable view of the national objectives of the USA or the Soviet Union. What would these consequences be? I believe the following is as accurate and detailed as is necessary and useful for any general but serious discussion of the subject. In the event of an exchange of blows by the strategic nuclear forces of the USA and the USSR, most of the urban populations of the Soviet Union and the United States could be killed, and most of the industry and commerce could be destroyed by the direct and immediate effects of the nuclear explosions. The towns and rural areas of the two countries would at the same time be subjected to varying amounts of radioactive fallout. The details of what would happen to the people living in such areas depend importantly on the weather conditions prevailing at the time and on the details of the attack pattern, but well over one-half of the town and country populations could be killed by the fallout. In addition, the living standards and the life expectancy of the survivors would be substantially

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reduced by secondary effects, including both the effect of less-than-lethal levels of fallout and the general breakdown of civilized services. The balance between the damage to the urban population of one side and the damage to the urban population of the other side depends somewhat, but not materially, on who strikes first. However, there is a real possibility that the rural population of the side that strikes first will end up somewhat better off.

In addition, the lives of many millions of people living in the immediate neighborhood of the superpowers would be imperiled by so-called local fallout, and long-range or world-wide fallout would endanger those living in even remote countries. It is very difficult to make precise estimates, but it seems that a full nuclear exchange between the USA and the USSR would result in the order of 10,000,000 casualties from cancer and leukemia in countries situated well away from the two main protagonists. In addition, genetic problems, that are even more difficult to calculate, would affect many, many millions of others, not only in this generation, but for centuries to come. Civilization would survive somewhere, but probably not in the United States or the Soviet Union, and perhaps not elsewhere in North America or Europe.

Some authorities have proposed that we confront these awful possibilities by undertaking huge, complex programs designed to cope directly with a massive nuclear attack. Such programs usually include the installation of a so-called thick system of antiballistic missiles combined with very extensive civil defense and post-attack recovery programs. In detailed examinations, however, the main elements of such proposals have always been judged to be either technically unsound, or economically unfeasible, or socially and politically unacceptable, and so no such programs are currently underway or even being seriously considered.

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In brief, for now and the foreseeable future, a nuclear exchange would result in the destruction of the two principles as nations regardless of who strikes first. This is what is usually meant by the phrase "Mutual Assured Destruction."

It is most important in any discussion about international affairs or the current military balance to have clearly in mind what the current technical situation means: the survival of the combined populations of the superpowers depends on the good will and the good sense of the separate leaderships of the superpowers. If the Soviet leadership, for whatever reason, or as a result of whatever mistaken information, chose to destroy America as a nation, it is unquestionably capable of doing so in less than half an hour, and there is literally nothing we could now do to prevent it. The only thing we could do is to wreak on them an equally terrible revenge. And, of course, the situation is the same the other way around.

Wld? No one can say ^{IF?} when deterrence will break down, or even why it ^{MAY} will. Indeed, if the leadership of all the nuclear powers always behave in a rational and humane way, it never will. But there are now five nuclear powers, and there will be more someday, and if any of them ever makes a technical, political or military nuclear mistake for any reason, real or imagined, then there will be a substantial chance that the whole civilized world could go up in nuclear smoke. This is simply too frightful and too dangerous a way to live indefinitely; we must find some better form of international relationship than the current dependency on a strategy of mutual assured destruction.

Let me now turn to the matter of the size of the force currently devoted to mutual assured destruction, and to the

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matter of "overkill." Informed opinions about how many weapons are really needed vary over an extremely wide range. For example, shortly after leaving the post of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy wrote, "In the real world of real political leaders -- whether here or in the Soviet Union -- a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable."

For a very much higher estimate, we turn to some calculations made in the early 1960's. In order to quantify the question, it was assumed that "assured destruction" meant guaranteeing the deaths of 25% of the population and the destruction of a majority of its industrial capacity. From that, it was calculated that as many as 400 bombs on target might be needed.

As an intermediate estimate, we may turn to what the French and British have actually done to produce what they evidently think is a deterrent force. In each case the number of large bombs devoted to that purpose seems to be something less than one hundred.

There is, thus, a wide range of views about what is needed for deterrence. My personal view is that Bundy is right: that from one to ten are enough whenever the course of the events is being rationally determined. In the case of irrational behavior, there is no way of calculating what it would take. The case of irrational behavior is, therefore, of little interest in connection with the question of how big the deterrent force should be; rather, the matter of

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irrational behavior only enters into questions about when and how deterrence will fail, and about whether a policy based on deterrence is of any political value at all.

How do these estimates of need, running from a low of one to a high of 400, compare with what we actually have?

When current plans are completed, just one component of the U.S. strategic force will consist of 31 Poseidon submarines. Each submarine has 16 missiles, each missile can deliver 10 or so warheads, each to a different target. That makes 5000 warheads altogether, and each of them is about three times as big as the one which killed about 100,000 people in Hiroshima in 1945.

In addition, we plan to retain 10 missile submarines of an older type, which deliver bigger warheads, but not so many of them. In addition to the submarine missiles are the land-based Minuteman and Titan forces, capable of delivering about 2000 warheads, ranging in size from those which are "only" ten times the size of the Hiroshima bomb up to warheads hundreds of times as big.

The third component of the "Triad" of strategic force consists of long-range bombers, mostly B-52's. The details of their capability are less well known publicly than those of the missile forces. It is known, however, that each bomber can deliver many individual weapons, including both air-to-surface missiles and free-fall bombs. The actual number and megatonnage depends more on administrative decisions than on technological limitations. It is, however, clear that the bombers can carry many more megatons than the combined sea-based and land-based missile force. All told, the total number of individual warheads in the force I have described

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is in excess of 10,000 and their total explosive power is about one half million times as great as the nuclear explosive power used to put the finishing touches on World War II.

By the time the Soviets complete their current round of missile deployments, they will possess a force which is in a general way comparable to ours, though differing in its details. Specifically, in the mid- and late-seventies they will end up with substantially fewer individual warheads, but with substantially more total megatonnage.

If one, or ten, or maybe a few hundred bombs on target are all that are needed to deter, how did it happen that we came to possess more than 10,000? And why so much total explosive power?

These numbers are not the result of a careful calculation of the need in some specific strategic or tactical situation. They are the result of a series of historical accidents which have been rationalized after the fact.

In the late forties and early fifties, before the invention of the H-bomb, it was determined that we needed on the order of 1000 delivery vehicles (then land-based and sea-based bombers) in our strategic forces. This was determined by several factors: World War II and the Korean experience; the need for a relatively large number of vehicles in order to develop the tactics needed to penetrate defenses with high assurance; and, probably most important of all, purely fiscal considerations during the late Truman and early Eisenhower administrations. Then suddenly when the H-bomb was perfected in 1954, the explosive power of the bombs multiplied 1000-fold. When the effectiveness of each nuclear weapon was thus so enormously increased, one might have supposed it would have

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resulted in a reduction in the number of delivery vehicles needed, but no such adjustment was made. In fact, since the perfection of the H-bomb was one of the technological advances that made long-range missiles practical, the H-bomb actually resulted in a proliferation of types of delivery systems, and that in turn resulted in a small increase in their total numbers. In the late sixties, further technological advances made it possible to provide each individual missile with more than ten individually targetable warheads. Again, one might have expected some adjustment in the number of delivery vehicles, but there was none; the number of land-based missiles and the number of sea-based missiles have both remained exactly the same as they were before this latest innovation was introduced. In sum, very great changes, even order-of-magnitude changes, in the technological capability of the strategic forces have resulted in no change whatsoever in their numbers.

As I remarked before, all of this has been rationalized after the fact. One method for doing so is called "worst case analysis." In such an analysis, the analyst starts with the assumption that his forces have just been subjected to a massive preemptive attack. He then makes a calculation in which he makes a series of very favorable assumptions about the attacker's equipment, knowledge and behavior, and a similar series of very unfavorable assumptions about his own forces. Such a calculation can result in an arithmetic justification for a very large force indeed, provided that we really believe there is a chance that all the many deviations from the most probable situation will go in one way for them and in the other way for us.

An additional argument for possessing many more weapons than are needed for deterrence involves a notion called "Damage Limitation." The idea is that a part of our force should be reserved for attacking and destroying those enemy

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weapons that for some reason were not used in his first, preemptive strike. Besides the obvious technical difficulties with such a scheme, it is counterproductive for political reasons. In today's world, the internal politics of each of the two superpowers requires them to maintain strategic forces that are roughly equal in size. That in turn means that if one side builds a large force for "damage limiting" purposes, the other side will build a roughly equal force which will inevitably be "damage producing." Such a chain of events obviously leads from bad to worse. Furthermore, the kind of forces needed for this so-called "damaging limiting" role are technologically identical to those needed for a first strike, and so such a strategy is obviously dangerous for that reason also.

In brief then, even if we accept for the time being the need for a policy of deterrence through mutual assured destruction, the forces now in being are enormously greater than are needed for that purpose. And again, if we recognize that deterrence can fail, and if we admit to ourselves the consequences of such a failure, then we see that greatly reducing the current degree of overkill is both possible and essential.

Before making some specific recommendations about what should be done, I shall first discuss one particular alternative proposal sometimes put forth as a means for improving the current dreadful situation. In that proposal the current deterrence policy, in which populations and industries are the key targets, would be replaced by a policy in which only weapons and military centers are targets. At first glance, it seems that such a policy would be more humane in some useful sense. As a result, such proposals have frequently arisen; the best known being the "counterforce" proposal made by Secretary McNamara at a NATO meeting in 1962. However, the idea has several flaws. First of all, such counterforce

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strategies, as they are called, always turn out to require, or at least justify, many more and generally larger weapons than are needed for the so-called counter-value, or deterrence strategy. In such a case, a failure in deterrence would generally result in many more deaths, especially in third countries, than would be the case for a force sized for deterrence only. This comes about partly due to an increase in collateral damage through fallout, and also because of the collocation of so many military targets with urban targets such as the military command posts in Washington, Omaha, and Moscow; the transportation centers in St. Louis, Chicago, Kharkov and Kiev; the naval bases at New York, Boston, San Diego, Los Angeles, Leningrad, Sevastopol and Vladivostock, and so on.

Moreover, a policy to target only military installations would only be an administrative arrangement; it would not rely on anything intrinsic in the equipment. Hence such a policy, agreed to internationally or not, could be abandoned or abrogated on short notice, after first being used to justify a substantial increase in force levels. For these reasons, I believe the proposals for improving the present situation by going to a counterforce strategy are among the most dangerous proposals I know.

How might we, then, go about reducing the great overkill inherent in the present Soviet and U.S. forces without at the same time affecting the style and stability of the nuclear deterrence strategy? Recalling that the local fallout from a nuclear exchange can cause the death of more than half of the town and rural populations of the two superpowers, and that the world-wide fallout from nuclear exchange will result in the death of many millions of people in third countries, and noting that fallout is essentially proportional to

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megatonnage, we see we ought to start by getting rid of those elements of the force that deliver the most megatons. In each case, roughly 20% of the forces carry roughly 80% of the megatons. In the U.S. case, these are the several hundred long-range bombers and the 54 Titan missiles. In the Soviet case, these are the 300 very large SS-9 missiles plus a relatively small intercontinental bomber force. Ridding the world of all these weapons and, of course, prohibiting their replacement by newer versions, would decrease substantially the threat to the rural populations of the two protagonists. It would also reduce the danger to residents of innocent countries five-fold. At the same time, their simultaneous elimination of these weapons through negotiation or, I would venture to say, even their unilateral elimination by one or both sides, would have little effect on the deterrent posture of either side.

There is another area where it should be easy to achieve a further two-fold reduction in potential fallout. Only one-half of our Minutemen are being converted to the new Minuteman III, and only 31 of our 41 Polaris boats are being converted to Poseidons. Simply abandoning the not-to-be converted residuals of these forces would eliminate about one-half the fallout potential of our missile forces. And precisely because these older weapons are less capable, their complete elimination would have only a marginal effect on our ability to deter. Similarly, we may be confident the Soviets also have some obsolescent weapons they could get rid of at the same time in order to keep things in formal balance. And beyond the elimination of these excessively murderous and obsolescent vehicles, we might also consider placing an upper limit on the explosive power of those remaining. For instance, we might set an upper limit in power equal to that of the Hiroshima bomb. The many thousands

how many?

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of bombs that would still remain in the strategic forces, even after the reductions I have suggested, would still seem to be many more than enough for deterrence through mutual assured destruction, even if each bomb were so limited in power.

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0 The overkill capacity in the present forces is so large that even the rather substantial reductions I have suggested would not do much to the threat hanging over the inhabitants of the larger cities; most of them would still be killed in the event of a breakdown of deterrence. But, since there would be big decreases in death and destruction in rural areas and small towns, the prospects for some sort of national survival would be much improved. Perhaps most important, the number of deaths and the amount of genetic damage in innocent countries would be reduced more than ten-fold. And whether or not one believes the leadership of a nation has the right to place all of its own citizens at risk, it surely does not have that right with regard to third parties.

In the real world, admittedly these specific arms reduction suggestions are clearly too much for the short term and too little for the long term.

The short-term objectives, as embodied in the SALT negotiations, are largely devoted to stopping the technological arms race, and real reductions in arms have been relegated to the future. 7
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The long-term objective, as attested to on several solemn occasions by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, and by Chairmen Khrushchev and Brezhnev, are general and complete disarmament. Leaving aside the question of the feasibility of their ultimate objectives, we must even so note that my suggestions are very modest by comparison.

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These particular suggestions, then, are meant for the intermediate term, say the next five or ten years. They are for the period after we finally succeed in fully arresting the forward momentum of arms development and deployment but before the final arrival of the conditions necessary for "General and Complete Disarmament."

So far, after almost thirty years of attempts to achieve some kind of serious disarmament, not one single nuclear weapon has ever been destroyed or even moved as a result of an agreement to do so. That record could lead to a feeling of utter hopelessness, or it could lead to a renewed determination to accomplish something at long last. Let us try to make it the latter.

1. Any historical evidence disarmament has worked?
 Takes trust - e.g. US vs Canada
 Not treaties - e.g. evasion of Washington Naval
 Treaties
2. Yuki's proposal at best would mitigate horrendous
 damage - & calculations of how much are
 dubious
 Isn't it better to concentrate on basic
 problem - how to keep weapons from being
 used at all - not how many when 10 is
 too much. Reduction in overkill may not reduce casualties -
 This approach could lead us into ^{e.g. 2 bombs in 1} false security ^{hole}

3. Need to look at other results of York's actions, e.g.

- a) Bombers are an assurance of continued ability to penetrate even if ABM of some sort develops, especially along limited arcs of entry to USSR of US missiles.
- b) Titans are our work horses - not really needed today - but in future?
And, gives us a closer megatonnage to Soviets, which may impress world opinion

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THE DEFENSE MONITOR

CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION

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The Sinkable Airfield

Would you spend several billion dollars for a ship that may be put out of action by a motor boat?

That of course is putting the question crudely. But it is essentially the issue raised by the Navy's request for a fourth, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

If the ship is built, it will be the most expensive in the world. It would also be unnecessary.

The Navy thinks it needs this ship. Many naval experts however don't agree. This Monitor sets forth the pros and cons.

The Center for Defense Information concludes that:

- Construction of a fourth, nuclear-powered carrier can be safely deferred, without any risk whatever to national security.
- 11 carriers are quite adequate in the 1980's, instead of the 12 carriers the Navy wants.
- An 11-carrier force, with 1,000 modern aircraft, would be very powerful. To it, a fourth, nuclear-powered carrier would add only a 1/12th increment. And that incremental addition is not worth the billions of dollars it would cost.

Pros & Cons of Attack Carrier CVN-70

The Navy is asking Congress for \$657 million this year as part of the cost of constructing a fourth, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the CVN-70. The Navy estimates the carrier would cost \$972 million to build, but this figure is only the tip of an iceberg. It excludes the costs of building the aircraft and the escort ships without which the carrier cannot operate. And the costs are rising steeply.

The Navy's first nuclear-powered carrier, the Enterprise, was commissioned in 1961, and it cost \$451 million. Two others, the Nimitz and the Dwight D. Eisenhower, are now under construction. The Navy estimate is that these two together will cost \$1.3 billion to build. The Nimitz (CVAN-68) is scheduled to undergo sea trials in August, and the Navy says the vessel's delivery date is to be March 1974. The Eisenhower (CVAN-69) is scheduled for delivery in September 1975.

The CVN-70, if it is built, would join the fleet in 1981. There are at present 14 attack aircraft carriers in service, but older carriers are to be retired, which means that in 1981 there will be 12 carriers including CVN-70, or 11 carriers without CVN-70. (The Navy estimates the life-span of a carrier at about 30 years.) In 1981 the oldest carrier would be the Forrestal, which was commissioned in 1955.

A force of 11 modern aircraft carriers, three of them nuclear-powered, carries 110 attack aircraft. The fleet is

be formidable. It would be big enough, without the CVN-70, to maintain an adequate level of six aircraft carriers stationed in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and five carriers in the Pacific three of which would be nuclear-powered. The Sixth Fleet would still have two carriers full time in the Mediterranean, the same as now.

The question arises whether it is really worth spending a minimum of \$1 billion to build a fourth, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, when aircraft carriers have no role in the direct defense of the United States in the nuclear age, and also are unlikely to have a mission in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

For a long time, the Nixon Administration was dubious about the practicality of building yet another highly expensive, and probably highly vulnerable, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. When the CVN-70 was being considered by Congress in 1970, the Administration said it might not build the carrier. The following year, the then Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, declared that the Administration would not spend funds for the CVN-70 even if Congress appropriated them. Later, however, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird intimated that the money would be spent if it was appropriated.

Nevertheless, Mr. Packard explained that he had in mind only as a marginal

item, "because it looked as though we were going to be allowed a little higher total" for spending on defense. He also gave his reasons for regarding the ship as just a marginal item. "The carrier," he said, "has a useful function in certain types of show of force, or application of force, around the world. It is not very important in our nuclear deterrent posture. It is not very important in our sea control." This is a billion-dollar ship he is talking about. Senator Goldwater has conceded that "there was a lot of (Navy) pressure to build CVN-70. I did not intend to vote for it."

The Navy is undergoing major modernization and federal budget authorizations for naval construction are 50% higher than the average for fiscal years 1962 to 1969. The Navy's plans call for spending \$50 billion over the next 10 years, solely for ship construction and conversion. This excludes operation, maintenance and other costs, all of which can be very severe.

Much of the Navy's budget revolves around carriers, their aircraft, and the other forces that supply and defend them. The Navy plans, for example, to have four nuclear-powered guided-missile frigates for each nuclear-powered carrier.

Carrier-related programs in this year's budget, in addition to the CVN-70 itself, are F-14 aircraft, Phoenix missiles to be fired by those aircraft, S-3A carrier-based anti-submarine aircraft, escort ships, and submarines. Funds for these systems total \$2.5 billion in this year's budget.

A decision on construction of CVN-70 has to include consideration of the costs of major weapon systems used for the defense of the new carrier or otherwise related to it. The carrier itself will cost \$972 million to build, according to the Navy. But the carrier, its aircraft and its ship and air crews will cost about \$10.4 billion, over the possible life-span of the ship. The Navy's estimated cost of building just the carrier itself has already risen by \$300 million, between 1970 and 1972, and the ship will take another seven years to construct.

There is considerable doubt concerning the degree of usefulness of an aircraft carrier and its accompanying aircraft, ships and submarines in the modern age. For example, this June 7 the Senate Armed Services Committee was told by Dr. Richard Garwin, a leading scientist who is an IBM Fellow at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center, and until last year was a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee: "While I believe that an aircraft carrier if it is to be built should have nuclear propulsion, my best advice is to recognize the lack of survivability of carriers, in war with the Soviet Union, and to cancel the carrier building program, the F-14 aircraft and most of the S-3 aircraft procurement."

The tasks that the aircraft carrier can successfully perform may be quite few. There may not be many wartime situations it can hope to survive. Many of its weapons are for its own defense, not for attack. The carrier's vulnerability may make it more a liability than an asset.

But there can be little question about the enormous costs attached to carriers and their operations.

- Based on the 1973 budget, the one-year cost of operating and maintaining 14 attack carriers, as well as construction and conversion, amounts to \$7.6 billion.
- The five-year cost of a 14-carrier force, declining to 13 carriers by 1978, comes to \$35.4 billion.

The CVN-70 is designed to be 1,092 feet in length, which is as long as three football fields, and to weigh 94,400 tons. There would be 2,829 men in the ship's crew, and the air wing personnel would number 2,506.

"These numbers," Rear Admiral I.W. Linder, Coordinator of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier program, told the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services this year, "vary a bit according to expected operations and types of aircraft carried." This exchange then occurred:

Costs of CVN-70 Over 30 Years: \$10 Billion*

Carrier Procurement	\$ 972,000,000
Aircraft Procurement	\$ 4,103,200,000**
Escort Ships Procurement	\$ 1,088,400,000***
Task Force Operation and Maintenance (30 years)	\$ 4,218,000,000****
30-Year Total Cost	\$10,381,600,000

* In constant FY 1973 dollars.

** Four full buys of F-14's, A-7E's and A-6E's; and 3 buys of all other aircraft.

*** Cost of 4 nuclear-powered escorts.

**** \$140.6 million per year.



Sen. Goldwater
"I did not intend to vote for it"



David Packard
"Not very important"



Dr. Richard Garwin
"Cancel the program"



Cong. Mollohan
"6,300 people!"



Admiral Zumwalt, Jr.
"Unique"



Sen. Stevenson
"Fragile and expensive"

Mr. Mollohan: You have accommodations on board for approximately 5,000?

Admiral Linder: For about 6,300.

Mr. Mollohan: That is more people than in my home county.

30 million man-hours

The carrier would be able to accommodate between 90 and 100 aircraft. The builder of the ship would be the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. of Virginia, which is currently building the two other nuclear-powered carriers, the Nimitz and the Eisenhower. The CVN-70 would require 30 million man-hours of labor to construct. It would have a speed of 31½ knots.

An aircraft carrier is basically an armored box, extensively compartmented into watertight and shock-resistant areas, and fitted with damage control equipment. The ship has four independent engines and four propellers. A carrier task force consists of a "mobile airfield", which is the carrier itself, accompanied by cruisers, frigates, destroyers, submarines and by clouds of aircraft: patrol planes, fighter planes, anti-submarine planes, long-range radar aircraft to detect enemy planes and ships, and airborne fuel tankers to extend the range of the fighters as well as the amount of time they can spend aloft.

The Navy says that the ships are dispersed over hundreds of miles of ocean, that they are highly mobile and elusive, and that they can strike, and they can also withdraw in face of superior force, then probe again from another direction. Admiral Linder claims that an enemy "perhaps is able to determine the location of the force at some particular time, but he will not know its position an hour later and he cannot plot its future course of movement." The enemy's missiles, the Navy explains, must be programmed before being launched, so as to strike a predetermined spot, but the aircraft carrier will not necessarily be there when the missile falls. It could be then be 11 miles away.

Enemy planes and surface ships can be detected by the task force's radar planes while they are still far from the carrier, says the Navy, and the carrier's fighters can get to them when they are still 200 miles off. The new F-14 fighters could fire radar-guided missiles, and the Phoenix missile, officially credited with a 60-mile range, in tests has sometimes hit targets that were 120 miles distant.

Admiral Linder says that new S-3 aircraft, with which the CVN-70 would be equipped, should be able to "provide the speed and the improved detection equipment" required to extend the size of the area in which enemy submarines are searched for; and that "these anti-submarine defenses give the task force comm

submarine before it can locate with any degree of precision the major ships of the task force." He says the S-3's would be able to search and attack up to two hours when they were 800 miles from the carrier, and for up to four hours when 500 miles from the carrier. But these anti-submarine aircraft cost \$15 million per plane.

Enemy submarines attempting to penetrate the carrier task force's defenses face a whole series of obstacles, says Admiral Linder. "The wide-ranging anti-submarine aircraft, with their highly sophisticated underwater-listening devices, are the first problem encountered. These are backed up by the destroyers and frigates, with their large sonars." Admiral Linder says if the task force also includes a nuclear attack submarine, "the enemy commander may well find himself surprised by a silent and effective adversary operating in his own environment." Finally, he says, the carrier itself is to be equipped to fire missiles to destroy attacking aircraft and incoming missiles, and to jam and confuse the enemy missiles, by electronic means.

Challenged

In spite of those claims, the aircraft carrier's alleged elusiveness and toughness have been challenged. For instance, the Navy says the carrier could be miles away before an enemy missile struck the spot where it had been, because the missile must be programmed before being launched, so as to strike a predetermined spot. But there is a type of so-called "active homing" missile, that need not be pre-programmed: it follows its prey. Then, the sonobuoys dropped in the ocean to detect submarines, as well as the other devices for detecting submarines, are anything but infallible.

Admiral Linder correctly points out that "since World War II, our carriers have not been called upon to defend themselves against an air enemy. Their operations have been relatively static: off-shore air platforms, so to speak."

And the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., has often stressed that the Soviet Union has 2½ times as many submarines as the United States, and that the Soviets have equipped their surface ships, submarines and aircraft with 1,400 cruise missiles: about 800 on surface ships, 400 on submarines and 200 on planes. A cruise missile is really a small unmanned plane that is electronically controlled.

Some U.S. naval commanders believe it is almost impossible to prevent an aircraft carrier being hit by several cruise missiles, if a number are fired at it. In the second World War, the Japanese directed suicide planes against U.S. aircraft carriers. These planes threw themselves at the carriers that took even

FY 1973 Costs of All 14 Attack Carriers: \$8 Billion

Military Personnel Pay	\$ 989,000,000
Military Construction	\$ 174,000,000
Operation & Maintenance	\$1,260,000,000
Research & Development	\$ 599,000,000
Ordnance & Missiles	\$ 947,000,000
Shipbuilding & Conversion	\$ 830,000,000
Aircraft Procurement	\$2,856,000,000
Total Cost	\$7,655,000,000

one hit from a "kamikaze" Japanese-piloted aircraft had to pull out of action and retire to port, and *all* the carriers that took more than one hit were compelled similarly to retire. An electronically-controlled cruise missile would be at least as effective against a carrier as a World War II manned plane. A cruise missile has a very small radar cross-section and is consequently difficult to detect. Any war that is likely to be fought that involves attacks on aircraft carriers will probably be so short that putting carriers out of action for two or three months would serve the enemy's purposes just as well as if they managed to actually sink the carrier.

Could be torpedoed

Admiral "Red" Ramage, the U.S. World War II submarine commander who sank five Japanese ships in less than one hour, thinks he could torpedo a modern carrier from a modern submarine, especially if the carrier was operating "in a locale where they are launching planes—they aren't going to be wandering too far from there. It's just a question of blocking and catching them at the right time." Commander Roy Beavers likewise thinks the odds are all on the side of the submarine against the aircraft carrier. Senator Barry Goldwater is on record as declaring: "I would say we would be very lucky if we could keep 25% of the enemy from reaching the target."

The Navy says that first the enemy has to locate the carrier task force. The task force's mobility ensures that a hostile nation will be compelled "to devote a considerable effort to attempting to find and to identify the carrier, among the hundreds and even thousands of ships using the sea"; and that even if a carrier is hit by a cruise missile, it should be able to resume operations "within hours". But the operations of a carrier that had been hit by one or more cruise missiles would probably be limited. An aircraft carrier that has inter-

steam at 30 knots cannot operate combat-ready aircraft if the wind velocity is low.

Expensive to defend

In short, the aircraft carrier requires an expensive collection of defensive weapons in order to help it survive, but its survival is not ensured. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, for instance, merely says he is convinced "that the attrition of carriers can be kept within acceptable bounds." Admiral Moorer is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some believe that in the circumstances the 30 million man-hours that would be needed to construct the CVN-70 could be more effectively used for producing other, more relevant additions to naval weaponry. Dominance of the aircraft carrier in the thinking of the Navy, it is argued, is what has led to a proliferation of expensive defensive weapons all designed to protect the carrier. Another tack would be to build more nuclear-powered attack submarines and to equip more surface ships with improved surface-to-surface weapons, especially low-flying cruise missiles. Greater numbers of smaller, low-cost ships might be built instead of a CVN-70, if it is felt that the incremental military benefit from one more carrier is not worth the CVN-70's immense cost.

A critic of CVN-70 is Captain John E. Moore, who has just retired from the post of deputy director of British Naval Intelligence, and who is the editor of the authoritative year-book, "Jane's Fighting Ships 1973-74", which was published at the end of July this year. Captain Moore says that the CVN-70's minimum price tag of \$1 billion might "be better spent on smaller, less complicated, and cheaper ships." He suggests that the present trend to building bigger and costlier warships, with CVN-70 a glaring example, may be a trend that is shortchanging taxpayers, both in money and protection. Some of the money for CVN-70 ought he thinks to be channeled into developing Hovercraft, and underwater fleets, "fields in which the U.S. Navy is today a leader." Keeping down size and costs makes it possible to produce ships which can deploy over large areas for anti-submarine operations.

What, in fact, are likely to be the current and future uses of carriers?

The Navy maintains that "the carrier can be effectively employed across the full spectrum of warfare," up to and including nuclear war. After World War II, carriers were armed with nuclear weapons and Admiral Linder has told the House Committee on Armed Services that carriers still have those weapons on board (Hearings, FY 1974, Military Procurement, p. 3725). Admiral Zumwalt also told the Senate Armed Services Committee this year that "the attack carriers play a prominent role in a wide variety of nuclear plans" (Hearings, FY 1974, Military Procurement, p. 732). However, the range and power of land-based ballistic missiles, land-based bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles far exceed what the carrier can offer for strategic nuclear war purposes.

Neither for strategic nor for conventional war has the aircraft carrier been a primary weapon in the 30 years since carriers displaced battleships in World War II. As Admiral

carriers have not been called upon to defend themselves against an air enemy and have been static, off-shore air platforms.

Control of the sea

The Navy nevertheless insists that, as Admiral Zumwalt has formulated the argument, aircraft carriers still have "unique" importance for the U.S. for maintaining control of the seas, for ensuring continuity of oil imports and other essentials into the United States, and for maintaining lines of communication at sea with our military forces in Europe and our NATO allies there. At the same time, however, the Navy is prepared to concede not only the "irrationality" of nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union but also the "improbability" of a NATO war (House Committee on Armed Services Hearings, FY 1974, Military Procurement, p. 3729).

The Navy says that, for control of the sea, "credible naval power" is required and that only the aircraft carrier can provide the essential concentration of air power that is needed. The Navy says further that the U.S. "cannot conduct overseas military operations without naval support", and argues that, without "adequate naval forces", the U.S. might find itself in the same plight as the Soviet Union allegedly did in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 when, the

Navy says, the Soviet Union had to back down precisely because its naval forces were inferior to those of the U.S.

These arguments are persuasive for supporting "credible naval power". But they are not so persuasive in support of a fourth, billion-dollar nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. For the purposes that the Navy describes, the existing carrier task forces are adequate, and an 11-carrier force in the 1980's would also be adequate. There is no clear case here for adding a 12th carrier in 1980, in the form of a fourth, nuclear-powered carrier.

The Navy says that "in the low-threat areas, where the Soviet air threat and surface threat is not as high as it is, say, next to Europe", the proposed U.S. counters to Soviet threats to U.S. ships are the patrol frigate, and the sea control ship. Both of these are much less costly than an aircraft carrier. The patrol frigate is designed to provide anti-submarine protection and the sea control ship is designed to operate helicopters and V/STOL type aircraft, that is, planes that can rise vertically and can take off and land in a small space. Admiral Price told the House Armed Services Committee the patrol frigate "is a ship we can afford". And he significantly conceded: "It is very expensive to try to build one ship with everything on it, and then it can only be in one spot at a time." That is not a bad description of an aircraft carrier, as opposed to several patrol frigates or sea control ships. According to Admiral Price, the sea control ship "can adequately carry out worldwide sea control tasks in an effective manner (but) it could not carry the . . . F-14's, the aircraft the carrier has to have." (House Armed Services Committee Hearings, FY 1974, Military Procurement, p. 3908)

The F-14 aircraft that are to go on the proposed new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier would be chiefly of use against Soviet cruise missiles. But a war at sea that involves the Soviet Union but does not involve use of nuclear weapons seems highly unlikely, and it is still less likely that any such war would be a long one.

Soviets not equipped

A critical attack by the Soviets against U.S. oil and other shipments from overseas seems implausible outside of a scenario embracing a protracted war of attrition at sea. The Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development told Congress that the Soviets are not equipped for a long naval war of attrition. That is the opinion of most military experts. If the Soviets attacked this country's oil shipments, they would be opening themselves to the dire prospect of nuclear attack by the U.S., just as we would be opening ourselves to Soviet nuclear attack, if we were to commit such an act of aggression. These alarming escalatory possibilities ought to give great pause to any power contemplating such attacks and serve to deter them.

Admiral Zumwalt calls the aircraft carrier "the principal tactical weapon system through which the Navy carries out its primary non-strategic mission." However, in the event of a conventional war breaking out in Europe, U.S. aircraft carriers operating off the European coasts would be vulnerable to concentrated and sophisticated attack by

Estimated 5-Year Costs of Attack Carriers, FY 1974-78: \$35 Billion

Ship Procurement	\$ 673,000,000
Ship Operation	\$ 2,721,500,000
Air Procurement	\$15,500,000,000
Air Operation	\$ 4,214,500,000
Escort Procurement	\$ 1,068,000,000
Escort Operation	\$ 2,950,500,000
Missile & Ordnance Procurement	\$ 3,542,000,000
Supply-Ship Procurement	\$ 80,000,000
Supply-Ship Operation	\$ 427,000,000
Land Support	\$ 320,000,000
Research & Development	\$ 2,995,000,000
Military Construction	\$ 870,000,000
Total Cost	\$35,361,500,000

U.S. Carriers in 1973

	Total	In Atlantic	In Pacific
Attack Carriers	14	6	8
Anti-submarine carriers	2	1	1
Helicopter carriers	7	4	3

firing anti-ship missiles. The carriers' function presumably would be to add the power of their attack aircraft to that of the land-based tactical aircraft engaged in the fighting. But the carriers' attack planes would to a large degree be only adding to the efforts of the 2,000 land-based aircraft on the NATO side. And the sea-based planes might well find they had to devote most of their energies not to attacking the enemy but to protecting the carriers from concentrated enemy onslaughts.

Admiral Zumwalt's answer to this is to say that "the carrier is the strongest naval ship that can be constructed; it is meant to go in harm's way and to carry out its mission in the face of intense enemy opposition." And Admiral Moorer argues that "to say the carrier task force cannot survive is to imply that no forces on the oceans can survive." But to employ carriers for launching sea-based tactical aircraft into the fray in a conventional war in Europe might be a wrong use of them when land-based tactical aircraft can do the job better.

This is another indication that the missions which carriers can reasonably be expected to perform in modern wartime conditions are modest enough to be undertaken successfully by an 11-carrier force, so that it is not really necessary at this time to spend a billion dollars on a fourth, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

Vietnam War

Since the second World War, carriers have been used in the Korean war and the Vietnam war. They were used in the Korean war because no air bases were available on land, these having been overrun by the North Korean forces. In those circumstances, and facing insignificant enemy opposition at sea, the carriers' attack aircraft were able to provide the conventional air power for bombing land targets that normally would have been provided by land-based tactical aircraft. In the Vietnam war, carriers were used as a supplement to land-based bombers. The sea-based tactical aircraft dropped a third of all the bombs that were used on both North and South Vietnam. However, there is no evidence that this bombing managed to significantly reduce the flow of munitions either into North Vietnam, from China and Russia, or from North into South Vietnam.

Elsewhere since World War II, U.S. aircraft carriers were present when the Marines landed at Lebanon and when

Americans were evacuated from Jordan; in the Taiwan Straits, to screen Formosa from mainland China; and most recently in the Indian Ocean in 1971, as a show of U.S. naval strength when India was militarily assisting the people of Bangladesh against Pakistan. At the time, official U.S. government sympathy was tilted away from India and towards Pakistan (which lost the war).

Two U.S. aircraft carriers are stationed in the Mediterranean, but have taken part in no fighting there. This may have been just as well. The Mediterranean Sea is a very hostile environment for an aircraft carrier. There, a carrier is vulnerable to attack by land-based enemy aircraft, by enemy submarines, and by enemy surface ships including small boats that have high speed and that carry missiles. The Egyptians have 12 submarines and 20 missile-carrying patrol boats. The Soviet Union has 140 such boats. In the event of war, U.S. carriers in the Mediterranean would be subject to attacks by these as well as by enemy submarines and aircraft. In such a geographically circumscribed area, the carriers would not be able to be elusive and might be vulnerable even to missiles fired by motor boats, which sank the Israeli destroyer, the Eilath, in 1967.

Admiral Moorer has explained the virtues of nuclear propulsion for carriers. "With nuclear propulsion, there is no need to refuel. A nuclear-powered fleet is freed from the constraints of tankers and base support, and therefore has increased reliability, speed, range, less fuel-carrying requirements and more payload." But even a nuclear-powered carrier would still need to be resupplied with aircraft fuel, aircraft ammunition and other items, and for this purpose would have to rendezvous with replenishment ships.

Future in doubt

Admiral Moorer's argument does not prove that it is necessary to acquire a fourth, nuclear-powered carrier now, or to have more than 11 aircraft carriers in the 1980's. As Dr. Garwin implied to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the long-term future of the aircraft carrier is in doubt. It would therefore seem prudent to make the most of existing carriers, rather than displace them as rapidly as possible with extremely expensive nuclear-powered carriers. Deferral of construction of further nuclear-powered carriers will buy time in which to resolve the fate of the aircraft carrier, one way or another.

This is not the Navy view. Admiral Zumwalt insists that the aircraft carrier has a "unique capability", and without it, "no other naval surface operations could safely be conducted." But the carrier has become effectively outdated as a strategic force, and, because of its vulnerability to cruise-missiles and other modern weapons, has only limited usefulness in any large-scale conventional war, especially with the Soviet Union.

Carriers may be useful in very remote parts of the South Atlantic, South-Pacific and Indian Ocean, where from time to time there may be no base facilities available to the United States for land-based tactical aircraft. Carriers are also used for showing the flag. One carrier can appear in

international waters to signify an American presence, without actually involving the U.S. in a situation unless and until a decision is made to actively intervene.

This was presumably the role of carriers in the Taiwan Straits in the 1950's. Their mere presence may have helped to discourage the mainland Chinese from launching an invasion of Formosa.

Policing the world

Dating back to about 1947, the United States has signed a number of treaties, some bilateral, others in connection with regional defense organizations like the South East Asian Treaty Organization. Excluding NATO, there are defense treaties with 21 countries in Latin America, and with at least seven countries in Asia, including the Philippines, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Thailand. Admiral Zumwalt said last year: "As the number of our land-based forces deployed overseas declines, we will need to keep some evidence of U.S. power in sight. This will at the same time sustain our allies' confidence in us, and demonstrate by our presence both our capability and our determination to protect our commerce and our sources of strategic materials from any interruption." And he said this year: "There are areas of the world where the U.S. has no formal security commitments, but continues to have an interest in helping to maintain stability and reduce the danger of conflict."

In pursuit of those world-wide policing objectives, U.S. aircraft carriers annually "show the flag" in foreign ports around the world, in the Caribbean, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Pacific, from Puerto Rico and Rio de Janeiro, to Greenock and Corfu, and Subic Bay and Yokosuka. But the Navy has not argued that it is essential to have a fourth, billion-dollar carrier in order to "show the flag". Far-flung foreign ports could continue to be visited in the 1980's with an 11-carrier force that included three nuclear-powered carriers.

U.S. and Soviet Carrier Strengths in 1973

	U.S.	USSR
Attack Carriers*	14 (2)**	0
Anti-submarine Carriers	2	0(2)
Helicopter Carriers	7 (5)	2
Total Carriers	23 (7)	2 (2)

* These carriers attack land targets, surface ships and aircraft.

** Figure in parentheses means number of ships being built.

If more carriers are needed in time of war, their numbers can be increased quite rapidly. The U.S. entered the second World War with only seven attack carriers, but there were 98 carriers on active service in the war's closing months. Again, there were only seven attack carriers on active duty when the Korean War broke out, but there were 16 by the time the war ended. There is however no certainty that carriers would be in great demand in the event of another war. In peacetime, the number of carriers maintained in active service has tended to diminish. That is what is happening now. The U.S. had 25 carriers in active service in 1962. It has 16 at present, 14 of them attack carriers. At the start of the 1980's, there will be 12 attack carriers, if a fourth, nuclear-powered carrier is built in time to be commissioned in 1980, and 11 attack carriers if it is not.


To repeat: At \$1 billion, the CVN-70 will be the most expensive ship ever built, and this excludes all consideration of the far greater cost of the nuclear-powered carrier's aircraft and escort ships.

The CVN-70's mission is described as "to support and operate aircraft to engage in attacks on targets afloat and ashore which threaten our use of the sea." But this task can usually be done better by land-based tactical air power, whose capability the carriers duplicate or overlap and thus add a large unnecessary amount to the cost of U.S. conventional forces, which account for 75% of the budget.

And the missions carriers seem best fitted for can be carried out by the carrier task forces already in existence or, in 1981, without the CVN-70.

Summing up

The arguments against adding the CVN-70 to the fleet were perhaps most succinctly presented by Senator Stevenson when he told the Senate: "The Navy has better ways of spending this billion dollars than on the CVN-70. Its anti-submarine role could be performed less expensively by existing land-based planes and new, less expensive multi-purpose vessels, including sea-based planes and helicopters. Its sea control mission could be performed less expensively by destroyers, patrol frigates, and other surface vessels—if sea control against the most modern nuclear submarines is possible by any means. Its shore support mission might be performed by surface-to-surface missiles launched from less expensive naval platforms, or by planes launched from existing carriers, or additional less expensive carriers. Why must we place so many of our eggs in this one, most fragile and expensive basket?" This is a simple statement, put in simple language, but it is not simplistic. It seems a sensible point of view.



CVN-70 WOULD BE THE MOST EXPENSIVE SHIP EVER BUILT

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RITCHIE-CALDER; family name of Baron Ritchie-Calder

RITCHIE-CALDER, Baron, cr 1966, of Balmashannar (Life Peer); Peter Ritchie Ritchie-Calder, CBE 1945; MA (Edinburgh) 1961; author and journalist; Chairman, Metrication Board, since 1969; b 1 July 1906; s of David Lindsay Calder and Georgina Ritchie, Forfar, Angus; m 1927, Mabel Jane Forbes, d of Dr David McKail, Glasgow; three s two d. Educ: Forfar Academy. Police court reporter, Dundee Courier (1922). D. C. Thomson Press (London office, 1924, Glasgow, 1925), Daily News (1926-30), Daily Chronicle (1930), Daily Herald (1930-41). Author, scientific, social and political journalist and broadcaster (radio and television). Science Editor, News Chronicle, 1945-56. Dept of FO, 1941-45; Editorial Staff, New Statesman, 1945-58; Montague Burton Professor of International Relations, Edinburgh University, 1961-67. Charles Beard lectr, Ruskin College, Oxford, 1957; Member Council British Association, Pres. Section X, 1955; Fell. Amer. Assoc. for Advancement of Science; Fabian Executive; Secretary of H. G. Wells' Debate, and Viscount Sankey Cttee. on New Declaration of the Rights of Man, 1940. Mem. British delegn to Unesco (Paris, 1946, Mexico City, 1947, 1966, 1968); special adviser at FAO Famine Conf. (Washington, 1946); Desert survey for Unesco, 1950; chief, special UN Mission to SE Asia, 1951; Mission (UN auspices) to Arctic, 1955; Member UN Secretariat, at Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Confs. 1955 and 1958, and Member WHO group on mental aspects of Atomic Energy, 1957; Consultant-Editor, UN Science and Technology Conference, Geneva, 1963; Chm. Chicago University study group on Radiation in the Environment, 1960; Special UN Mission to Congo, 1960; 2nd UN Mission to SE Asia, 1962. Associate, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, California, 1965; Chairman Association of British Science Writers, 1949-55. President: Mental Health Film Council; National Peace Council; Fellow of World Academy of Arts and Science; Danforth Foundation Lecturer, USA, 1965. UK Commn for WHO; UK Commn for Unesco; Cons., OXFAM; Vice-Pres. Workers' Educational Assoc., 1958-68; Member: Gen. Council, Open Univ., 1969; Community Relations Commn, 1968; Kalanga Internat. Award for science writing, 1960; Victor Gollanz Award for service to humanity, 1969; New York Cornary Medal, 1961. Publications: Birth of the Future, 1934; Conquest of Suffering, 1935; Roving Commission, 1935; Lesson of London, 1941; Carry on, London, 1941; Start Planning Britain Now, 1941; Men against the Desert, 1951; Profile of Science, 1951; The Lamp is Lit, 1951; Men against Ignorance, 1953 (UNESCO); Men Against the Jungle, 1954; Science in Our Lives, 1954 (USA); Science Makes Sense, 1955; Men against the Frozen North, 1957; Magic to Medicine, 1958; Medicine and Man, 1958; Ten Steps Forward: The Story of WHO, 1958; The Hand of Life: The Story of the Weizmann Institute, 1959; The Inheritors, 1960; Agony of the Congo, 1961; Life-Savers, 1961; Common Sense about

a Starving World, 1962; Living with the Atom, 1962; World of Opportunity (for United Nations), 1963; Two-Way Passage, 1964; The Evolution of the Machine, 1965; Man and the Cosmos, 1968; Leonardo and the Age of the Eye, 1970. Recreation: carpentry. Address: 1 Randolph Place, Edinburgh S. 7, 051-225 5565. Clubs: Savile; Scottish Arts. University Staff, Press (Edinburgh).
See also N. D. R. Calder.

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The Age of Triumph and Frustration: Modern Dialogues, 1964; *The Insecurity of Nations: International Relations in the Twentieth Century*, 1968. Office: 1050 Fifth Av New York City NY 10028

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Times, 1962; *More Thoughts for Our Times*, 1965, 322 Mo. Thoughts for Our Times, 1966; *Thoughts IV*, 1966; *Thoughts V*, 1969. Home: Corby Hall Notre Dame IN 46556

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✓ **WARNKE, PAUL CULLITON**, govt. ofcl.; b. Webster, Mass., Jan. 31, 1920; s. Paul Martin and Lillian (Culliton) W.; A.B., Yale, 1941; LL.B., Columbia, 1943; m. Jean Farjeon Rowe, Sept. 9, 1948; children—Margaret Farjeon, Georgia Culliton, Thomas Martin, Stephen August, Benjamin Hyatt. Admitted to D.C. bar, 1948; asso. firm Covington & Burling, Washington, 1948-57, partner, 1957-66; gen. counsel Dept. Def., 1966-67; asst. sec. def. for internat. security affairs, 1967-69; partner firm Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain & Finney, 1969—. Mem. Md. and D.C. adv. coms. to U.S. Commn. Civil Rights, 1962-66, Trustee Potomac Sch., 1958-66, chmn. bd., 1965-66; bd. dirs. Health and Welfare Council Nat. Capital Area, 1966-67; dir. Madeira Sch., 1969—; trustee Northland Coll., 1970—. Served to lt. (s.g.) USCGR, 1942-46. Mem. Am. Fed., D.C. bar assns., Am. Soc. Internat. Law, Democrat. Clubs: Metropolitan (Washington); Yale (N.Y.C.). Home: 5037 Garfield St NW Washington DC 20016 Office: 815 Connecticut Av Washington DC 20006

GARDNER, RICHARD NEWTON, educator; b. N.Y.C. July 9, 1927; s. Samuel I. and Ethel (Elias) G.; A.B. magna cum laude, 1947; Harvard, 1948; LL.B., Yale, 1951; Ph.D. (Rhodes scholar, 1951-53); Oxford (Eng.) U., 1954; m. Danielle Luzzatto, June 10, 1956; children—Nina Jessica, Anthony Laurence. Corr., United Press, 1946-47, A.P., 1948; admitted to N.Y. bar, 1952; teaching fellow, internat. legal studies Harvard Law Sch., 1953-54; with Court & Bros., N.Y.C., 1954-57; asso. prof. law Columbia, 1957-60; prof., 1960-61, 65-66; prof. law and internat. relations, 1966—, now Henry L. Moses prof. law and internat. orgn.; dep. ass. sec. state internat. orgns., State Dept., 1961-65; vis. prof. Lt. Istanbul, 1958, U. Rome, 1967-68; dep. U.S. rep. UN Com. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 1962-65; U.S. alternate del. 19th UN Gen Assembly; sr. adviser to U.S. ambassador to UN, 1965—; sr. adviser U.S. delegation to 20th and 21st UN Gen. Assemblies; adv. editor, trade dept. McGraw Hill, 1966—. Dir. Freedom House, Planned Parenthood Fedn. Am. Served with AUS, 1945-46. Harvard Club scholar, N.Y.C., 1944; recipient Detur prize for distinguished scholarship Harvard, 1948, Arthur S. Flemming award, 1963. Mem. American, N.Y. State bar assns., UN Assn. (dir.), Fgn. Policy Assn. (dir.), Assn. Bar City of N.Y., Council Fgn. Relations, Am. Econ. Assn., Royal Econ. Soc., Phi Beta Kappa, Order of Coif, Club Century Assn. (N.Y.C.); Metropolitan (Washington). Author: Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, 1956; New Directions in U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1959; In Pursuit of World Order, 1964; Blueprint for Peace, 1966; (with Max F. Millikan) The Global Partnership: International Agencies and Economic Development, 1968. Note editor Yale Law Jours., 1950-51. Home: 1150 Fifth Av New York City NY 10028 Office: Columbia Law Sch New York City NY 10027

HOROWITZ, DAVID CHARLES, correspondent: b. N.Y.C. June 30, 1937; a. Max Leo and Dorothy (Lippman) H. E.A., Bradley U. 1959; M.S.J., Northeastern U. 1960; CBS fellow: Columbia, 1962-63; m. Judith Ann Rosenthal, July 13, 1964; 1 dau., Victoria Ann; Editor-in-chief Tazewell County (Ill.) Newspaper, 1956; reporter: Peoria (Ill.) Jour. Star, 1957-60; Lerner Newspapers and Chgo. City News Bur., 1959-60; newscaster KRNT Radio-TV, Des Moines, 1960-62; newswriter-producer: ABC Radio Network, N.Y.C., 1963; far east corr. NBC News, 1963-64; pub. affairs dir. WMCA, N.Y.C., 1964-66; corr., edn. editor NBC News, Los Angeles, 1966--; Dir. Nat. Broadcast Editorial Conf. Patron, Los Angeles County Art Museum; mem. adv. council on pub. information Am. Cancer Soc. Served with USNR, 1954-62. Mem. Acad. Television Arts and Scis., Internal Radio-Television Soc., Radio-Television News Dir. Assn., The Guardians, Nat. Edn. Writers Assn., Sigma Delta Chi, Clubs: Friars, Overseas Press America (N.Y.C.). Home: 455 Bonhill Rd Los Angeles CA 90049

JESSUP, PHILIP C., former judge; b. N.Y.C. Jan. 5, 1897; s. Henry Wynans and Mary Hay (Scotesbury) J.; A.B., Hamilton Coll., 1919, LL.D., 1937; LL.B., Yale, 1924; LL.D., 1964; A.M., Columbia, 1924 Ph.D., 1927; LL.D., Western Res. U., 1941; Rutgers U. 1950; Seoul Nat. U., 1950, Middlebury Coll., 1950, Brown U., 1949, St. Lawrence U., 1966, U. Mich., 1966, Johns Hopkins, 1970, Brandeis U., 1971; L.C.D., Colgate U., 1950, Union Coll., 1951, Lit.D., U. Hanot, 1950; J.D., Oslo U., 1946; Dr.hon.causa, U. Paris, 1948; m. Lois Walcott Kellogg, July 23, 1921; 1 son, Philip C. Admitted to D.C. bar, 1925, N.Y. bar, 1927; mem. Parker & Duryea, 1927-43; lectr. internat. law Columbia, 1925-27, asst. prof., 1927-29, asso. prof., 1929-35, prof., 1935-46, Hamilton Fish prof. internat. law and diplomacy, 1946-61, Jacob Blaustein lectr., 1970; judge Internat. Ct. of Justice, 1961-70; Whitney H. Shepherdson sr. research fellow in residence Council on Fgn. Relations, 1970-71. Vis. prof. Harvard Law Sch., 1938-39; Storrs lectr. Yale Law Sch., 1956; Cooley lectr. Mich. U. Law Sch., 1958; Sibley lectr. U. Ga. Sch. of Law, 1970; Legal adviser to fed. govt. officers, 1924-53, at internat. confs., embassies and to U.S. deis. as UN; U.S. Rep. to U.N. Gen. Assembly, 1948-52; appd. ambassador as large, 1949, resigned 1953. Chmn. Chile-Norway Permanent Counciliation Commn. Hon. mem. governing council Internat. Inst. for Unification of Priv. Law, 1957— Served with A.E.F., World War I. Decorated Hungarian Cross of Merit, Class II; Official Order Nacional do Cruzeiro do Sul (Brazil); grand officer Nat. Order Cedars (Lebanon), 1956; recipient Hudson God medal Am. Soc. Internat. Law; Fowler Harper fellow Yale Law School 1966. Mem. Am. Philos. Soc., Am. Acad. Arts and Scis., Institut de droit internat., Am. Soc. Internat. Law (hon. pres. 1969-), Internat. Law Assn. (hon. pres. Am. br. 1970-), Conn. Bar Assn. (Distinguished Pub. Service award 1970), other assns. Clubs: Century (N.Y.C.); Cosmos (Washington). Author several books in field 1927-; including *Elihu Root*, 2 vols., 1935; *A Modern Law of Nations*, 1948; *Transnational Law*, 1956; *The Use of International Law*, 1959; (with H. H. Taubenfeld) *Controls for Outer Space & The Antarctic Analogy*, 1959; *The Price of International Justice*, 1971. Supervising editor Columbia U. Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, 1929-33; hon. mem. bd. editors Am. Jour. Internat. Law; former mem. bd. editors World Politics, Internat. Org. Home: Norfolk CT 06058

KARNOV, STANLEY, journalist; b. N.Y.C., Feb. 4, 1925; s. Harry and Henriette (Koepf) K.; b.A., Harvard, 1947; student U. Paris (France). 1948-49, Inst. d'Etudes politiques, Paris, 1949-50; m. Claude Sarraute, July 15, 1948 (div. 1955); m. 2d, Annette Kline, Apr. 21, 1959; children—Curtis Edward, Catherine Ann, Michael Franklin. Corr. Time mag., Paris, 1950-57; bur. chief N. Africa, Time-Life, 1958-59, Hong Kong, 1959-62; spl. corr. Time, Inc., 1962-63; Far East corr. Sat. Eve. Post, 1963-65, Washington Post, 1965-71; mem. Washington bar. Washington Post, 1971—. Served with USAF, 1943-46. Neiman fellow Harvard, 1957-58; recipient citation Overseas Press Club, 1966, Ann. award for best newspaper interpretation of foreign affairs Overseas Press Club, 1968; fellow Inst. Politics, John F. Kennedy Sch. Govt., also fellow E. Asian-Research Center, Harvard, 1970-71. Mem. Signal Soc. Clubs: Harvard, Foreign Correspondents, Shek-O (Hong Kong). Author: Southeast Asia, 1963; also articles. Home: Office: Washington Post 1515 L St NW Washington DC 20003

LAROCQUE, GENE ROBERT. ofcl. Navy Dept., Inter-Am. Defense Bd.; B. Kankakee, Ill., June 29, 1918; s. Edward and Lucille (Ely) R.; student U. Ill., 1936-40; B.A., Armed Forces U. U.S., 1958; poss. grad. Naval War Coll., Indsl. Coll., George Washington U., Smith-McCune U., etc.; Apr. 17, 1945: children—John C., James C., Annette D.; comdr. ensign USN, 1944, advanced through grades to rear adm., 1965; mem. faculty Naval War Coll., 1951-53; comdr. Task Group in the 6th Mediterranean Sea, 1965-66; dir. Inter-Am. Def. Coll., Inter-Am. Defense Bd., Washington, 1969—. Cons. Latin Am. affairs. Decorated Bronze Star with Combat V, Legion Merit; Order Naval Merit (Brazil). Mem. Naval Inst. Clubs; New York Yacht; Washington Army Navy Home; Quarters 3, Fort L.J., McNav Washington DC 20024. Offices: Inter-American Defense College—Washington DC 20315.

MORGENTHAU, HANS JOACHIM, educator; b. Coburg, Germany, Feb. 17, 1904; s. Ludwig and Frieda (Bachmann) M.; student U. Berlin, U. Frankfurt, U. Munich, 1923-27; magna cum laude, U. Munich, 1927; summa cum laude, U. Frankfurt, 1929; postgrad. Grad. Inst. International Studies, Geneva, 1932; LL.D., Clark U., 1962, Ripon Coll., 1962. Alma Coll., 1965, U. Denver, 1971; Litt.D., Western Res. U., 1965; m. Irma Thormann, June 5, 1935; children—Matthew, Susanna. Came to U.S., 1937, naturalized, 1943. Admitted to bar, 1927; practice law, 1927-30; asst. to law faculty U. Frankfurt, 1931; acting sec. Labor Law Ct., Frankfurt, 1931-33; instr. polit. sci. U. Geneva, 1932-35; prof. internat. law inst. internat. and econ. studies, Madrid, Spain, 1935-36; instr. govt. Bklyn. Coll., 1937-39; asst. prof. law history and polit. sci. U. Kan., Kansas City, Mo., 1939-43; admitted to Mo. bar; vis. asso. prof. polit. sci. U. Chgo., 1943-45; asso. prof., 1945-49, prof., 1949-61, prof. polit. sci. and modern history, 1961—, Albert A. Michelson Distinguished Service prof., 1963—, Jr. Center Study Am. Fgn. Policy, 1950—; Leonard D. Distinguished prof. City Coll., City U. N.Y., 1968—; vis. prof. U. Cal. at Berkeley, 1949, Harvard, 1951, 59, 60, 61, Northwestern U., 1954, Columbia, Yale, 1956, U. Wyo., 1955-58, Princeton Inst. Advanced Study, 1958, Washington Center Fgn. policy Research, 1958-60; sr. research fellow Council Fgn. Relations, N.Y.C., 1966. Cons. Dept. State, 1949-51, 61—, Dept. Def., 1961-65. Mem. Am. Philos. Soc., Am. Internat. polit. sci. assns., Am. Acad. Arts and Scis., Am. Assn. U. Johns Hopkins Soc. Scholars Profs. Club: Quadrangle (Chgo.). Author, co-author numerous books relating to field, 1929—, latest being: *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, 1946; *Politics Among Nations*, 1948. 4th. edit., 1967; *Principles and Problems of International Politics* (with Kenneth W. Thompson), 1950; *In Defense of the National Interest*, 1951; *Dilemmas of Politics*, 1958; *The Purpose of American Politics*, 1960; *Politics in the 20th Century*, 3 vols., 1962; *A New Foreign Policy for the United States*, 1969; *Truth and Power*, 1970; *Science: Master or Servant*, 1971. Contrib. articles to philos., law and polit. sci. journs. nat. newspapers, and Ency. Brit. Home: 5585 S Dorchester Ave Chicago IL 60637 also 19 E 80th St New York City NY 10021 ☆

MORSE, F. BRADFORD, congressman; b. Lowell, Mass. Aug. 7, 1921; s. Frank Young and Inez Rice (Turnbull) M.; B.S., Boston U. 1941; A.B. cum laude, 1949; D. Sc. (hon.), Lowell Technol. Inst., 1953; D.P.A. (hon.), Northeastern U., 1967; m. Vera Francesca Cassidy, May 7 1955; children—Susanna Francesca, Anthony Bradford. Admitted to Mass. bar, 1948; law clk. Chief Justice Supreme Just. Ct. Mass., 1949; practice law, Lowell, 1949-53; lectur., instr. Boston U. Sch. Law, 1949-53; atty. Senate Com. on Armed Services, 1953-54; exec. sec., chief asst. U.S. Senator Leverett Saltonstall, 1955-58; dep. adminstr. V.A. Washington, 1958-60; mem. 87th to 92d congresses, 5th Dist. Mass., mem. fgn. affairs com. Adviser to 18-Nation Disarmament Conf., Geneva; U.S. rep. Council of Europe; U.S. del. Interparliamentary Union, U.S.-Mexico Interparliamentary Group, African-Am. Dialogue I; U.S. observer Latin Am. Parliament; sponsor Atlantic Council; chm. of Mem. of Congress for Peace Through Understanding, 1965-70; U.S. del. dir. Brazilian Am. Inst. of Int. bd. fellows Boston U. City councilor, Lowell, 1952-53. Served from pvt. to 2d Lt. A.U.S. 1942-46. Mem. Am. Bar Assn., Council on Fgn. Relations, V.F.W., Am. Legion, Sigma Alpha Epsilon, Republican. Elk. Home: 476 Beacon St Lowell MA 01850 Office: House Office Bldg Washington DC 20515

* NOT CERTAIN THIS IS CORRECT
DAVID HOROWITZ

SPEAKERS AND PARTICIPANTS

✓ **BROWN, HARRISON SCOTT**, chemist, educator; b. Sheridan, Wyo., Sept. 26, 1917; s. Harrison H. and Agatha (Scott) B.; B.S., U. Cal., 1938; LL.D., 1970; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1941; LL.D., U. Alta., 1961; St. D., Rutgers U., 1954, Amherst Coll., 1966, Cambridge U., 1969; m. Radd Owen, Nov. 11, 1949; 1 son, Eric Scott. Instr.

chemistry Johns Hopkins, 1941-42; asst. dir. chemistry Clinton Labs., Oak Ridge, 1943-46; research asso. plutonium project U. Chgo., 1942-43; asst. prof. Inst. for Nuclear Studies, 1946-48, asso. prof. 1943-51; prof. geochemistry, Cal. Inst. Tech., 1951—, prof. sci. and govt., 1957—. Trustee Charles F. Kettering Found., Resources for Future. Recipient Lasker Found. award. Mem. Nat. Acad. Scis. (ign. sec.), Am. Chem. Soc. (received award in pure chemistry, 1952), Geol. Soc. Am., A.A.A.S. (ann. award, 1947), Am. Geophys. Union, Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi. Author: Must Destruction Be Our Destiny?, 1946; The Challenge of Man's Future, 1954, The Next Hundred Years, 1957; The Cassiopeia Affair, 1968. Editor-at-large Saturday Rev. Home: 623 E California Blvd Pasadena CA 91106 Office: Cal Inst Tech Pasadena CA 91109

✓ **CHURCH, FRANK**, U.S. senator; b. Boise, Ida., July 25, 1924; s. Frank Forrester and Laura (Bilderback) C.; B.A., Stanford, 1947, LL.B., 1950; student Harvard, 1948; m. Bethine Clark, June 21, 1947; children—Frank Forrester, Chase. Admitted to Ida. bar, 1950, practiced in Boise until 1956; U.S. senator from Ida., 1957—. Chmn. fgn. relations subcom. on Western hemisphere affairs; chmn. interior subcom. on pub. lands; chmn. Spl. Com. on Aging. Mem. U.S. Mission to U.N., 1966. Ida. chmn. Crusade for Freedom, 1954, 55. State chmn. Ida. Young Democrats, 1952, 54, keynoter state conv., 1952, nat. conv., 1960. Bd. overseers Coll. of V. I. Served as 1st Lt. M.I., AUS, World War II. Recipient nat. award Am. Legion Oratorical Contest, 1941. Joffe Debate medal Stanford, 1947; One of Ten Outstanding Young Men award Nat. Jr. C. of C., 1957. Mem. Am., Ida. bar assns., Am. Legion, V.F.W., Soc. Mayflower Descs., Phi Beta Kappa, Elk. Home: Boise ID 83707 Office: Senate Office Bldg Washington DC 20510

✓ **COHEN, JEROME ALAN**, educator; b. Elizabeth, N.J., July 1, 1930; s. Philip and Beatrice (Kaufman) C.; B.A., Yale, 1951; LL.B., 1955; postgrad. U. Lyons (France), 1951-52; m. Joan F. Lebold, June 30, 1954; children—Peter, Seth, Ethan. Admitted to Conn. bar, 1955, D.C. bar, 1957; law sec. to Chief Justice Warren, 1955-56, to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 1956-57; asso. firm Covington & Burling, Washington, 1957-58; asst. U.S. atty., Washington, 1958-59; cons. U.S. Senate Com. Fgn. Relations, 1959; mem. faculty U. Cal. at Berkeley, 1959-63; prof. Harvard Law Sch., 1964—. Chmn. subcom. Chinese law, joint com. contemporary China, Am. Council Learned Soc., Social Sci. Research Council, 1965—; chmn. panel China and U.N. order Soc. Internat. Law, 1965—. Mem. Assn. Asian Studies, Am. Soc. Internat. Law, Am. Assn. U. Prefs. Author: The Criminal Process in the Peoples Republic of China, 1949-63, 1968. Editor: Contemporary Chinese Law, 1970; The Dynamics of China's Foreign Relations, 1970. Home: 21 Bryant St Cambridge MA 02138

✓ **COOPER, RICHARD NEWELL**, educator, economist; b. Seattle, June 14, 1934; s. Richard Warren and Lucile (Newell) C.; A.B., Oberlin Coll., 1956; M.Sc. in Econ., London (England) Sch. Econ. and Polit. Sci., 1958; Ph.D., Harvard, 1962; M.A. (hon.), Yale, 1966; m. Carolyn Jane Cahan, June 5, 1956; children—Laura Katherine, Mark Daniel. Sr. staff economist Council Econ. Advisers, 1961-63; asst. prof. econs. Yale, 1963-65, prof., 1966—; dep. asst. sec. state internat. monetary affairs, 1965-66; lectr. U. Md., 1961-62; cons. to govt. and industry. Mem. Am. Econ. Assn., Royal Econ. Soc., Council Fgn. Relations. Author: Economics of Interdependence, 1968. Contrb. articles to profl. jours. Home: 239 Everit St New Haven CT 06511

✓ **FALK, RICHARD ANDERSON**, educator; b. N.Y.C., Nov. 13, 1930; s. Edwin Albert and Helene (Pollak) F.; grad. Fieldston Sch., 1948; B.S. in Econ., U. Pa., 1952; LL.B., Yale, 1955; J.S.D., Harvard, 1962; m. 2d, Florence Gross Goldstein, Dec. 15, 1967; children—Christopher, and Dimitri. Asst., then asso. prof. Coll. Law, Ohio State U., 1955-61; admitted to N.Y. bar, 1956; asso. prof. Princeton, 1961-65, Albert G. Milbank prof. internat. law and practice, 1965—. Cons. World Law Fund, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agy., 1962-63, U.S. Senate Fgn. Relations Com. 1967; counsel before Internat. Ct. Justice, 1965. Mem. editorial policy bd. Pub. Broadcast Lab., 1967-68; adv. bd. Amnesty Internat. Trustee Procedural Inst. Internat. Law and Fund for Peace; bd. dirs. Fgn. Policy Assn. Ford Found. fellow, 1958-59; McCosh Faculty fellow, 1965-69; fellow Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Scis., 1968-69. Mem. Bar Assn. City N.Y., Am. Soc. Internat. Law (v.p. 1970—, exec. com., bd. rev. 1964-67, and devel. 1965-69), Council on Fgn. Relations, Internat. Law Assn., Am. Polit. Sci. Assn. Author: Law, War and Morality in the Contemporary World, 1963; The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 1964; Legal Order in a Violent World, 1968; Neutralization and World Politics, 1968; The Status of Law in International Society, 1970; This

Foster, William Chapman; American retd. government official; b. 27 April 1897, Westfield, N.J.; s. of J. S. Foster and Anna L. Chapman; m. Beulah Robinson 1925; one s.; ed. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology. With Pressed and Welded Steel Products Co. 22-46, Pres. 46; resigned to become Under Sec. of Commerce 46-48; Deputy U.S. Representative abroad to E.C.A. 48-49. Deputy Administrator 49-50, Administrator 50-51; Deputy Sec. of Defense 51-53; Pres. Manufacturing Chemists Assn. 53-55, Exec. Vice-Pres. and Dir. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., Chair. and mem. Board of Dirs. Reaction Motors Inc. 55-58; Vice-Pres. and Senior Adviser, Olin Mathieson 58-61; Chair. of Board and Pres. United Nuclear Corp. 61; Dir.—U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency—61-69; Chair. Porter Int. Co.; served U.S. Army World War I and War Dept. World War II; U.S. Medal for Merit; Hon. mem. A.S.M.E. 69; numerous hon. degrees.

Leisure interests: yachting, golf.
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✓ **FREDERICK, PAULINE**, radio and TV news correspondent; b. Gallatin, Pa., d. Matthew Phillip and Susan (Stanley) Frederick; A.B., Am. U., Washington, also A.M.; m. Charles Robbins, State Dept. corr. U.S. News; radio editorial asst. H. P. Ranthorge, Blue Network and ABC; free-lance Western Newspaper Union, North Am. Newspaper Alliance, also news commentator ABC, 1946-53; news corr. NBC, 1953—, also UN corr. ABC, NBC; radio anchor man Dem. and Rep. Convs., NBC, 1956. Recipient Headliner award Theta Sigma Phi, Alfred I duPont award, George Foster Peabody award for contrib. to internat. understanding, Golden Mike award for outstanding woman in radio-TV, McCall's; voted radio's woman of the year Radio-TV Daily poll; Univ. of Missouri School of Journalism medal; voted outstanding woman of the year Women's Advt. Club of Phila., special citation for UN coverage, National Federation of Women's Clubs, East-West Center award, 1966; Journalism Achievement award, U. So. Cal., 1967; First Pennsylvania Journalism Achievement award; Carr New Anda award Ohio U. Sch. Journalism, 1971. Mem. UN Corrs. Assn., Assn. Radio and Television Analysts, Radio-TV Corrs. Assn. Author: Ten First Ladies of the World, 1963. Office: 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York City NY 10020

REAR ADMIRAL GENE R. La ROCQUE, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED

Gene Robert La Rocque was born in Kankakee, Illinois, on June 29, 1918, son of Edward and Lucille La Rocque. He enlisted in the U. S. Naval Reserve on August 3, 1940 and was honorably discharged on December 16, that year, to accept an appointment as Midshipman, USNR. Commissioned Ensign in the U. S. Naval Reserve on March 14, 1941, he transferred to the United States Navy on September 11, 1946. He was selected for promotion to Rear Admiral in October 1965 assumed the title of Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, on November 19, 1965, when he became Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla TWELVE.

After his commissioning in 1941, he remained until June 1941 at U. S. Naval Midshipman School, Chicago, Illinois, to serve as Company Officer for Reserve (V-7) officers. In July 1941 he reported to USS MacDONOUGH. He was attached to that destroyer at Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, when the Japanese attacked the Naval Base there on December 7, 1941. He subsequently participated in the actions off Bougainville; Salamaua-Lae raids; Guadalcanal landings; operations in the eastern Solomons and the capture and defense of Guadalcanal. Detached from the MacDONOUGH in November 1942, he was Operations and Gunnery Officer on the Staff of Commander Destroyer Squadron ONE until October 1943, then returned to the MacDONOUGH to serve as Executive Officer. As such he saw action during the Gilbert and Marshall operations; raids on Palau, Yap, Ulithi, Woleai, Truk, Sawatan, Ponape and the Marianas, Leyte and Luzon operations. He was awarded the Bronze Star Medal, with Combat "V," and a Letter of Commendation, with authorization to wear the Commendation Ribbon and Combat "V", from the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. The citations follow in part:

Bronze Star Medal: "For meritorious achievement while serving as Executive Officer and acting as Evaluator in the Combat Information Center, on board the USS MacDONOUGH, during action against an enemy Japanese submarine in the Pacific War Area, on April 29, 1944..."

Letter of Commendation: "...When it appeared that the initial landing on Mille Island was being held up and not proceeding according to schedule, and communications could not be established with the assault waves, he volunteered to proceed to the beach and ascertain the reason for the delay. By his proceeding to the beach, assisting in the landing and relaying to the Task Force Commander important information, the next phase of the attack was able to proceed..."

Between May and August 1945, he trained the precommissioning crew of USS JOHN R. CRAIG (DD 885) at the Naval Training Station, Norfolk, Virginia, then served as Executive Officer of USS JOHN R. CRAIG (DD 885).

R. Adm. G. R. La Rocque, USN, Ret.

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In March 1946 he assumed command of USS SOLAR (DE 221) and during the period June 1946 to June 1947 attended the General Line School, Newport, Rhode Island. He next commanded USS MAJOR (DE 796). In May 1948 he joined the Staff of Commander Naval Training Command, U. S. Pacific Fleet as ASW Officer, and in June 1950 was assigned to the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, where he was a student until June 1951, then served on the Staff for two years.

In July 1953 he assumed command of USS MILLER (DD 535) and in July 1955 reported for duty as Operations Officer on the Staff of Commander Destroyer Flotilla TWO. Between November 1956 and July 1959 he served in the Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., after which he was a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C. He was in command of Destroyer Division SIXTY-TWO during the period July 1960 to May 1961, then reported as Chief of Staff and Aide to Commander Destroyer Flotilla SIX (redesignated in May 1962 Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla SIX).

Assigned in August 1962 to the Strategic Plans Directorate, Strategic Plans Branch, Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C., he remained there until August 1964 and in October of that year he assumed command of USS PROVIDENCE (CLG 6). In November 1965 he reported as Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla TWELVE and in October 1966 assumed the additional duty as Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla FOUR. He was Assistant Director of the Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations from January 1967 to February 1968, after which he served as Director of the Pan-American, Naval Missions and Advisory Group Division in that Office. He was awarded the Legion of Merit "for exceptionally meritorious service from February 1968 to July 1969...(in the latter capacity) and as U. S. Navy Representative to certain International Defense Boards and Commissions..." he was awarded the Legion of Merit. The citation further states in part:

"...Through his keen insight into the organizational and operational requirements of the Latin American Navies, and establishment of cordial personal relations with the leadership of the individual Navies, he has greatly strengthened the ties of friendship and enhanced the spirit of mutual cooperation between the United States Navy and the Latin American Navies..."

In August 1969 he became Director of the Inter-American Defense College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D. C. and served as such until relieved of active duty pending his retirement, effective April 1, 1972.

In addition to the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V", and the Commendation Ribbon, also with "V", Rear Admiral La Rocque has the American Defense Service Medal; American Campaign

R. Adm. G. R. La Rocque, USN, Ret.

Page 3

Medal; Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal; World War II Victory Medal; Navy Occupation Service Medal, Europe Clasp; National Defense Service Medal with bronze star; and the Philippine Liberation Ribbon. He also has the Philippine Republic Presidential Unit Citation Badge.

His official home address is Kankakee, Illinois. He is married to the former Sarah M. Fox of Seattle, Washington, and they have three children.

JOINED CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION
UPON RETIREMENT 1 APRIL 1972

NAVY - Office of Information
Biographies Branch (OI-0111)
16 August 1972

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
GRAND QUARTIER GENERAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIEES EN EUROPE
BELGIUM

PANDP DIVISION

25 September 1973

Vice-Admiral Stansfield Turner
President, U.S. Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

Dear Admiral Turner,

In response to our September 15th discussion at the IISS Conference at Travemunde I am enclosing a copy of an article "A Case for Officer Graduate Education".

As this has been submitted to me in confidence for comments by the Editor of the Journal of Political-Military Sociology (with the authors unknown to me) I would appreciate its being handled in a privileged manner. I suspect it will be published in the Spring 1974 edition of the JPMS but I understand that that would be too late for your use in preparing your own case with Congress.

In case the recent interview with Morris Janowitz in the July 73 Air Force Magazine on "Social Sciences, the Armed Forces, and Society" has not come to your attention I have also enclosed a copy of it. I see you will be at the IUSFAFA Conference in Chicago. I hope to be able to attend also.

Sincerely,

2 Enclosures
a/s

Robert M. Krone
ROBERT M. KRONE
Colonel, US AF

MAHAN LIBRARY NOTES

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R.I.

1 October 1973
vol. 1, no. 4

LAW OF THE SEA AND PEACEFUL USES OF THE SEABED:
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JOHN NICHOLAS BROWN
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET
PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND 02903

11 October 1973



Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner USN
President, Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Dear Stan:

I have just walked into my office from a delightful cruise on the Chesapeake and find your nice letter enclosing the abstract of your report as President as well as the full text. I look forward to reading these documents with keen interest.

Anne and I are looking forward to the 17th with high anticipation.

Yours ever,



B16:sm
3 Oct/ 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE ADMIRAL TURNER

Subj: Pacem in Terris III

I thought I would summarize my arguments from yesterday's meeting as one option you might consider for your short talk.

Optional Outline of talk

Main themes:

1. U.S. has armed forces because other nations have armed forces and we do not want to be put in the position of relying on the good will and unilateral restraint of nations who may have different goals than we do.
2. In particular, our forces are sized, together with those of our closest allies, the Europeans, to roughly match the forces of the Soviet Union.
3. There has been an encouraging detente in the past three years.
4. I believe a major cause of that detente has been our strength.
5. The Soviets see no contradiction between the spirit of detente and the strength of their armed forces.
6. The overall Soviet Defense budget is growing by 5% a year in real terms.
7. Our force structure has been reduced 30% since 1969.
8. We can argue all sorts of figures to "prove" or disprove the notion that the DoD is eating up more money.
9. Due to inflation, the President does request a larger budget for Defense each year, as is ~~also~~^{true} with the salaries of most people in this room.

10. That does not mean either you or DoD has more real buying power in every consecutive year.

11. DoD as a percent of GNP is lower than it has been in 20 years.

12. DoD as a % of the federal budget has dropped from 40% to 20% (about) in five years, -- and will continue to drop as the growth in the domestic sector funding continues.

13. If you want to cut Defense, I think you should do so for the right reason, not for the specious reason that you are concerned with inflation. If inflation is the issue, look at 100% of the federal budget, not at 20%.

14. At this point in time, given Soviet forces are growing up and U.S. forces have been coming down, you should do so with the awareness that you are willing to base national security more on the intent of the Soviets than the capability of the U.S.

Very respectfully,



F.J. West, Jr.

PACEM IN TERRIS III

A national convocation to consider
new opportunities for
United States foreign policy

Sheraton-Park Hotel,
Washington, D.C.
October 8-11, 1973

The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions



*The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions gratefully
acknowledges the collaboration of the Businessmen's Educational Fund
in obtaining the necessary underwriting for the convocation of
Pacem in Terris III*

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"SOMETHING IS BEGINNING..."

The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions has convened *Pacem in Terris III* for the same reason that it called together *Pacem in Terris I* and *II*: the Center, like everybody else, wants peace; the Center believes that peace is not likely to come by neglecting it—accidental peace, or peace as a by-product of anything but policies directed toward it seems improbable. The best efforts to formulate a foreign policy for the United States in the light of the most serious reflection and discussion are called for if this country is to be the force for peace we all hope it will become.

Cliches and slogans will not do. They are poor substitutes for thought. Demands of American leaders that this country remain the most powerful in the world have no more rational content than Winston Churchill's announcement that he did not become the King's first minister to preside over the liquidation of the British empire.

In fact the state of the world, of which science and technology are the distinguishing characteristics, and the hydrogen bomb, satellites, and multi-national corporations the symbols, puts in question the definition of power by which we have lived and the future of the nation-state to which that power has been attributed. Meanwhile, we have international and transnational issues without international or transnational institutions adequate to cope with them. We must still speak of foreign policy even though we know that, science and technology being what they are, domestic and foreign policy are now inseparable.

The events of recent years make it clear that something is ending. But if something is ending, there must be a new beginning. The object of *Pacem in Terris III* is to consider, in a non-partisan way, what that beginning might be and what it ought to be. What can and should the United States do now to bring peace to a world that will have either peace or catastrophe?

The purpose of the Center is to clarify the basic issues and widen the circles of discussion about them. The program of this convocation is designed to bring home to every American the question of what his country ought to do about the basic issue of life and death.

Robert M. Hutchins

CHAIRMAN

Robert M. Hutchins
CONVOCATION
CHAIRMAN

Harry S. Ashmore
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN

Fred Warner Neal,
Sander Vanocur
CONSULTANTS

PACEM IN TERRIS

III

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

Monday evening
8:00 to 10:30

Opening remarks

Harold Willens

A new global setting

Robert M. Hutchins

I

PRESIDING :

Robert M. Hutchins

The national interests of the United States

The view of the Administration

Henry A. Kissinger

A Congressional view

J. William Fulbright

II

October 9

III

The national interests of the United States

An independent view

Stanley Hoffmann, Richard J. Barnet, Robert W. Tucker

The opening addresses are intended to set forth the current range of agreement and disagreement among those officially charged with responsibility for creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy. These addresses are intended to be representative of more detached views among the experts who operate in the academic/intellectual community.

Critique: Norton Ginsburg, CHAIRMAN Frances FitzGerald, Leslie H. Gelb, Stanley Karnow, Hans J. Morgenthau, Harvey Wheeler, George F. Will

Tuesday morning
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING :
Morris L. Levinson

IV

The national interests of the United States

Relations with adversaries *Marshall Shulman*

Relations with allies *Paul Warnke*

Relations with less-developed countries *Theodore M. Hesburgh*

Critique: Fred Warner Neal, CHAIRMAN Herschelle Challenor, Jerome Alan Cohen, John Paton Davies, Morton H. Halperin, David Horowitz, Ronald Steel

Tuesday afternoon
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING :
Arnold M. Grant

V

The national interest and military power

Clark Clifford

What kind of military establishment is required to maintain national security in the new global setting?

Tuesday evening
8:00 to 10:30

PRESIDING :
James H. Douglas

VI

Deterrence through the threat of mutual assured destruction

Herbert York

The limitations of arms control, the possibilities of disarmament, and prospectively, possible new developments in armament.

Critique: Albert Wohlstetter, CHAIRMAN Gloria Emerson, William Foster, Admiral Gene R. La Rocque, Jeremy Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner

October 10

Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600160001-9

Wednesday morning
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING:
Charles H. Dyson

Trade and economic competition
Peter G. Peterson

The possible replacement of questions of security by economics as the primary factor in international relations; credits and currency; the multinational corporation.

Development
Kenneth W. Thompson

Can we transfer resources and technology from developed to developing countries on terms acceptable to both?

Critique: James P. Grant, CHAIRMAN Frank Church, Richard N. Cooper, Neil Jacoby, Abraham Ribicoff, Walter Sterling Surrey, Paul M. Sweezy

VII

VIII

Wednesday Afternoon
1:45

The special case of Japan *Edwin O. Reischauer*

PRESIDING: Seniel Ostrow

Wednesday afternoon
2:15 to 5:00

PRESIDING:
Edward Lamb

The emergence of transnational issues

The scientific/technological challenge *Alexander King*

The necessity of common or shared resources, including science and technology *Gerard Piel*

Critique: Lord Ritchie-Calder, CHAIRMAN George Brown, Jr., Harrison Brown, Seyom Brown, Jonas Salk, Louis Sohn, John Wilkinson

IX

Wednesday evening
8:00 to 10:30

PRESIDING:
Frances McAllister

The imperatives of institution-building
Philip C. Jessup

The basic questions of sovereignty, nationalism, interdependence, and the role of law raised by sovereign nations.

The United Nations and alternative formulations
Richard N. Gardner

Charter revision and/or the creation of new regional or interest groupings; the increasing demands upon the specialized agencies.

Critique: Bradford Morse, CHAIRMAN Elisabeth Mann Borgese, Richard A. Falk, Pauline Frederick, Sol M. Linowitz, Charles W. Yost

X

XI

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October 11

XII

The requirements of democratic foreign policy

Checks and balances: Executive vs. Congress

Sam J. Ervin, Jr.

Divided powers as stultification of policy-making vs. lack of accountability as a force toward authoritarianism.

Comment: *Rexford G. Tugwell*

Checks and balances: The partisan role

Hubert H. Humphrey, Henry M. Jackson, Eugene McCarthy, George McGovern, Edmund S. Muskie, Nelson Rockefeller, George Wallace

Political parties as the focus of interest-centered and ideological pressures. Can politics stop at the water's edge? Is bi-partisan foreign policy desirable? Are there proper limits to the political adversary process?

Thursday morning
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING :
J. R. Parten

XIII

The requirements of democratic foreign policy

Power, self-interest and social pretense —

The establishment and foreign policy

John Kenneth Galbraith

Can a self-governing people tolerate a closed elitist foreign policy process?
Can international relations be based on open covenants, openly arrived at?

The relationship of government and media

James C. Thomson, Jr.

Secrecy, deception, and manipulation of public opinion.
The First Amendment issue.

Critique: John Cogley, CHAIRMAN Alfred Balk, Thomas E. Cronin,
David Halberstam, Richard Holbrooke, Peter Lisagor, George E. Reedy

Conclusion:

Robert M. Hutchins

Thursday afternoon
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING :
Eleanor B. Stevenson

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PACEM IN TERRIS

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

III

Pusty —

Jacques —

Charlie —

Circulated: September 6, 1973

Address

DETERRENCE BY MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

by Herbert York

Professor of Physics, University of California at San Diego;
former Science Advisor to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy;
former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY

Scheduled:

Session V-VI, beginning at 8 p.m., Tuesday, October 9, 1973

Also Scheduled:

Address by Clark Clifford

Critique: Albert Wohlstetter (Chairman); Gloria Emerson,
William Foster, Admiral Gene La Rocque, Jeremy
Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner



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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE FORCES NEEDED FOR IT

by Herbert F. York

In this paper I shall try to make two main points and one specific proposal based on them.

The first point is that, while Deterrence through the Threat of Mutual Assured Destruction may be the best strategy available to us at the present time, we should not delude ourselves into believing that it is a good strategy. It is a terrible strategy, and our highest-priority, long-run objective should be to get rid of it altogether.

The second point is that, even if we accept the strategy of deterrence as the best currently available to us, the stockpile of weapons we now rely on to produce it is from ten to one hundred times as murderous and destructive as it needs to be to satisfy that purpose. Therefore, our highest-priority objective for the immediate future should be to reduce greatly the current level of "overkill" even while we still maintain the strategy of deterrence.

The specific proposal describes a way to make a very large reduction in overkill without requiring or producing any change in the strategy of nuclear deterrence.

Basically, a strategy of nuclear deterrence is one in which we seek to prevent certain political or military actions by others by threatening to use our nuclear weapons rather than by actually using them. Maintaining such a strategy, therefore,

is more a matter of political psychology than of nuclear technology. Someone will be deterred if he believes that the nuclear punishment he will receive will be more severe than the achievement of some particular objective merits. Thus, the actual physical properties of the weapons only enter the deterrence equation insofar as the physical properties affect the beliefs of the various parties. However, if and when deterrence fails, the matter changes radically. Then it is no longer what people believe about the weapons that counts, but the real physical facts about their properties.

Twenty years ago, the general strategy of nuclear deterrence was particularized in John Foster Dulles' doctrine of Massive Retaliation. The Korean War was fresh in peoples' minds, and those who advocated massive retaliation were in effect saying, "The next time we are seriously challenged, we will not allow the enemy to choose the place and style of warfare most favorable to him." Instead, they said, "If there is another attack anywhere on one of our allies, we will immediately retaliate with a massive nuclear strike on the real source of the new aggression." At that time, the idea was to deter conventional war anywhere in the world, but especially in Europe, through the threat of massive nuclear retaliation. The United States was able to make such a threat because we had an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons. We had, perhaps, a few hundred atomic bombs, each somewhat bigger than the one that had killed about 100,000 people in Hiroshima eight years earlier. We also had many long-range aircraft and we had many air bases from which even short-range aircraft could reach the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviets had only just begun to accumulate atomic bombs, their aircraft were less capable, and they had no air bases close to our heartland. The situation was so unsymmetrical that it made perfectly good sense from our point of view to deter conventional attack by a threat of massive retaliation.

Since then, the situation has changed radically. In the meantime, the hydrogen bomb has been perfected, resulting in a thousandfold increase in the power of individual weapons. Now nuclear bombs number in the tens of thousands rather than in the hundreds, intercontinental bombers and rockets have replaced short-range aircraft, and forward bases are no longer essential. Most important, there are now two nuclear superpowers possessing these extreme capabilities, and there are three other nuclear powers each of which has a nuclear capability that is small compared to what the superpowers have today, but enormous compared to that which the USA had when it first put forth its policy of massive retaliation. In recognition of the fact that for some time now there has been a rough balance of terror between the two superpowers, we now speak of deterrence as being based on the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction. Under such circumstances, one set of strategic nuclear forces does little more than deter a direct attack by another. To be sure, there are those who would like to believe these terribly murderous and destructive forces achieve other, broader objectives, but it is doubtful that they any longer do so. The best that is usually claimed for nuclear deterrence is that it "works," and that it is stable. The first of these claims is speculative -- and in any event, unprovable. The fact that there has been no invasion of Western Europe is consistent with the notion that the threat of massive retaliation "worked," but does not prove that it did. Similarly, the fact that there has been no strategic nuclear bombardment by anybody since 1945 is also consistent with the idea that nuclear deterrence works, but again it simply is not possible to prove there is any causal connection.

Along with most others, I believe the current nuclear balance has been stable for some time, and that the SALT I agreements go a long way toward assuring that it will remain

stable for the foreseeable future. Moreover, I believe the present balance is stable in two different ways. First, it possesses what is called "crisis stability." That is, in a military crisis, one side cannot add much to its chances of survival by striking first, and so there is no strong inducement to do so. The current nuclear balance is also reasonably stable in the "arms race" sense. That is, there does not appear to be any way for one side to achieve an overwhelming advantage over the other side by quickly acquiring any reasonable quantity of some new weapon, and so again there exists no really strong inducement to do so.

So much for what might be called "the good side" of deterrence; what is wrong with it? Simply this: If for any political or psychological or technical reason deterrence should fail, the physical, biological and social consequences would be completely out of line with any reasonable view of the national objectives of the USA or the Soviet Union. What would these consequences be? I believe the following is as accurate and detailed as is necessary and useful for any general but serious discussion of the subject. In the event of an exchange of blows by the strategic nuclear forces of the USA and the USSR, most of the urban populations of the Soviet Union and the United States could be killed, and most of the industry and commerce could be destroyed by the direct and immediate effects of the nuclear explosions. The towns and rural areas of the two countries would at the same time be subjected to varying amounts of radioactive fallout. The details of what would happen to the people living in such areas depend importantly on the weather conditions prevailing at the time and on the details of the attack pattern, but well over one-half of the town and country populations could be killed by the fallout. In addition, the living standards and the life expectancy of the survivors would be substantially

reduced by secondary effects, including both the effect of less-than-lethal levels of fallout and the general breakdown of civilized services. The balance between the damage to the urban population of one side and the damage to the urban population of the other side depends somewhat, but not materially, on who strikes first. However, there is a real possibility that the rural population of the side that strikes first will end up somewhat better off.

In addition, the lives of many millions of people living in the immediate neighborhood of the superpowers would be imperiled by so-called local fallout, and long-range or world-wide fallout would endanger those living in even remote countries. It is very difficult to make precise estimates, but it seems that a full nuclear exchange between the USA and the USSR would result in the order of 10,000,000 casualties from cancer and leukemia in countries situated well away from the two main protagonists. In addition, genetic problems, that are even more difficult to calculate, would affect many, many millions of others, not only in this generation, but for centuries to come. Civilization would survive somewhere, but probably not in the United States or the Soviet Union, and perhaps not elsewhere in North America or Europe.

Some authorities have proposed that we confront these awful possibilities by undertaking huge, complex programs designed to cope directly with a massive nuclear attack. Such programs usually include the installation of a so-called thick system of antiballistic missiles combined with very extensive civil defense and post-attack recovery programs. In detailed examinations, however, the main elements of such proposals have always been judged to be either technically unsound, or economically unfeasible, or socially and politically unacceptable, and so no such programs are currently underway or even being seriously considered.

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In brief, for now and the foreseeable future, a nuclear exchange would result in the destruction of the two principles as nations regardless of who strikes first. This is what is usually meant by the phrase "Mutual Assured Destruction."

It is most important in any discussion about international affairs or the current military balance to have clearly in mind what the current technical situation means: the survival of the combined populations of the superpowers depends on the good will and the good sense of the separate leaderships of the superpowers. If the Soviet leadership, for whatever reason, or as a result of whatever mistaken information, chose to destroy America as a nation, it is unquestionably capable of doing so in less than half an hour, and there is literally nothing we could now do to prevent it. The only thing we could do is to wreak on them an equally terrible revenge. And, of course, the situation is the same the other way around.

W/A? ^{IF?}
No one can say ^{MAY} when deterrence will break down, or even why it will. Indeed, if the leadership of all the nuclear powers always behave in a rational and humane way, it never will. But there are now five nuclear powers, and there will be more someday, and if any of them ever makes a technical, political or military nuclear mistake for any reason, real or imagined, then there will be a substantial chance that the whole civilized world could go up in nuclear smoke. This is simply too frightful and too dangerous a way to live indefinitely; we must find some better form of international relationship than the current dependency on a strategy of mutual assured destruction.

Let me now turn to the matter of the size of the force currently devoted to mutual assured destruction, and to the

matter of "overkill." Informed opinions about how many weapons are really needed vary over an extremely wide range. For example, shortly after leaving the post of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy wrote, "In the real world of real political leaders -- whether here or in the Soviet Union -- a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable."

For a very much higher estimate, we turn to some calculations made in the early 1960's. In order to quantify the question, it was assumed that "assured destruction" meant guaranteeing the deaths of 25% of the population and the destruction of a majority of its industrial capacity. From that, it was calculated that as many as 400 bombs on target might be needed.

As an intermediate estimate, we may turn to what the French and British have actually done to produce what they evidently think is a deterrent force. In each case the number of large bombs devoted to that purpose seems to be something less than one hundred.

There is, thus, a wide range of views about what is needed for deterrence. My personal view is that Bundy is right: that from one to ten are enough whenever the course of the events is being rationally determined. In the case of irrational behavior, there is no way of calculating what it would take. The case of irrational behavior is, therefore, of little interest in connection with the question of how big the deterrent force should be; rather, the matter of

irrational behavior only enters into questions about when and how deterrence will fail, and about whether a policy based on deterrence is of any political value at all.

How do these estimates of need, running from a low of one to a high of 400, compare with what we actually have?

When current plans are completed, just one component of the U.S. strategic force will consist of 31 Poseidon submarines. Each submarine has 16 missiles, each missile can deliver 10 or so warheads, each to a different target. That makes 5000 warheads altogether, and each of them is about three times as big as the one which killed about 100,000 people in Hiroshima in 1945.

In addition, we plan to retain 10 missile submarines of an older type, which deliver bigger warheads, but not so many of them. In addition to the submarine missiles are the land-based Minuteman and Titan forces, capable of delivering about 2000 warheads, ranging in size from those which are "only" ten times the size of the Hiroshima bomb up to warheads hundreds of times as big.

The third component of the "Triad" of strategic force consists of long-range bombers, mostly B-52's. The details of their capability are less well known publicly than those of the missile forces. It is known, however, that each bomber can deliver many individual weapons, including both air-to-surface missiles and free-fall bombs. The actual number and megatonnage depends more on administrative decisions than on technological limitations. It is, however, clear that the bombers can carry many more megatons than the combined sea-based and land-based missile force. All told, the total number of individual warheads in the force I have described

is in excess of 10,000 and their total explosive power is about one half million times as great as the nuclear explosive power used to put the finishing touches on World War II.

By the time the Soviets complete their current round of missile deployments, they will possess a force which is in a general way comparable to ours, though differing in its details. Specifically, in the mid- and late-seventies they will end up with substantially fewer individual warheads, but with substantially more total megatonnage.

If one, or ten, or maybe a few hundred bombs on target are all that are needed to deter, how did it happen that we came to possess more than 10,000? And why so much total explosive power?

These numbers are not the result of a careful calculation of the need in some specific strategic or tactical situation. They are the result of a series of historical accidents which have been rationalized after the fact.

In the late forties and early fifties, before the invention of the H-bomb, it was determined that we needed on the order of 1000 delivery vehicles (then land-based and sea-based bombers) in our strategic forces. This was determined by several factors: World War II and the Korean experience; the need for a relatively large number of vehicles in order to develop the tactics needed to penetrate defenses with high assurance; and, probably most important of all, purely fiscal considerations during the late Truman and early Eisenhower administrations. Then suddenly when the H-bomb was perfected in 1954, the explosive power of the bombs multiplied 1000-fold. When the effectiveness of each nuclear weapon was thus so enormously increased, one might have supposed it would have

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resulted in a reduction in the number of delivery vehicles needed, but no such adjustment was made. In fact, since the perfection of the H-bomb was one of the technological advances that made long-range missiles practical, the H-bomb actually resulted in a proliferation of types of delivery systems, and that in turn resulted in a small increase in their total numbers. In the late sixties, further technological advances made it possible to provide each individual missile with more than ten individually targetable warheads. Again, one might have expected some adjustment in the number of delivery vehicles, but there was none; the number of land-based missiles and the number of sea-based missiles have both remained exactly the same as they were before this latest innovation was introduced. In sum, very great changes, even order-of-magnitude changes, in the technological capability of the strategic forces have resulted in no change whatsoever in their numbers.

As I remarked before, all of this has been rationalized after the fact. One method for doing so is called "worst case analysis." In such an analysis, the analyst starts with the assumption that his forces have just been subjected to a massive preemptive attack. He then makes a calculation in which he makes a series of very favorable assumptions about the attacker's equipment, knowledge and behavior, and a similar series of very unfavorable assumptions about his own forces. Such a calculation can result in an arithmetic justification for a very large force indeed, provided that we really believe there is a chance that all the many deviations from the most probable situation will go in one way for them and in the other way for us.

An additional argument for possessing many more weapons than are needed for deterrence involves a notion called "Damage Limitation." The idea is that a part of our force should be reserved for attacking and destroying those enemy

weapons that for some reason were not used in his first, preemptive strike. Besides the obvious technical difficulties with such a scheme, it is counterproductive for political reasons. In today's world, the internal politics of each of the two superpowers requires them to maintain strategic forces that are roughly equal in size. That in turn means that if one side builds a large force for "damage limiting" purposes, the other side will build a roughly equal force which will inevitably be "damage producing." Such a chain of events obviously leads from bad to worse. Furthermore, the kind of forces needed for this so-called "damaging limiting" role are technologically identical to those needed for a first strike, and so such a strategy is obviously dangerous for that reason also.

In brief then, even if we accept for the time being the need for a policy of deterrence through mutual assured destruction, the forces now in being are enormously greater than are needed for that purpose. And again, if we recognize that deterrence can fail, and if we admit to ourselves the consequences of such a failure, then we see that greatly reducing the current degree of overkill is both possible and essential.

Before making some specific recommendations about what should be done, I shall first discuss one particular alternative proposal sometimes put forth as a means for improving the current dreadful situation. In that proposal the current deterrence policy, in which populations and industries are the key targets, would be replaced by a policy in which only weapons and military centers are targets. At first glance, it seems that such a policy would be more humane in some useful sense. As a result, such proposals have frequently arisen; the best known being the "counterforce" proposal made by Secretary McNamara at a NATO meeting in 1962. However, the idea has several flaws. First of all, such counterforce

strategies, as they are called, always turn out to require, or at least justify, many more and generally larger weapons than are needed for the so-called counter-value, or deterrence strategy. In such a case, a failure in deterrence would generally result in many more deaths, especially in third countries, than would be the case for a force sized for deterrence only. This comes about partly due to an increase in collateral damage through fallout, and also because of the collocation of so many military targets with urban targets such as the military command posts in Washington, Omaha, and Moscow; the transportation centers in St. Louis, Chicago, Kharkov and Kiev; the naval bases at New York, Boston, San Diego, Los Angeles, Leningrad, Sevastopol and Vladivostock, and so on.

Moreover, a policy to target only military installations would only be an administrative arrangement; it would not rely on anything intrinsic in the equipment. Hence such a policy, agreed to internationally or not, could be abandoned or abrogated on short notice, after first being used to justify a substantial increase in force levels. For these reasons, I believe the proposals for improving the present situation by going to a counterforce strategy are among the most dangerous proposals I know.

How might we, then, go about reducing the great overkill inherent in the present Soviet and U.S. forces without at the same time affecting the style and stability of the nuclear deterrence strategy? Recalling that the local fallout from a nuclear exchange can cause the death of more than half of the town and rural populations of the two superpowers, and that the world-wide fallout from nuclear exchange will result in the death of many millions of people in third countries, and noting that fallout is essentially proportional to

megatonnage, we see we ought to start by getting rid of those elements of the force that deliver the most megatons. In each case, roughly 20% of the forces carry roughly 80% of the megatons. In the U.S. case, these are the several hundred long-range bombers and the 54 Titan missiles. In the Soviet case, these are the 300 very large SS-9 missiles plus a relatively small intercontinental bomber force. Ridding the world of all these weapons and, of course, prohibiting their replacement by newer versions, would decrease substantially the threat to the rural populations of the two protagonists. It would also reduce the danger to residents of innocent countries five-fold. At the same time, their simultaneous elimination of these weapons through negotiation or, I would venture to say, even their unilateral elimination by one or both sides, would have little effect on the deterrent posture of either side.

There is another area where it should be easy to achieve a further two-fold reduction in potential fallout. Only one-half of our Minutemen are being converted to the new Minuteman III, and only 31 of our 41 Polaris boats are being converted to Poseidons. Simply abandoning the not-to-be converted residuals of these forces would eliminate about one-half the fallout potential of our missile forces. And precisely because these older weapons are less capable, their complete elimination would have only a marginal effect on our ability to deter. Similarly, we may be confident the Soviets also have some obsolescent weapons they could get rid of at the same time in order to keep things in formal balance. And beyond the elimination of these excessively murderous and obsolescent vehicles, we might also consider placing an upper limit on the explosive power of those remaining. For instance, we might set an upper limit in power equal to that of the Hiroshima bomb. The many thousands

*hand
min*

of bombs that would still remain in the strategic forces, even after the reductions I have suggested, would still seem to be many more than enough for deterrence through mutual assured destruction, even if each bomb were so limited in power.

The overkill capacity in the present forces is so large that even the rather substantial reductions I have suggested would not do much to the threat hanging over the inhabitants of the larger cities; most of them would still be killed in the event of a breakdown of deterrence. But, since there would be big decreases in death and destruction in rural areas and small towns, the prospects for some sort of national survival would be much improved. Perhaps most important, the number of deaths and the amount of genetic damage in innocent countries would be reduced more than ten-fold. And whether or not one believes the leadership of a nation has the right to place all of its own citizens at risk, it surely does not have that right with regard to third parties.

In the real world, admittedly these specific arms reduction suggestions are clearly too much for the short term and too little for the long term.

The short-term objectives, as embodied in the SALT negotiations, are largely devoted to stopping the technological arms race, and real reductions in arms have been relegated to the future.

The long-term objective, as attested to on several solemn occasions by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, and by Chairmen Khrushchev and Brezhnev, are general and complete disarmament. Leaving aside the question of the feasibility of their ultimate objectives, we must even so note that my suggestions are very modest by comparison.

These particular suggestions, then, are meant for the intermediate term, say the next five or ten years. They are for the period after we finally succeed in fully arresting the forward momentum of arms development and deployment but before the final arrival of the conditions necessary for "General and Complete Disarmament."

So far, after almost thirty years of attempts to achieve some kind of serious disarmament, not one single nuclear weapon has ever been destroyed or even moved as a result of an agreement to do so. That record could lead to a feeling of utter hopelessness, or it could lead to a renewed determination to accomplish something at long last. Let us try to make it the latter.

1. Any historical evidence disarmament has worked?
Takes trust - e.g. US vs Canada
Not treaties - e.g. evasion of Washington Naval
Treaties
2. Your proposal at best would mitigate horrendous
damage - & calculations of how much are
dubious
Isn't it better to concentrate on basic
problem - how to keep weapons from being
used at all - not how many when 10 is
too much. Reduction in overall may not reduce casualties -
e.g. 2 boys in 1
This approach could lead us into
false security

3. Need to look at other results of York's actions, e.g.

a) Bombers are an assurance of continued ability to penetrate even if ABM of some sort develops, especially along limited axis of entry to USSR of US missiles

b) Titans are our work horses - not really needed today - but in future?

And, gives us a closer relationship to Soviets, which may impress world opinion

4.

July 20, 1973

⑦
Pint*for the Study of Democratic Institutions / The Fund for the Republic, Inc.*Pacem in Terris III.

NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

A convocation to be held by the

Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions

October 8-11, 1973

Washington, D.C.

Notes:

1. Those listed on the attached outline have accepted invitations to participate unless marked by (*), which indicates formal acceptance has not been received.
2. These sessions are timed on the assumption that formal speeches ordinarily will not exceed forty minutes. Panel members will be expected to make three to five minute opening responses in rotation, with the remainder of the time available for free exchange. Principal speakers and session chairmen are expected to participate in the panel discussions.
3. All sessions will be open to the press, and extensive television coverage is being arranged.

MONDAY EVENING, October 8
8:00 to 11:00

PRESIDING: Robert M. Hutchins

I. THE NEW GLOBAL SETTING

(Opening session to be announced)

II. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

A. The view of the Administration

Henry A. Kissinger

B. A Congressional View

J. William Fulbright

(The opening addresses are intended to set forth the current range of agreement and disagreement among those officially charged with responsibility for creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy.)

TUESDAY MORNING, October 9
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: Fred Warner Neal ✓

III. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES (cont'd)

A. An Independent View

1. Stanley Hoffmann ✓
2. Robert Tucker*
3. Richard Barnet ✓

(These addresses are intended to be representative of more detached views among the experts who operate in the academic/intellectual community. The central questions are: How are the national interests of the U.S. currently defined in terms of its international relations? How are they threatened? How can they be defended and advanced?)

*Invitation under consideration

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Frances FitzGerald,
Leslie Gelb, Stanley Karnow*, Hans
Morgenthau, Harvey Wheeler, George F.
Will ✓

TUESDAY AFTERNOON, October 9
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING: Norton Ginsburg ✓

IV. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (cont'd)

A. Relations with Allies

Paul Warnke

B. Relations with Adversaries

Marshall Shulman ✓

C. Relations with Less Developed
Countries

Theodore M. Hesburgh

D. The Special Case of Japan

Edwin O. Reischauer*

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Herschelle Challenor, ✓
Jerome Cohen, John Paton Davies,
Morton Halperin, David Horowitz, ✓
Ronald Steel ✓

*Invitation under consideration

TUESDAY EVENING, October 9, 1973
8:00 to 10:00

PRESIDING: Stanley R. Resor*

V. THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY
POWER

Clark Clifford

(What kind of military establishment is
required to maintain national security
in the new global setting?)

VI. DETERRENCE BY MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Herbert York

(Possible new developments in armaments,
the limitations of arms control, and the
possibilities of disarmament.)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Gloria Emerson, William
Foster, Admiral Gene La Rocque, Jeremy
Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner,
Albert Wohlstetter

WEDNESDAY MORNING, October 10
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: W. Michael Blumenthal* ✓

VII: TRADE AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION

Peter G. Petersen

(The possible replacement of security
by economics as the primary factor in
international relations; credits and
currency; the multinational corporation.)

*Invitation under consideration

VIII: DEVELOPMENT

Kenneth Thompson ✓

(Can we transfer resources and technology from developed to developing countries on terms acceptable to both?)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Frank Church, Richard N. Cooper, Neil Jacoby, Abraham Ribicoff, Walter Surrey, Paul Sweezy ✓

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, October 10
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING: Lord Ritchie-Calder ✓

IX. THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

A. The Scientific/Technological
Challenge to Traditional
Concepts of Sovereignty

Alexander King

B. The Necessity of Common or Shared
Resources, including Science and
Technology

Gerard Piel

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: George Brown, Jr.,
Harrison Brown*, Seyon Brown*, Jonas
Salk, Louis Sohn, John Wilkinson ✓

*Invitation under consideration

WEDNESDAY EVENING, October 10
8:00 to 11:00

PRESIDING: Bradford Morse✓

X. THE IMPERATIVES OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING

Philip Jessup✓

(The basic questions of sovereignty, nationalism, interdependence, and the role of law.)

XI. THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS

Richard Gardner✓

(Charter revision and/or the creation of new regional or interest groupings to deal with peace-keeping, and the increasing demands upon the specialized agencies.)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Elisabeth Mann Borgese, George Bush, Richard Falk, Pauline Frederick, Sol Linowitz, Charles Yost✓

THURSDAY MORNING, October 11
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING: Rexford G. Tugwell

XII. INTERNAL CHECKS AND BALANCES:
EXECUTIVE vs. CONGRESS

Sam J. Ervin, Jr.

(Divided powers as stultification of policy-making vs. lack of accountability as a force toward authoritarianism.)

PRESIDING: Harry S. Ashmore

XIII. THE ROLE OF THE PARTISAN OPPOSITION

Hubert Humphrey
Eugene McCarthy
George McGovern
Edmund S. Muskie
George Wallace

(Political parties as the focus of interest-centered and ideological pressures on the allocation of priorities. Can politics stop at the water's edge? If possible, is bi-partisan foreign policy desirable? What are the proper limits to the adversary process in a political campaign?)

THURSDAY AFTERNOON, October 11
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING: John Cogley

XIV. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC
FOREIGN POLICY

A. The Establishment and Foreign
Policy

J. Kenneth Galbraith

(Can a self governing people tolerate the concentrated power, self-interest and social pretense inherent in a closed elitist foreign policy process?)

B. The Relationship of Government and
Media

James C. Thomson

(Secrecy, deception, and manipulation of public opinion. The First Amendment issue.)

CRITIQUE

Panel Members: Alfred Balk, Tom Cronin,
David Halberstam, Richard Holbrooke,
Peter Lisagor, George Reedy

CONCLUSION: Robert M. Hutchins



INSTANT REPLAY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

F
P. in T III

Let us pause for a moment and grieve for the shattered illusions of those Republican ladies of Los Angeles who jumped to their feet, and shrieked their approval as Spiro Agnew poured it on; vowing to fight to the end, protesting that he would never resign. They were tricked. They were conned. They were led down the garden path by a man who knew exactly what he had done and was waging an intricate campaign to stay out of jail. With good reason they may remain forever cynical about politicians.

But I, too, could never tell when the Vice President was speaking from the heart—even when he was on the attack. The monotone, the plastic sheen, the flat immobility of his face were an impenetrable shield. There always seemed to be a gap between what he said and what he felt. Indeed, the only time I can remember Agnew talking with any real passion was at a dinner meeting with a few of the editors of this magazine. The evening began on a chilly note and ended in an atmosphere of frozen bad temper as the conversation turned to the Vice President's acrimonious relations with the press. But there was a moment of honest heat when Agnew said: "It's one thing for me to attack the press. But when the press attacks me you're endangering my livelihood." We thought that Agnew was speaking of the future, when he would leave office for private life. We were wrong.

PACEM IN TERRIS

In any case, I don't want to add to the avalanche of words about the Agnew affair—except to make two points. I cannot understand the sanctimonious crocodile of the tears that are being shed for Ted Agnew. Call him what you will, he is not a tragic figure. Moreover, the President is turning out to be one of the poorest judges of men since Warren Harding. By its record to date, the Administration may be remembered as Mediocrity, Inc.

I learned of Agnew's resignation while attending a remarkable conference in Washington that went by the name of Pacem in Terris III. (In a few years, when Latin has vanished from the schools, one may have to translate these words.) When I decided to attend this conference my friends worried whether it would be possible to pick a way through the fog of rhetoric and abstractions which usually engulf such meetings. I wasn't sure. After all, there were to be 15 speakers, floating some half-million

words across a hotel ballroom. Nor is the conference's sponsor, the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, noted for the sprightliness of its convocations.

And, as it happened, this vast and ambitious talkfest was to open only a very short time after the outbreak of the terrible war that is devastating the Middle East. I braced myself for the heavy ironies that would contrast the Pacem of the convocation with the Bellum so far away. It was a sign of the conference that this easy point was rarely made. Somehow, the occasion "to consider new opportunities for United States foreign policy" was taken with a high seriousness that was underlined—not undercut—by both the savagery of the Mideast war and the political disarray at home.

DILEMMAS OF DETENTE

The substance of the speeches and the accompanying commentary that made up the conference could fill a dozen columns—and I will return to them in the future. But there were some general things that struck me. No one spoke of Vietnam, except for a few passionate interventions by correspondents and writers who have been seared by the experience of the war; no one spoke of Watergate, although it was there like a brooding presence in the hall; no one developed the specific theme of the Mideast, although it was the riveting, brutal event of the moment. The conference was keyed to a longer wave, a slower rhythm which encompassed these things but was not defined by them.

The grand set speeches which kicked off Pacem in Terris were made by the new Secretary of State and the old chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Each ranged far and wide and then returned to those central problems that have been exposed by the growing détente between the Soviet Union and the United States. Mr. Kissinger's speech was slow, ponderous and philosophical. He developed the theme of the difference between the policy-maker and the theorist or critic; and used this argument to refute the charge that he is interested in power and not morality. Speaking of détente, he said: "... let us not address this as a debate between those who are morally sensitive and those who are not, between those who care for justice and those who are oblivious to humane values." Mr. Fulbright, who has been even longer at this game, was more extensive in his remarks.

He agreed with the Administration on the necessity of doing business with the Russians, and he objected to the Jackson amendment, which would deny most-favored-nation trade agreements to the U.S.S.R. unless it eliminates restrictions on emigration by its citizens. But he was critical of the Administration's balance-of-power approach. "The merit of the Nixon-Kissinger policy is that it is rooted in a coherent view of the world; the principal failing of the Nixon-Kissinger policy is the particular world view in which it is rooted."

What was most impressive about the conference was the way in which the speakers—politicians, journalists, bureaucrats and scholars—questioned foreign policy. They were not strident, or picaresque, or pragmatic. They went about their business in a tentative, worried way that suggests the uncertainties before the nation. The politics of humility was the order of the day and it somehow seemed to reflect the national mood. I have always been wary of those grandiloquent efforts to re-examine the "National Porpoise" as one of my colleagues jokingly calls it. But there are periods when the effort seems appropriate and this seems to be one of them.

RADICAL SKEPTICISM

It will not be an easy job and it needs a certain amount of good faith, and trust—and, most important, a radical skepticism. There was a moment—a purely contemporary moment—toward the end of the conference when I was reminded of this. The morning session—about the requirements of democratic foreign policy—was in full swing and there on the platform were Senators McGovern and Humphrey and McCarthy and Muskie. Governor Rockefeller had the floor, but since his speech was already printed it was easy to slip out. In the press room there were two TV sets. One held a close-up of Rocky—with the sound cut off; while the other—quite audible—had Attorney General Richardson's press conference about the Agnew case. Suddenly the camera pulled back and there was the past, the present and the future all fused. On one screen, Richardson, pinning Agnew to the specimen table in the coolest, most detached manner; on the other, politicians whom both Agnew and Nixon had savaged; and speaking, soundlessly, a man with intense political ambitions for the future. There is reason to be skeptical. Pacem in Terris.

PACEM IN TERRIS

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

III

Circulated: October 4, 1973

Remarks:

by · Albert Wohlstetter
Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago

FOR 6:00 P.M. RELEASE

Scheduled:

Session V-VI, beginning at 8 p.m., Tuesday, October 9, 1973

Also Scheduled:

Addresses by Clark Clifford and Herbert York

Critique: Dr. Wohlstetter (Chairman); Gloria Emerson,
William Foster, Admiral Gene R. La Rocque,
Jeremy Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner



A Paper prepared for delivery at a national convocation sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, to convene at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, Oct. 8-11, 1973. Press inquiries should be directed to Frank K. Kelly, The Center, PO Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103. Telephone: Area Code 805 969-3281.

ALTERNATIVES TO MASS DESTRUCTION AS DETERRENT: COMMENTS
ON THE ADDRESSES OF PROF. YORK AND MR. CLIFFORD

by

Albert Wohlstetter

University Professor, University of Chicago

Consultant on arms control, Department of State
and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Albert Wohlstetter

10/3/73

ALTERNATIVES TO MASS DESTRUCTION AS DETERRENT -- COMMENTS ON THE ADDRESSES
OF PROF. YORK & MR. CLIFFORD*

My comments focus mainly on Prof. York's praiseworthy effort to make somewhat more sane what he himself has characterized** as an essentially mad strategic doctrine: deterring attack by threatening the mass destruction of civilian population. However, in considering whether alternative forms of deterrence imply a strategic arms spiral, I shall question the received notions --- reflected by Mr. Clifford as well as Prof. York --- as to the nature and actual history of strategic arms interactions.

1. The received strategic doctrine in the foreign policy establishment today calls not only for keeping civilians defenseless on both sides, but for deliberately aiming whatever strategic forces are available exclusively to kill adversary civilians; for avoiding military targets; and for shunning as much as possible any development of discriminateness, of an ability to destroy military targets without destroying civilians in mass.

2. Despite ambiguities, this doctrine of "Mutual Assured Destruction" (for which Donald Brennan proposed the acronym "MAD") has never been officially accepted by either the Soviet or the American government as the policy for actually using their strategic forces. Nor do the forces of either side conform to such a policy. The Soviet Union, for example, continues to spend roughly as much on defense of their civilians as the United States spends in total on strategic offense and defense. And official statements on both sides have made clear that --- whatever the capabilities for reciprocal mass

*Copyright, Albert Wohlstetter, 1973

**Herbert York, "Proposal for a Saner Deterrent," June 1973, presented at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, summer 1973.

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destruction --- in the event of a nuclear war, the governments would use their forces against a variety of military targets. Moreover, as Prof. York has himself pointed out, accuracies (and, therefore, the ability to reduce unintended destruction) have improved dramatically and are likely to continue improving on both sides.

3. Systems analysts gave currency to the ghastly --- and most unassuring --- phrase "mutual assured destruction". They stressed that it was an accounting device measuring how the forces could be used rather than a policy for their actual use in the event of war. The relevance and meaning of such a macabre accounting device are then dubious. And indeed there is plenty wrong with both the doctrines and the forces of the present superpowers. However, in my view, a responsible policy would move further away from rather than towards the targeting of civilians.

4. The diverse critics of Mutual Assured Destruction range from the respected Princeton theologian and long-term student of ethics and war, Paul Ramsey, to the current director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Fred Iklé, and to Dr. Michael May, who, like Prof. York, formerly directed the Lawrence Livermore Radiation Laboratory. Prof. York accepts one of their most powerful objections: namely --- even if MAD were a persuasive deterrent to a thoroughly rational decision maker, such rationality is hardly universal. Even if no one "deliberately takes the responsibility for the appalling destruction and sorrow that war would bring in its train," as the Encyclical Pacem in Terris said, "the conflagration may be set off by some uncontrollable and unexpected chance". In that event, to execute the doctrine would mean an unprecedented mass slaughter of unoffending civilians. Prof.

York therefore proposes to limit the damage that would be done in such a case, by altering not the aiming points but the size of the force aimed, leaving essentially the "MIRVed" missile force: Poseidon and Minute Man III. For these remaining missiles, he would limit the yield of each warhead, if I understand him, to $12\frac{1}{2}$ kilotons. I presume he would welcome, if not insist on, cutting the Soviet force to the same total of small warheads.

I want to stress my complete sympathy with any attempts to modify so harsh a doctrine, though I do not hold this doctrine and never have. In any case, I favor reducing the weight of explosives that can be launched by strategic forces. I would like to see each side with the same total, and that much lower than the present U.S. total.

However, one must ask of Prof. York's reduced force first--- if it is deliberately aimed at killing civilians --- will the reduction in fact significantly limit the slaughter? And second, would aiming such a reduced force at military targets provide a useful deterrent and yet destroy fewer bystanders?

As for the first question, even if the $12\frac{1}{2}$ KT limit were monitorable, the successful launching of $\frac{3}{4}$ of Minute Man III and less than half the Poseidon---when aimed solely to kill Russian civilians--- would promptly destroy nearly 100 million. The delayed effects from fallout would be small only in comparison with this enormous prompt slaughter. In short, simply reducing the force will not accomplish Prof. York's goal. Even more drastic cuts in the strategic force to a size that still remains reasonably secure against attack in

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the face of uncertainties or unmonitorable increases will not make it small enough to keep slaughter less than catastrophic --- so long as the force is aimed exclusively at defenseless population centers.

A war will in any case be terrible. But if deterrence fails, the alternative to aiming at civilians is to aim at military targets, to limit these targets in number, to choose them in part for their geographical separation from civilian population centers so as to keep the destruction of civilians as low as one can, to select weapons and yields and accuracies with that purpose in mind, and specifically to reduce fallout by using weapons with lower fission fractions, by avoiding surface bursts;* and, (as Jeremy Stone's comment reminds us) to maintain command and control of nuclear weapons throughout the conflict, to avoid destroying adversary command centers and to try to bring the war to an end as rapidly as one can with as much as possible left intact of civil society.

This suggests an answer to the second question raised by Prof. York's proposal. There are tens of thousands of possible military targets just as there are at least equal numbers of villages and farms containing civilians that could be attacked. But there is no legitimate military need to attack every single military target, (not to say every civilian target). The force that Dr. York proposes, given the accuracies that he himself has predicted,

*In fact, surface bursts in such military attacks are a doubly bad idea: they not only increase the unintended harm done by fallout; they also reduce the intended harm to military structures, both hard and soft, from blast over-pressure, (the most predictable weapons effect, and therefore the one most likely to be counted on by a conservative military planner).

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could destroy any of several selected military systems --- 'either long range or "general purpose" forces and their means of support. The loss of any of several such massive and costly systems --- for example, along tensely disputed borders --- would be felt as an enormous disaster by the political-military leaders, leaving them and the nation "naked to enemies". Why wouldn't the prospect of such a loss be an excellent deterrent? Must we aim to kill non-combatants? I have said that I favor cutting the force to an agreed lower total, though I might specify the cuts differently from Prof. York. For reducing mass destruction of civilians, however, the force cut is not the essential; it is how the force would be aimed and used.

Prof. York fears that if we aim at anything other than population centers, this would mean more and larger weapons and so more unintended damage to civilians ^{than} could be done deliberately by his smaller force. On the face of it, given the concentration of populations and their vulnerability to even a few weapons, this seems implausible. With the accuracies Prof. York and others expect, fewer and smaller weapons than in the present forces (which may be agreed to under SALT II) would do very well for attacking military targets. Moreover, we should think most soberly about using a hypothetical increase in weapons to justify so cruel a targetting policy. For one thing, numbers are already limited by the SALT I agreement, and can be limited more in SALT II. Further, the hypothetical models of spirals are quite remote from the realities. Claims have been repeated for years, without evidence, that there has been a spiralling increase in strategic budgets, in megatonnage, or in the area that could be destroyed by strategic weapons, and that this spiral would be worsened unless civilians became the exclusive targets. These claims are simply

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inconsistent with the actual U.S. history. The United States has always aimed at military targets and this has not meant an exponential increase in destructive power in the past, nor need it in the future.

In constant dollars, strategic budgets in the mid-1950s were $2\frac{1}{2}$ times what they are now. Strategic defense vehicles, (which current arms race theory supposes to be particularly destabilising) peaked at 7 times what they are now. Offense vehicles have been roughly constant, (as Mr. Clifford and Prof. York observe). Moreover, contrary to stereotype, not only has strategic megatonnage declined drastically, but the area that could be destroyed^{4*} by the many smaller warheads has been declining for many years and in 1972 was the same as in 1956.

We may reach agreements on still lower strategic budgets, but can we justify aiming at civilians simply because they are easy and cheap to kill, because, so to speak, non-combatant populations come in the large economy size?

7. We should question not only the familiar arguments about budget instabilities, but also the argument that strategic forces aimed exclusively at civilians can provide a stable deterrent ("even one bomb on one city" etc.), while a force aimed at military targets cannot. To deter one needs to possess not only a capability to destroy something important to an adversary, but also an ability to convince him that the capability would actually be used in response to the action one wants to deter. However, if the action to be deterred left our own civil society essentially intact --- as it would most

* What is, in the jargon, called "equivalent megatons" --- a measure in between counting warheads of vastly disparate size and counting megatons, and somewhat less misleading than either.

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obviously if an adversary made a nuclear attack on an ally in Europe or on Japan --- would our promise to respond be convincing if the response would destroy not only his civilians but also our own? One of the many problems with Mutual Assured Destruction when used as a threat is that the destruction would be mutual and therefore quite unassured.

On the other hand, a policy of attacking military targets that minimizes unintended civilian fatalities would offer incentives for an adversary to reciprocate by attacking military targets and therefore would be neither mass homicide nor suicide. In any case military attacks even with the proposed reduced force could scarcely remove the possibility of the urban destruction, to which proponents of Mutual Assured Destruction cling. With Prof. York's force of Minute Man III and Poseidon (assuming 10 reentry vehicles per Poseidon, rather than 14), there would be 6200 RVs on each side. No one could dream of destroying 6199; for whatever that is worth, the possibility of one bomb on one city would always remain. But a responsible deterrent calls for a less reckless and less suicidal response.

One final point concerns détente. The process of constructing common interests and warranted mutual trust among sovereign nations with a long history of divergence is likely to be long and painful. The Pacem in Terris Encyclical had something to say about the disabilities of threats and fear as a way of moving men towards common goals. In the long run, mutual threats to kill innocent populations seem an especially poor way of building a community of interest between the Soviet Union and the United States..

PACEM IN TERRIS

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

III

Circulated: October 4, 1973

Critique:

by Rear Admiral Gene La Rocque, USN (ret.)

Director, Center for Defense Information, Rear Admiral (Ret.),
United States Navy

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Addresses by Clark Clifford and Herbert York

Critique: Albert Wohlstetter (Chairman); Gloria Emerson,
William Foster, Admiral Gene R. La Rocque,
Jeremy Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner



A Paper prepared for delivery at a national convocation sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, to convene at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, Oct. 8-11, 1973. Press inquiries should be directed to Frank K. Kelly, The Center, PO Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103. Telephone: Area Code 805 969-3281.

Center For Defense Information

PACEM IN TERRIS III

STATEMENT

OF

REAR ADMIRAL GENE LA ROCQUE, USN (RET.)

BECAUSE I FIND MYSELF SO STRONGLY IN AGREEMENT WITH THE ANALYSIS OF BOTH SECRETARY CLIFFORD AND DR. YORK, I WOULD LIKE TO CONFINE MYSELF TO ADDING TO THEIR CASE.

ANYONE PRIVY TO THE DATA ON THE SOVIET MILITARY OVER THE PAST TWENTY YEARS CAN SEE CERTAIN TRENDS.

FIRST, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN AHEAD IN EVERY MAJOR OFFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEM SINCE WORLD WAR II. CONSISTENTLY, IN MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS THE ATOMIC BOMB, THE HYDROGEN BOMB, ICBM'S, THE MISSILE SUBMARINE, THE NUCLEAR SUBMARINE, AND THE MULTI-WEAPON MIRV CAPABILITY, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN YEARS AHEAD OF THE SOVIETS.

THIS TREND IS NO LESS TRUE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES THAN STRATEGIC. THE WARSAW PACT WAS CREATED AFTER WE SET UP NATO. AFTER WE HAD RINGED THE SOVIET UNION WITH LAND-BASED MISSILES IN EUROPE. THE SOVIETS ARE ONLY NOW, AFTER THIRTY YEARS OF AMERICAN DOMINANCE OF THE SEAS, BUILDING TWO SMALL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.

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FOR THIRTY YEARS THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN THE
OVERWHELMINGLY DOMINANT MILITARY FORCE IN THE WORLD.
OUR STRENGTH SO FAR OUTRAN THE SOVIET CAPABILITY
THAT THEY WERE FORCED TO TRY AND CATCH UP. FOR EXAMPLE,
IN 1971 THE U. S. HAD 4,700 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TO ATTACK RUSSIA, AND THE SOVIETS HAD 2,100. TODAY WE
HAVE 7,100 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE SOVIETS
ONLY 2,300.

OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS AMERICANS HAVE HEARD WARNINGS
OF MISSILE GAPS, BOMBER GAPS, SOVIET DIVISIONS IN EUROPE
AND OTHERS. THESE STATEMENTS WERE LARGELY DESIGNED TO
CREATE A SENSE OF FEAR IN THE U. S. THE STRONGEST NATION
IN THE WORLD--STRONGER THAN ALL THE REST OF THE WORLD
TOGETHER--HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO FEAR ADVERSARIES WHICH MERIT
LITTLE FEAR.

THE SIMPLE FACT IS WE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN CHASING OUR
OWN TAIL IN THE ARMS RACE DURING THE LAST THIRTY YEARS. WE
HAVE BEEN TOLD OVER AND OVER THAT BUYING ONE MORE WEAPON,
OR BACKING ONE MORE FORCE WOULD MAKE US SECURE.

BUT, NOW THE TIME HAS COME TO TELL IT LIKE IT IS. THE
TRUTH AS ANY GENERAL OR ANY ADMIRAL IN THE PENTAGON KNOWS,

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IN A NUCLEAR WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION THERE IS NO DEFENSE. THERE IS NO SYSTEM FOR ANY AMOUNT OF MONEY WHICH WILL DEFEND THE UNITED STATES AGAINST MISSILE ATTACK. THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, THE AMERICAN MILITARY, THE SOVIET MILITARY ALL RECOGNIZE THIS FACT. THEY HAVE, AS A MATTER OF FACT, MADE THIS MUTUAL WEAKNESS THE DECLARED NATIONAL POLICY OF BOTH NATIONS AT THE SALT TALKS.

IN MOSCOW BOTH SIDES IN THE COLD WAR ACCEPTED THEIR MUTUAL MILITARY VULNERABILITY. THEY SIGNED AWAY THE DEFENSE OF THEIR PEOPLE WITH A STRICT LIMITATION ON ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES IN A PERMANENT TREATY. AND THEY DID THIS OUT OF RECOGNITION OF THE HARD MILITARY FACTS OF LIFE--NOT THE GOODNESS OF THEIR HEARTS. NO DOUBT PRESIDENT NIXON SPOKE FOR PREMIER BREZHNEV, AND ALL THE ASSEMBLED MILITARY FROM BOTH SIDES, WHEN HE SAID HE WISHED MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE THAT HE COULD PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE U. S. AGAINST STRATEGIC MISSILES. BUT HE CANDIDLY ADMITTED HE COULD NOT. THAT HE SIGNED, THAT THEY ALL SIGNED, WAS A RARE TRIUMPH OF REASON OVER WISHFUL THINKING AND WASTEFUL SPENDING.

THE SOVIETS HAVEN'T CAUGHT UP WITH THE UNITED STATES. THEY DON'T HAVE TO. THERE ARE NO WINNERS IN NUCLEAR WAR.

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THEY HAVE AN INFERIOR FORCE, MUCH LESS EXPENSIVE. BUT THEY HAVE ENOUGH. SO DOES FRANCE. SO DOES ENGLAND. SOON CHINA WILL HAVE ENOUGH. PERPHAPS JAPAN THEN, AND LATER GERMANY....

YET, AMERICANS GO ON SEEKING STRATEGIC SECURITY. WISHFULLY, HOPEFULLY, WE BUY POSEIDON, TRIDENT, THE B-1, SAM-D AND THE REST...STOCKPILING \$50 BILLION IN WHAT WE HAVE COME TO CALL BARGAINING CHIPS. AGAINST WHOM?

*Not a
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4300*

THE SOVIETS HAVE NOTHING LIKE TRIDENT, THEIR BOMBERS ARE TWENTY YEARS OLD AND FOURFOLD FEWER THAN OURS.

IS IT WORTH OUR DEVELOPING A \$13 BILLION TRIDENT NUCLEAR SUBMARINE AS A BARGAINING CHIP?

IS IT WORTH OUR BUILDING AN \$11 BILLION B-1 BOMBER WHEN THE SOVIETS COME TO THE BARGAINING TABLE WITH 140 OLD BOMBERS?

IS IT WORTH WRECKING OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS TO SPEND \$17 BILLION FOR KEEPING FORCES IN EUROPE ON THE CHANCE THAT THEY MIGHT FIGHT A COVENTIONAL WAR AGAINST THE SOVIETS? IS A CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE WITH THE SOVIET UNION EVEN A REMOTE POSSIBILITY? MUCH LESS A \$17 BILLION ANNUAL PROBABILITY?

ONE FINAL CAUTION...BEWARE OF ARMS CONTROL. BEWARE OF THOSE WHO SAY WE SHOULD NEGOTIATE ON EVERY MILITARY ISSUE AND EVERY MILITARY FORCE. WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO IN STABILIZING

Page 5

OUR OWN FORCES, BEFORE THE SOVIETS ARE EVEN IN THE SAME BALL GAME. IN THESE AREAS OF OVERWHELMING AMERICAN DOMINANCE WE CAN TAKE THE INITIATIVE UNILATERALLY WITH NO RISK TO OURSELVES. IF WE HAD ONLY ONE-HALF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS WE HAVE TODAY, WE WOULD HAVE FAR MORE THAN NEEDED TO DETER AN ATTACK AND RETALIATE IF NECESSARY.

INSTEAD OF CHASING OURSELVES ROUND AND ROUND IN THE ARMS RACE WHY DON'T WE PLAY THE WAITING GAME OURSELVES. SLOWDOWN, HANGBACK, AND SEE WHAT THE SOVIETS DO. THEY HAVE SAVED A LOT OF MONEY BY LETTING US DO THE LEADING ~~FOR THIRTY YEARS.~~
FOR THIRTY YEARS.

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PACEM IN TERRIS

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

III

Circulated: September 25, 1973

Critique:

by Dr. Jeremy Stone

Director, Federation of American Scientists; former
Consultant, RAND Corporation

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Addresses by Clark Clifford and Herbert York

Critique: Albert Wohlstetter (Chairman); Gloria Emerson,
William Foster, Admiral Gene La Rocque, Jeremy
Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner



A Paper prepared for delivery at a national convocation sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, to convene at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, Oct. 8-11, 1973. Press inquiries should be directed to Frank K. Kelly, The Center, PO Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103. Telephone: Area Code 805 969-3281.

Panel Response of Jeremy J. Stone
Pacem in Terris III
October 9, 1973 8-10 P.M.

RE: THE PAPER BY CLARK CLIFFORD

Secretary Clifford's paper notes that the world has changed. These changes have finally validated arguments long used by critics of defense spending.

Twenty years ago one of these critics, President Eisenhower, was already complaining that defense costs would "bankrupt" America; he was widely advised to study Keynes. But today the dollar is badly devalued, and fears are still expressed about the "overhang" of dollars extant around the world -- dollars for which we sometimes even have to refuse payment; for example, when we have only enough soybeans for ourselves.

Ten years ago, seizing upon domestic disorder, other critics of defense spending argued that "security" ought to be interpreted to include "domestic security"; were we not running greater risks of losing Chicago through insurrection than through nuclear war? But today it is not necessary to expand the notion of security to complain about the defense budget. Even the Armed Services Committee wonders whether manpower, and rising weapons costs, have priced the military out of the market.

America is now in a position in which most world countries have been for most of their existence -- one in which we must consider seriously civilian-military priorities. Heretofore, these were often only a slogan -- a slogan of opposition to military expenditure.

In the words of Madison Avenue, those who voiced the criticism have got "attention". The time has come to deliver the message. Now we need much more serious analyses of the costs to Americans of slighting

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non-military expenditures in favor of military ones. The depletion of the civilian sector, the withdrawal from the civilian economy of resources that might have increased productivity, the inflationary effect of running constant deficits because of a swollen defense budget, and the costs to society of failing to heal social ills. In this age, American scholars must become adept at the calculus of priorities.

Secretary Clifford's second observation that the defense establishment has not changed despite world changes should be a final warning to all who take geopolitical and military planning too seriously. The record of strategic plans of the Cold War is not a happy one. Both the Korean and the Vietnamese wars were mishandled. Between wars, bomber gaps, missile gaps, anti-missile gaps, and big-missile gaps revealed our compulsive response to strategically motivated misinformation. Wisdom was found in such gems as "more bang for the buck". Thousands of nuclear weapons were placed in Europe with no visible doctrine for their use. In strategic weapons, a tradition was developed of cost overruns, waste, and overbuilding in numbers. Ad hoc explanations for strategic decisions; weapons systems in search of missions; and scare stories timed to the spring became perennial phenomena. Finally, to top it off, we switched from a 2-1/2 war strategic requirement to a 1-1/2 war strategic requirement and nothing much happened to our force structure.

Whether the strategic planning is done by civilians, the Joint Chiefs, or Joseph Alsop, the history of the last 25 years suggests that their plans and reasoning ought to be taken with a very large grain of salt. Our job, in the next 25 years, is to avoid making again the same mistakes.

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RE: The paper by Herbert York

The paper by Herbert F. York, "Nuclear Deterrence and the Forces Needed for It", observes that superpower strategic forces are much larger than necessary and could be greatly reduced without affecting the strategy of mutual deterrence. It concludes that our "highest priority short-term objective" should be to do just that.

It is true that enormous reductions of strategic forces could be achieved without affecting the capability of the United States and the Soviet Union to destroy high percentages of the population of the other side. But, if so, do these reductions make enough difference to deserve the highest priority, albeit in the short run?

Could it not be argued as follows, from the same datum: If disarmament is irrelevant to the vast majority of the lives that would be destroyed with nuclear weapons, then perhaps the highest immediate priority should be placed on making sure that nuclear weapons are not used. This includes such ideas as:

discouraging the initial use of nuclear weapons: by requiring that no one man (even the President) can make the decision; by shaping the options provided in military planning; by controlling the authority of nuclear commanders, especially at sea; by encouraging public attitudes to consider the use of nuclear weapons a criminal act; by shaping the reciprocal expectations of leaders in favor of non-use rather than use of nuclear weapons through public statements, quiet discussions, and so on.

discouraging the escalation to nuclear war of any isolated use of nuclear weapons: by indoctrination of battlefield commanders; locks and physical restraints on unauthorized use, methods of high-level explanatory communication (hot lines), and so on.

encouraging methods for terminating nuclear war if it occurs: by avoiding doctrines that encourage spasm war, embodying recognition of the fruitlessness of trying to disarm the other side in the plans and expectations of the highest military leadership; avoidance of attacks upon command centers rather than emphasizing such attack; preparing to maintain command and control of nuclear weapons throughout any war whatsoever.

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If, for example, planning in Europe in one or both camps is for prompt and easy escalation to nuclear weapons; if the sudden outbreak of violence will not realistically permit other possibilities, then what is needed is a world-wide campaign against these plans and attitudes and against nuclear weapons themselves, rather than a campaign only to reduce their numbers. Would we, for example, prefer to have: (a) 50% of the nuclear weapons destroyed (and national planning as it is), or (b) everyone thinking that the first use of nuclear weapons anywhere was a criminal act comparable to the use of biological warfare (and national planning based on that latter assumption). Neither of these outcomes provides perfect protection but there is a lot to be said for the second. It may, of course, be harder to achieve -- I'm not sure. But, in any case, it strikes me as irresponsible to continue to ignore the dynamics of nuclear war in conferences of this kind. The world in general, and Europe in particular, is a nuclear tinderbox which disarmament is not going to cure.

Of course, nuclear reductions, if explained properly, can play an important role in discouraging the use of nuclear weapons. How can these reductions best be motivated? Dr. York has argued persuasively for destroying the largest nuclear weapons on the grounds that they create that much more collateral damage through fallout. Happily for his excellent proposal, these same large nuclear weapons are probably also to be found among the most vulnerable, destabilizing and/or provocative nuclear weapons. Thus, the argument for his conclusion is greatly strengthened.

However, I would argue that, in general, the most persuasive argument for reductions may lie elsewhere -- in the realm of economics.

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While it is not, by great power standards, overwhelmingly expensive to maintain a large strategic force, it is extremely expensive to keep modernizing such a force. And neither great power seems to be able to resist the impulse to modernize all that it has built -- no matter how much it says about part of the force being "backup", "secondary", "insurance only" or whatever. Thus the slogan, "One does not modernize what one does not have" might be of more significance to political leaders than the fallout produced by the weapons they have already paid for and built.

PACEM IN TERRIS

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

III

Circulated: September 14, 1973

Address

THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY POWER

by Clark Clifford

Former Secretary of Defense; Special Counsel to
President Truman

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Session V-VI, beginning at 8 p.m., Tuesday, October 9, 1973

Also Scheduled:

Address by Herbert York

Critique: Albert Wohlstetter (Chairman); Gloria Emerson,
William Foster, Admiral Gene La Rocque,
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Speech of Clark M. Clifford
Pacem in Terris III
October 9, 1973

THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY POWER

Out of the welter of conflicting views regarding the world today, there is one development upon which we can all agree. That is the profound and far reaching manner in which our world has changed these last few years.

The major thrust of my remarks on this occasion is that,

(A) The world has changed; and (B) The United States defense establishment and the defense budget have not. I cannot state the problem more simply.

My hope is that I may offer thoughts tonight that will lead to a better understanding of the defense policy that our country needs in today's world.

There exists a gap -- an undeniable gap -- between a foreign policy that purports to deal with a world of detente, and a defense policy that is mired in the backward looking attitudes of the Cold War.

Like many of you here, and in a sense like the military establishment which we are examining tonight, I am a product of the Cold War. I was with President Truman from 1945 to 1950 and I recall with vividness and pride those dramatic days. But the military forces devised to meet the problems that existed then still exist today. They are enormous, unwieldy, terribly expensive and unnecessary.

Times change, and the challenge of our era is whether we can change with them.

As our tragic intervention in Indo-China draws too slowly to a halt, we look at the world around us and we see a near total transformation. Contrast the world as it appeared immediately after the second World War, and for much of the period up until the middle 1960's, to the world as it appears now. In this contrast we will find the guides for reshaping our defense policies and budgets.

During that earlier era, the Soviet Union seemed intent on threatening the United States, if not directly, then through pressure on other nations whose survival and independence were, and to a great degree remain, vital to our interests. We had no alternative but the firmest common resistance.

For all but the last few years of that period, there appeared to be allied to the strength of the Soviet Union the massive population and immense potential of China.

In that era, the Soviets and their Chinese associates seemed resolved to make the political situation and the economic development of every nation in the world, no matter how small or how obscure, a testing ground for the confrontation of the most ultimate issues of how society and life were to be organized. We responded in kind.

Faced with that situation -- an aggressive USSR, Soviet-Chinese solidarity, and a communist effort to be involved in every significant conflict over the future of any nation -- those responsible for our nation's policies, including the state of our military forces, felt that the United States had to plan its military forces with the real expectation that they might, at any

moment, be called upon to resist militarily, and directly, large-scale aggression in Asia or Europe, and perhaps in both simultaneously.

On the nuclear side, as our atomic monopoly evaporated, the need for constantly increasing stock of even more sophisticated nuclear weapons seemed to grow greater, not less. The first priority was to build a deterrent, proof against the most effective conceivable surprise Soviet attack. The result was the construction of a strategic deterrent force composed of three basic elements -- land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, and bombers -- each independently capable of surviving an all-out Soviet attack with sufficient strength for a retaliation that would destroy the Soviet Union as an organized society. In addition, in an effort to extend our nuclear strength to protect our allies, we deployed literally thousands of nuclear weapons throughout the world. These weapons were supposed to compensate for inadequacies in ours and our allies' non-nuclear forces.

This image of the world on which our military forces were premised is scarcely recognizable from the perspective of late 1973.

First, while the profound differences between the social and political systems of the United States and the Soviet Union remain, and while there persist genuine areas of serious international conflict between the U.S. and the USSR, the relationship of the two superpowers simply can no longer be described as one of general and unrelenting confrontation. The past two years have seen two United States-Soviet summits marked by effusive cordiality, by the conclusion of the strategic arms limitation agreement which, whatever

its limitations, marks an acceptance by both sides that there is no real defense against nuclear war except mutual vulnerability, and by intense discussion of immensely expanded economic links between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nor, of course, is this phenomenon of detente with the USSR only a bilateral one. The Ostpolitik has brought with it, if not permanent settlement of the conflicts which divide Europe, at least a renunciation of the use of force. The European security conference and the negotiations on force reductions in Europe are signs of a change in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the nations of Western Europe and may portend more basic settlements in the long run. Such a sign of change and an end to confrontation is the very rapidly expanding Soviet trade with Western Europe and Japan.

Even more dramatic is the change in the relationship between the United States and China. Rigid antagonism on each side has given way to a reopening of communication based on a cautious but, in all probability, irreversible recognition that there are simply not that many profound conflicts between the vital interests of the United States and those of China. As we come to take a more realistic view of China, and, perhaps, also a less omnipotent view of ourselves, we find less and less to fear from that immense nation, faced as it is with profound challenges in its own internal development.

At the same time, relations between China and the USSR have so deteriorated as to make the phrase "Sino-Soviet Bloc" but a memory.

And, of course, in planning defense policy, there is the fact that we are involved no longer in the war in Indo-China.

Finally, in a world in which economic issues on the international scene are growing in relative importance, we must recognize that the United States has lost its economic domination of the international scene, even while retaining its vast military strength.

From these profound changes in the international setting, one would expect profound changes in American military policy and military forces. For it is, of course, to serve our international policy that we create military forces, however often it may seem that the relationship is reversed.

To be sure, there has been a certain amount of verbal change in our declaratory policy. But if we turn from declaratory policy to the hard facts of budgets and forces, we find incredibly little change. Measured by its own sound maxim -- watch what we do, not what we say -- the present Administration's defense policies seem all but oblivious to the great changes taking place in the world around us.

Despite these changes and the much-advertised winding down of American involvement in Viet Nam, we are being asked to spend more, not less, on military force. The Department of Defense budget requested by the President for Fiscal 1974 -- that is the year we are now in -- is \$4.1 billion more than we spent in 1973 and that expenditure was, in turn, \$3.2 billion more than in 1972. Even taking price changes fully into account, spending on non-Viet Nam military forces will increase by \$3.4 billion from 1973 through 1974, if the Administration's proposals are approved by Congress.

This is in sharp contrast to past post-war budgets. Following the second World War, by the year 1947, the defense budget was less than 10 per cent of its wartime high. After Korea, defense spending fell in two years to just 45 percent of its Korean peak in 1952. In the present post-Viet Nam case, there were, to be sure, small reductions from the years of very high levels of combat activity in Viet Nam. But the basic pattern, fixed early in the process of reducing direct combat expenses in Viet Nam, has been to maintain real defense spending at a relatively constant level.

Even this "level budget" policy cannot long continue, unless we change the policies on force size, manpower, and procurement which underlie the present budget. The current budget includes plans to buy weapons and maintain forces whose increase in costs in the rest of this decade can be fairly readily measured.

The estimates of the cost of staying on our present course are staggering. The 1974 budget projects a further \$4.6 billion increase in the national defense budget for next year.

The Brookings Institution in its analysis of the 1974 budget offers a longer-term projection. It estimates that maintaining current defense policies will require that we increase the defense budget from the \$85 billion requested for Fiscal 1974 to almost \$100 billion in Fiscal 1980. And that is without making any allowance for increases in price, which, according to the same analysis, would mean the \$100 billion mark would be passed in 1977 and we would have a \$114 billion budget in 1980.

Thus, we face a paradox of an increasing budget for military

purposes in a world in which all the political signs point to contingencies calling for U. S. military action being less rather than more. This paradox cannot be explained by any restructuring in our forces to meet the new situation. Instead, the \$85 billion request of the Administration is to support forces of essentially the same size and type as (though in most cases far more powerful than) those maintained by the United States in the early to middle 1960's, when political conditions were radically different..

To be specific:

--Our strategic forces in 1974 will be essentially identical in numbers of vehicles to those of 1964, except for the retirement of some older bombers and the completion of some missiles and submarines under construction in 1964. The effective striking power of those forces has, of course, been multiplied several times in the interim by the introduction of multiple warheads.

--Our tactical air forces have remained at only slightly below the 1964 levels, with 2,800 aircraft in all services as against 3,000 in that year. But simply counting aircraft or squadrons ignores the fact that the improvements in the new aircraft which have come into service in the interval have greatly increased the capability of the force as a whole.

--Our naval forces continue to be centered around aircraft carriers. Again, although there is a reduction from the 15 attack carriers maintained in 1964 to 13 now, the newer units are more capable than those they replaced. The number of ships in the fleet is substantially reduced, but the force as a whole is much newer and more capable.

--Similarly, with ground forces, there has been but a modest

reduction from the 1964 figure of 19 1/3 divisions to the present 16 divisions with a considerable build-up of firepower and mobility.

Moreover, the missions assigned these forces are essentially the same as those assigned to forces in 1964. The Air Force is designed to conduct deep interdiction of enemy supply routes as part of a prolonged war in Europe or on the Asian continent. The Navy is planned on the assumption it must be ready to fight a sustained antisubmarine effort in the North Atlantic and, with its carrier aircraft, to provide interdiction, air superiority, and ground support for sustained combat ashore. The Army and Marines are to be prepared to sustain a long war in Europe, and, to judge from their deployment and numbers, also to be prepared to fight directly on the Asian continent.

Is it not clear that today we simply do not need all the military forces which we now maintain? As I have suggested, we are maintaining in 1973, in the face of substantially reduced international tensions and substantially consolidated U. S. international objectives, practically as large a force as we did in 1964 when the global confrontation seemed to be much sharper and America's goals much more ambitious. It should be noted that 1964, the last pre-Viet Nam year, marked a post-Korea high.

What kind of forces would the Administration be asking the American people and the economy to support if international relations had remained essentially the same? And what would we be told we required if relations with China and the Soviet Union had worsened?

It must be recognized that, to a degree, our forces and our defense

policies are functions of tradition and bureaucratic pressures as well as products of analysis of our interests and the forces we need to protect them. To the degree that this is true, it makes it all the clearer that something is gravely wrong.

For, if we consider our international policy and not bureaucratic politics, our present situation is truly inexplicable.

Why, in the changed world situation which President Nixon has called an era of negotiation, do we still need -- and why should the American people be asked to support -- the military establishment which was created for an era of confrontation?

After Viet Nam, do we really want the military forces we now maintain to fight a land war in Asia?

With the profound changes in relationships between the two parts of Europe, do we really need an Army, Navy and Air Force structured around a mission of sustaining a long conventional land war in Europe? Incidentally, this question is made all the more pointed by the fact that neither the Soviets nor their allies, nor our own NATO allies, appear to believe sufficiently in the likelihood of such a contingency to design their forces for it. All other forces in Europe appear quite clearly to expect a short, intense conflict, if there is one.

Why, given our recognition of the inadvisability of military intervention in marginal conflicts, do we need a military force with the capability of intervening on a massive scale anywhere in the world with carrier air, land-based tactical air, and ground troops?

We need a fundamental re-examination of our defense policies and

the missions for our forces.

There are, of course, substantial savings that can be made simply from greater efficiencies, especially in the use of manpower, in curbing our military establishment's propensity for overly complex multi-purpose weapons systems, and in avoiding procurement of strategic nuclear weapons which actually diminish our security by decreasing mutual stability. However, to bring our defense budgets into line with our foreign policies and our national interests, we cannot avoid a fundamental re-examination of the missions of our military forces.

What military missions make sense in this decade of the twentieth century?

--First, of course, the defense of the United States itself. Indeed, it is a striking measure of how large our defense establishment has become to consider what would be necessary if this were the only mission we now assigned our military forces -- as, of course, it was for all but about the last 30 years of our nation's history. Adequate for that mission would be an invulnerable nuclear deterrent and minimum conventional forces, all of which would cost perhaps one-third of our current defense budget.

--However, we must recognize that, while there have been important changes in the world, there are still many elements of tension and potential conflicts between the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China on the one hand and, on the other, nations whose independence is a direct and vital national interest of the United States. For this reason, we do indeed need the

FROM: PRESIDENT

TO:

*File with
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military forces necessary to support international commitments jointly agreed upon by the Congress and the President as genuinely serving our vital interests.

In strategic forces, we need a secure and stable nuclear deterrent, that is, a force such that any potential attacker would recognize that enough U. S. forces would survive and be used after an all-out surprise attack utterly to destroy the society of the attacker.

In planning a new national defense policy that takes account of our national interests as they now exist, we must also recognize that there are limits to what we can afford to spend on defense even in this rich, though currently troubled, economy. A dramatic example of how heavy a burden our people have had to bear for arms is the following. In the last ten years, individual income taxes on all Americans have totaled \$790 billion. During that same ten years, spending on defense has totaled \$760 billion. That is, virtually the entire revenue of the individual income tax has been devoted to defense spending. As we continue a chronic inflation at home, and as international confidence in the American economy declines, these economic factors assume increased relevance.

Particularly in these days when "national security" is being used to justify things far worse than inflated defense budgets, we must give new thought to what real national security means.

Finally, it seems to me appropriate to establish certain negative goals as well as affirmative ones, that is, to say what we do not need our military forces to be able to do. We do not need to exceed our potential

opponents in every possible category merely to avoid the supposed stigma of not being "number one" in everything. We do not need the capability for general intervention everywhere in the world. We do not need to buy forces necessary only for contingencies which are not only remote -- such as the so-called war at sea or a long conventional war in Europe -- but which would never occur without advance warning, far in advance, by a radical change in the political setting.

With respect to strategic forces as well, negative goals may be as important as affirmative missions. We need, as the President has said, sufficiency; we need not be concerned about disparities in crude force levels or destructive power which in Churchill's haunting phrase would only "make the rubble bounce." We must not construct systems which, sometimes in the name of accumulating "bargaining chips," make negotiations on arms control more difficult by creating powerful vested constituencies for the preservation of weapons. Also, we must recognize that for all their terrible destructiveness, the political and military use of nuclear weapons is quite limited, namely, the deterrence of their use by others.

The recent Pentagon announcement that the Soviets have now tested MIRVs, the Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle, does not change the basic facts of the nuclear stalemate. The only surprise about the Soviet development is that it has taken so long in coming. When I was in the Pentagon, five years ago, it was anticipated that the Soviets would develop, within a couple of years, the capacity to deploy on its missiles multiple

warheads that were capable of being aimed separately at different targets. We had, at that time, already tested MIRVs of our own, and we have now deployed them on hundreds of our land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

We continue to retain a large lead in numbers of warheads. But the Soviet Union has the capability today of destroying our society, without its new MIRVs, even if the United States were to attempt a first strike. No matter how many or how large the missiles that the Soviet Union might equip with multiple warheads, we would still have the ability to retaliate and destroy Soviet society even after an all-out attack.

Accordingly, all that the Soviet MIRV development should mean is that both sides should pursue as a matter of priority the efforts at SALT II to place effective controls on further accumulation of unnecessary, immensely expensive and desperately dangerous nuclear weapons.

These principles, presenting the reasons for our military forces, demonstrate vividly that substantial cuts can be made in the defense budget and in the forces it sustains. Such changes will make our military posture reflect the changes in the world and the changes in our national policies. The changes will leave us with a military force fully adequate for our own defense and for carrying out commitments to our allies, but they will permit us to do so at a cost that our economy and our health, as a society, can far better sustain.

I believe it is a mistake to plan our military expenditures for one year only, on a year to year basis. An area of expense that constitutes over

fifty per cent of our total budget deserves better planning than that.

If the Administration's requests for new weapons and for its building and manpower programs were to be granted, it is estimated that the defense budget would continue to increase yearly, to a figure of over \$100 billion. I consider this an outrageous burden for our country to carry. Instead of defense expenditures going up each year, they should be coming down.

I do not favor a large cut in one year in the defense budget. I believe it would be better to make smaller reductions but to continue such cuts over a period of years. This plan would have less impact on our domestic economy, upon employment in defense industries and upon the attitude of other countries.

I would like to cut the defense budget in Fiscal 1974 from the proposed figure of \$85 billion to \$81 billion. Next year, I would favor a further cut to \$77 billion. Then, in the following year, Fiscal 1976, cut to \$73 billion. From then on, starting with Fiscal 1977, I would stabilize the budget at \$69 billion.

This approach would contrast with budgets which could otherwise be expected, under present policies, to be \$85 billion for 1974, and to reach more than \$93 billion for 1978.

In this period of time, therefore, under the plan I recommend, we would, in round numbers, go from a current budget of \$85 billion to \$70 billion a year in 1978, instead of going from \$85 billion to \$95 billion in the same period. Thus, the total savings over the five fiscal years would be an impressive figure

of \$80 billion. The saving thus effected is computed in current dollars. If one anticipates continuing inflation, the saving would be substantially greater.

There is not sufficient time on an occasion such as this to present in detail each specific cut which I believe ought to be made to accomplish this objective. There has been developed in recent years a number of extremely well-informed critiques of the official proposals, with comprehensive suggestions for bringing specific items in our military forces in line with current realities and policies. However, it is appropriate to indicate some general areas in which changes should be made.

The substantial ground and air forces earmarked for operations in Asia can be greatly cut back or eliminated, since we clearly do not need or want, as a nation, to pursue political policies which would make it necessary to use military force in that way. As a first step, the U. S. division still in Korea should be withdrawn and demobilized.

We should start bringing troops back from Europe now. We can do this without destroying the NATO alliance and, indeed, without compromising the principle, which I fully support, that the highest priority for our conventional forces is the contribution they make to presenting a credible conventional defense in Europe. Indeed, by abandoning the "long war" premise, and configuring our NATO force recognizing that in the unlikely event of a conventional war in Europe, it will be a short one, we could actually have a stronger NATO conventional capability at lower costs and troop levels.

Making the changes to bring our NATO force up to date will not,

as is so often claimed, foredoom the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe which are now beginning. Those talks are certain to be long and not unlikely to be ultimately unproductive. Therefore, we must not delay the steps we need to take in our own national interests to preserve "bargaining chips" for them. But, I believe, carefully planned U. S. withdrawals and restructuring of our NATO forces could actually increase the favorable prospects for those negotiations. International arms control negotiations are not fully understood by drawing analogies to poker tables. In fact, unilateral signs of restraint, far from vitiating the prospects of negotiated restraint on the other side may, by indicating seriousness of purpose, actually make the agreements easier to reach.

Similarly, we must not be deluded, in the cause of gathering "bargaining chips" for further rounds of the SALT talks, into buying strategic weapons we do not need and which could actually jeopardize our security by contributing to nuclear instability. If such programs are truly "throw-aways" for bargaining purposes, the Soviet negotiators can be expected to understand that. If, as it seems more likely, they have powerful bureaucratic backers, taking the first step now is likely simply to create a constituency for insisting that the right to build these systems be protected in any future negotiation.

Many of our current weapons programs not only are inordinately complex and expensive, but they represent little, if any, real advance over existing systems which will be adequate for years to come.

I am by no means calling for across-the-board cuts in every

category of our military program. Precisely because I believe that forces in being should be sharply cut, I urge the importance of keeping up an active and imaginative research and development program to provide us with the technological base we would need for adjustment to future changes in the international situation. Similarly, if we adopt a military policy which takes better account of the international political situation and which accepts the fact that we cannot afford to hedge heavily against all possible contingencies, it becomes all the more important to have an efficient -- and honest -- intelligence-gathering system.

In any discussion of American defense policy for the future, it is impossible to ignore problems of more efficient use of manpower. Manpower has been a steadily increasing element in the defense budget. Some 58 percent of the defense dollar now goes for pay and allowances for military personnel.

Consider the following facts: There are more three and four star generals today than at the end of World War II, when the military establishment was four times as large; twenty-five years ago, the Army had seven recruits for each sergeant, today there are more sergeants than recruits; twenty-five years ago, more than half of our officers were below the grade of captain, today two-thirds of our officers are captains or higher. With a total defense establishment of 315,000 men less than in 1948, we now have 26,000 more captains, 21,000 more majors, 15,000 more lieutenant colonels, and 4,000 more colonels.

The most fundamental decision on military manpower made in recent years has been the adoption of the all-volunteer force concept. The same

alternative to the inequities and irrationalities of the old draft was needed, few would dispute.

But that the volunteer army is an equitable or a workable solution seems equally doubtful. It is proving extremely expensive, not merely in pay but in accumulated pension obligations for the future. Further, as enlistments fall short of goals in both numbers and quality, one may fairly ask whether a volunteer system is likely to produce the large number of technically talented personnel needed in the increasingly technological military establishment.

Finally, the volunteer army concept rests upon negation of a principle which I believe remains valid even under today's changed conditions -- that a free society can properly call on its citizens to perform military service and to have military training. Indeed, an all-volunteer army appears to be a way of institutionalizing the worst feature of the old military draft, that is, concentrating military service and its burdens and risks among citizens with lower incomes.

As we adjust our defense policy to new conditions, I believe we must start now to explore what we will put in the place of the volunteer army system if, as I believe, that system proves itself to be unworkable and unacceptable. In that consideration, the concept of universal national service whereby all young men and women would give a year of service to their country, either in the military or in assigned civilian jobs in the areas of their background and competence, ought, I believe, to receive the highest attention.

In sum, I believe that the changed world calls for a changed defense policy and a changed defense budget. Of course, it will always be said that the uncertainties of any change are so great that only the most trivial adjustments can safely be made. But with the profound changes on the international scene, if we cannot begin now to reduce our defense budget, rather than continuing to increase it, when will we ever be able to do so? Will we have to wait until we really reach a \$100 billion defense budget, and even higher, before we take a serious look at where we are and where we are going?

It is argued in many circles that the defense budget must be cut in order to free funds for domestic programs. I would not cast the argument in those terms. For the reasons I have stated, I believe the defense budget should be cut to bring our military policy in line with our foreign policy and international reality. I do not necessarily propose that the funds thus saved would automatically be expended in other parts of the federal budget. Indeed, I suggest that a high national priority now is to get our own house in order financially. This requires, given the heavy inflationary pressures in this country, putting a stop to the budget deficits to which defense spending makes so large a contribution. In the years since 1969, the total United States deficit has been \$74 billion. Is it any wonder that with these deficits, combined with a serious inflation, there has been a decline in international confidence in the dollar and in the American economy in general? Unnecessary, profligate defense spending and maintenance of unnecessary overseas military establishments has contributed importantly to this loss of confidence in America's financial

integrity, both directly and through its contributions to the unacceptable budget deficits of recent years.

Our true national security resides in something more than overblown military forces and hardware. It rests, more basically, on the ability of our society to maintain a sound, productive and growing economy. Today we are deeply troubled by a damaging and unabated inflation, a deterioration in our balance of trade and our balance of payments which, in turn, lead to an increasing lack of confidence in the dollar.

We have the undoubted power to destroy all the countries of the world. But our present inability to control our own economic destiny threatens to deprive us of any genuine influence in world affairs. If we allow this to occur, we will indeed have become, in President Nixon's imagery, a "pitiful, stumbling giant."

In sum, for a defense posture for an era of negotiation, not confrontation, I offer a different concept of the policies and missions our military forces are to perform. The premises on which these proposals are based would maintain fully adequate forces to defend our country and to carry out our basic international commitments.

A study of the rise and fall of great nations discloses that their decline was not due to a reduction in their military strength, but to a loss of confidence of their own people in their government and in their economy. Our most important problems today are internal ones.

We must place the issue of defense policy in its proper perspective,

and let us get on with the task of developing once again that moral fibre and economic strength and opportunity that made the United States the hope of the world.

PACEM IN TERRIS

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

III

Circulated: October 8, 1973

Critique:

by Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner

Vice Admiral, United States Navy; President, Naval War College; former Director, Systems Analysis Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

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Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 8 Oct 1973

Dr. York and Mr. Clifford have clearly identified the fact that the usefulness of military forces and the situations in which they are appropriate are quite different today than a decade ago. There are many complex reasons for this. Some reasons such as the achievement of nuclear balance by the Soviets, are almost certainly permanent. Others such as the current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic and economic purposes may change tomorrow.

The essential ingredient of today's detente is the military balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or conquest. The primary role of our military forces today is to preserve that strategic balance so that detente can flourish. This balance is a dynamic matter. This means that we must continuously adapt the size and shape of our military forces and how we employ them to meet the demands of balance.

In doing this we must first achieve equilibrium of strategic nuclear forces. SALT I was an attempt to dampen strategic arms competition, but I do not believe we and the Soviets have yet reached a state of sufficient trust and confidence necessary to achieve an assuring balance. Dr. York may be correct then. Today there is already substantial overkill capacity on both sides. Yet, what he calls overkill or

overinsurance may be the only practical substitute for mutual trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers on the triggers of nuclear holocaust it may not be all bad. The primary virtue in reducing overkill, Dr. York contends, is in reducing the effects on innocent bystanders if a nuclear exchange should occur. It seems to me, though, that our primary concern should be to ensure that no such exchange ever occurs.

We must search for a new strategy for world security which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war. For instance, perhaps deliberate efforts to translate some of our investment in nuclear weapons into joint economic adventures within each other's territory could eventually put self interest above fear as the stabilizing factor in super power relations.

In the interim, our approach to strategic nuclear balance should be a positive one of searching for steps that will promote equilibrium and confidence. The result, hopefully will be a smaller and less costly force, but its composition may be somewhat different from what we have today and additional investment expenditure may be required to attain it. In short much as we may wish to adopt a force-cutting strategy it may be incompatible with the requirements to achieve and sustain a nuclear equilibrium in a dynamic multi-polar world.

Just as balance is necessary in nuclear weaponry, so it is in (what we label as) general purpose forces. As enunciated in the Nixon Doctrine, we must rely on our principal allies for assistance in maintaining enough warfighting capability to deter aggression. It is, however, the U.S. military contribution to this common objective which provides the essential linkage to our nuclear power. Without that, our allies would be subject to nuclear blackmail. This does not mean that we must maintain a capability for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining defense budget simply does not permit us to do that in any event. The defense budget of \$79 billion in outlays being considered by the Congress today is well below pre-Vietnam figures in purchasing power. In fact President Nixon's FY 1974 National Defense Budget is the lowest in real terms since FY 1951. There are three fundamental factors which push the size of the defense budget upward in terms of current dollars, but which have no effect on the actual defense we are purchasing. These are:

- First, a promisory note in the form of military retirement benefits is coming due. This is a cost of past wars. It makes today's budget of \$5 billion higher than that of a decade ago.

- Second, an artificial subsidy to the defense budget in the form of the draft has been removed. This has added several billions to the defense budget in FY 1974.
- Third, the Defense Department suffers from the same general inflation which affects us all. This has been over 64 percent since 1964. This amounts to \$33 billion in FY 1974, when compared with FY 1964.

We also have an obligation to provide military balance in relations with the Third World. Hopefully this will induce abstention of the major powers and discourage adventurism on the part of those nations themselves, either of which could be dangerously escalatory. Clearly the Soviets are increasing their military activities in the Third World, by adventurous positioning of air and air defense forces, and by the increasing display of their growing naval forces. We need not try to match meter by meter. But without a reasonable countervailing capability on our part, we can expect these Third World nations to succumb to military pressures. For example one might reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their "advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediterranean Sea. To express a personal opinion, even though the U.S. is not an ally of Egypt our visible military force on the scene might well have been the latent potential support which permitted him to take the action he did.

In summary, our military force structure and employment practices must change under these new circumstances, as Mr. Clifford mentioned. The motivating pressure to achieve this must not be an obsession simply to cut forces and defense dollars. Such an approach could upset the delicate balance of force which we have sought and which has made the current steps toward detente feasible. Rather, our purpose should be to examine continuously what minimum size and shape military force will best preserve that balance. We have a responsibility here not only to ourselves, but to all those others who aspire to freedom and human dignity. While we clearly must acknowledge the limits on our power and on the scope of our national interests, the people of this country, I am confident, are not willing to turn their backs on the contribution that our example and support can give to those struggling for what we have been given as our heritage.

PACEM IN TERRIS

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

III

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Address

DETERRENCE BY MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

by Herbert York

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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE FORCES NEEDED FOR IT

by Herbert F. York

In this paper I shall try to make two main points and one specific proposal based on them.

The first point is that, while Deterrence through the Threat of Mutual Assured Destruction may be the best strategy available to us at the present time, we should not delude ourselves into believing that it is a good strategy. It is a terrible strategy, and our highest-priority, long-run objective should be to get rid of it altogether.

The second point is that, even if we accept the strategy of deterrence as the best currently available to us, the stockpile of weapons we now rely on to produce it is from ten to one hundred times as murderous and destructive as it needs to be to satisfy that purpose. Therefore, our highest-priority objective for the immediate future should be to reduce greatly the current level of "overkill" even while we still maintain the strategy of deterrence.

The specific proposal describes a way to make a very large reduction in overkill without requiring or producing any change in the strategy of nuclear deterrence.

Basically, a strategy of nuclear deterrence is one in which we seek to prevent certain political or military actions by others by threatening to use our nuclear weapons rather than by actually using them. Maintaining such a strategy, therefore,

is more a matter of political psychology than of nuclear technology. Someone will be deterred if he believes that the nuclear punishment he will receive will be more severe than the achievement of some particular objective merits. Thus, the actual physical properties of the weapons only enter the deterrence equation insofar as the physical properties affect the beliefs of the various parties. However, if and when deterrence fails, the matter changes radically. Then it is no longer what people believe about the weapons that counts, but the real physical facts about their properties.

Twenty years ago, the general strategy of nuclear deterrence was particularized in John Foster Dulles' doctrine of Massive Retaliation. The Korean War was fresh in peoples' minds, and those who advocated massive retaliation were in effect saying, "The next time we are seriously challenged, we will not allow the enemy to choose the place and style of warfare most favorable to him." Instead, they said, "If there is another attack anywhere on one of our allies, we will immediately retaliate with a massive nuclear strike on the real source of the new aggression." At that time, the idea was to deter conventional war anywhere in the world, but especially in Europe, through the threat of massive nuclear retaliation. The United States was able to make such a threat because we had an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons. We had, perhaps, a few hundred atomic bombs, each somewhat bigger than the one that had killed about 100,000 people in Hiroshima eight years earlier. We also had many long-range aircraft and we had many air bases from which even short-range aircraft could reach the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviets had only just begun to accumulate atomic bombs, their aircraft were less capable, and they had no air bases close to our heartland. The situation was so unsymmetrical that it made perfectly good sense from our point of view to deter conventional attack by a threat of massive retaliation.

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Since then, the situation has changed radically. In the meantime, the hydrogen bomb has been perfected, resulting in a thousandfold increase in the power of individual weapons. Now nuclear bombs number in the tens of thousands rather than in the hundreds, intercontinental bombers and rockets have replaced short-range aircraft, and forward bases are no longer essential. Most important, there are now two nuclear superpowers possessing these extreme capabilities, and there are three other nuclear powers each of which has a nuclear capability that is small compared to what the superpowers have today, but enormous compared to that which the USA had when it first put forth its policy of massive retaliation. In recognition of the fact that for some time now there has been a rough balance of terror between the two superpowers, we now speak of deterrence as being based on the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction. Under such circumstances, one set of strategic nuclear forces does little more than deter a direct attack by another. To be sure, there are those who would like to believe these terribly murderous and destructive forces achieve other, broader objectives, but it is doubtful that they any longer do so. The best that is usually claimed for nuclear deterrence is that it "works," and that it is stable. The first of these claims is speculative -- and in any event, unprovable. The fact that there has been no invasion of Western Europe is consistent with the notion that the threat of massive retaliation "worked," but does not prove that it did. Similarly, the fact that there has been no strategic nuclear bombardment by anybody since 1945 is also consistent with the idea that nuclear deterrence works, but again it simply is not possible to prove there is any causal connection.

Along with most others, I believe the current nuclear balance has been stable for some time, and that the SALT I agreements go a long way toward assuring that it will remain

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stable for the foreseeable future. Moreover, I believe the present balance is stable in two different ways. First, it possesses what is called "crisis stability." That is, in a military crisis, one side cannot add much to its chances of survival by striking first, and so there is no strong inducement to do so. The current nuclear balance is also reasonably stable in the "arms race" sense. That is, there does not appear to be any way for one side to achieve an overwhelming advantage over the other side by quickly acquiring any reasonable quantity of some new weapon, and so again there exists no really strong inducement to do so.

So much for what might be called "the good side" of deterrence; what is wrong with it? Simply this: If for any political or psychological or technical reason deterrence should fail, the physical, biological and social consequences would be completely out of line with any reasonable view of the national objectives of the USA or the Soviet Union. What would these consequences be? I believe the following is as accurate and detailed as is necessary and useful for any general but serious discussion of the subject. In the event of an exchange of blows by the strategic nuclear forces of the USA and the USSR, most of the urban populations of the Soviet Union and the United States could be killed, and most of the industry and commerce could be destroyed by the direct and immediate effects of the nuclear explosions. The towns and rural areas of the two countries would at the same time be subjected to varying amounts of radioactive fallout. The details of what would happen to the people living in such areas depend importantly on the weather conditions prevailing at the time and on the details of the attack pattern, but well over one-half of the town and country populations could be killed by the fallout. In addition, the living standards and the life expectancy of the survivors would be substantially

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reduced by secondary effects, including both the effect of less-than-lethal levels of fallout and the general breakdown of civilized services. The balance between the damage to the urban population of one side and the damage to the urban population of the other side depends somewhat, but not materially, on who strikes first. However, there is a real possibility that the rural population of the side that strikes first will end up somewhat better off.

In addition, the lives of many millions of people living in the immediate neighborhood of the superpowers would be imperiled by so-called local fallout, and long-range or world-wide fallout would endanger those living in even remote countries. It is very difficult to make precise estimates, but it seems that a full nuclear exchange between the USA and the USSR would result in the order of 10,000,000 casualties from cancer and leukemia in countries situated well away from the two main protagonists. In addition, genetic problems, that are even more difficult to calculate, would affect many, many millions of others, not only in this generation, but for centuries to come. Civilization would survive somewhere, but probably not in the United States or the Soviet Union, and perhaps not elsewhere in North America or Europe.

Some authorities have proposed that we confront these awful possibilities by undertaking huge, complex programs designed to cope directly with a massive nuclear attack. Such programs usually include the installation of a so-called thick system of antiballistic missiles combined with very extensive civil defense and post-attack recovery programs. In detailed examinations, however, the main elements of such proposals have always been judged to be either technically unsound, or economically unfeasible, or socially and politically unacceptable, and so no such programs are currently underway or even being seriously considered.

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In brief, for now and the foreseeable future, a nuclear exchange would result in the destruction of the two principles as nations regardless of who strikes first. This is what is usually meant by the phrase "Mutual Assured Destruction."

It is most important in any discussion about international affairs or the current military balance to have clearly in mind what the current technical situation means: the survival of the combined populations of the superpowers depends on the good will and the good sense of the separate leaderships of the superpowers. If the Soviet leadership, for whatever reason, or as a result of whatever mistaken information, chose to destroy America as a nation, it is unquestionably capable of doing so in less than half an hour, and there is literally nothing we could now do to prevent it. The only thing we could do is to wreak on them an equally terrible revenge. And, of course, the situation is the same the other way around.

No one can say when deterrence will break down, or even why it will. Indeed, if the leadership of all the nuclear powers always behave in a rational and humane way, it never will. But there are now five nuclear powers, and there will be more someday, and if any of them ever makes a technical, political or military nuclear mistake for any reason, real or imagined, then there will be a substantial chance that the whole civilized world could go up in nuclear smoke. This is simply too frightful and too dangerous a way to live indefinitely; we must find some better form of international relationship than the current dependency on a strategy of mutual assured destruction.

Let me now turn to the matter of the size of the force currently devoted to mutual assured destruction, and to the

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matter of "overkill." Informed opinions about how many weapons are really needed vary over an extremely wide range. For example, shortly after leaving the post of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy wrote, "In the real world of real political leaders -- whether here or in the Soviet Union -- a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable."

For a very much higher estimate, we turn to some calculations made in the early 1960's. In order to quantify the question, it was assumed that "assured destruction" meant guaranteeing the deaths of 25% of the population and the destruction of a majority of its industrial capacity. From that, it was calculated that as many as 400 bombs on target might be needed.

As an intermediate estimate, we may turn to what the French and British have actually done to produce what they evidently think is a deterrent force. In each case the number of large bombs devoted to that purpose seems to be something less than one hundred.

There is, thus, a wide range of views about what is needed for deterrence. My personal view is that Bundy is right: that from one to ten are enough whenever the course of the events is being rationally determined. In the case of irrational behavior, there is no way of calculating what it would take. The case of irrational behavior is, therefore, of little interest in connection with the question of how big the deterrent force should be; rather, the matter of

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irrational behavior only enters into questions about when and how deterrence will fail, and about whether a policy based on deterrence is of any political value at all.

How do these estimates of need, running from a low of one to a high of 400, compare with what we actually have?

When current plans are completed, just one component of the U.S. strategic force will consist of 31 Poseidon submarines. Each submarine has 16 missiles, each missile can deliver 10 or so warheads, each to a different target. That makes 5000 warheads altogether, and each of them is about three times as big as the one which killed about 100,000 people in Hiroshima in 1945.

In addition, we plan to retain 10 missile submarines of an older type, which deliver bigger warheads, but not so many of them. In addition to the submarine missiles are the land-based Minuteman and Titan forces, capable of delivering about 2000 warheads, ranging in size from those which are "only" ten times the size of the Hiroshima bomb up to warheads hundreds of times as big.

The third component of the "Triad" of strategic force consists of long-range bombers, mostly B-52's. The details of their capability are less well known publicly than those of the missile forces. It is known, however, that each bomber can deliver many individual weapons, including both air-to-surface missiles and free-fall bombs. The actual number and megatonnage depends more on administrative decisions than on technological limitations. It is, however, clear that the bombers can carry many more megatons than the combined sea-based and land-based missile force. All told, the total number of individual warheads in the force I have described

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is in excess of 10,000 and their total explosive power is about one half million times as great as the nuclear explosive power used to put the finishing touches on World War II.

By the time the Soviets complete their current round of missile deployments, they will possess a force which is in a general way comparable to ours, though differing in its details. Specifically, in the mid- and late-seventies they will end up with substantially fewer individual warheads, but with substantially more total megatonnage.

If one, or ten, or maybe a few hundred bombs on target are all that are needed to deter, how did it happen that we came to possess more than 10,000? And why so much total explosive power?

These numbers are not the result of a careful calculation of the need in some specific strategic or tactical situation. They are the result of a series of historical accidents which have been rationalized after the fact.

In the late forties and early fifties, before the invention of the H-bomb, it was determined that we needed on the order of 1000 delivery vehicles (then land-based and sea-based bombers) in our strategic forces. This was determined by several factors: World War II and the Korean experience; the need for a relatively large number of vehicles in order to develop the tactics needed to penetrate defenses with high assurance; and, probably most important of all, purely fiscal considerations during the late Truman and early Eisenhower administrations. Then suddenly when the H-bomb was perfected in 1954, the explosive power of the bombs multiplied 1000-fold. When the effectiveness of each nuclear weapon was thus so enormously increased, one might have supposed it would have

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resulted in a reduction in the number of delivery vehicles needed, but no such adjustment was made. In fact, since the perfection of the H-bomb was one of the technological advances that made long-range missiles practical, the H-bomb actually resulted in a proliferation of types of delivery systems, and that in turn resulted in a small increase in their total numbers. In the late sixties, further technological advances made it possible to provide each individual missile with more than ten individually targetable warheads. Again, one might have expected some adjustment in the number of delivery vehicles, but there was none; the number of land-based missiles and the number of sea-based missiles have both remained exactly the same as they were before this latest innovation was introduced. In sum, very great changes, even order-of-magnitude changes, in the technological capability of the strategic forces have resulted in no change whatsoever in their numbers.

As I remarked before, all of this has been rationalized after the fact. One method for doing so is called "worst case analysis." In such an analysis, the analyst starts with the assumption that his forces have just been subjected to a massive preemptive attack. He then makes a calculation in which he makes a series of very favorable assumptions about the attacker's equipment, knowledge and behavior, and a similar series of very unfavorable assumptions about his own forces. Such a calculation can result in an arithmetic justification for a very large force indeed, provided that we really believe there is a chance that all the many deviations from the most probable situation will go in one way for them and in the other way for us.

An additional argument for possessing many more weapons than are needed for deterrence involves a notion called "Damage Limitation." The idea is that a part of our force should be reserved for attacking and destroying those enemy

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weapons that for some reason were not used in his first, preemptive strike. Besides the obvious technical difficulties with such a scheme, it is counterproductive for political reasons. In today's world, the internal politics of each of the two superpowers requires them to maintain strategic forces that are roughly equal in size. That in turn means that if one side builds a large force for "damage limiting" purposes, the other side will build a roughly equal force which will inevitably be "damage producing." Such a chain of events obviously leads from bad to worse. Furthermore, the kind of forces needed for this so-called "damaging limiting" role are technologically identical to those needed for a first strike, and so such a strategy is obviously dangerous for that reason also.

In brief then, even if we accept for the time being the need for a policy of deterrence through mutual assured destruction, the forces now in being are enormously greater than are needed for that purpose. And again, if we recognize that deterrence can fail, and if we admit to ourselves the consequences of such a failure, then we see that greatly reducing the current degree of overkill is both possible and essential.

Before making some specific recommendations about what should be done, I shall first discuss one particular alternative proposal sometimes put forth as a means for improving the current dreadful situation. In that proposal the current deterrence policy, in which populations and industries are the key targets, would be replaced by a policy in which only weapons and military centers are targets. At first glance, it seems that such a policy would be more humane in some useful sense. As a result, such proposals have frequently arisen; the best known being the "counterforce" proposal made by Secretary McNamara at a NATO meeting in 1962. However, the idea has several flaws. First of all, such counterforce

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strategies, as they are called, always turn out to require, or at least justify, many more and generally larger weapons than are needed for the so-called counter-value, or deterrence strategy. In such a case, a failure in deterrence would generally result in many more deaths, especially in third countries, than would be the case for a force sized for deterrence only. This comes about partly due to an increase in collateral damage through fallout, and also because of the colocation of so many military targets with urban targets such as the military command posts in Washington, Omaha, and Moscow; the transportation centers in St. Louis, Chicago, Kharkov and Kiev; the naval bases at New York, Boston, San Diego, Los Angeles, Leningrad, Sevastopol and Vladivostock, and so on.

Moreover, a policy to target only military installations would only be an administrative arrangement; it would not rely on anything intrinsic in the equipment. Hence such a policy, agreed to internationally or not, could be abandoned or abrogated on short notice, after first being used to justify a substantial increase in force levels. For these reasons, I believe the proposals for improving the present situation by going to a counterforce strategy are among the most dangerous proposals I know.

How might we, then, go about reducing the great overkill inherent in the present Soviet and U.S. forces without at the same time affecting the style and stability of the nuclear deterrence strategy? Recalling that the local fallout from a nuclear exchange can cause the death of more than half of the town and rural populations of the two superpowers, and that the world-wide fallout from nuclear exchange will result in the death of many millions of people in third countries, and noting that fallout is essentially proportional to

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megatonnage, we see we ought to start by getting rid of those elements of the force that deliver the most megatons. In each case, roughly 20% of the forces carry roughly 80% of the megatons. In the U.S. case, these are the several hundred long-range bombers and the 54 Titan missiles. In the Soviet case, these are the 300 very large SS-9 missiles plus a relatively small intercontinental bomber force. Ridding the world of all these weapons and, of course, prohibiting their replacement by newer versions, would decrease substantially the threat to the rural populations of the two protagonists. It would also reduce the danger to residents of innocent countries five-fold. At the same time, their simultaneous elimination of these weapons through negotiation or, I would venture to say, even their unilateral elimination by one or both sides, would have little effect on the deterrent posture of either side.

There is another area where it should be easy to achieve a further two-fold reduction in potential fallout. Only one-half of our Minutemen are being converted to the new Minuteman III, and only 31 of our 41 Polaris boats are being converted to Poseidons. Simply abandoning the not-to-be converted residuals of these forces would eliminate about one-half the fallout potential of our missile forces. And precisely because these older weapons are less capable, their complete elimination would have only a marginal effect on our ability to deter. Similarly, we may be confident the Soviets also have some obsolescent weapons they could get rid of at the same time in order to keep things in formal balance. And beyond the elimination of these excessively murderous and obsolescent vehicles, we might also consider placing an upper limit on the explosive power of those remaining. For instance, we might set an upper limit in power equal to that of the Hiroshima bomb. The many thousands

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of bombs that would still remain in the strategic forces, even after the reductions I have suggested, would still seem to be many more than enough for deterrence through mutual assured destruction, even if each bomb were so limited in power.

The overkill capacity in the present forces is so large that even the rather substantial reductions I have suggested would not do much to the threat hanging over the inhabitants of the larger cities; most of them would still be killed in the event of a breakdown of deterrence. But, since there would be big decreases in death and destruction in rural areas and small towns, the prospects for some sort of national survival would be much improved. Perhaps most important, the number of deaths and the amount of genetic damage in innocent countries would be reduced more than ten-fold. And whether or not one believes the leadership of a nation has the right to place all of its own citizens at risk, it surely does not have that right with regard to third parties.

In the real world, admittedly these specific arms reduction suggestions are clearly too much for the short term and too little for the long term.

The short-term objectives, as embodied in the SALT negotiations, are largely devoted to stopping the technological arms race, and real reductions in arms have been relegated to the future.

The long-term objective, as attested to on several solemn occasions by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, and by Chairmen Khrushchev and Brezhnev, are general and complete disarmament. Leaving aside the question of the feasibility of their ultimate objectives, we must even so note that my suggestions are very modest by comparison.

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These particular suggestions, then, are meant for the intermediate term, say the next five or ten years. They are for the period after we finally succeed in fully arresting the forward momentum of arms development and deployment but before the final arrival of the conditions necessary for "General and Complete Disarmament."

So far, after almost thirty years of attempts to achieve some kind of serious disarmament, not one single nuclear weapon has ever been destroyed or even moved as a result of an agreement to do so. That record could lead to a feeling of utter hopelessness, or it could lead to a renewed determination to accomplish something at long last. Let us try to make it the latter.

PACEM IN TERRIS

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

III

Circulated: October 4, 1973

Critique:

by William C. Foster

former Director, United States Arms Control & Disarmament Agency;
former Deputy Secretary of Defense

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Addresses by Clark Clifford and Herbert York

Critique: Albert Wohlstetter (Chairman); Gloria Emerson,
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Admiral Stansfield Turner



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Pacem in Terris III

Comments by William C. Foster

In view of the time limitation, I will confine my comments to Dr. Herbert York's statement.

Dr. York has made two important main points: First, deterrence through the threat of mutually assured destruction is a terrible and uncivilized strategy, and high priority must be given to developing something better. It is unworthy of civilized mankind to have to deal in such threats of massive destruction.

The plain fact is that no President of the United States and no leader of the U.S.S.R. could bring himself to launch such an attack. As quoted by Dr. York, McGeorge Bundy strongly supported that view. This view ignored the additional fact that in the event of an actual nuclear exchange there would be millions of casualties outside of the countries of the two main adversaries, making the possible nuclear exchange even more inhumane.

Dr. York's second point sets forth the insane potential magnitude of "overkill" in our nuclear weapons, and also in those of the Soviet Union. Certainly most experts agree that these excesses exist.

Dr. York also outlines the background of how and why we arrived at where we are in strategic weapons and states sound reasons why, with the passage of time and with the changes that

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have taken place in the political situation, we should now begin to reduce both inventories and the threat. There are less burdensome and wiser ways to maintain stability. It is true that for sometime now the M.A.D. concept (appropriate acronym) has led to at least temporary stability. However, the only answer in the end is to alter attitudes and realize the crucial fact that we dwell on one space craft not two; that damage to the craft would be universal, not only a national calamity.

Dr. York later introduces a suggestion for reducing these over-large inventories of nuclear weapons so as to make possible an eventual elimination of dependence on the strategy of mutual assured destruction. It is true, that even with his recommended reduction, both sides would still have the capability of reacting to any world strife by the threat of destruction at a lower level, but at least it might be confined to the cities of the two adversaries, eliminating much of the threat to the rest of mankind.

In other words, start by mutually destroying or removing some of the older, powerful, but less efficient devices. He is hopeful that this might work, but United States' attempts back in 1964 to do something of this sort by matching destruction of U.S. B-47's and Soviet TU-16's, ran into stubborn resistance. There seems to be a universal tendency to hang on to weapons that may have outlived broad usefulness.

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In view of that, I venture another suggestion which might either supplant or supplement Dr. York's idea and over time could have a major effect. It is obvious that to be certain that weapons in inventory are ready and effective, there must be continuous proof testing. This testing of delivery vehicles is done in the atmosphere and is readily detectable by national means on the other side.

Also, the development of new devices depends on a multitude of tests. My suggestion is that we negotiate a mutual agreement limiting all atmospheric tests to a modest number. This would have two effects. First, gradually, weapons in inventory would become less dependable; and, second, the ability to deploy new devices would be restricted. I would strengthen the restrictive effect of these proof tests by a comprehensive test ban on nuclear explosions underground. Our capability to detect such tests from a distance and to distinguish them from earthquakes has, by the massive expenditure of funds and scientific effort, gradually improved over the years so that the risk of an adversary making tests of significant value without detection is minimal.

Dr. York says that after thirty years not one single nuclear weapon has been destroyed or even moved as a result of an agreement to do so. That could lead, he states, to a feeling of utter

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hopelessness or to a renewed determination to accomplish something at long last. Certainly the time is ripe for the latter. SALT, if vigorously pressed by our leaders, can make progress in this direction.

Our new Secretary of State has in the past been deeply engaged in the nuclear field, including SALT. With continued interest and new authority, he can by vigorous participation give new momentum to United States' efforts.

Dr. York's method and my own, plus SALT, are all we can perhaps attempt for the time being, and would be something but not the final answer. That answer, as everyone knows, is to focus the great technology and resources of the world on undertakings that are vastly more beneficial to the march of man than preparing for his destruction.

After many years of grappling with the problem, of countless hours in negotiations, and in preparation for negotiations, it seems clear that the answer is not in the hands of men, but in their hearts. But given what we are given, Dr. York is right; let us do what we can.

U.S., U.S.S.R., China Believed In Accord on Limiting Fighting

3 Big Powers Hope to Limit Area of War

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

High U.S. officials said yesterday that the United States, the Soviet Union and China appeared to be in agreement that they would not permit the fighting in the Middle East to spread beyond the region.

The disclosure followed announcement that President Nixon had sent a message to Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev. White House spokesman Ronald L. Ziegler said the two leaders exchanged written messages through normal diplomatic channels.

State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey said later that the United States had been approaching its diplomatic discussions with the major powers in the "spirit of the content and substance" of communiqués issued with both the Soviet Union and China in the 1972 summit meetings in Moscow and Peking.

In both the Moscow and Shanghai communiques of 1972 the United States agreed with each of the major powers to limit international tensions through consultations. U.S. officials said that while the United States had not attempted to invoke the letter of the communiques in the current discussions on the Mideast crisis, "We have attempted to speak in the spirit of those communiques."

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger met with the head of the Chinese liaison office in Washington, Huang Chen, Saturday night. The Nixon-Brezhnev exchange came the next day, on Sunday.

Any decision by the major powers to limit the conflict by remaining outside is likely to be severely tested, however, in the days to come. Israeli officials said they have three objectives in the current crisis: to eject the Egyptians; to eject the Syrians; and "to deal a devastating blow to the military machine of both Arab states so that it will be impossible for them to launch another aggression for a very long time."

Israeli sources said they have made these objectives known to the Americans. Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz saw Kissinger Sunday evening shortly after Dinitz returned from Israel. Diplomatic sources said that U.S. officials, informed of Israel's three objectives, did not demand that Israel refrain from what it has undertaken.

At his regular briefing yesterday, McCloskey said the United States was not urging Israel not to go beyond the 1967 cease-fire lines in repulsing Egyptian and Syrian forces. "We have not wanted to prejudice our own case by levying demands or specific requirements during the battle on anyone," McCloskey said.

While Israel was still reportedly battling to repulse the Syrians and the Egyptians from territory it has occupied since the 1967 six-day war, the Senate, with only half a dozen members present, passed a resolution calling for withdrawal of the parties to the 1967 cease-fire line. Kissinger was quoted later by Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania as saying, "I have no fault to find with the resolution whatsoever."

The resolution was apparently directed to the problem of Arab withdrawal, however, could shortly be superseded by events, and the question will then be whether Israel will hold to the cease-fire lines or go beyond. Israeli sources made clear that they would not stop fighting until the three stated objectives were achieved. But they would not elaborate on the kind of "devastating blow" they intended to inflict on neighboring Arab states. They said, however, that it was the military machine that was the target and not populations or cities.

President Nixon spoke briefly with reporters yesterday and said the United States "for a position which we hope and believe will be effective in stopping the fighting." The President was referring to consultations leading to Security Council action to deal with the Mideast situation.

"It is very easy," the President said, "to think of this particular kind of a crisis simply in terms of a grandstand play where the United States will go in and unilaterally make a move which then fails."

Kissinger, who was with the President, said, "We have been in close contact with all the permanent members of the Security Council, with the parties to the conflict and we have been doing this since Saturday afternoon in order to bring an end to the fighting. Our intention is to move forward with the broadest possible support that can be effected."

Although U.S. officials would not disclose the nature of President Nixon's message to Brezhnev or the Soviet reply, it appeared that the United States was in part seeking Moscow's support for a Security Council meeting.

Beyond that, however, it was understood he was acting in accordance with the "basic principles" signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972, in which the two countries agreed to "avoid military confrontations and prevent nuclear war" and to "exercise restraint in their mutual relations." They further agreed to "do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions."

In the June 22, 1973, agreement on the prevention of nuclear war the two countries agreed to "enter into urgent consultation" to avert the risk of nuclear war arising from any conflicts.

In his statement last evening to the Pacemakers conference, Kissinger supplied a kind of rationale for the high-level contacts with the Russians. "Detente," he said, "cannot survive irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East."

At a luncheon for Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union is "prepared as before to make our contribution toward ensuring peace." He said Soviet sympathies lie with the Arabs, whom he termed "the victims of aggression," but he was relatively mild, giving no support to Arab claims on the territory of Israel itself, saying only that the Soviet Union would "support a fair and lasting peace... and... guaranteed security for all countries and peoples of the area which is so close to our frontiers."

The Chinese, in an article signed "Commentator" in the official People's Daily, more strongly labeled Israel the aggressor. But while reiterating support for the "just struggle of Egypt and Syria," the Chinese made clear, in accordance with their doctrine of the people's war, that it was the Arabs alone who would have to fight the battle. "With the support of the people throughout the world, the Arab countries and their people will certainly be able to overcome hardships of all descriptions on the road of advance and will be victorious as long as they strengthen their unity and persist in fighting," the paper said.

The Senate resolution calling on both sides to observe the 1967 cease-fire line was approved by voice vote shortly after noon yesterday, with only about eight or nine senators on the floor. But within a few hours, 38 senators had joined as cosponsors in addition to Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) and Minority Leader Scott, the original sponsors.

The resolution called on the Mideast combatants to stop fighting and to return to the cease-fire lines they occupied before the fighting broke out Saturday. It read:

"It is the sense of the Senate that we deplore the outbreak of tragic hostilities in the Middle East and that we support the use of the good offices of the United States by the President and the Secretary of State to urge the participants to bring about a cease-fire and a return of the parties involved to lines and positions occupied by them prior to the outbreak of current hostilities, and, further, that the Senate expresses its hope for a more stable condition leading to peace in that region."

Scott told reporters that about 40 minutes after the Senate approved the resolution, Kissinger called him and asked him to read the resolution text. He found no fault whatever and he felt it properly stated the U.S. position and what were doing—we want the parties back where they were.

Scott said of his conversation with Kissinger:

Scott said the resolution "implicitly recognizes that aggression has taken place and the lines occupied by the Israelis have been breached." He thus interpreted the resolution as being generally pro-Israel, without being so marked as to endanger U.S. diplomatic initiatives with the Arabs.

However, several strong supporters of Israel specifically declined to endorse the resolution, hinting that they considered its implication that Israel had been on the receiving end of aggression too weak a statement of the pro-Israel sentiment of the Senate.

"I haven't joined in sponsoring it and I won't," said Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff (D-Conn.). "I don't think it's a very good resolution—the Arabs started the war, they started invading and now the resolution says go back to where you were."

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) said the resolution "really does not adequately cover this problem." What he fears most, he said, is that the Arabs might seek to get the U.N. to order a standstill cease-fire in place which could leave Arabs in control of some portions of the area held by Israel prior to the start of fighting on Saturday. Thus, although "the first moves were made by them," the Arab nations might seek to obtain a U.N.-sanctioned benefit from their aggression.

There was some hint yesterday that the Scott-Mansfield language had been drafted and rushed through the Senate for fear some strong pro-Israel senators might try to force through a resolution condemning Syria and Egypt, which could upset U.S. peace initiatives. Jackson denied, however, that he had intended to push for such language at this time.

Sen. George D. Aiken (R-Vt.) said there were indications a much stronger pro-Israel resolution would be offered but "I'm satisfied what has passed will not upset (Kissinger's) plans."

The thrust of the resolution is that neither side should benefit from the fighting—a position that would automatically strip from the winner whatever territorial gains he might make in the current situation. This could work against the Arabs if they hold the upper hand but it would work against Israel if Israel should drive across the Suez Canal or beyond the Golan Heights and occupy territory it didn't occupy prior to the new outbreak of fighting.

At the State Department, McCloskey reiterated that the United States had no fixed proposals to present at the Security Council session. "We have not yet produced a piece of paper that we are prepared to introduce," he said. Then, in an attempt to dampen speculation that the United States had not moved with dispatch in the crisis, permitting the Israelis time to retake territory, McCloskey volunteered that the United States had sought to get Security Council action from the start, but only when it would not lead to "useless rhetoric" and "endless debate." Such speculation, he said, "is unfair, unworthy of the spirit in which the United States has approached the entire situation."

After his morning meeting with the President, Kissinger spent the day in his State Department office, contacting foreign diplomats by telephone and meeting with senior aides in the Middle East crisis, McCloskey said.

In addition to the immediate crisis growing out of the hostilities along the frontiers of the occupied territories U. S. officials are faced with the potential problem that the oil-rich Arab states could try to influence the conflict by carrying out earlier threats to withhold oil or refuse to increase production in step with Western requirements. U. S. officials, however, in response to a question, said they had seen no "mobilization of attitudes toward that kind of decision." They added that "it is a contingency—that has been considered here in Washington," obviously. We hope that nothing like that occurs."

Israeli officials asked whether Kissinger had raised the energy question in talks with them, said that no American official had brought up the oil problem. In the past the Israelis have stated that the energy question would exist even if there were no Arab-Israeli problem.

Also contributing to this report was Washington Post Staff Writer Spencer Rich.

Kissinger Sees Threat to Detente if Moscow Is Prodded

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said last night that the United States must recognize the risks for East-West detente in levying demands upon the Soviet Union to liberalize its own society.

The "intense debate" under way in this country over imposing conditions on Soviet trade with the United States is a major policy issue, as well as "a genuine moral dilemma," said Kissinger.

Asked Kissinger:

"How hard can we press without provoking the Soviet leadership into returning to practices in its foreign policy that increase international tension?"

Kissinger was the opening speaker last night before a four-day national conference on U.S. foreign policy, entitled "Pacem in Terris" (peace in earth), sponsored by The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, at the Sheraton Park Hotel.

Demonstrators briefly disrupted this first appearance of Kissinger as Secretary of State before a public audi-

ence of about 3,000 persons, with 500 others watching on television in an adjoining room.

Two men, scattering leaflets headed "Bellum in Terris" (war in earth), and playing battery-powered laughing boxes, shouted that Kissinger represented "the war makers" and his choice as first speaker was "a charade." One of the demonstrators was punched by a member of the audience, and security men pushed the demonstrators out of the hall. Kissinger resumed speaking after a delay of about five minutes, with the audience

overwhelmingly urging him to continue.

Kissinger, in brief references to the present Middle East crisis, treated it as a challenge that would be surmounted by the American-Soviet policy of detente.

"Detente cannot survive irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East," said Kissinger. But he said, "However well we contain this crisis, as we have contained others, we must still ask ourselves what we seek beyond the management of conflict."

Kissinger was facing an audience composed of many intellectual critics, including former academic colleagues. The critics support the majority opposition raised in the Senate and House to granting the Soviet Union most-favored-nation trade benefits without conditions.

The original conditions demanded in Congress were guarantees of emigration rights, especially for Russian Jews; Soviet dissenters led by physicist Andrei D. Sakharov and author Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, aroused greater sentiment in this country by urging the United States to insist on "democratization" in the Soviet Union as the price for detente.

Kissinger's speech in defense of administration policy for granting the trade benefits to the Soviet Union was followed by an address by Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.).

While Fulbright joined Kissinger in defending the Nixon administration's resistance to attempts to impose conditions on Soviet trade, the senator challenged what he called "the power politics approach" of existing policy.

"The need for a dialogue about national purposes has never been more urgent," Kissinger agreed. He said, "Let us search for a fresh consensus. Let us restore a spirit of understanding between the legislative and the executive, between the government and the press, between the people and their public servants."

But "the prerequisite for a fruitful national debate," said Kissinger, "is that the policy makers and critics appreciate each other's perspective and respect each other's purposes."

That was the line that touched off the loudest outburst from the demonstrators in the audience. Once order was restored in the room, Kissinger repeated it to a burst of applause.

Kissinger said the policy maker "must strike a balance between what is desirable and what is possible," and "the outsider" and critic must acknowledge the complexity of the choices.

"For half a century," said Kissinger, "we have objected to Communist efforts to alter the domestic structures of other countries. For a generation of Cold War we sought to ease the risks produced by competing ideologies. Are we now to come full circle and insist on domestic compatibility as a condition of progress toward peace?"

Throughout his address Kissinger put questions to the critics: "Are we ready to face the crises and increased defense budgets that a return to Cold War conditions would spawn?"

Is it detente that has prompted repression (inside the Soviet Union) or is it detente that has generated the ferment and the demand for openness which we are now witnessing?"

The U.S. government "may underestimate the margin of concessions available to us," Kissinger acknowledged. "But a fair debate," he said, "must admit that they are genuine questions, the answers to which could affect the fate of all of us."

In the struggle "between freedom and its enemies," he said, "we are not neu-

tral," and the United States always will use its influence "to promote freedom." But "the attainment of peace is also a profound moral concern," said Kissinger, and "these questions have no easy answers."

It is "misleading," he said, to imply that the term, "most favored nation," implies "preferential treatment" for the Soviet Union. Instead, he said, it means permitting "normal economic relations" to resume, by abolishing discriminatory trade restrictions imposed on the Soviet Union in 1951, restoring rights now shared by over 100 other nations.

"This administration has never had any illusions about the Soviet system," said Kissinger.

cannot concur in the appeal of Mr. Sakharov, the Soviet physicist, who says that there can be no detente without democracy, or the novelist Solzhenitsyn, who says that mankind's sole salvation lies in everyone making everything his business.

"If we wish to apply pressure for democracy and human rights," said Fulbright, "would it not make sense to start with Chile, Brazil or Greece, all of whom are vulnerable to American pressures, none of whom are essential partners for the maintenance of world peace?"

Fulbright said, as did Kissinger, that the Soviet Union already has yielded considerably to U.S. demands on Jewish emigration. To adopt the demands that Sen. Hen-

ry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) is leading in the Senate, said Fulbright, "may not in itself destroy the detente between the Soviet Union and the United States, but it may well derail it."

Sen. Jackson, in a statement last night commenting on both the Kissinger and Fulbright remarks, said, "You can't go on giving things away around the world—as we did with our wheat—and call it a foreign policy."

He said, "Kissinger and Fulbright failed to mention the proposed granting of credits to Russia, but that is what they are seeking—billions of dollars at 6 per cent interest. What American can get credit for a house or a car at 3 per cent?"

By Judith Martin

The cackles of two novelty store laugh-boxes briefly disrupted a speech by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger last night, sounding an eerie note at an evening session of Pacem in Terris, a four-day seminar on peace at the Sheraton Park Hotel.

The crowd of 3,500, gathered to hear Kissinger and Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) talk about peace as war raged in the Middle East, already appeared grim and tense.

When Theodore Glick, 23, —one of the Harrisburg Eight charged in 1971 with conspiracy to kidnap Kissinger but later cleared—and his companion, Christopher Thomas, interrupted Kissinger to shout slogans and hold their laugh-boxes aloft, the tension boiled over into a scuffle.

An unidentified man seated in front of Glick and Thomas jumped to his feet and hit Thomas. The man's wife grabbed his arm and tried to pull him away.

As police hustled the two out and Kissinger stood silent at the podium, a few people screamed "Let them stay" while most shouted, "Out!" The police attempted to make arrests, but this was a peace conference and executive director of Peter Tagger refused to press charges.

Livid, Tagger screamed at Glick and Thomas instead and waved a crumpled \$10 bill under their noses demanding that they accept a refund for their admissions. They refused. Thomas had tears in his eyes.

The two protesters were among five young people from the Community for Creative Nonviolence, a Washington group that maintains free food, medical and legal services for the poor. The other three, Edward Guinan, Rachelle Linner and Katheline Thorsby, also used laugh-boxes at the beginning of Kissinger's speech, but their protests brought only nervous laughter from the audience.

Kissinger joked later that the outburst sounded like one of his own staff meetings. Asked how he felt about the fact that there had been no arrests following the disruption of the peace seminar, Kissinger said, "I was very touched by it."

The speech was Kissinger's first since assuming his new post. Last week he hosted a dinner at New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art for



Photos by Ken Pell—The Washington Post

Christopher Thomas (right) is grabbed as he holds his laugh-box.

Little Peace on Earth

PACEM, From B1

about 450 United Nations diplomats and visiting foreign ministers.

Sitting in a hotel bar after he had been ejected from the session, Glick said the protest was not connected with the Middle East situation, but was directed at Kissinger because he was "an architect of American policy in Indochina and Chile."

His companions handed out leaflets entitled "Bellum in Terris" ("War on Earth").

Even through the earlier part of the evening when there was partying, there was little laughter, ironic or otherwise.

"I'm very sad, I'm very discouraged," said Ellsworth Bunker, former U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam.

But asked if he meant that he was discouraged about the possibility of there ever being the peace discussed at the conference, he said slowly, "We have to keep trying to bring it about in some way. No, I'm not discouraged about achieving peace in the world."

Asked if he expected to see it in his lifetime, Bunker shook his head sadly. "I'm pretty old," he said. "I'm 79."

His wife, Carol Laise, also a U.S. diplomat, said, "It's

something one always has to struggle for and never give up."

Robert M. Hutchins, chairman of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, sponsor of the conference, was one of those who tried to keep up an optimistic tone. "Hope is congenital with me," he said.

"We just have to be optimistic," said Iranian Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi.

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"How can anything come of this," said Tony Antin, a student from Towson State College who wandered in on a break from taking his Law Aptitude test in another room of the hotel. "Groups of people get together all over the country. Nothing ever comes of it," he said.

Then he left to return to his exams. "If I ever want to become a heavy, like him," he said, jerking his head toward Kissinger, "I've got to pass."



Henry Kissinger delivers his speech.

Summitry and the War

Six days ago, the outbreak of the new Arab-Israeli war raised a hypothetical challenge to the soaring goals of American-Soviet detente. In the intervening week, that possibility has escalated into a tangible danger.

That, at least, evidently is the message that the Nixon administration wishes to convey to the Soviet Union in a carefully-orchestrated pattern of rising American concern during the last 48 hours over Russian words and actions in the volatile crisis.

On Tuesday Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev was reported to have urged all Arab states to supply "the greatest possible support" to Egypt and Syria in their conflict with Israel. According to the Algerian news agency, one Brezhnev message, received by Algerian President Houari Boumedienne, exhorted, "Syria and Egypt must not remain alone in their struggle against a perfidious enemy."

When that report reached the United Nations, where Soviet rhetoric

The writer is on the national staff of The Washington Post.

about the war noticeably hardened between Monday and Tuesday, one U.S. source is reported to have exclaimed privately, "So much for detente!"

The U.S. government officially has said nothing remotely resembling such a grim, dire conclusion, nor does it appear likely to do so. It probably would require a complete unraveling of all prospects for containing the new Middle East conflict before the Nixon administration even would conceive of abandoning the high hopes of detente on which its entire foreign policy is based.

Nevertheless, by yesterday it was apparent that an international squeeze play was underway on the premise that detente could be damaged, if not jeopardized, by the repercussions of Mideast warfare.

The Nixon administration let it be known, selectively, Wednesday morning, that it was very disturbed that the Soviet government was encouraging Arab nations to supply support for Egypt and Syria. The Pentagon next sounded open warnings, without attribution to named officials, of serious U.S. concern about the magnitude of the airlifting of Soviet supplies to the warring Arab nations.

In language that was more guarded, diplomatically, but at least equally pointed, State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey, who is a veteran in calibrated phrasing, expressed an official warning: "If this (the report out of the Pentagon) turns out to be a massive airlift, it would tend to put a new face on the situation. But I am not in position to confirm that any of this is taking place at this time."

That formulation coupled a serious admonition with a major qualification—whether a massive airlift of Soviet military supplies into Egypt and Syria is indeed underway.

According to available information, Soviet air traffic into Egypt and Syria increased considerably over the Oct. 4-6 period immediately before the new Arab-Israeli warfare erupted, then subsided, and now the air traffic is back to the high volume of the immediate pre-fighting days. What is still unclear is just what war material the Soviet transports are carrying.

In any event, to underscore the administration's position that more is at stake than simply the level of war supplies, McCloskey readily recalled what Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said publicly last Monday night: "Detente cannot survive irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East."

Arming adversaries in the Mideast, however, is not a one-way street.

The question which was immediately raised yesterday, and left officially unanswered, was whether the United States was pointing an accusing finger at the Soviet dispatch of war supplies

in order to justify replenishing the Israeli army's stock of war equipment which has been severely hit in the fighting.

Inevitably, the alarm raised by the administration about Soviet replenishment of Arab supplies produced a rebound on Capitol Hill, in urgent demands for the United States to resupply the Israelis.

The danger for detente is that interaction can develop a life of its own, which the Nixon administration and the Kremlin, even if they do get back on a cooperative track, cannot necessarily fully control. For on stage, on Capitol Hill, there remains the original challenge to the goals of summitry. This is the roaring controversy over whether or not the United States should demand concessions from the Soviet Union in the treatment of its own dissidents and its emigrants, as the price for non-discriminatory tariffs and credits for Russian exports to the United States.

The Nixon administration obviously will progressively undermine its own case for resisting these congressional demands by complaints of its own that the Soviet Union is defaulting on the multiple-summit-pledged pattern of cooperative detente.

Long before the acclaimed era of negotiation, back in the days of blatant confrontation, the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, whose strategy flourished in the cold war, made a memorable remark about the ability of small, weak nations to confound the strategy of the most powerful nations. Dulles deplored what he described as "the tyranny of the weak."

The Arab-Israeli war carries the threat of revalidating that maxim, by confounding the goals of superpower detente.

In their summit commitments, the United States and the Soviet Union pledged not only to avoid war or military confrontations between them, but to act jointly for "preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations."

The United States officially acknowledges that it was caught by surprise by the outbreak of the current war, except for a few hours of inadequate warning. When did the Soviet Union first know, or sense, that war was ahead?

Was it as early, perhaps, as Sept. 27, when Syria was reported publicly to have restricted the movement of its Soviet advisers through the Syrian countryside? That reported Syrian action, according to press accounts, was seen as Syrian retaliation for Soviet refusal to activate Russian surface-to-air missile launchers during the lopsided air battle two weeks earlier in which Israel claimed it shot down 13 Syrian Mig-21s.

Should the Soviet Union, if it knew in late September, have cautioned the United States under the terms of their summit accord, that there was an imminent threat of war? But is it conceivable, given the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are the armors for the warring nations, that one of the superpowers would tip off the other that its client state is about to make war? If not, then what is the validity of the detente pledge? Does it apply only to selective threats, of the "exacerbation of . . . relations?"

However these questions may be answered, they illustrate how the world is now probing the depth or the shallowness of the summit commitments.

At the same time, the record shows that even prolonged war between client states need not automatically destroy, or cripple superpower detente. For the structure, for East-West detente, was erected at the climactic height of the Indochina war, in the direct American challenge to Soviet prestige by the mining of North Vietnam's harbors, immediately before the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit in May, 1972.

But that is the kind of crisis at the brink that neither nation is anxious to repeat—nor bet that detente can again survive.

U.S., U.S.S.R., China Believed In Accord on Limiting Fighting

3 Big Powers Hope to Limit Area of War

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

High U.S. officials said yesterday that the United States, the Soviet Union and China appeared to be in agreement that they would not permit the fighting in the Middle East to spread beyond the region.

The disclosure followed announcement that President Nixon had sent a message to Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev. White House spokesman Ronald L. Ziegler said the two leaders exchanged written messages through normal diplomatic channels.

State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey said later that the United States had been approaching its diplomatic discussions with the major powers in the "spirit of the content and substance" of communiqués issued with both the Soviet Union and China in the 1972 summit meetings in Moscow and Peking.

In both the Moscow and Shanghai communiqués of 1972 the United States agreed with each of the major powers to limit international tensions through consultations. U.S. officials said that while the United States had not attempted to invoke the letter of the communiqués in the current discussions on the Mideast crisis, "We have attempted to speak in the spirit of those communiqués."

Secretary of State Henry

A. Kissinger met with the head of the Chinese liaison office in Washington, Huang Chen, Saturday night. The Nixon-Brezhnev exchange came the next day, on Sunday.

Any decision by the major powers to limit the conflict by remaining outside is likely to be severely tested, however, in the days to come. Israeli officials said they have three objectives in the current crisis: to eject the Egyptians; to eject the Syrians; and "to deal a devastating blow to the military machine of both Arab states so that it will be impossible for them to launch another aggression for a very long time." Approved

Israeli sources said they have made these objectives known to the Americans. Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz saw Kissinger Sunday evening shortly after Dinitz returned from Israel. Diplomatic sources said that U.S. officials, informed of Israel's three objectives, did not demand that Israel refrain from what it has undertaken.

At his regular briefing yesterday, McCloskey said the United States was not urging Israel not to go beyond the 1967 cease-fire lines in repulsing Egyptian and Syrian forces. "We have not wanted to prejudice our own case by levying demands or specific requirements during the battle on anyone," McCloskey said.

While Israel was still reportedly battling to repulse the Syrians and the Egyptians from territory it has occupied since the 1967 six-day war, the Senate, with only half a dozen members present, passed a resolution calling for withdrawal of the parties to the 1967 cease-fire lines. Kissinger was quoted later by Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania as saying, "I have no fault to find with the resolution whatsoever."

The resolution was apparently directed to the problem of Arab withdrawal, however, could shortly be superseded by events, and the questions will then be whether Israel will hold to the cease-fire lines or go beyond. Israeli sources made clear that they would not stop fighting until the three stated objectives were achieved. But they would not elaborate on the kind of "devastating blow" they intended to inflict on neighboring Arab states. They said, however, that it was the military machine that was the target and not populations or cities.

President Nixon spoke briefly with reporters yesterday and said the United States "for a position which we hope and believe will be effective in stopping the fighting." The President was referring to consultations leading to Security Council action to deal with the Mideast situation.

"It is very easy," the President said, "to think of this particular kind of a crisis simply in terms of a grandstand play, where the United States will go in and unilaterally make a move which then fails."

Kissinger, who was with the President, said, "We have been in close contact ... with all the permanent members of the Security Council, with the parties to the conflict and we have been doing this since Saturday afternoon in order to bring an end to the fighting. Our intention is to move forward with the broadest possible support that can be effected."

Although U.S. officials would not disclose the nature of President Nixon's message to Brezhnev or the Soviet reply, it appeared that the United States was in part seeking Moscow's support for a Security Council meeting.

Beyond that, however, it was understood he was acting in accordance with the "basic principles" signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972, in which the two countries agreed to "avoid military confrontations and prevent nuclear war" and to "exercise restraint in their mutual relations." They further agreed to "do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions."

In the June 22, 1973, agreement on the prevention of nuclear war the two countries agreed to "enter into urgent consultation" to avert the risk of nuclear war arising from any conflicts.

In his statement last evening to the Paeon in Terra conference, Kissinger supplied a kind of rationale for the high-level contacts with the Russians. "Detente," he said, "cannot survive irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East."

At a luncheon for Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union is "prepared as before to make our contribution toward ensuring ... peace." He said Soviet sympathies lie with the Arabs, whom he termed "the victims of aggression," but he was relatively mild, giving no support to Arab claims on the territory of Israel itself, saying only that the Soviet Union would "support a fair and lasting peace ... and ... guaranteed security for all countries and peoples of the area which is so close to our frontiers."

The Chinese, in an article signed "Commentator" in the official People's Daily, more strongly labeled Israel the aggressor. But while reiterating support for the "just struggle of Egypt and Syria" the Chinese made clear in accordance with their doctrine of the people's war, that it was the Arabs alone who would have to fight the battle. "With the support of the people throughout the world, the Arab countries and their people will certainly be able to overcome hardships of all descriptions on the road of advance, and will be victorious as long as they strengthen their unity and persist in fighting," the paper said.

The Senate resolution calling on both sides to observe the 1967 cease-fire line was approved by voice vote shortly after noon yesterday, with only about eight or nine senators on the floor. But within a few hours, 38 senators had joined as cosponsors in addition to Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) and Minority Leader Scott, the original sponsors.

The resolution called on the Mideast combatants to stop fighting and to return to the cease-fire lines they occupied before the fighting broke out Saturday. It read:

"It is the sense of the Senate that we deplore the outbreak of tragic hostilities in the Middle East and that we support the use of the good offices of the United States by the President and the Secretary of State to urge the participants to bring about a cease-fire and a return of the parties involved to lines and positions occupied by them prior to the outbreak of current hostilities, and, further, that the Senate expresses its hope for a more stable condition leading to peace in that region."

Scott told reporters that about 40 minutes after the Senate approved the resolution, Kissinger called him and asked him to read the resolution text. "He found no fault whatever and he felt it properly stated the U.S. position and what we're doing—we want the parties back where they were."

Scott said of his conversation with Kissinger:

Scott said the resolution "implicitly recognizes that aggression has taken place and the lines occupied by the Israelis have been breached." He thus interpreted the resolution as being generally pro-Israeli without being so marked as to endanger U.S. diplomatic initiatives with the Arabs.

However, several strong supporters of Israel specifically declined to endorse the resolution, hinting that they considered its implication that Israel had been on the receiving end of aggression too weak a statement of the pro-Israel sentiment of the Senate.

"I haven't joined in sponsoring it and I won't," said Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff (D-Conn.). "I don't think it's a very good resolution—the Arabs started the war, they started invading and now the resolution says go back to where you were."

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) said the resolution "really does not adequately cover this problem." What he fears most, he said, is that the Arabs might seek to get the U.N. to order a standstill cease-fire in place which could leave Arabs in control of some portions of the area held by Israel prior to the start of fighting on Saturday. Thus, although "the first moves were made by them," the Arab nations might seek to obtain a U.N.-sanctioned benefit from their aggression.

There was some hint yesterday that the Scott-Mansfield language had been drafted and rushed through the Senate for fear some strong pro-Israel senators might try to force through a resolution condemning Syria and Egypt, which could upset U.S. peace initiatives. Jackson denied, however, that he had intended to push for such language at this time.

Sen. George D. Aiken (R-Vt.) said there were indications a much stronger pro-Israel resolution would be offered but "I'm satisfied what has passed will not upset (Kissinger's) plans."

The thrust of the resolution is that neither side should benefit from the fighting—a position that would automatically strip from the winner whatever territorial gains he might make in the current situation. That could work against the Arabs if they hold the upper hand, but it would work against Israel if Israel should drive across the Suez Canal or beyond the Golan Heights and occupy territory it didn't occupy prior to the new outbreak of fighting.

At the State Department, McCloskey reiterated that the United States had no fixed proposals to present at the Security Council session. "We have not yet produced a piece of paper that we are prepared to introduce," he said. Then, in an attempt to dampen speculation that the United States had not moved with dispatch in the crisis, permitting the Israelis time to retake territory, McCloskey volunteered that the United States had sought to get Security Council action from the start, but only when it would not lead to useless rhetoric and "endless debate." Such speculation, he said, "is unfair, unworthy of the spirit in which the United States has approached the entire situation."

After his morning meeting with the President, Kissinger spent the day in his State Department office, contacting foreign diplomats by telephone and meeting with senior aides in the Middle East crisis, McCloskey said.

In addition to the immediate crisis growing out of the hostilities along the frontiers of the occupied territories U.S. officials are faced with the potential problem that the oil-rich Arab states could try to influence the conflict by carrying out earlier threats to withhold oil or refuse to increase production in step with Western requirements. U.S. officials, however, in response to a question, said they had seen no "mobilization of attitudes toward that kind of decision." They added that "it is a contingency—that has been considered here in Washington, obviously. We hope that nothing like that occurs."

Israeli officials asked whether Kissinger had raised the energy question in talks with them said that no American official had brought up the oil problem. In the past the Israelis have stated that the energy question would exist even if there were no Arab-Israeli problem.

Also contributing to this report was Washington Post Staff Writer Spencer Rich.

Kissinger Sees Threat to Detente if Moscow Is Prodded

By Murray Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said last night that the United States must recognize the risks for East-West detente in levying demands upon the Soviet Union to liberalize its own society.

The "intense debate" under way in this country over imposing conditions on Soviet trade with the United States is a major policy issue, as well as "a genuine moral dilemma," said Kissinger.

Asked Kissinger:

"How hard can we press without provoking the Soviet leadership into returning to practices in its foreign policy that increase international tension?"

Kissinger was the opening speaker last night before a four-day national conference on U.S. foreign policy, entitled "Pacem in Terris" (peace in earth), sponsored by The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at the Sheraton-Park Hotel. Demonstrators briefly disrupted this first appearance of Kissinger as Secretary of State before a public audi-

ence of about 3,000 persons, with 500 others watching on television in an adjoining room.

Two men, scattering leaflets headed "Bellum in Terris" (war in earth), and playing battery-powered laughing boxes, shouted that Kissinger represented "the war makers" and his choice as first speaker was "a charade." One of the demonstrators was punched by a member of the audience, and security men pushed the demonstrators out of the hall. Kissinger resumed speaking after a delay of about five minutes, with the audience

overwhelmingly urging him to continue.

Kissinger, in brief references to the present Middle East crisis, treated it as a challenge that would be surmounted by the American-Soviet policy of detente.

"Detente cannot survive irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East," said Kissinger. But he said, "However well we contain this crisis, as we have contained others, we must still ask ourselves what we seek beyond the management of conflict."

Kissinger was facing an audience composed of many intellectual critics, including former academic colleagues. The critics support the majority opposition raised in the Senate and House to granting the Soviet Union most-favored-nation trade benefits without conditions.

The original conditions demanded in Congress were guarantees of emigration rights, especially for Russian Jews. Soviet dissenters, led by physicist Andrei D. Sakharov and author Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, aroused greater sentiment in this country by urging the United States to insist on "democratization" in the Soviet Union as the price for detente.

Kissinger's speech in defense of administration policy for granting the trade benefits to the Soviet Union was followed by an address by Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.).

While Fulbright joined Kissinger in defending the Nixon administration's resistance to attempts to impose conditions on Soviet trade, the senator challenged what he called "the power politics approach" of existing policy.

"The need for a dialogue about national purposes has never been more urgent," Kissinger agreed. He said, "Let us search for a fresh consensus. Let us restore a spirit of understanding between the legislative and the executive, between the government and the press, between the people and their public servants."

But "the prerequisite for a fruitful national debate," said Kissinger, "is that the policy makers and critics appreciate each other's perspective and respect each other's purposes."

That was the line that touched off the loudest outburst from the demonstrators in the audience. Once order was restored in the room, Kissinger repeated it to a burst of applause.

Kissinger said the policy maker "must strike a balance between what is desirable and what is possible" and "the outsider" and critic must acknowledge the complexity of the choices.

"For half a century," said Kissinger, "we have objected to Communist efforts to alter the domestic structures of other countries. For a generation of Cold War we sought to ease the risks produced by competing ideologies. Are we now to come full circle and insist on domestic compatibility as a condition of progress toward peace?"

Throughout his address Kissinger put questions to the critics: "Are we ready to face the crises and increased defense budgets that a return to Cold War conditions would spawn?"

Is it detente that has prompted repression (inside the Soviet Union) or is it detente that has generated the ferment and the demand for openness which we are now witnessing?

The U.S. government "may underestimate the margin of concessions available to us," Kissinger acknowledged. "But a fair debate," he said, "must admit that they are genuine questions, the answers to which could affect the fate of all of us."

In the struggle between freedom and its enemies, he said, "we are not neu-

tral," and the United States always will use its influence "to promote freedom." But "the attainment of peace is also a profound moral concern," said Kissinger, and "these questions have no easy answers."

It is "misleading," he said, to imply that the term "most favored nation" implies "preferential treatment" for the Soviet Union. Instead, he said, it means permitting "normal economic relations" to resume, by abolishing discriminatory trade restrictions imposed on the Soviet Union in 1951, restoring rights now shared by over 100 other nations.

"This administration has never had any illusions about the Soviet system,"

cannot concur in the appeal of Mr. Sakharov, the Soviet physicist, who says that there can be no detente without democracy, or the novelist Solzhenitsyn, who says that "mankind's sole salvation lies in everyone making everything his business."

"If we wish to apply pressure for democracy and human rights," said Fulbright, "would it not make sense to start with Chile, Brazil or Greece, all of whom are vulnerable to American pressures, none of whom are essential partners for the maintenance of world peace?"

Fulbright said, as did Kissinger, that the Soviet Union already has yielded considerably to U.S. demands on Jewish emigration. To adopt the demands that Sen. Hen-

ry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) is leading in the Senate, said Fulbright, "may not in itself destroy the detente between the Soviet Union and the United States, but it may well derail it."

Sen. Jackson, in a statement last night commenting on both the Kissinger and Fulbright remarks, said, "You can't go on giving things away around the world—as we did with our wheat—and call it a foreign policy."

He said, "Kissinger and Fulbright failed to mention the proposed granting of credits to Russia, but that is what they are seeking—billions of dollars at 6 percent interest. What American can get credit for a house or a car at 6 percent?"

Earth: Little Good Will

By Judith Martin

The cackles of two novelty store laugh-boxes briefly disrupted a speech by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger last night, sounding an eerie note at an evening session of Pacem in Terris, a four-day seminar on peace at the Sheraton Park Hotel.

The crowd of 3,500, gathered to hear Kissinger and Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) talk about peace as war raged in the Middle East, already appeared grim and tense.

When Theodore Glick, 23, —one of the Harrisburg Eight charged in 1971 with conspiracy to kidnap Kissinger but later cleared—and his companion, Christopher Thomas, interrupted Kissinger to shout slogans and hold their laugh-boxes aloft, the tension boiled over into a scuffle.

An unidentified man seated in front of Glick and Thomas jumped to his feet and hit Thomas. The man's wife grabbed his arm and tried to pull him away.

As police hustled the two out and Kissinger stood silent at the podium, a few people screamed "Let them stay" while most shouted, "Out!" The police attempted to make arrests, but this was a peace conference and executive director Peter Tagger refused to press charges.

Livid, Tagger screamed at Glick and Thomas instead and waved a crumpled \$10 bill under their noses demanding that they accept a refund for their admissions. They refused. Thomas had tears in his eyes.

The two protesters were among five young people from the Community for Creative Nonviolence, a Washington group that maintains free food, medical and legal services for the poor. The other three, Edward Guinan, Rachelle Linner and Katheline Thorsby, also used laugh-boxes at the beginning of Kissinger's speech, but their protests brought only nervous laughter from the audience.

Kissinger joked later that the outburst sounded like one of his own staff meetings. Asked how he felt about the fact that there had been no arrests following the disruption of the peace seminar, Kissinger said, "I was very touched by it."

The speech was Kissinger's first since assuming his new post. Last week he hosted a dinner at New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art for

PEOPLE



Photos by Ken Pell—The Washington Post

Christopher Thomas (right) is grabbed as he holds his laugh-box.

Little Peace on Earth

PACEM, From B1

about 450 United Nations diplomats and visiting foreign ministers.

Sitting in a hotel bar after he had been ejected from the session, Glick said the protest was not connected with the Middle East situation, but was directed at Kissinger because he was "an architect of American policy in Indochina and Chile."

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But asked if he meant that he was discouraged about the possibility of there ever being the peace discussed at the conference, he said slowly, "We have to keep trying to bring it about in some way. No, I'm not discouraged about achieving peace in the world."

Asked if he expected to see it in his lifetime, Bunker shook his head sadly. "I'm pretty old," he said. "I'm 79."

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something one always has to struggle for and never give up."

Robert M. Hutchins, chairman of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, sponsor of the conference, was one of those who tried to keep up an optimistic tone. "Hope is congenital with me," he said.

"We just have to be optimistic," said Iranian Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi.

Paul Newman, the actor, didn't want to say anything. He silently shook his head and watched the goings-on. "How can anything come of this," said Tony Antin, a student from Towson State College, who wandered in on a break from taking his Law Aptitude test in another room of the hotel. "Groups of people get together all over the country. Nothing ever comes of it," he said.

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Henry Kissinger delivering his speech.

Murray Marder

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But that is the kind of crisis, at the brink that neither nation is anxious to repeat--nor bet that detente can again survive.

The writer is on the national staff of The Washington Post.

about the war noticeably hardened between Monday and Tuesday, one U.S. source is reported to have exclaimed privately, "So much for detente!"

The U.S. government officially has said nothing remotely resembling such a grim, dire conclusion, nor does it appear likely to do so. It probably would require a complete unraveling of all prospects for containing the new Mideast conflict before the Nixon administration even would conceive of abandoning the high hopes of detente on which its entire foreign policy is based.

Nevertheless, by yesterday it was apparent that an international squeeze play was underway on the premise that detente could be damaged, if not jeopardized, by the repercussions of Mideast warfare.

The Nixon administration let it be known, selectively, Wednesday morning, that it was very disturbed that the Soviet government was encouraging Arab nations to supply support for Egypt and Syria. The Pentagon next sounded open warnings, without attribution to named officials, of serious U.S. concern about the magnitude of the airlifting of Soviet supplies to the warring Arab nations.

In language that was more guarded, diplomatically, but at least equally pointed, State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey, who is a veteran in calibrated phrasing, expressed an official warning: "If this (the report out of the Pentagon) turns out to be a massive airlift, it would tend to put a new face on the situation. But I am not in position to confirm that any of this is taking place at this time."

That formulation coupled a serious admonition with a major qualification--whether a massive airlift of Soviet military supplies into Egypt and Syria is indeed underway.

A Heavy Challenge to Detente

For the United States, the most sobering revelation to come out of the fourth Arab-Israeli war is that detente—the President's "structure for peace," or at least that part of it which rests upon a Soviet-American detente—may not be nearly as sturdy as its American builders proclaimed it to be. When the war broke out last weekend, the immediate tendency was to take comfort in the fact that neither Moscow nor Washington was involved militarily, and that no unduly harsh Soviet-American political crisis threatened. But as Murrey Marder writes elsewhere on this page today, this is no longer the case.

This is the emerging record:

- The Russians unquestionably knew Egypt and Syria were about to attack yet they did not inform the United States as they are obligated to do under the Basic Principles of Relations which were signed in Moscow in 1972 and reaffirmed in Washington last June.

- The third "Principle" affirms the special Soviet-American responsibility "to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tension." Faced with a choice between honoring this fundamental commitment and letting its clients start a war, Moscow chose war. It violated its solemn obligation to the United States and it did so in a context where the result was immediate, violent and tragic.

- Since the war opened, moreover, Moscow has begun a military supply airlift to Syria, if not also to Egypt, and publicly urged other Arab states to give the combatants the "greatest possible support." These actions run directly counter to the specific promise of General Secretary Brezhnev to work for international order and, indeed, counter to the general promise of detente.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said last Monday, "We will react if relaxation of tensions is used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots." He went on to say that "the Soviet Union cannot disregard (these principles) in any area of the world without imperiling its entire relationship with the United States. Detente cannot survive irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East." These statements suggest the administration fully understands the heavy challenge to a relaxation of tension which has been posed by the Kremlin's Mideast policy. For it cannot be easy for

a President who is otherwise weakened by a multiplicity of domestic troubles, and has made detente the centerpiece of his presidency, to admit the possibility that that policy may be deeply flawed.

Just how flawed, no one can possibly say. The particular situation is fluid; no final judgment can or need be made right now. It is evident, though, that Soviet policy as currently perceived has transformed the Mideast war from a fierce but essentially local conflict into yet another exercise in great-power rivalry. The war is proceeding not just because Egypt and Syria decided to attack but because the Soviet Union decided to seek a passing advantage with its Arab clients rather than pursue an abiding relationship with its ostensible partner in detente. This ensures that the outcome of the war will affect not only the Mideast but the Soviet-American scene. Mr. Nixon, ever sensitive to the interaction between the local conflicts and great-power relations, will surely perceive this to be so.

One early test of his attitude may well be whether or how he matches the Soviet gesture of immediate military resupply of its Arab allies. We believe the President should consider carefully some response, perhaps in the form of an offsetting offer to resupply Israel if the need arises, by way of informing all parties that this country is not indifferent to the incendiary and provocative performance of the Soviets in the current Mideast conflict. Detente cannot work if Moscow is permitted to believe that it can encourage war-making by the Arabs while piously giving lip service to its interest in building a durable peace in the world. An even more difficult situation for Mr. Nixon could arise if Moscow, to save Egypt or Syria from Israeli counterattack, suddenly demanded an in-place cease-fire. Such a demand, if accepted, could leave Israel—and the United States—in a greatly reduced bargaining position in any effort of negotiation which may follow a cease-fire.

Not just for the administration but for all of us, it is cruel to imagine that the hopeful prospect of Soviet-American relations could dissolve as the result of Soviet policy in this crisis. But the stakes cannot be ignored. One can only hope that the crisis in regional and great-power relations will devolve in such a way as to minimize the damage to detente done so far.